Connexion
The ataman (head) of the “All-Russian Cossack Society,” Nikolai Doluda, addressed a meeting of the Atamans’ Council, in Krasnodar Krai, on February 4, and instructed those gathered that “the time has come when the Cossacks are once again becoming a stronghold and reliable shield of Russia, a guarantor of unity and protection of its national interests” (Vsko.ru, February 4). The words take on a more ominous tone when considered against the background of the current security crisis around Ukraine. Namely, Russia has been massing increasingly large numbers of troops and heavy weaponry along the border with Ukraine for months (see EDM, January 26, 27, February 3, 8). Moreover, Doluda’s remarks were pointedly uttered in Krasnodar, a region close to Ukraine (whose Cossack population was, in fact, originally relocated from Ukraine). And finally, Cossacks from Krasnodar were employed by the Kremlin to help seize Crimea back in 2014, and their role in the annexation operation is openly celebrated by Russian Cossack authorities (Vsko.ru, accessed February 10). Considering Russia’s heavy reliance on “hybrid war” tactics, it is thus likely that the “official” (state-supported) Cossack movement will again be used in whatever plans Moscow has in store for its southwestern neighbor (see EDM, January 31).
Doluda’s speech last week in Krasnodar continued with the boast that “Russian Cossacks have shown themselves as a strong military community, capable of defending the borders of Russia, strengthening the state from within, and coming to the aid of people during disasters. Cossacks today participate in the protection of state borders and public order, emergency response and environmental protection measures. In Cossack classes and schools, in Cossack cadet corps and universities, a new generation of young citizens is being prepared, for whom patriotism and love for the Fatherland are in their blood. I will do everything to ensure that the Cossacks become powerful, strong, and necessary for our country” (Vsko.ru, February 4).
A government-organized non-governmental organization (GONGO), Russia’s contemporary state-backed Cossack movement plays the role of a vanguard of popular nationalism. Some of its members’ activities include patrolling the streets of Russian cities and creating “Cossack cadets corps” or youth camps similar to the Young Pioneers of the Communist era. However, up until the annexation of Crimea, the formal role of Cossacks in Russian defense policy was not overt. But now, the formalization of their role in the military seems to have reached a new phase: in particular, Doluda’s speech references plans to create a reserve army amongst the Krasnodar Cossacks—a continuation of the long process of integrating Cossack volunteers into the Russian Armed Forces (EDM, July 16 2021).
Three days after Doluda’s remarks, The All-Russian Cossack Society head arrived at the Russian General Staff, and the two sides signed a document describing the specific procedures for the interaction of registered Cossacks with the leadership of military districts and the commissariats of Russian Federal subjects. Doluda himself also signed a contract to become the first Cossack initiate to the Armed Forces reserve under this new system (Vsko.ru, February 7). The binding of the 69-year-old Doluda to the mobilization reserve is symbolic, but it also means that he will undertake two key tasks.
First, he will organize the interaction of military Cossack societies (voiska) with the commanders of the troops of military districts and with the Northern Fleet “to attract members of societies as candidates in the mobilized human reserve of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.” Second, his office will keep records of Cossacks in the reserve and “carry out activities related to the preparation and commission of conscription and sending members of Cossack voiska to military service.” Such agreements between the registered Cossacks and the Russian state will take their service “to a new level” (Vsko.ru, February 7).
Granted, there is sufficient overlap between the work of the Cossack voiska and the Russian state, and so such developments leave some room for ambiguity as to the purpose of those agreements. However, given the simmering situation in eastern Ukraine (see EDM, January 31) as well as the positioning of Russian combat forces around the theater, Doluda’s speech and subsequent agreement with the General Staff hint at more extensive military planning involving the Cossacks going on under the surface.
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Over the last several years, Ukraine’s leaders have expressed grave concern over the dangers posed to regional energy security by Russia’s Nord Stream Two natural gas pipeline. From Germany and, more broadly, from Europe, the answer we received was: “Do not worry, we will not let it become a problem, either for you or for Europe.” Yet today, with energy prices at record highs, it is increasingly clear that promises are easy to make but harder to deliver. Even more so when Russia is involved.
It is now November 2021, and Ukraine’s warnings about Nord Stream Two were not heard. The pipeline, whose main purpose is to make Europe more dependent on Russia, was built—on Europe’s dime but under Russian Gazprom’s ownership and control. Nord Stream Two has yet to be certified, but it is already causing substantial problems.
Because of the pipeline, the European Union is divided and Russia is all the more convinced that the EU is weak and corruptible. Moscow lobbyists around the world pontificate that, with energy demand as well as prices soaring, the West’s “green delusion” is finally over, and the world is back to an era of rule by nations that have what really counts: oil, gas and coal.
For quite a while, Moscow has pursued a three-fold strategy: fool Europe, corrupt Europe, seduce Europe. The Nord Stream Two saga included all three elements. It fooled Europe by promising an unnecessary pipeline that was rooted in geopolitical expediency. It corrupted Europe, by hiring its former leaders to lucrative advisory contracts and allowing Europe to finance what it promised would eventually be a cash cow. With the pipeline certification under consideration, Russia is now in the seduction phase, promising that once Nord Stream Two is certified, gas supply problems, will go away. Of course, that is like saying that one more bottle of vodka will make alcoholism go away.
The West should remain sober though. Here are five basic facts about the Nord Stream Two pipeline.
First, it will not bring more natural gas to Europe, but it will undoubtedly allocate Gazprom even more leverage than it already has.
Second, it will take decades for the pipeline to pay off economically. Yet this does not matter—the project is not about economics but about Russia’s attempted domination over the European energy market.
Third, Nord Stream Two (in its current form) ultimately eliminates Central Asia as a significant European supplier and makes Ukraine (the cheapest, shortest and most efficient gas transit route) reliant on Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Fourth, it undermines Europe’s “green deal” by spiking market prices, making the long-term transition to renewables even more expensive.
Fifth, it is a way to force Europe to pay for a pipeline that punishes Ukraine while simultaneously obliging Europe to compensate Ukraine for the punishment.
If certified, the project would have long repercussions for Europe—not only because of its dubious moral nature but primarily because of its geopolitical miscalculations. Europe is about to get in bed with someone who clearly believes the EU is on its way out. Should this someone really be trusted?
So, what is to be done here? Three things.
First, do not rush to anything. Take a deep breath and count to ten.
Second, start listening to what Russian propaganda says behind your back, not to your face: Energy prices are soaring; the Western economies are collapsing; the EU is drifting away from the US and towards Russia. This is the picture of the world the Kremlin propaganda mills have been selling to Russians for quite a while.
Third, if you do not want to be on a short leash, then either do not certify Nord Stream Two, or certify it on your own terms—not Russia’s. The latter means the full application of EU energy rules, including requiring the unbundling of gas production from gas transit, as well as moving the gas entry points of Ukrainian pipelines from the Ukraine-EU to the Ukraine-Russia border (Ukrainians have been urging this for years).
Do not make the mistake of handing an essential part of Europe’s future to a country that is demonstratively not the EU’s friend. Time will not be kind to such decision or to those who made it.
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On July 28, Ukrainian Orthodox Christians celebrated the 1,033rd anniversary of the Baptism of Kyivan Rus—a remarkable annual event for Ukrainian history and another reason for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s political speculations. After the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, Bartholomew I, signed the Ukrainian Orthodox Church tomos in 2019, granting it autocephaly—independence from the Russian Orthodox Church (see EDM, July 26, 2018; RFE, January 23, 2020)—experts warned that Moscow would double its efforts to weaponize religious issues as an element of its “hybrid war” against Ukraine (Warsawinstitute.org, January 31, 2019).
In his recent article “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” (Kremlin.ru, July 12), Putin appeals to “Orthodox Christianity unity” in nearly every paragraph, with a special emphasis on Kyivan Prince Vladimir the Great’s adoption of the Christian faith in 988 as a symbol of kinship. Moreover, the fact of the Kyivan Rus’ ruler being baptized in Chersonesus (today, Sevastopol, Crimea) has been used by Putin as a justification for the occupation of Crimea, namely “to unify the sacred lands of the Slavic nations’ cradle—Kyivan Rus” (Parlamentskaya Gazeta, July 27, 2018). Yet not only is the association of the terms “Rus” and “Russia” historically erroneous (Fakeoff.org, February 18, 2015; RFE, April 12, 2020), but the fact of Russia’s adoption of Kyivan Rus Baptism Day in 2010—only two years after Ukrainian erstwhile president Viktor Yushchenko’s 2008 decree establishing the holiday—raises questions about Russia’s actual intentions (Rada.gov.ua, July 25, 2008; Kremlin.ru, June 1, 2010).
According to the most recent Razumkov Analytical Center poll, 34 percent of Ukrainians identify themselves with the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP), with only 13.8 percent of respondents leaning toward the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP). In turn, 27.6 percent of Ukrainians consider themselves Orthodox but not belonging to any specific church, 9.3 percent say they are Christian but not Orthodox, 8.8 percent do not affiliate with any religion at all, 5.6 percent claim to be atheists, and 0.6 percent lean toward other religions—the predominant views among youth who despise the interfaith conflicts inside the country (Razumkov.org.ua, February 3, 2020).
Therefore, the effectiveness of religion as the Kremlin’s hybrid war weapon against Ukraine, especially over the last several years, is questionable. Membership in the Moscow-affiliated Orthodox Church has been persistently dropping among Ukrainian society since the start of the war with Russia. The UOC-MP has been repeatedly rebuked and criticized for not officially condemning (and instead even supporting) Russia’s occupation of Crimea and eastern Ukrainian regions (see EDM, July 26, 2018). Since the beginning of Russia’s military intervention in 2014, pro-Moscow priests have been caught leading Russian ideological campaigns such as the notorious “The Gift of the Magi” (“Dary volkhvov”) operation. In February of 2014, the Gift of the Magi, a holy Orthodox golden adornment that was supposed to be transferred from Greece to Kyiv, ended up in Crimea under the guard of Igor Girkin—a separatist leader later responsible for the catastrophic shootdown of Flight MH-17 over Donbas (The Interpreter, July 27, 2014). The so-called “priests” subsequently gathered crowds of Crimean citizens to “observe the holy piece,” during which time the public was openly encouraged to pray for Crimea’s integration into Russia amid uncertainty caused by the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine (RFE, February 27). Large numbers of Ukrainians have also been repelled by mandatory prayers within UOC-MP parishes for church leader Patriarch Kirill of Moscow—a close ally of Putin—as well as numerous incidents of local UOC-MP clerics refusing to conduct funeral services for Ukrainian soldiers killed on the front lines (Religion.in.ua, August 4, 2014).
The Kremlin’s religious propaganda is not limited to internal affairs, however. After Patriarch Kirill’s letter to Pope Francis, United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron complaining of the “Moscow-backed Church’s oppression by the Ukrainian government” (Mospat.ru, December 14, 2018), a wave of Russian Orthodox religious leaders added to this onslaught of disinformation. Thus, pro-Russian Bishop Gedeon complained to the US Department of State about his deportation from Ukraine and alleged abuses leveled against the UOC-MP by Kyiv (Spzh.news, February 16, 2019). This was followed by another bishop, Viktor Kotsaba, composing a letter with similar charges addressed to the European Parliament (Risu.ua, February 28, 2020). None of these appeals were taken into consideration by the West—another failure of Russia’s “religious” policy.
Of course, all such complaints to the West about purported attacks on the Russian Church in Ukraine disregard or draw attention away from actual abuses occurring inside Russia. Indeed, just a year before Patriarch Kirill addressed the Normandy Format representatives about what he claimed were infringements of human rights in Ukraine (Patriarchia.ru, May 17, 2017), he had explicitly referred to the concept of human rights as a “global heresy” (Interfax, March 20, 2016). And later, he openly demonized the LGBTQ+ communities in both Ukraine (Dumskaya.net, August 20, 2019) and Georgia, mainly amid recent violent protests in the latter (Kommersant, July 8, 2021). Moreover, while promoting Russia as a supposed luminary of Orthodox Christianity and a holy savior around the world, Moscow ignores the persecutions of other religious groups in its “multiculturally friendly” state (Hrw.org, January 9, 2020; Crisisgroup.org, May 12, 2021), including the intimidation of Crimean Tatar Muslims in occupied Crimea (State.gov, May 12).
Because the Moscow Patriarchate has lost significant support among progressive Ukrainian citizens, Putin’s continuing line of “religious” attack is now arguably targeted toward only two main groups: the country’s remaining UOC-MP parishioners, such as those who gathered on Tuesday in the Ukrainian capital (despite COVID-19 restrictions) for a Kyivan Rus Baptism Day procession (Hromadske.ua, July 27), as well as Russian devotees willing to fight a “holy war” in Donbas (BBC, December 18, 2014). While the UOC-MP’s influence has continued to decline sharply since 2014, mainly due to the Church’s obsolete practices and notorious examples of disrespect for Ukraine’s modern aspirations, the danger of Russian “religiously” minded militants remains. Therefore, Ukrainian officials will need to be on guard for possible outbreaks of new clashes in the occupied territories and the rest of the country that coincide with the upcoming visit of Bartholomew I of Constantinople to Ukraine—another great outrage for the Kremlin (RFE, April 25).
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On May 25, just ahead of the 103rd anniversary of the First Georgian Republic’s (1918–1921) independence, Georgian protesters paralyzed the streets of the capital city of Tbilisi in the largest rally to date against the Namakhvani Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP) project (Civil.ge, May 25, 26). Relatively small demonstrations against the planned dam, by locals organized under the banner “Guardians of the Rioni Valley,” began years ago around the construction site on the Rioni River in western Georgia. These rallies gradually expanded in number and participation, eventually reaching a nation-wide character by January 2021. On May 23, the demonstrations shifted to Tbilisi, where Rioni inhabitants were joined in solidarity by striking workers from other regions of Georgia (Facebook.com/rioniskheobisgadarchenistvis, May 23). These protests stretched on for three consecutive days before a decision was made to return to the Rioni Valley (Agenda.ge, May 26).
Criticism of the Namakhvani HPP project was first raised by inhabitants of the Rioni Gorge, who complained they were not involved in the negotiations of the agreement with the foreign contractor companies. Those grievances were augmented by serious environmental and procedural concerns. On the other side, the Georgian government considers the infrastructure fundamental to bolstering the country’s energy security. Moreover, the authorities claim the associated foreign direct investment will benefit Georgians by creating new jobs and reducing prices for household electricity.
The Namakhvani HPP project envisages the construction, by 2024, of a double-dam facility on the Rioni River in the Racha-Lechkhumi and Western Imereti regions of Georgia. The two dams, measuring 59 and 100 meters in height, respectively, are expected to produce 1.514 gigawatt hours (GWh) of electricity yearly and have a capacity of 433 megawatts (MW). The reservoirs created by the damming will cover 610 hectares surface and will be linked by a 4.4-kilometer-long power tunnel. The southernmost chunk of the facility is around 30 km from Georgia’s third largest city, Kutaisi. The biggest construction project since Georgian independence, the Namakhvani HPP has received $800 million in foreign direct investment from its main contractor, the Turkish company ENKA Renewables, which will hold a 90 percent share in the project; the Norwegian Clean Energy group will hold 10 percent (Enka.com, Cleanenergy.no, accessed June 1).
Georgia’s annual energy consumption of 12.37 terawatt hours (TWh) amounts to a per capita average consumption of 3,300 kilowatt hours (kWh). Georgian citizens spend an average of roughly 660 lari ($200) per year on electricity (Geostat.ge, accessed June 1). Domestic electricity supply relies mainly on hydropower and thermal plants as well as, to a minor extent, wind turbines. Georgian generation capacity fails to meet domestic consumption, however, especially in winter months (Iea.org, accessed June 1). The single most important source of electricity is the critical Enguri complex, partially situated in the occupied region of Abkhazia. A temporary halt in production earlier this year, due to maintenance work, made Georgia’s dependence on the Enguri HPP even clearer (Agenda.ge, January 18).
The Namakhvani procurement comes with a 15-year Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) that entitles the owners to auction the generated electricity yearly on the free market during the May–August period. For the remaining eight months of the year, electricity must be sold directly to the Georgian government. Details of the contract, first publicized in February by a Georgian newspaper, raised criticism over the price of the electricity expected from the hydroelectric plant, the fiscal burden on the Georgian state, environmental and territorial issues, and the ultimate value of Namakhvani as an additional source of electricity (Iset-pi.ge, May 3; Socialjustice.org, March 3). On May 25, the newspaper Mtisambebi obtained and released a document, dated March 30, 2019, in which Georgia’s Ministry of Justice gives a negative assessment of the project (Mtisambebi.ge, May 25).
In contrast, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili, along with his entire cabinet, asserts that the Namakhavani HPP is fundamental to the country’s development because of its prospects of boosting domestic electricity production by 12 percent—especially in light of projected increases in consumption over the next several years (Gov.ge, April 3). Additionally, a higher reliance on domestically generated electricity from renewable sources would reduce Georgia’s dependence on imports from Russia, help the country meet its pledges under the Paris Climate Accord, as well as improve Georgian compliance with European Union accession criteria.
While controversy over the HPP certainly touches on legitimate concerns related to the project’s technical aspects, the Namakhvani dams have, lately, also assumed a political and geopolitical character.
On the political front, the Rioni Valley Movement has been targeted by misleading social media campaigns that exploit the cause to disseminate nationalist and xenophobic content, slander protest leader Varlam Goletiani, and promote political advertisements on news and events sponsored by right-wing, Russia-backed, populist politician Levan Vasadze (Civil.ge, May 19). Moreover, the widely cross-cutting nature of the Namakhvani opposition attracts diverse social groups from opposing political backgrounds. Episodes of violence were reported on May 24 against LGBT groups that joined the rally marches, which also included far-right nationalists. Such incidents further polarize the discourse and dilute the original cause (Facebook.com/equalitymovementgeorgia, May 24).
The Namakhvani issue has additionally been exploited to incite anti-Turkish sentiment, particularly since the main contractor is a Turkish company. In April, Turkey’s ambassador to Georgia, Fatma Ceren Yazgan, addressed the problem by reminding of the importance of ties between the two countries and affirming the benefits of the HPP for Georgian communities (Civil.ge, Apr 16). Good relations between Georgia and Turkey are not only based on economics; they also have a central strategic component in the form of shared transit and energy corridors as well as trilateral defense cooperation with Azerbaijan (see EDM, June 7, 2017). Russian-backed media has long promoted misleading and conspiratorial narratives about alleged Turkish irredentism in the region of Adjara, and insinuated Georgia is giving up its territory to a “Turkish invasion” (see EDM, July 30, 2019).
Currently, with the Georgian government increasing its rhetoric about integrating closer with the Euro-Atlantic community, and the South Caucasus not yet fully pacified following last year’s Karabakh war, the Russia informational offensive targeting Georgia and the wider region has been growing. Not only anti-Western but also anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim rhetoric have all grown louder. Playing on internal political cleavages and exploiting the variegated ethnic, linguistic and religious composition of Georgian society, Russia is backing extremist leaders as well as promoting divisive narratives to split the society and hinder friendly ties with Georgia’s neighbors.
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The Russian Cossack movement is emerging as one of the key social pillars supporting the regime, and increasingly it is taking on the mold of Kuban Cossackdom, found in the southern part of the country. An outline of plans for the further institutionalization of the movement at the administrative levels makes this clear. Officially, the Kremlin has been working on developing relations among Cossacks across the territorial subjects of the Russian Federation (see EDM, January 22), and so the shift to a model resembling that used in the Kuban region is plausible. Namely, in the Kuban’s Krasnodar Krai, in the 1990s and early 2000s, the regional administration co-opted a grassroots movement and made them emblems of the federal subject through such gestures as creating public memorials, facilitating Cossack education, holding weekly parades in the summer, using Cossack troops to punish liberal activists, and letting them patrol the streets of cities in the region. The Krasnodar Cossacks also played an important role in the annexation of Crimea (see EDM, September 30, 2020), providing a kind of gendarme for Russian forces to relieve them of the need to provide public order.
The importance of the Krasnodar movement for the national Cossack archetype is epitomized in the fact that Nikolai Doluda—who had been ataman (head) of the Kuban Cossack force since 2008—was appointed ataman of the all-Russian Cossack host in 2019 (Fedpress.ru, May 1, 2021). Doluda took part in the annexation of Crimea and attended a victory parade in Moscow in 2015. He has since been named vice governor of the Krasnodar region and a member of the Russian public chamber. He also sits on the “Presidential Council for the Rebirth of Cossacks,” inter alia committed to the creation of a central historical Cossack museum, including memorials to those who fell in defense of the fatherland (Kremlin.ru, April 9). The Council also mentions the return of Cossack regalia from outside the country, similar to what was done in Krasnodar.
Doluda has been busy furthering this model of Cossack development, telling journalists that he had traveled to 11 Cossack hosts throughout Russia and found uneven levels of development for the nurturing of patriotism. To counter this, the Russian government has created 35 indicators that atamans of Cossack societies and representatives of government bodies should consult in this endeavor—thus, de facto bestowing on government plenipotentiaries an administrative role over the Cossacks. Indeed, Doluda said, “for the even development of 12 registered Cossack troops, it is necessary to develop a single standard for organizing work in all areas of activity. To this end, Kuban Cossacks held an educational and methodological seminar on May 18–20, during which the host’s representatives shared their experiences with representatives of all military Cossack societies of Russia” (Kazakisibiri.rf, April 26). In education policy, then, the Kuban Cossacks are clearly the model to which every other host should aspire.
The traditional Cossack regions of Russia are located in the south—in the Kuban, Rostov, Volgograd and Stavropol. While Cossacks played an important role in expanding the Russian Empire and were dislocated by Soviet modernization, Siberia never had the same resonance as a locus of Cossack identity. Nevertheless, Doluda chose the base of the Yaik (Ural) Cossacks to make his speech about the importance of Cossack education, saying,
Our meeting is taking place today in new historical realities. Responding to the challenges of the times, the Russian Cossacks are becoming a notable force. The tasks before them are of state importance, connected, first of all, with national security, protection of public order, guarding state borders, environmental protection, and elimination of the consequences of emergencies. For their successful solution, the collective efforts of the branch departments should be involved in the first place on the preparation of the personnel reserve of the Cossack societies… The results of today’s work should be the definition of ways to form a single education standard, a single understanding, what the responsibilities of the future ataman of Cossack society should be, the real leader of the Cossack movement must correspond (Kazakisibiri.rf, April 26).
He continued that today, “the Cossack cadet corps and universities help to solve the most acute problems to date—the deficit of highly educated personnel,” gesturing toward efforts to include Cossack educational components at universities (Kazakisibiri.rf, April 26). This largely replicates patterns seen in the Kuban.
The same appears to hold true for empowering Russian Cossack hosts to punish domestic liberal activists and liberalism in general: the promoted activities increasingly resemble those already employed in Krasnodar. For example, in Tula (120 miles south of Moscow), on January 23, Cossack patrols were “very active”—and used nagaika (traditional Cossack leather horse whips)—in helping the police arrest supporters of opposition leader Alexei Navalny (Sova-center.ru, February 1). In Yekaterinburg, Cossacks were outraged by the sight of a new bar in the city with the provocative name “Gastrobar of Temptations.” Ataman Oleg Senenko rebuked the Ministry of Justice for permitting a business to register such a “demonic” moniker and implied that Molotov cocktails could be thrown at the establishment (Anews.com, September 21, 2020).
When searching for the future shape of Russia’s Cossack movement, then, one would do well to examine Krasnodar.
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On April 21, Vasily Piskarev, the head of the State Duma’s commission to investigate the facts of interference in the internal affairs of Russia, announced that his body was preparing legislative initiatives to combat foreign interference in Russia, including in its elections, by non-profits and non-governmental organizations (NGO). Piskarev said that “insults against Russia” will receive a “worthy response, including at the legislative level” (RIA Novosti, April 21). In President Vladimir Putin’s speech to the joint session of parliament that same day, he warned that those who organized against Russia’s interests would “regret their actions like they have not regretted anything for a long time” (Radio Sputnik, April 21). Taken together, these policies and rhetoric confirm once again spotlight Russia’s attempts to casts itself in the role of victim even when it is the antagonist on the world stage.
It is not for nothing, for example, that Piskarev announced his commission was investigating foreign interference into the 2021 Russian parliamentary elections just days after a report from the United States’ National Intelligence Council proposed sanctions on Russia for interfering in the 2020 presidential election (RBC, March 17; RIA Novosti, March 20). Russian politicians allege their victimhood in cases like this, when the reality of Russian interference in US elections is plain to see. In his statement on Instagram, Piskarev said that elections should be “open, competitive, and in full compliance with Russian electoral legislation” (Instagram, March 20). One would be hard-pressed to find many experts who would call Russian elections over the last 20 years truly open and competitive, but Piskarev paints foreign powers as the threat to free elections rather than internal forces.
At the same time that the government is preparing legislative action against NGOs and non-profits it deems as acting on behalf of foreign governments, it is labeling media outlets as foreign agents, too. Meduza, an independent Russian- and English-language news site, received that label on April 23. The outlet now has to warn readers on every post that they are on the foreign agents list; and the worry is that readers will be wary of Meduza going forward. Even more significantly, advertisers may pull out, and Meduza may fold. “We really don’t know what to do next,” wrote Editor-in-Chief Ivan Kolpakov (Meduza, April 26).
The narrative that is being proposed by the government is clear: foreign forces are attempting to interfere in Russian matters, by means of elections, by means of the press and by means of NGOs, so Russia has to protect itself. This messaging plays well among a citizenry with low trust in institutions, particularly the press. According to a Levada survey from 2018, only 31 percent of Russians completely trusted the press (Levada.ru, October 22, 2018). That same survey, interestingly, found that 58 percent of Russians called Putin “completely trustworthy.” The dynamics at play here allow for Putin and his government to attack other institutions as foreign actors, thereby discrediting them.
Of course, there is a denial of reality occurring here, too. Russia’s interference in foreign elections, be it in the US or in smaller countries like Moldova, is well documented (see EDM, January 31 2019). By proclaiming its commitment to the sovereignty of all countries, Russia is articulating a worldview it has no interest in actually prescribing to. Ultimately, Russia seems defensive on this issue because it feels it needs to be. Russia has learned to speak the language of international order, even as it defies that order in its actions. It is one more example of a mismatch between rhetoric and reality that pervades Russian political life.
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On February 20, Ruslan Ablyakimov was walking in Makhachkala, the capital of Dagestan, with two friends when he was stopped by six young men who proceeded to beat him. “Where did you come here from?” they asked, “You are from Moscow, right? What are you doing here?” Before the men left Ablyakimov, they told him, “You have until tomorrow to get out of here” (Meduza, February 20).
Why did these men choose Ablyakimov to beat up? The answer is straightforward: he was the coordinator of the new Navalny Regional Headquarters in Makhachkala. Following this violent event, Ablyakimov complained that he could not find any space to rent for the headquarters, and he ultimately left Dagestan. He promised that this did not mean the headquarters would not open eventually; but its future is uncertain (Kavkazsky Uzel, February 22).
Authorities in Dagestan have not been friendly to supporters of Russian opposition leader and anti-corruption crusader Alexei Navalny in recent months. In late January, protests erupted across Russia, including, on a small scale, in Makhachkala. On January 21, a lone protester was detained by the police with his sign that read “Freedom for Navalny/Freedom for political prisoners” (Kavkaz Realii, January 21). Two days later, over 40 protesters were arrested, including students, in the center of Makhachkala, a city of about half a million (Kavkaz Realii, January 23).
According to journalist Magomed Magomedov, there are two groups of Navalny supporters in Dagestan. The majority of them support his anti-corruption efforts but do not necessarily share his political views; the rest are those who would like to see Navalny as president (Kavkazsky Uzel, January 21). Neither of these groups are particularly large, and videos of protests in Makhachkala show only a small crowd—tens, not hundreds (Kavkaz Realii, January 23).
These protests, which occurred all across Russia, took on a different meaning in the North Caucasus. Indeed, in Makhachkala, protesters frequently distanced themselves from Navalny and said that their actions were in response to dissatisfaction with the authorities in general (Kavkazsky Uzel, February 1). While protests against corruption in the North Caucasus are not an everyday occurrence, there is precedent. In 2017, a few hundred demonstrators came out to support Navalny’s anti-corruption message (Kavkazsky Uzel, June 12, 2017). Earlier, in October 2011, hundreds protested corruption in Makhachkala itself (see EDM, October 12, 2011).
Still, support and turnout for the Navalny protests in particular was low in the region (Kavkazsky Uzel, January 21). So why were authorities so quick to arrest protesters and reticent to allow these actions in the first place? What threat did they perceive? The answer lies not in Makhachkala, but in Moscow. The authorities in the North Caucasus understood that to allow these rallies to move forward would not align with Moscow’s directives to quash any Navalny-related activity, however small the demonstrations may be (Kavkazsky Uzel, January 21). And in the North Caucasus, alignment with Moscow is often vital for regional elites to maintain their power and privilege. Both economically and administratively, Moscow pulls many strings in the region, by appointing outsider governors like Dagestan’s Sergei Melikov and by ordering financial policy in republics like Ingushetia (see EDM, November 16, 2020). In 2014, subsidies to the North Caucasus Republics were all higher per capita than the average in Russia with the exception of Stavropol Krai (Edward C. Holland, “Economic Development and Subsidies in the North Caucasus,” Problems of Post-Communism, December 2015).
The hard line on even limited protests in Makhachkala suggests that any open displays of discontent in opposition to Moscow’s official stance will not be tolerated in Dagestan. At the same time, this implies that Alexei Navalny is likely not the man to mobilize the masses in the North Caucasus, even though some citizens there are sympathetic to his anti-corruption campaign.
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The foreign and security policy expert communities in Georgia (Neweurope.eu, November 17) as well as both the outgoing and candidate Lithuanian defense ministers (LRT, November 16, 19) have called for a permanent presence of United States military forces in their respective countries. These calls indicate a hope that the incoming administration of President-elect Joseph Biden will bring greater attention to security on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastern flank.
In addition to the results of the US presidential election, this summer’s announcement that thousands of US troops would be moved out of Germany, with some being re-stationed elsewhere, led to a small bidding war for some of those military units. Poland, as the result of signing the Joint Declaration on Defense Cooperation ratified in August, will receive an additional 1,000 US troops to the current 4,500 rotational forces, plus a further 200 soldiers as part of the newly established V Corps Forward Command Center (see EDM, June 29). Moreover, rotational presences will be deployed to other countries along NATO’s eastern and southeastern flanks (Crsreports.congress.gov, August 4). Latvian Defense Minister Artis Pabriks expressed Latvia’s wish—and willingness to pay—for a US troop presence in his country, either on a rotational or permanent basis (Leta.lv, July 11; Lsm.lv, September 9). Pabriks had previously expressed excitement at the prospect of US troops more frequently operating in Latvia if they are stationed in Poland (Lsm.lv, June 26). Estonia, on the other hand, has only emphasized the role US troops play as “a cornerstone of European security” since the troop withdrawal and re-stationing from Germany was announced (ERR, June 18, July 30, November 29). Georgia and Lithuania are just the most recent states trying to capitalize on a potential shift in the US’s defense posture in Europe.
Prospects for a more robust US military presence are much stronger in the case of Lithuania than Georgia. Lithuania, a NATO member, is currently home to a NATO Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) multinational battalion in Rukla, between Kaunas and Vilnius, plus a six-month deployment of 500 US troops, starting this past October (Nato.int, accessed November 27; Reuters, September 25). On the other hand, Georgia, a NATO Partner for Peace since 1994—which was promised eventual membership at the 2008 Bucharest Summit but has yet to even receive a Membership Action Plan (MAP)—only benefits from a training center and troops during exercises, despite 77 percent of Georgians supporting European Union accession and 74 percent supporting NATO accession. Moreover, Georgia has long contributed to NATO’s Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan and Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean (Mod.gov.ge, September 18; Nato.int, March 18, 2019 and October 21, 2020; Ndi.org, May 28, 2019).
Russian aggression is also a contributing factor, and both Georgia and the Baltics have been particularly concerned about their level of security since the 2014 invasion of Ukraine. With the Karabakh peace deal further increasing Russia’s military presence in the South Caucasus, Georgia is wary of more “peacekeepers” arriving to the region. Georgia knows better than most that Russian peacekeepers can eventually transform into invading forces.
In the Baltics, Lithuania holds a special status in terms of strategic importance. Lithuania’s border with Poland forms the so-called Suwałki Corridor, which runs between the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and Belarus. Security expert Jacek Bartosiak, in his interview on The Jamestown Foundation’s first episode of the Eastern Approaches webinar series, highlighted three main security issues for Lithuania and the Suwałki Corridor. First, this 65-kilometer strip of land contains the only two main roads on which NATO forces (other than the Baltic eFPs) could reach the Baltic States from Poland (only one of these roadways is sufficiently developed for troop mobility). Both routes, which go to Vilnius and Kaunas respectively, are vulnerable to rapid projections of military power from Grodno in Belarus and from Kaliningrad. The situation in Belarus has brought about greater Russian military activity, with a more permanent Russian presence potentially on the horizon (see EDM, September 17, October 20, 22). Kaliningrad, which is surrounded by NATO members, has undergone rapid military modernization over the past few years, including the development of a layered Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) system and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities (see EDM, February 23, 2018, December 11, 2018, January 17, 2019, April 1, 2020). Second, the Baltic States have vulnerable eastern and western flanks: the east is sparsely populated with Russian speakers, leaving it more vulnerable to information warfare and slow mobilization, while the west is open to naval and amphibious attacks through the many ports and beaches. Third, the geography of Lithuania is ideal for tank warfare but not for the use of Javelin anti-tank missiles; this issue is compounded by the inadequacy of armored NATO forces as part of the eFP battalions and the positioning of the NATO base at Rukla, which leaves the entire countryside vulnerable in the event of a Russian invasion (see Eastern Approaches, July 17).
The geographic compactness of the Baltics heightens the risk each vulnerability poses. Other than Lithuania and the Suwałki Corridor, Riga, which some consider the center of gravity for Baltic security (see Eastern Approaches, July 17), and the Estonian island of Saaremaa, whose location allows for control of this sector of the Baltic Sea, are the most exposed in the event of invasion (see Eastern Approaches, September 25).
Georgia’s location on the eastern coast of the Black Sea proves the country’s strategic importance twofold. First, Georgia helps limit Russia’s presence on the Black Sea, working in tandem with NATO members Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey and NATO partner Ukraine (see EDM, February 4). The Black Sea is becoming increasingly important due to energy and goods transit, in addition to bordering Russian-occupied Abkhazia and Crimea. Second, Georgia plays a key role in the Caspian–Black Sea transit corridor as the central stop of the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway and the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan and South Caucasus pipelines (see EDM, July 30). As a defense partner, Georgia has consistently stood by the West in Afghanistan, providing 20,000 troops to Resolute Support Mission since 2010, the most of any non-NATO country and more than many Alliance members (Nato.int, February 2020; State.gov, June 16). Georgian troops also participate in the annual Joint Noble and Agile Spirit exercises with the US.
Georgia, Lithuania and the other countries that have asked for a permanent US presence have clearly been motivated to speak up by the controversial decision to move troops out of Germany. And yet even opponents of the new basing decisions admit that Germany is a logistics and command hub, not the frontline (see Jamestown.org, August 18).
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In the first week of August, cellphones across Russia lit up with surprising text messages. They came from different numbers, but each said the same thing in Russian: “The US State Department is offering up to $10 million for information about interference in the US elections. If you have information, contact rfj.tips/bngc.” The State Department confirmed the messages were authentic (TV Rain, August 6). They came from the department’s “Rewards for Justice Program,” which had just expanded from hunting terrorists to tracking election interference.
Russian authorities ridiculed the messages. But their reaction suggested they saw something more sinister. “By offering money to talk about interference in American elections, American intelligence is blatantly interfering in our life,” declared Maria Zakharova, spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “What is this, if not the most real kind of hybrid attack?” (Vedomosti, August 6).
Zakharova’s reference to hybrid warfare suggested that Russian officials were paying as much attention to the medium as to the message. They undoubtedly realized the potential of the United States deciding to reach out to individual Russians so directly. In the future, US messages might not be about American elections, but about Russian foreign policy or internal conditions.
As it readies its policy toward Russia, the incoming Joseph Biden administration will need to decide whether to let Vladimir Putin’s government be its sole interlocutor in Russia, or if it will regularly go beyond the Kremlin to communicate directly to the Russian population.
In recent years, US government agencies have hesitated about messaging campaigns to Russian citizens. Several proposals have been considered but set aside. The reasons for pulling back ranged from a fear that such messaging would be too provocative to a belief it would have little effect given the power of Putin’s internal propaganda. At the same time, online platforms like YouTube and social networks offer access to Russian citizens as never before. “In an age of openness, we’ve stopped trying to communicate with the Russian people,” says Peter Pomerantsev, the British specialist on Russia and the information war. “The opportunities are just there to be seized” (see Jamestown.org, October 23).
Of course, two US government-financed broadcasting networks—Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America—have been speaking to Russian citizens for decades. They have never shied away from talking about internal conditions in Russia or the costs of its foreign adventures. Under the law, however, the broadcasters enjoy editorial independence. They cannot be harnessed to convey specific messages or told to turn up or reduce the heat on an adversary. If the new administration wants to communicate to Russians in a way that is precisely calibrated with its policy goals, it will need to develop its own messaging tools and doctrine.
Many US officials and analysts are wary of anything that looks like a US government “propaganda offensive” to Russia. They ask what such messages would even look like. If they bore the brands of US government agencies, they say, Russians would view them with contempt. If they were unattributed—not revealing where they came from—their source would likely be exposed anyhow. Then the US would be accused of descending to the same level as Russian covert information operators. (The nature of the August text messages suggested they came from US authorities, but they were not signed.)
Others, however, believe stepped-up communication to Russians is not only reasonable but essential. Dmitri Teperik of Estonia’s International Center for Defense and Security calls for a “ruthless projection of truth” to Putin’s people (Icds.ee, June 8, 2020). Such an effort might even add stability to the US-Russian relationship by establishing a balance of information power. Especially with a new administration that is highly aware of Russian operations, the United States cannot indefinitely tolerate Russia assaulting the US information space with impunity. Unless Washington develops a concept and capability for response, US frustration over Russian provocations could boil over into an overreaction that could escalate beyond the information realm.
During the 2018 midterm elections, US Cyber Command launched an electronic strike on Russia’s Internet Research Agency, a major troll farm, and briefly cut it off from the internet. (see EDM, February 27, 2019). Writing after that action, Benjamin Jensen and Brandon Valeriano of Marine Corps University said, “It’s valuable for the US to introduce friction against enemies who seek to harm the American way of life. But it’s equally important to consider the potential for escalation to more widely harmful forms of conflict. […] Quick wins, like shutting down a troll factory for a few days, could produce much bigger longer-term consequences in a connected world” (Navy Times, March 13, 2019).
US messaging to Russia, as a response to Russian messaging to the US, would be more symmetrical than a cyber strike and present less chance of a spillover to other domains. Any new campaign should be based on a coherent US policy toward the Kremlin, which the new administration is drafting now. Then, depending on how US-Russian relations evolve in the first part of the Biden administration, US messaging could be targeted to whatever goals policymakers found appropriate.
These could include:
Any hope that Western messaging to the general Russian population can chase Putin from office is probably fanciful. Should he fall from power, the impetus could well come not from ordinary people, but from a decision by Kremlin powerbrokers that his policies have outlived their usefulness.
If the goal is more incremental change in Russia, increased communication from the United States and its allies could play a role. A growing number of Russians already see the West as a potential friend or partner, and are unenthusiastic about seizing other countries’ territory (Levada, May 6, 2019 and February 28, 2020; Thechicagocouncil.org, April 3, 2019). “I wonder how many Russians, as opposed to what the Kremlin wants, want to actually be a normal European country in the international community,” asks Pomerantsev. “Can we start […] a broader dialogue with the Russian population about how they see Russia’s role in the world? Is it the same as the role the Kremlin has given them, which is these rogue pariahs?” (see Jamestown.org, October 23, 2020). US messaging might also be designed to aid and amplify Russia’s own liberal-minded independent journalists, social influencers and civil society. They have been courageous advocates for basic freedoms at home and constructive policies abroad.
Since much of Putin’s legitimacy rests on his being a bulwark against the West, US messaging should seek to improve Russians’ view of the United States. The goal would not be to whitewash the US’s failings, but to recognize its successes and demonstrate that few Americans have any interest in invading or humiliating Russia. The most effective communications will probably not consist of quoting US officials. More convincing voices might be those of US celebrities known in Russia, and recent Russian emigrants who have forged rewarding lives in the United States. However, Biden himself should consider an early address to the Russian people. It can be on YouTube if Putin will not grant him the appearances on Russian television that the Soviet Union allowed Ronald Reagan in 1986 and Margaret Thatcher in 1987 (Margaretthatcher.org, March 31, 1987; Reaganlibrary.gov, January 1, 1986). Such a speech would demonstrate to Russians that Biden sees them not just as disciples of their president, but as a people with their own dignity and agency.
Demonstrating “information teeth” would not aim to change anything inside Russia in the short term. Rather, the United States and its allies could launch small demonstration campaigns with political or non-political content, just to make clear they have the tools and social insight to affect Russian attitudes if they so choose. Such demonstrations would be the cognitive equivalent of the US government’s reported placement of potentially crippling software inside the Russian electrical grid, designed to be visible to the Russians as a signal of what the US is capable of (The New York Times, June 15, 2019).
As for establishing new channels to reach Russia’s population, failing to do so seems almost irresponsible—especially when Russia runs a 24-hour television channel visible across the United States, and AM and FM radio stations in Washington and Kansas City. If the United States government must suddenly reach the Russian people in an urgent situation, it cannot start building social accounts and websites at that moment. It makes sense to establish a panoply of sites and accounts now with a wide variety of content, and work to build audiences for the day they are needed. US branding is not necessarily a dealbreaker; at the very least, the United States is a constant subject of Russian curiosity.
Many of the tactics above can be implemented by a wide variety of actors. A growing number of non-governmental pro-democracy groups have appeared in recent years that have broad experience with social network campaigns and websites. Several are located in former Soviet-bloc countries, meaning they can work easily in Russian. Small amounts of US support could encourage them to engage Russian citizens, each group using themes it develops on its own.
Policy papers often imagine the United States “working closely with allies” on information strategies against Russia. Such cooperation may well founder on those governments’ reluctance to stand up to the Kremlin—for reasons of domestic politics, fear of Russian retaliation or an aversion to “doing propaganda.” Non-governmental activists have fewer such concerns. They also tend to be more creative and nimble than government departments.
A potential obstacle to messaging to Russia is the possibility that the Kremlin could close off its internet to content originating abroad. In May 2019, Putin signed a law that would allow authorities to disconnect the so-called Runet from the rest of the world in extreme situations. This project is technically problematic and may never succeed. However, even if the ultimate “cutoff switch” never appears, the Kremlin will likely develop some new barriers to foreign web and social network penetration (see EDM, June 23, 2016, March 27, 2018, February 27, 2019).
For this reason, any strategy to communicate with Russian citizens must include alternative technical options. Text messages are a simple possibility. Email, if allowed by the “cutoff switch,” can carry text and video attachments. Russians likely would become more adept at using VPNs and proxies to reach foreign destinations. A cutoff of foreign content would also raise the importance of Russia’s own independent journalists, social influencers and civil society—whom the West would do well to encourage now.
As the US looks for new responses to Russian information violence, there will likely be more pressure to shoot not only the arrow but the archer—not only to protect our own populations from Russian disinformation, but to respond with information tools directed at Russia’s own population. Strategies for the Biden administration must be built on a clear consensus of what such actions would aim to accomplish and the best tools to do the job.
Thomas Kent, a former president of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, teaches about disinformation and Russian affairs at Columbia University’s Harriman Institute. This article is based in part on his new book published by Jamestown, Striking Back: Overt and Covert Options to Combat Russian Disinformation, and on an October 23 Jamestown webinar with Kent and Pomerantsev on communicating to Russians.
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Recent comments by former vice president of the separatist Georgian region of Abkhazia Valery Arshba indicate a split between the older political elite and the current administration of President Aslan Bzhania (Gazeta-ra.info, October 19; Civil.ge, October 23). Arshba called for the breakaway republic to join the Union State of Russia and Belarus, “without losing [its] sovereignty.”
Arshba himself has a turbulent history in Abkhaz politics. He served two terms as vice president (1995–2005) before being fired by then-president Vladislav Ardzinba, who accused him of supporting a coup (Ekho Kavkaza, August 23, 2018). During his time as vice president, Abkhazia sought an “associate status” with Russia, a vague term that acknowledged that the spheres of cooperation went beyond those defined by the Union State treaty (RFE/RL, October 29, 2001). Additionally, Arshba personally called for a treaty on peace and cessation of hostilities with Tbilisi several times following the Rose Revolution (RFE/RL, January 9, 2004). After a failed bid for the presidency in 2004, he stepped back from the spotlight but has maintained his connections to the top levels of government, currently serving as head of the Abkhaz Olympic Committee (Presidentofabkhazia.org, March 15, 2019).
Arshba’s comments come a few months after some emerging Russian politicians called for the outright annexation of Abkhazia (Jam-news.net, July 8), a call that was condemned by the Abkhazian parliament, discounted on Russian social media and treated warily by Georgians seeking a Kremlin connection. The Abkhazians themselves have not supported full annexation by Russia after the August 2008 War, but public opinions on joining the Union State are not known—a 2014 poll simply asked about “integration with Russia,” not specifying the method of integration (RFE/RL, February 18, 2010; Washington Post, March 20, 2014; Agenda.ge, June 10, 2016). It is worth noting that former president Sergei Bagapsh, whom Arshba backed after dropping out of the 2004 election, previously called for Abkhazia to join the Union State, and the Belarus-Kazakhstan-Russia Customs Union, during his first official visit to Moscow in 2010 (Kavkazsky Uzel, February 17, 2010), although there is no indication this proposal was publicly supported. The suggestions from hardliners in both Abkhazia and Russia contrast greatly with those of Bzhania, who took over from embattled president Raul Khajimba after winning the March elections.
The current Abkhazian de facto president has spoken openly about his desire for an open dialogue with Georgia, both before and after the election, while maintaining that any talks must occur with Abkhazia as an independent state (see EDM, June 15). Based on an interview with Georgian First Channel, the 2018 peace plan—which was proposed by Georgia and swiftly rejected by both Abkhazia and South Ossetia in a decision attributed to their reliance on Moscow—is not off the table for Bzhania (see EDM, April 18, 2018; 1tv.ge, July 9). The main political opposition, led by former presidential candidate and Minister for Economy Adgur Ardzinba, does not actually disagree with his positions regarding Russian citizenship and real estate rights, but its members are much less open toward Georgia (Jam-news.net, October 10).
Georgian politicians appear not to have officially responded to Bzhania’s calls for dialogue since January, prior to his victory (Jam-news.net, January 17; Oc-media.org, September 22). However, Georgia has made other kinds of overtures during the pandemic, such as offering to provide assistance in addition to already available Georgian medical care (Agenda.ge, March 24; Mei.edu, September 28). More recently, on a cultural note, Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili tweeted a video recording to commemorate Abkhaz Language Day (Twitter.com/Zourabichvili_S, October 27). In the recording, she said both sides could work toward the preservation of the Abkhaz language, “regardless of the line of occupation.” The self-proclaimed Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Republic of Abkhazia did not receive these comments favorably, disagreeing with Abkhaz’s status on the UNESCO list of endangered languages and accusing the Georgians of “committing a genocide of the Abkhaz people in 1992–1993” (Apsnypress.info, October 27).
It is difficult to evaluate the actual level of popular support for Arshba’s comments, since no public opinion polls exist concerning Abkhazia’s hypothetical accession to the Union State. With the current political leadership displaying openness toward Georgia, Sukhumi is unlikely to pursue closer ties with Moscow. However, Abkhazian politics is anything but stable, involving contested elections, poisonings, Russian involvement and revolutions; so current policy stances are not reliable indicators of future developments. Considering this, there are two reasons, long-term and extending beyond internal Abkhazian politics, why the so-called Abkhaz Republic will likely not join the Union State nor gain some other formal closer merger with Russia.
First, the Abkhazia-Russia relationship is already closer than contours of integration defined by the (only partially implemented) Union State treaty. Over the past decade, Russia has invested in Abkhazia’s infrastructure, electrical grid and military modernization (see EDM, October 24, 2014, September 25, 2019; Agenda.ge, February 27, 2019). However, the crucial, economically sustaining funds from the Kremlin have been drying up in recent years, a phenomenon only accentuated by the current COVID-19 crisis (Mei.edu, September 28). Despite this close relationship, there are still two major Russian policy goals Bzhania has stymied: he has prevented Abkhazians from being able to gain Russian citizenship and refused to grant the right to buy and own real estate to Russian nationals (see EDM, June 15). The latter point in particular has frustrated Moscow, with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov commenting that they “are a little surprised that this problem remains unresolved” (Civil.ge, October 14). Abkhazia’s accession to the Union State would likely bring about a policy shift in these matters; however, conceding on the real estate issue would cause an uproar in Abkhazia, as it would negate decades of public cries against Georgianization and the dilution of Abkhaz power over their homeland.
Second, any further formalizing of the close Abkhazian-Russian ties would complicate the Circassian question. Russia is currently considering merging the Republic of Adygea with Krasnodar Krai in an attempt to reduce the number of North Caucasus republics, causing a great amount of backlash among local Circassians (see EDM, June 16, 2020; Regnum, September 24, 2018). The Abkhaz would likely support the Circassian cause, as they have before: In 2017, Ruslan Gvashev, a Shapsugh activist and Abkhaz war hero, faced prosecution by the Russian government for the “organization of an unauthorized action,” during which he and several other Shapsughs prayed around a tree on the Circassian memorial day of mourning (Chegem.su, September 28, 2017). But Arshba, at the behest of then-President Khajimba, accompanied a presidential envoy to visit Gvashev at his home, where he was carrying on a hunger strike to protest the court’s decision against him, to indicate the Abkhazian government’s support for him. The question then becomes whether the Abkhaz will extend their support beyond territorial boundaries, to topics such as the repatriation of the Circassian diaspora back to their homeland in the Northwest Caucasus.
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On the morning of October 22, Armenian forces fired SCUD missile at various locations inside Azerbaijan, including the city of Gabala, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported (Twitter.com/HikmetHajiyev, Azerbaycan24.com, October 22). Gabala is an important hub along the Oguz–Gabala–Baku water pipeline, which was built in 2011 in order to supply the region of Absheron and the Azerbaijani capital (see EDM, January 7, 2011).
The missile barrage was, at that time, the latest in a series of such strikes targeting cities and strategic infrastructure outside the Karabakh conflict zone (see EDM, October 19, 2020). Among others, long-range attacks have been previously aimed at Mingachevir, which hosts an important water reservoir and a hydroelectric power plant, itself the objective of an October 11 strike (TASS, October 11).
Water shortages and the risk of drought have long been major sources of concern in Azerbaijan, which is heavily dependent for its supplies of water for drinking and irrigation on the Kura-Araks river basin, shared with Georgia and Armenia. The main exception is, in fact, the Oguz–Gabala–Baku pipeline, which pumps water sourced entirely from local springs in norther Azerbaijan. The authorities have made multiple attempts over time to try to address the country’s water security issue, mainly by drilling wells. And over the summer, President Ilham Aliyev reiterated this topic, characterizing it as a top-agenda item for his administration (President.az, July 23).
In fact, one of the first moves that followed Azerbaijan’s reclaiming of territory as a result of the ongoing weeks of fierce fighting in Karabakh was the announcement of a tender for the maintenance and amelioration of water facilities in the former occupied lands (Azertag.az, October 19). Among the retaken territories, many have strategic importance for water management, including Khudaferin and Sugovushan (formerly Madagiz). In particular, Sugovushan hosts a water reservoir that is central to the operation of the Sarsang water facility complex. The Sarsang reservoir on the Terter River was built by Soviet authorities to serve the area of lower Karabakh. It is located in the mountains, currently de facto controlled by the Yerevan-backed separatist forces. Sarsang is used both to generate electricity and provide drinking and irrigation water. The smaller Madagiz reservoir is located 20 kilometers downstream and feeds irrigation canals that were meant to serve the regions in the lowlands (Aghdam, Aghjabedi, Barda, Goranboy, Terter, Yevlakh). Prior to 1994, annual water use in the region was estimated at around 700 million cubic meters. But until the current advancement of Azerbaijani forces, the use of over 90 percent of the 22-km-long canal from Sarsang was denied to Azerbaijan’s nearby lowlands.
Armenian control of the area permitted Yerevan to use Sarsang as political leverage during the non-combat phases of the three-decades-long Karabakh conflict. In fact, by holding the upstream, main branch of the water complex, Karabakh’s de facto authorities could alternatively regulate periodic outflows of water or turn off the taps. A 2015 investigation by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) highlighted the multiple environmental and social consequences an uncooperative management of the reservoir. According to the report, water flow from Sarsang was reduced during the summer months, when it is most needed, resulting in insufficient supplies for agricultural purposes. Moreover, the lack of maintenance of the reservoir and denial of access to independent experts not only spurred concerns over the damaged structure but also impeded the use of Sarsang water as potable, due to concerns it could be contaminated. Consequently, Azerbaijan had to put in place a system of groundwater pumps and wells, which is more costly and environmental destructive, can lead to salinity intrusion of the soil, and result in lower agricultural productivity (Assembly.coe.in, December 12, 2015). Following the 2015 report, PACE approved a resolution in 2016 that framed the situation as a humanitarian problem and requested that the Armenian Armed Forces withdraw from the area to allow access to independent engineers and international supervisors to oversee an equitable operation of the facility. Moreover, the pan-European democratization and human rights body defined the present situation as “environmental aggression,” referencing the 1992 United Nations Water Convention (Assembly.coe.int, January 26 2016).
On October 22, President Aliyev sent a tweet accusing Armenia of perpetrating “ecological terror” and called for the development of agriculture in the retaken areas (Twitter.com/presidentaz, October 22).
Throughout the long-lasting so-called “frozen conflict,” the water dispute has been an important underlying factor. And by, now, trying to attack water facilities, in particular the vital Oguz–Gabala–Baku pipeline, Armenian forces aim at undermining civilian Azerbaijani morale and creating unrest within the country, where support for the military operation and the current favorable momentum in the war constitute a unifying factor and boost support for Aliyev (Aqreqator.az, July 13).
In the previous outbreak of serious clashes, this past July, experts and observers expressed concern for the security of Azerbaijani oil and natural gas facilities, which permit the country to export its energy resources to the global market. This time, Armenian forces are concentrating on water facilities to affect the Azerbaijani people exclusively, thus significantly reducing the likelihood that these strikes might push third parties with an interest in stable energy flows to interfere in the conflict on the side of Baku.
Given the Azerbaijani military’s overwhelming successes in recent weeks in progressively overpowering the Armenian forces, Yerevan’s strategy has been to wage an asymmetric war, aimed at sapping the enemy’s morale and endurance by depriving it of a basic good. This strategy represents a continuation of the past three decades of such activities, during the non-combat phases of the conflict, but heretofore largely limited to the occupied territories. Now, with the use of ballistic missiles, Armenia’s strategy is specifically to expand those activities beyond the occupied regions in order to even put the residents of the Azerbaijani capital at risk of manufactured drought.
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Today, September 23, Alyaksandr Lukashenka was officially inaugurated to his sixth consecutive term as president of Belarus. The ceremony took place at the Palace of Independence with about 700 guests representing the executive and legislative branches of the government, regional administrations, the government-run media, as well as the military, science establishment, popular culture and sports (Belta, September 23).
The event’s most unusual aspect is that it was not pre-announced. Likewise, no foreign guests were reported—even the Russian ambassador was not there. When the inauguration was already in full swing, the usually well-informed Lenta.ru wrote, with reference to Tut.by, that “near the Palace of Independence in Minsk, a crowd of people in suits, as well as buses and trucks with military personnel, including representatives of the guard of honor, were noticed. Most likely, the inauguration rehearsal is taking place at the Palace” (Lenta.ru, September 23).
Yury Drakokhrust of Radio Liberty believes that covering the event with a shroud of mystery was needed to prevent groups of protesters from gathering close to the venue with their white-red-white flags and shouting their favorite slogan: “Ukhodi” (“Go away”). That situation would have led to multiple pictures across world-wide media besmirching the inauguration (Tut.by, September 23).
According to the Belarusian constitution, the event had to take place within two months from the election—that is, on or before October 9. Lukashenka took the oath of office in Belarusian and then delivered a speech in Russian. “We did not just elect the president of the country,” he declared, continuing, “We defended our values, our peaceful life, sovereignty and independence. And in this regard, we still have a lot to do.” Other essential parts of his speech concerned his interpretation of Belarus’s acquisition of statehood and of the unusually tenacious protest movement that arose immediately after the August 9 election, Belarus’s social policies, economic development, work on the new constitution, and even Belarus’s peace-keeping functions that Lukashenka vowed to preserve (Belta, September 23).
“Once, by God’s providence, the people of Belarus easily and, frankly, unexpectedly gained their independence,” acknowledged Lukashenka. “And we have long taken it for granted. Sometimes we did not appreciate it. Today, having suffered so much for this victory [i.e., his electoral victory and cracking down on protests], we have risen to a new level of self-awareness. Having cooled down from the fever of electoral battles, we saw how our entire nation was growing up. And even if Belarus is a very young independent state by world standards, the Belarusians as a nation are no longer children, we are a grown-up people.” Lukashenka attributed protests to Belarusian statehood being subjected to an unprecedented challenge, the challenge of repeatedly tested and seemingly reliable “technologies of destruction of independent states. But we were among the very few—even, perhaps, the only ones—where the color revolution failed,” declared Lukashenka. And it failed allegedly because Belarusians “did not want to lose their country.”
So just as protesters perceive themselves as representing all of Belarusian society, Lukashenka believes he speaks for the many Belarusians who either rely on the continuation of his power vertical or simply chose to stay away from the demonstrations. His speech conspicuously did not even hint at any kind of willingness to negotiate with the “other” Belarus.
Lukashenka maintained that the government’s emphasis on social policies, like support for retirees, families with multiple children, and vulnerable social strata, will be retained. Considering economic innovations, he expressed hope that “wise investors who think in terms of cross-border commerce will appreciate our efforts to create an attractive business environment.” He also acknowledged the ongoing work on the new constitution and underscored that a strong power vertical is the only guarantee of Belarus’s survival as an independent state. Finally, he expressed certainty that Belarus will cope with its problems without foreign interference.
Multiple international comments on the inauguration will surely invoke Lukashenka’s limited legitimacy at the helm of power in view of the dominant opinion that his elections was compromised. Legitimacy, however, is a tricky subject. If and when the newly promoted United States ambassador to Belarus, Julie Fisher, receives the endorsement of the full US Senate, as seems likely, she will have to present her credentials to Alyaksandr Lukashenka.
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Internet connectivity in Belarus saw significant disruption following the country’s presidential election on Sunday, August 9. The shutdown is widely believed to be a state-sanctioned effort to reduce the effectiveness of protests following the disputed vote, in which Alyaksandr Lukashenka sought a sixth term in office. The internet outage was not limited to Minsk but also affected much of the rest of Belarus, notably other major cities such as Hrodna, Brest, Homel, Mahilyow and Vitebsk. Lukashenka quickly claimed that the internet had been disrupted “from abroad” in order to ferment discontent inside the country, with state media reporting that websites of government agencies were specifically targeted (BelTA, August 10 [1] [2]). Despite the state’s claims, Belarusian IT specialists believe the shutdown was, in fact, state-orchestrated, and experts have explained the complexity, difficulty and unlikelihood of conducting a nation-wide internet blackout from abroad (Meduza, August 12). While the aim of the stoppage was, indeed, likely to reduce the ability of protestors to coordinate and reduce the spread of news of discontent, the repercussions are already being felt by the country’s previously flourishing IT sector (see EDM, March 18, 2015 and March15, 2018).
Internet access largely returned on August 12, after a three-day outage—costing the economy some $170 million, according to the international non-governmental organization (NGO) NetBlocks. To put this in perspective, the country’s GDP per day is approximately $160 million (Netblocks.org, Dev.by, August 12).
Aside from the huge costs to the overall economy, there is likely to be a lasting detrimental impact on the Belarusian IT sector. Information technology is one of Belarus’s most promising economic areas, with the country having been labeled an emerging Silicon Valley of Eastern Europe (Wall Street Journal, December 6, 2016). Big names in the software development space, EPAM and Wargaming, were founded by Belarusians, and the well-known company Viber was built up in Belarus. In 2018, IT accounted for 5.7 percent of Belarus’s GDP, a share predicted to increase to 10 percent by 2022 (Software-development-cee-report.com, 2018, accessed August 13, 2020). In 2019, the country was ranked sixth worldwide in mobile app creation. Drivers of Belarus’ success include a strong STEM education system, little government regulation, low wage costs, and a time zone from which companies can easily work with Europe, Asia and the United States.
The low level of state control in the Belarusian IT sector distinguishes it from other domestic industries. Companies registered in the Belarusian Hi-Tech Park enjoy little regulation, specifically low tax rates and the ability to hire foreign workers without visas. In November 2019, Arthur Pratapopau, the head of Global PR at Wargaming, stressed that the government’s approach, particularly low interference and regulation, had been conducive to its growth and was pushing the sector forward. But since August 10, 2020, IT workers in Belarus have grown increasingly pessimistic about the future of the sphere; one software developer explained that due to the internet blackout, outsourcing contracts are now being broken. Outsourcing makes up around 60 percent of the Belarusian IT industry, with over 90 percent of customers coming from the US and the European Union. Some companies have been unwilling to disclose the political instability behind the blackout to foreign customers in case they lose clients altogether. In Belarus, over 90 percent of software produced by the Hi-Tech Park is exported. IT workers have been sent to neighboring countries from multiple Belarusian IT companies to be able to work effectively during the shutdown (Author’s interviews, November 14, 2019 and August 12, 2020).
On August 12, over 1,500 individuals (as of this writing) from the Belarusian IT sector signed onto an open letter stating that “startups are not born in an atmosphere of fear and violence.” IT leaders effectively threatened to take their business out of Belarus given the rise of conditions “in which a tech business cannot function” (Dev.by, August 12).
In Belarus, the immediate impact of the internet blackout is being temporarily addressed by tech-savvy residents who are providing VPNs to provide access. The long-term impact on the IT sphere is harder to remedy, with Belarus’ reputation as a burgeoning tech hub likely already eroded. To stem this downward trend, the government will need to take immediate action to reassure domestic employees and international customers alike.
The post Repercussions of the Internet Shutdown on the Belarusian IT Sector appeared first on Jamestown.
The eventful presidential campaign in Belarus has left the incumbent, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, more isolated from his main external interlocutors. The West remains critical of the Belarusian authorities’ repeated civil rights violations, while the recent incident involving the arrest of 33 Wagner Group mercenaries upended what was left of Lukashenka’s already strained relationship with the Kremlin (see EDM, August 3).
In this context, China has shown a willingness to fill the void. Interviewed by the official Belarusian news agency BelTA, on August 4, in response to President Lukashenka’s annual address to the Belarusian people and the National Assembly, China’s ambassador to Minsk, Cui Qiming, praised what he defined as Lukashenka’s “greater value.” Namely, the Chinese envoy lauded the Belarusian president’s “efficient defense” of his country’s sovereignty and independence as well as Minsk’s “socially oriented policy of development,” stressing that state policy under Lukashenka has been “clearly focused” and characterized by “continuity” enabling the Belarusian people to be “self-sufficient and independent in choosing their destiny” (BelTA, August 4). Ambassador Cui further underscored the importance of Belarus as a contributor to regional stability. And he restated the importance of the Belarusian-Chinese strategic partnership and cooperation, notably reiterating China’s willingness to enhance it within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Commenting on the elections, Cui said China is “confident that the Belarusian people will make the right choice” (BelTA, August 4).
The reference to Belarusian independence and sovereignty is a clear plaudit to Lukashenka for his efforts at avoiding integration with Russia, while the appeal to continuity reflects China’s traditional preference for the preservation of the domestic political status quo in its partner countries. The mention of “socially oriented” policies echoes the ideological harmony between Beijing and Minsk, as spotlighted last year by analyst Paul Goble (see EDM, December 10, 2019).
Cooperation with Belarus is valuable to China given the former’s geographic position as the westernmost Eurasian Economic Union member state, thus making it a potential outpost from which to reach the European Union’s large common market via trans-Eurasian overland transit corridors—although this role remains at least somewhat subordinated to Russia’s will. On the other hand, China’s advertised strategic partnership with Belarus has, so far, been limited to relatively small-scale commitments, particularly in comparison with the commitments to Belarus from Russia and Europe.
China has loaned Belarus approximately $500 million, mainly for Minsk to repay its foreign debts, and awarded them at a time when integration talks with Russia resumed, following a previous round that had ended in failure (Chinaobservers.eu, January 14). Additionally, the China-Belarus “Great Stone” industrial park is a flagship bilateral cooperation project, though one among several such Special Economic Zones envisaged to emerge along the BRI corridors.
But within the general vision of a trading partnership focused on technology and innovation, China’s most cherished initiative for Belarus at the moment is likely the 5G pilot project to be installed at the Great Stone industrial park, agreed upon by the two countries last February (Belaruschina.by, February 26). The project will be implemented by Beltelecom in cooperation with Huawei (BelTA, February 25).
While Minsk continues to seek loans from other foreign investors and multinational institutions (BelTA, August 5 [1] [2], 6) and attempts to build diplomatic ties with multiple foreign actors, President Lukashenka is aware that his political approval both abroad and at home has become seriously eroded. In recent days, he referred to certain foreign countries as potential perpetrators of a “hybrid war” against Belarus (BelTA, August 6). China may, thus, exploit Lukashenka’s difficult present position and greater international isolation to negotiate from a position of strength on such strategic issues as 5G technology development.
The post China Reiterates Its Support for Lukashenka Amidst Troubled Belarusian Presidential Election appeared first on Jamestown.
On November 19, Estonian Interior Minister Mart Helme, who chairs the far-right Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE), surprised members of his government with comments to a Finnish newspaper that Tallinn was preparing a “plan B” in case the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) “fails.” In his remarks to the paper, he claimed that the contingency was being developed together with Latvia and Lithuania, and that NATO could not be counted on to defend the Baltic States: “Nobody knows what is going to happen next,” he said, “That is why we need a plan B” (ERR, November 19). His comments came a day before a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Brussels, ahead of the 2019 Alliance summit in London.
Helme’s statement to the Finnish media drew swift reactions from the rest of the Estonian government: Prime Minister Jüri Ratas of the Center Party said the country had no plans that did not involve remaining in the North Atlantic Alliance and strengthening Estonia’s defense capacity (ERR, November 19). Minister of Defense Jüri Luik of the conservative Isamaa party denied that the government had any discussions about a “plan B”; while Minister of Foreign Affairs Urmas Reinsalu (also from Isamaa) declared that “NATO is strong and there is no alternative to it” (ERR, November 19, 20). The defense ministers of Latvia and Finland also denied any involvement in such purported plans (Delfi.ee, ERR [1], [2], November 20; Iltalehti.fi, November 19).
Helme’s comments should not be taken as a signal that Estonia is changing its relationship to NATO in any substantive way, as the swift response of virtually all other relevant portions of the Estonian government clearly indicates. However, the incident is valuable both as a window into the state of Estonia’s governing coalition and as a data point in the role of far-right parties in the Alliance’s frontline states.
With regards to Estonia’s government, the current coalition is a somewhat odd composition: the Center Party leads a grouping of parties in which Isamaa and (controversially) EKRE are junior partners. This latest scandal is the third involving EKRE; a separate scandal regarding accusations of a conflict of interest involving the minister of rural affairs, an EKRE-held post, is under investigation (ERR, November 13). Before this, Helme and his son, also an EKRE party member and government minister, were embroiled in yet another scandal for attempting to dismiss the director-general of the Estonian Police and Border Guard (PPA) Board (ERR, Postimees, August 16).
In the PPA scandal, the government sought to move quickly past the controversy and preserve the coalition (ERR, August 22). Initial indications are that, in the short term, the Ratas government is looking to do the same with respect to the “Plan B” imbroglio. Helme has asserted, in a statement, that he was “misunderstood” by reporters in his earlier comments, claiming he had “not said anything implying that our government is working together with our neighbors to find an alternative to NATO” (ERR, November 20). Thereafter, Reinsalu assured that Helme had adequately explained himself and that “this case can be considered closed” (ERR, November 20). It stands to reason, however, that this coalition can only endure so much turbulence as a result of EKRE’s actions, especially given that this latest scandal is a departure from the previous two, which concern personal misconduct. Rather, it had briefly derailed Estonian foreign policy discourse, raised public doubt about the reliability of NATO and drawn allies and neighboring states into the confusion.
Beyond Estonia, it is worth considering how the affair aligns with Russian support for far-right European parties and Russia’s objectives pertaining to NATO frontline states. An Estonian opposition lawmaker likened Helme’s comments to “the statements of Kremlin-paid claqueurs who are tasked with eroding unity in countries” (ERR, November 20). While statements from far-right politicians criticizing NATO and the European Union are not new, they carry outsize weight in countries such as Estonia that stand to benefit the most from membership in both institutions. Kremlin officials are likely pleased with how the last week played out with respect to Estonian foreign policy—and they may be keen on repeating their success.
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