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“The genie is out of the bottle. The provocation of a “USV privateer war” on trade routes threatens to collapse global maritime trade.”
By Rotislav Ishchenko at ukraine.ru.
(machine translation)
The oil tanker Virat has been attacked twice by unmanned boats near the Bosphorus Strait. On one occasion, the ship Kairos was also set on fire. Western media outlets have claimed that the tanker belongs to Russia’s “shadow fleet.” This expands the list of potential suspects. Naturally, Ukraine, which has been waging a long-standing war against the Russian military fleet using unmanned combatants, is at the top of the list. However, it is unlikely that Kiev would have dared to attack merchant ships, especially near one of the world’s most important transportation hubs connecting the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, which is controlled by Turkey, without the direct approval of its Western allies. The consequences, both direct and indirect, would have been far-reaching, affecting the entire world. Ukraine may no longer exist, but the unmanned surface vehicle’s (USV) attack on merchant ships could echo for decades, shaping the maritime trade landscape.
So it doesn’t matter whether these USVs belonged to Ukraine or whether the British and Americans decided to use their own or those belonging to a third country. The genie is out of the bottle. And not only because this game can be played by two people.
In this case, Britain is unlikely to hope to remain outside the scope of retaliatory actions. It is clear that it is more difficult to use USV to disrupt shipping in the open ocean than in enclosed waters such as the Black, Baltic, Mediterranean, White, Red, Yellow, and Japanese Seas, as well as all Chinese coastal seas. However, the ports of the United Kingdom are within direct reach of USV strikes from the continent and/or from ships and vessels passing through the English Channel. The situation for shipping may be even more dangerous in the classic pirate stronghold of the Caribbean Sea, which borders dozens of countries, many of which are home to both drug cartels and ideological guerrillas.
The threat to American southern ports in the Atlantic is clear.
At the same time, although USVs are more complex than the simplest air drones, they do not require high-tech enterprises for their creation. The problem of guidance, especially at shorter distances, is also solvable. This means that it is not always possible to determine the nationality of a USV that has not exploded, especially if the manufacturer deliberately conceals it.
Almost all strategic global maritime trade routes, no matter how far they extend into the open ocean, eventually pass through bottlenecks like the Bosphorus. Moreover, almost all of these bottlenecks are within the reach of the USV from the coasts of dozens of countries and/or hundreds of ships passing by simultaneously. Only the Northern Sea Route is relatively protected by national means. The rest can be blocked.
The provocation of a “USV privateer war” on trade routes threatens to collapse global maritime trade. This does not require sinking all ships. It is enough to make the threat significant enough to increase insurance premiums, crew salaries, and security costs, as well as delivery times. As a result, significant volumes will be excluded from global trade due to their unprofitability. Additionally, USV can be produced in large quantities (or purchased) and used by dozens of countries against each other. As we know, the greater the demand, the cheaper and easier to use the technology becomes. The first AK-47s were secret and carried in tarpaulin cases, but now the entire world, including the poorest tribes, is using them, and only the lazy ones are not producing them. Finally, the Ukrainian military crisis, as well as the wars between the Houthis and the Saudis and Israel, have demonstrated how easy it is to use high-tech weapons against a third country under the guise of a proxy ally. If Ukraine can launch American and European missiles, which require satellite guidance, at targets deep within Russia, and the Houthis can use hypersonic weapons to attack their enemies, what is stopping Somali pirates or Colombian drug lords from developing similar technologies for the USV?
I want to emphasize that the problem is not that a tanker that could theoretically belong to Russia’s “shadow fleet” was attacked. Russia is primarily a land-based power, and its main trade routes are located within the Eurasian continent and are well-protected. The main targets of the “USV privateer war” may include China, Taiwan, Japan, both Koreas, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar, Taiwan, India, the Gulf oil monarchies, Iran, Singapore, Turkey, Indonesia, and countries in the Caribbean, Mediterranean, North Sea, and Baltic regions.
These are either trade competitors of the United States and the United Kingdom, or allies of the United States who are in a leading geopolitical position and are used as a springboard for military and political pressure on the United States’ trade and economic competitors.
In recent years, the West has been losing not only the financial and economic struggle, but also the struggle for control of global trade. The dollar and the euro are losing their positions as the main and auxiliary global currencies and currencies for trade settlements. The yuan, rather than the ruble or the rupee, is actively replacing them. The traditional trade between the West and countries in the Gulf, Latin America, and Southeast Asia is gradually shifting to China. China is also actively expanding its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, moving through the Greater Middle East.
In all of China’s advancements, maritime trade routes are of utmost importance.
The land-based trans-Eurasian trade routes that connect the continent into a unified economic Greater Eurasia serve as the foundation, but it is the control over maritime trade routes that allows China to build a “fairy-tale castle” of global profitable trade. It is no coincidence that China is building a navy that surpasses the United States in terms of the number of ships and is poised to surpass it in terms of overall combat power. China needs to control the routes that facilitate the sale of its goods. Russia can exist as an autarky, but China will quickly explode from within if its trade is blocked.
During the Ukrainian military crisis, Western UAVs, which were limited in their use in Ukraine, proved to be highly effective in controlling the water area dominated by the enemy’s navy and aviation, as well as in blocking ports and posing a constant threat to military bases. Russian sailors gradually learned to combat the UAV threat, but they were unable to completely eliminate it.
It should be noted that the military fleet, which exercises dominance in a closed water area, has impressive capabilities for combating enemy USVs. However, as mentioned earlier, the threat of USVs in the Black Sea has not been completely eliminated. For the military, repelling attacks is a natural activity. The merchant fleet, on the other hand, is not equipped to handle this task. Any measures taken to enhance the security of commercial ports and the surrounding water area will immediately impact the speed and cost of shipping goods, while the threat of USVs remains high.
The West is not just not afraid of playing a “double game” in the “USV privateer war.” It is provoking this war, deliberately seeking to paralyze global maritime trade.
We can say that this will hit the West itself. It will hit it, but not as hard as we would like. As mentioned above, the West has already lost its trade supremacy to China, and it will only continue to lose ground. However, the rules of geopolitical warfare require us to try to destroy the mechanism that benefits our geopolitical adversary rather than ourselves. During the two World Wars, when maritime trade was an Anglo-Saxon monopoly, Germany attempted to wage war against it using its submarine fleet. The West is now trying to strike a blow to global maritime trade, which is gradually being taken over by China.
We have repeatedly said that the paralysis of Chinese trade will inevitably plunge Beijing into a financial, economic, and then a social and political crisis. The Anglo-Americans have failed to isolate China through legal means, so why not try proxy piracy, since they are already waging a proxy war on land against Russia.
It is clear that we should not expect hundreds of USV attacks on sea routes tomorrow. However, we should not expect them to take decades to organize. As the development of UAV technology during the Ukrainian military crisis has shown, it is possible to transition from isolated attacks to large-scale use in a matter of months (or even a couple of years), which can change the entire dynamics of the conflict and require the development of appropriate countermeasures, which may not always be as quick as desired.
The fact that the incidents involving attacks on merchant ships by the USV occurred in the area of the Bosphorus, a trade route controlled by a NATO country, indicates that the organizers of this provocation are preparing for a global undeclared war on trade routes (similar to the war between English pirates and Spanish transatlantic trade in the 16th to 18th centuries), and they do not intend to tolerate the transfer of control over these routes to their geopolitical opponents. Given that the United States is developing an icebreaker fleet and actively expanding its presence in the Arctic, we should also consider strengthening the security of the Northern Sea Route.
Colombia is being internally attacked as part of the Venezuela threat. A commentator asked for reading material on Colombia a while ago, and I said at the time it is difficult as Colombia is divided. Now the results of that is becoming clear. The hegemon wants its backyard back. This is detailed and perhaps difficult to understand.
If you don’t get it, get the final sentence.
And if the institutions won’t listen?
Then it’s time to build new ones.
The leftist coalition sabotage unfolds as Colombia’s National Electoral Council obstructs the Pacto Histórico while courts overturn convictions of far-right leaders tied to paramilitarism.
Colombia’s leftist coalition sabotage intensifies as the CNE blocks the Pacto Histórico and courts free Uribe — exposing deep judicial bias and electoral manipulation.
Related: Bolivia Backs Colombian President Petro After Trump Sanctions
On Sunday, October 26, 2025, Colombia held a pivotal primary consultation intended to unify the country’s fragmented left under a single presidential banner. But what should have been a moment of democratic consolidation turned into another chapter in a deepening political crisis — one marked by institutional obstruction, judicial reversals, and growing fears that the nation’s progressive movement is being systematically dismantled from within.
At the heart of the turmoil lies the Historic Pact (Pacto Histórico), the coalition led by President Gustavo Petro, which sought to formalize its internal unity ahead of broader elections in March 2026. However, decisions by the National Electoral Council (CNE) have thrown the process into legal limbo, effectively blocking the coalition from registering as a unified political party — a move that could disqualify its winner from participating in the upcoming Broad Front (Frente Amplio) primary.
“This isn’t just bureaucracy — it’s sabotage,” said Senator Iván Cepeda, one of the leading candidates in the consultation. “There must be total clarity: we’re participating under the guarantee that we’ll go to March.”
National Electoral Council of Colombia – Official Resolutions
For months, progressive forces in Colombia have faced relentless pressure from multiple fronts. The U.S. revoked President Petro’s visa earlier this year, a rare diplomatic rebuke widely interpreted as political retaliation. At the same time, conservative sectors have weaponized the judiciary and electoral institutions to weaken the left’s momentum.
The latest blow came from the CNE, which refused to recognize the Historic Pact as a single party despite formal merger requests from key organizations: the Polo Democrático, Partido Comunista Colombiano, Unión Patriótica, Minga Indígena Social y Popular, and Progresistas, a breakaway faction led by Senator María José Pizarro.
The CNE excluded Colombia Humana for allegedly lacking quorum, Progresistas for lacking legal status, and offered no explanation for rejecting Minga Indígena.
This ruling transformed the October 26 consultation into an “inter-party” rather than “intra-party” process — a distinction with major consequences. Only parties with full legal recognition can feed candidates into larger coalitions like the Broad Front.
“They’ve killed the Historic Pact consultation,” declared Daniel Quintero, former mayor of Medellín and a contender in the vote, who subsequently withdrew from the race. “It’s clear the right wants to prevent us from uniting next year. I won’t fall into that trap.”
Former Health Minister Carolina Corcho, another candidate, vowed to continue: “We remain firm in our participation in the October 26 consultation.”
But without legal backing, her campaign — and those of others — faces an uncertain future.
Truth Commission Report – Victims of Paramilitarism in Colombia
The CNE’s controversial decision was spearheaded by Álvaro Hernán Prada, its president and a member of the Centro Democrático, the far-right party founded by former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez.
Prada is currently under investigation for alleged witness tampering and judicial intimidation against Justice Minister Eduardo Montealegre — allegations that fuel widespread doubts about his impartiality.
His leadership at the helm of Colombia’s top electoral body has raised alarms among civil society groups. The Electoral Observation Mission (MOE) has long warned that the CNE suffers from partisan quotas, compromising its independence and transparency.
“The system is designed to favor traditional parties,” said MOE spokesperson Ana María Ospina. “When judges are appointed based on political loyalty, not merit, democracy becomes a rigged game.”
Seven of the nine CNE magistrates supported the decision — most affiliated with opposition or traditional parties, including Liberal, Conservative, Green Alliance, and Centro Democrático members.
MOE – Mission for Electoral Observation in Colombia
While the CNE blocked leftist unity, Colombia’s judiciary delivered another shock: the full acquittal of Álvaro Uribe on charges of bribery, procedural fraud, and witness intimidation.
Uribe, sentenced in August 2025 to 12 years of house arrest for attempting to discredit Senator Iván Cepeda, walked free after the Bogotá Superior Tribunal overturned the conviction.
President Petro denounced the ruling as a green light for impunity:
“This grants protection to politicians who rose to power allied with narcotrafficking and unleashed genocide in Colombia.”
The case dates back to 2012, when Uribe accused Cepeda of offering benefits to witnesses in exchange for testimony linking him and his family to paramilitary networks.
Instead, evidence emerged that Uribe himself helped create and finance the Bloque Metro, a paramilitary faction of the AUC (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia), from his family estate, Hacienda Guacharacas in Antioquia.
Juan Guillermo Monsalve, a former paramilitary serving over 40 years, testified that the Uribes were directly involved.
In May 2024, prosecutors formally charged Uribe, arguing he orchestrated a scheme to manipulate justice by forcing retractions from key witnesses.
Yet in October 2025, three judges reversed the conviction without addressing the core evidence. The ruling emboldens Centro Democrático to reposition Uribe as a Senate candidate in 2026.
“Álvaro Uribe will be number 25 on our list,” declared party president Gabriel Vallejo.
Central to understanding Uribe’s rise is the Convivir system — rural security cooperatives created during the presidency of César Gaviria and aggressively expanded by Uribe during his tenure as governor of Antioquia (1995–1997).
Though presented as civilian auxiliaries to the military, many Convivir groups became recruitment fronts for paramilitaries.
To establish a Convivir, three approvals were needed:
Uribe signed personhood documents for numerous groups led by known paramilitary commanders. He later defended the system before the Constitutional Court, ignoring links to massacres like Mapiripán (1997) and Tocaima (1997).
Under his leadership, Antioquia saw 69 Convivir groups — part of a national network exceeding 600.
According to Colombia’s Truth Commission, between 1995 and 2004 — the peak of Uribe’s influence — 45% of all conflict-related victims were recorded, with paramilitary groups responsible for 205,028 deaths and 63,029 forced disappearances.
Antioquia, Uribe’s home department, suffered the highest toll: 125,980 victims.
Even as Colombian courts absolve him, Uribe enjoys growing honors abroad — particularly in Miami-Dade County, Florida, where pro-Uribista groups have successfully lobbied local officials to name streets in his honor.
In August 2025, Commissioner Roberto González announced a new “Avenida Colombia” tribute to Uribe — coinciding with his judicial release.
This follows earlier tributes: in 2020, a stretch of SW 117th Avenue was renamed “Álvaro Uribe Way”, and in 2021, “President Álvaro Uribe Way” was inaugurated in Hialeah, with Uribe attending via video call.
These gestures normalize a figure implicated in mass atrocities — and reveal transnational support networks for Colombia’s far-right.
In response to the CNE’s restrictions, the Communist Party and Unión Patriótica formally withdrew their legal status from the CNE, Registraduría, and Procuraduría — a tactical retreat to preserve autonomy and avoid future sanctions.
Gabriel Becerra, head of Unión Patriótica, said the move ensures the Pacto Histórico can still participate in the Frente Amplio primary.
Jaime Caicedo of the Communist Party stressed this is not a break, but a protective measure.
As a result, the Polo Democrático Alternativo will now hold the consultation alone, determining its own representative — not a unified leftist standard-bearer.
Faced with institutional siege, President Petro has shifted from reform to revolution. He called on the people to enter “constituent mode” and collect 2.5 million signatures to convene a National Constituent Assembly.
“If they block every path within the system, we must change the system itself,” Petro declared.
The proposed assembly would draft a new constitution incorporating long-demanded social reforms: land redistribution, environmental protection, healthcare expansion, and demilitarization.
Petro confirmed he intends to run in elections for the constituent body — positioning himself as both president and revolutionary.
He predicted that progressive forces will triumph in the 2026 presidential and legislative elections, despite current setbacks.
Colombia’s crisis is not isolated. Across Latin America, right-wing sectors — often backed by U.S. interests — use judicial coups (lawfare), media smears, and electoral manipulation to weaken or remove leftist leaders.
From Brazil to Mexico, Ecuador to Honduras, the playbook is the same: criminalize dissent, control institutions, and delegitimize reformist agendas.
What happened to Lula, Dilma, Bachelet, and Morales is now unfolding in Colombia.
The international community must recognize what is happening: a soft coup disguised as legality.
October 26, 2025, may go down as the day Colombia’s left was tested like never before.
Blocked by courts, sabotaged by electoral councils, and mocked by foreign tributes to a disgraced ex-president, the movement faces unprecedented challenges.
But it also has something powerful: a base of millions who voted for peace, justice, and dignity in 2022.
They know the stakes. They have seen the graves. They carry the trauma.
And still, they march.
Because in the end, no court ruling, no electoral trick, no street named in Miami can erase the people’s will.
And if the institutions won’t listen?
Then it’s time to build new ones.
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