Connexion
Executive Summary:
In mid-March, nine central ministries jointly released a new plan for the country’s Internet of Things (IoT) industry over the next three years (Ministry of Industry and Information Technology [MIIT], March 31). The plan clarifies Beijing’s vision of a seamless cyber-physical ecosystem to integrate “people, machines, and things” (人、机、物) through a centralized architecture of networks and platforms. What sets this directive apart is its sheer systemic reach. Beyond the goal of 10 billion terminal connections, the plan fuses IoT with artificial intelligence (AI) and edge computing to modernize the industrial and social backbone of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This evolution matters because it shifts the frontier, engineering the rules and infrastructure of the next digital age to establish domestic dominance and extend Beijing’s leverage in its managed confrontation with the West.
New Plan Drives Cyber-Physical Integration
Beijing’s new “Action Plan to Promote Innovative Development of the Internet of Things Industry (2026–2028)” (推动物联网产业创新发展行动方案 (2026—2028年)) is a nine-ministry directive led by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) that defines medium-term goals for creating a national cyber-physical infrastructure (MIIT, March 31). It also shows clear intent to dominate standards, supply chains, and deployable architectures that could later be exported.
The plan aims to “accelerate the comprehensive integration of IoT technology into production, consumption, and social governance” (进一步加速物联网技术全面融入生产、消费和社会治理各领域) and to build a new IoT infrastructure defined by “comprehensive sensing, ubiquitous intelligent connectivity, multi-network integration, and security and trustworthiness” (全域感知、泛在智联、多网融合、安全可信). By 2028, Beijing wants more than 50 new standards; 10 application areas with 100 million connections and 15 with 10 million connections; 10 billion total terminal connections; and a core industry size exceeding renminbi (RMB) 3.5 trillion ($510 billion).
The plan is notable for its definition of IoT as a total cyber-physical environment. It says IoT should “use sensing technologies and communications networks to realize ubiquitous intelligent connections among people, machines, and things, and to connect the digital world and the physical world” (基于感知技术，通过通信网络，实现人、机、物的泛在智能连接，打通数字世界和物理世界), and it defines the industry as being composed of “sensing, networks, platforms, applications, and security” (感知、网络、平台、应用和安全保障). Sectorally, it focuses on production first—industry, agriculture, energy, transport, logistics, construction, resources, and the environment—but also targets consumer and governance domains through smartphones, wearables, smart homes, smart appliances, connected vehicles, robots, remote healthcare, digital education, digital twin cities, urban risk warning systems, and emergency rescue.
Beijing seems to be moving from building lots of connected devices to shaping the rules and infrastructure of the next cyber-physical layer at home and abroad. The plan calls for “optimizing and improving the IoT standards system” (优化完善物联网标准体系), building a map of the “core industrial chain” (核心产业链图谱), strengthening industrial monitoring and supply capability assessment, and promoting technologies such as IPv6, NB-IoT, RedCap, satellite IoT, edge AI, lightweight deployment of large models at the terminal and edge, and integration with quantum communications and next-generation internet. While the document is framed as domestic industrial policy, its scale, targets, standard-setting agenda, and language around multi-network fusion and platform integration point to a broader ambition: to set the rules for a globally exportable cyber-physical ecosystem.
Table 1: Key Targets and Priority Domains in the 2026–2028 IoT Action Plan
| Domain | Targets |
| Deployment by 2028 | 50+ standards; ten 100 million-scale fields; fifteen 10 million-scale fields; 10 billion connections; RMB 3.5 trillion core industry |
| Production sectors | Industry, agriculture, energy, transport, logistics, construction, environment |
| Consumer sectors | Smartphones, wearables, smart homes, appliances, connected vehicles, robots |
| Governance sectors | Digital twin cities, urban management, risk warning, emergency rescue |
| AI integration | “Lightweight deployment” (轻量化部署) of large models at terminal and edge |
| Standards / industrial control | “Optimize and improve the IoT standards system”; build “core industrial chain maps” |
(Source: MIIT)
The new action plan is best understood as an implementing document for the 15th Five-Year Plan’s broader push to build a “modernized industrial system” (现代化产业体系) and to develop “new infrastructure” (新型基础设施) that supports industrial upgrading and digital-intelligent transformation. It extends from the five-year plan’s call to “promote the independent iteration of the mobile Internet of Things” (推动移动物联网自主迭代), deepen deployment of 5G/5G-A/6G telecoms infrastructure, build a national integrated computing network (全国一体化算力网), expand satellite internet, and accelerate the digital-intelligent upgrading of transport, energy, and water infrastructure (Xinhua, March 14). The emerging model is a vertically integrated cyber-physical infrastructure in which Beijing supplies the endpoints, networks, compute, data systems, and standards that bind them together.
The IoT action plan and the new five-year plan intentionally reinforce each other. While the former focuses on sensors, modules, platforms, edge computing, applications, and security, the latter’s “new infrastructure” construction framework provides the larger substrate those systems will rely on: a national integrated computing network, satellite internet, upgraded information and communications networks, new data infrastructure, and “low-altitude infrastructure” (低空基础设施) (China Brief, February 17). Read together, the documents indicate that Beijing is also accelerating construction of communications, compute, routing, identity, and data systems to underpin its IoT strategy.
This matters strategically because it points to a much more ambitious objective than simply saturating the market with smart products. Beijing is moving toward a model in which PRC firms and state-backed systems can provide both devices and the backbone. In that sense, Beijing’s push is not just to export IoT devices, but to shape a globally deployable cyber-physical environment in which devices, sensors, vehicles, robots, logistics systems, and urban infrastructure all run on infrastructure layers increasingly defined by PRC standards, platforms, and network architectures.
At the top level, the language used by Chinese leader Xi Jinping and its authorized Party interpretations make clear that the buildout of IoT and adjacent digital infrastructure is part of a larger effort to secure national power by controlling the next infrastructural layer of economic and social life. Xi links “accelerating the development of the Internet of Things” (加快发展物联网) directly to building a “modernized industrial system” (现代化产业体系), optimizing the “layout, structure, functions, and system integration” of infrastructure (优化基础设施布局、结构、功能和系统集成), and constructing a “modernized infrastructure system” (现代化基础设施体系) (Xi Jinping Thought Research Center, December 8, 2023).
Official gloss pushes Xi’s logic even further. A 2023 Party interpretation says digital infrastructure now serves as the “key base” (关键底座) shaping new directions in development, while Xi is quoted as calling for an “intelligent and comprehensive” (智能化综合性) digital information infrastructure that is “high-speed and ubiquitous, space-ground integrated, cloud-network fused, intelligent and agile, green and low-carbon, and secure and controllable” (高速泛在、天地一体、云网融合、智能敏捷、绿色低碳、安全可控) (Cyberspace Administration of China [CAC], April 10, 2023). A 2025 Party School-linked commentary frames the broader trajectory as entry into an era of the intelligent interconnection of everything, built around the “triple fusion of ‘people-machines-things’” (‘人机物’三元融合的万物智能互联时代). It explicitly says that digital-intelligent technologies are becoming a “key force in reorganizing global factor resources, reshaping the global economic structure, and transforming the global competitive landscape” (重组全球要素资源、重塑全球经济结构、改变全球竞争格局的关键力量) (Red Flag Magazine, April 14, 2025). These are all statements of intent to build a cyber-physical system that strengthens domestic control, upgrades industry, and positions the PRC to shape the architecture of future global competition.
Table 2: How the PRC’s New Infrastructure Agenda Reinforces IoT Deployment
| Layer | Five-year plan priority | What it does | How it reinforces the IoT action plan |
| Devices / sensing | Action plan for sensors, smart modules, terminals, gateways | Creates the physical endpoints that collect data and act in the real world | Supplies the edge layer of the cyber-physical system |
| Communications | 5G, 5G-A, 10G optical, backbone transmission, submarine cable cooperation | Connects endpoints with low latency, high density, and wide coverage | Makes large-scale machine-to-machine connection and control possible |
| Compute | National integrated computing network | Provides supercomputing, general computing, intelligent computing, and cloud services | Lets IoT systems process and act on data at scale |
| Data | Data infrastructure, identity authentication, access management, circulation and security systems | Organizes, authenticates, governs, and moves data across systems | Turns device outputs into a managed national data resource |
| Space / positioning | Satellite internet and BeiDou | Extends connectivity, navigation, sensing, and communications into remote, mobile, and international settings | Expands IoT beyond terrestrial networks and supports global deployment |
| Sectoral control systems | Low-altitude infrastructure, transport/energy/water digital upgrading | Embeds intelligent networking into aviation, cities, logistics, energy, and public systems | Pushes IoT from consumer tech into critical infrastructure and governance |
(Source: Xinhua; MIIT)
Cyber-Physical Systems as a New Front in U.S.–PRC Competition
In the context of the longer term, Beijing’s current IoT push represents the latest phase of a steadily expanding strategy that has moved from industrial prioritization to systems integration and now toward full-spectrum cyber-physical buildout. The progression began with the 2009–2011 elevation of IoT as a “strategic emerging industry” (战略性新兴产业) and one of the “commanding heights” (制高点) of industrial competition; evolved with the Made in China 2025 and Internet Plus strategies, which tied smart terminals, industrial software, and connected infrastructure to manufacturing upgrading and international standards influence; and was cemented in the 13th Five-Year Plan and National Informatization Development Strategy, which framed IoT as a “ubiquitous secure Internet of Things” (泛在安全物联网) and part of the race to “seize the initiative, gain advantages, win security, and win the future” (掌握先机、赢得优势、赢得安全、赢得未来) (China Brief, July 25, 2025).
By the early 2020s, policy had shifted from promoting connected devices to building a broader architecture. The 14th Five-Year Plan treated IoT as “new infrastructure”; the 2021–2023 New IoT Infrastructure Action Plan pushed “interconnected heterogeneous products and centralized control” (异构产品互联、集中控制) in homes and buildings; and the 2024 “Intelligent Connection of Everything” notice advanced the move from “the connection of everything” (万物互联) to the “intelligent connection of everything” (万物智联). Against this backdrop, the latest action plan represents a new stage in Beijing’s strategic thinking, focused on control over the standards, platforms, networks, and governance structures of an increasingly global cyber-physical environment.
This new stage of strategy could increase cyber risks precisely because it pushes the PRC’s IoT ecosystem beyond standalone devices and toward deeper integration with AI, cloud, edge computing, advanced telecom networks, and international standards infrastructure. Beijing is aligning telecom infrastructure, protected domestic markets, and tightly managed technical standards behind a system in which everyday devices are increasingly linked to larger digital environments, while PRC security services themselves acknowledge that connected products can contain backdoors enabling remote control or covert data collection (China Brief, August 7, 2025). In practical terms, that means the attack surface grows not only because there are more endpoints, but because those endpoints are becoming more interoperable, more remotely manageable, and more deeply embedded in critical systems. Users now face heightened risks of cyber pre-positioning, persistent access, and the ordinary commercial devices used as pathways into more sensitive networks.
In the context of the broader competition the PRC is preparing for with the United States, these risks matter because IoT is becoming part of a larger architecture of managed confrontation. By engineering a system in which economic planning, technological control, infrastructure buildout, and national security are increasingly fused, Beijing is organizing its economy for long-term rivalry. Its drive to harden supply chains, expand “self-reliance” (自立自强), embed security into development, and build outward-facing transport, digital, and data networks makes the spread of PRC-linked connected systems abroad more than a commercial issue. Instead, it functions as another channel through which Beijing can accumulate leverage, shape dependencies, gather data, and potentially pre-position access inside the very infrastructure that will matter in a prolonged contest with the United States (China Brief, November 3, 2025).
Conclusion
Over the next three years, we should expect Beijing to push beyond rapid device proliferation and toward tighter integration of the full cyber-physical stack. This will involve more aggressive rollout of IoT across production, consumption, and governance; deeper fusion with AI, edge computing, satellite internet, and national computing infrastructure; and continued efforts to harden domestic control while exporting standards, platforms, and turnkey systems abroad. In practice, that likely means faster buildout of PRC-defined architectures in smart homes, logistics, transport, energy, urban management, and low-altitude systems; greater emphasis on standards-setting and industrial-chain mapping; and a more explicit use of connected infrastructure as a tool of strategic leverage in a prolonged contest with the United States.
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Executive Summary:
On October 19, the Ministry of State Security (MSS; 国家安全部) informed national media that it had disrupted a U.S. cyberattack targeting the National Time Service Center (NTSC; 国家授时中心) (CCTV, October 19). The center is responsible for maintaining and distributing official Beijing Time (北京时间) throughout the People’s Republic of China (PRC), supporting logistics, finance, and energy functions (NTSC, accessed October 20). In response to the attack, state media claimed that the United States is “the biggest source of chaos in cyberspace” (网络空间的最大乱源), while denying what it calls the “PRC cyber threat theory” (中国网络威胁论) (CCTV, October 19).
Earlier this year, the Public Security Bureau of Tianhe District in Guangzhou announced that it had foiled a cyberattack linked to the Information, Communications, and Electronics Force (ICEFCOM; 國防部資通電軍指揮部) of Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (Xinhua, June 5). According to the PRC’s National Computer Virus Emergency Response Center (CVERC; 国家计算机病毒应急处理中心), the Taiwanese unit carried out cyberattacks on the country’s military-industrial, government, energy, and transportation sectors over several years (CVERC, June 5). In this case, the PRC responded with a coordinated hybrid warfare campaign, releasing the identities of 20 suspected participants and offering rewards for their arrest (China Brief, July 25).
PRC tactics diverged following the U.S. and Taiwanese incidents. This was likely due to significant differences in intelligence capabilities the MSS has with the United States and Taiwan, as well as the respective positions of the two countries in the international system. The PRC’s rhetorical response to the alleged U.S. cyberattacks also forms part of a wider push to advance its leadership of an anti-Western bloc, constructing a narrative of a one-sided cyber war waged by a “hacker empire” (黑客帝国) (CCTV, October 19).
PRC Leverages Defense and Offense
Speaking at the 2016 Symposium on Network Security and Information Technology, Xi Jinping said that cyber defense and offense are interrelated. He argued that “the essence of cybersecurity is in confrontation” (网络安全的本质在对抗), and called for “using technology against technology” (以技术对技术) to ensure that the PRC is more powerful than any enemy (Xinhua, April 25, 2016).
Since the NTSC attack was announced, government and media sources have echoed this assessment, advocating for strengthening defenses as well as developing offensive capabilities. Media reports have called on network operators to reinforce security and honor their legal duties under the country’s Cybersecurity Law (网络安全法), which attempts to strengthen network security and prevent cyber intrusions (Xinhua, November 7, 2016; CCTV, October 19). In line with Xi’s call to “use technology against technology,” one article argued for “enhancing … cyber defense and retaliatory capabilities” (提升 … 网络防御与反击能力) in order to expose the “hegemonic nature” (霸权本质) of U.S. espionage and sabotage (Kunlun Policy Research Institute, October 26).
PRC cyber activities go beyond the “retaliation” that nationalist commentaries rationalize. “Retaliation” invokes a narrative of victimhood, but it does not reflect the intention behind contemporary PRC cyberattacks. In 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted PLA hackers for the first time, but offensive cyber has since evolved. Recent cyberattacks that embed “disruptive capabilities within U.S. critical infrastructure” represent a development towards “preparation for potential future conflict and a persistent escalation in the cyber domain,” a departure from the theft and espionage of the past (McCrary Institute, October 28). This pivot occurred during Xi’s term and follows his public guidance.
Cyber Narratives Consolidate Global South Alignment
In both the U.S. and Taiwanese cases, Chinese media commentaries and military officials used the incidents to frame the PRC as the victim (China Brief, July 25). But statements diverged on account of the hegemonic position of the United States in the international system. Jin Fei (金飞), deputy leader of a military-civil expert panel, argued that such attacks are a systemic attempt to slow the PRC’s rise, disrupt the country’s economic development, and maintain U.S. dominance (CCTV, October 20). [1]
The NTSC incident also provided an opportunity to showcase the perceived hypocrisy of U.S. values and the norms of the U.S.-led international system. One essay mocked the U.S. claim that it supports internet freedom, arguing that the values it purportedly supports simply “cover its hegemonic ambitions” (掩盖其霸权野心) (Kunlun Policy Research Institute, October 26). Others pointed to the destabilizing effect of cyberattacks on mutual trust, calling on the international community to restrain “digital hegemony” (数字霸权) (CCTV, October 20).
The narrative of digital hegemony reinforces the PRC’s alignment with the Global South by positioning itself as a fellow victim of Western neo-imperialism. For example, official media states that the PRC is not alone in being targeted by U.S. cyberattacks, listing it alongside Southeast Asia, Europe, and Latin America, regions either currently dominated by U.S. leadership or previously victims of U.S. interventions (CCTV, October 19). This characterization of cyberattacks as the continuation of 20th century interventionism is more explicitly evoked in the call to “unite with other countries and regions that have felt the hegemonic pressure of the United States” (联合其他受到美国霸权压迫的国家和地区) (Kunlun Policy Research Institute, October 26). The same author concludes by calling to “establish a fair, just, and transparent new cyberspace order” (建立公平、公正、透明的网络空间新秩序), presumably constructed with the PRC’s leadership (Kunlun Policy Research Institute, October 26). [2]
Conclusion
The PRC’s rhetoric in the wake of the NTSC cyberattack fits its broader goal of preparing the international landscape for its predicted ascent to global leadership. Official narratives fall back on a familiar playbook seen in response to the Taiwanese attack in June. This rhetoric casts the PRC as both victim and vanguard of the international system, pushing a paradoxical narrative of both victimhood and strength. Despite the PRC’s documented record of cyber espionage, state and media narratives instead cast itself as a virtuous actor charting a course away from a U.S.-led world toward a new order with the PRC at its core.
Notes
[1] Jin Fei (金飞) is the deputy leader of the Military-Civilian Innovation Service Professional Committee (军地创新服务专业委员会).
[2] The PRC’s Global Governance Initiative concept paper, released during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in September, listed cyberspace governance as a priority area for reform. The SCO may continue to act as a vessel for the PRC to counter what it describes elsewhere as “digital hegemony” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 1).
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- Vidéo / Chine , Diplomatie, Géopolitique, Eurasie, Route de la soie, Infrastructures, 2020, Programme d'histoire-géographie, géopolitique et sciences politiques
Aux frontières de la Chine, comment le Parti-État adapte-t-il ses plans de développement ? Avec quels résultats ? 3 cartes pour comprendre.
- Asie / Chine , Cartes géopolitiques, Géopolitique, Territoires, Frontière, Minorités, Eau, Croissance économique, Infrastructures, Electricité, Tourisme, 2020, Energie
La coopération arméno-iranienne reste grandement dépendante de l'influente Russie mais aussi des dynamiques géopolitiques internationales, notamment liées aux Etats-Unis. Avec une carte inédite.
- CEI / Russie , Arménie, Iran , Cartes géopolitiques, Diplomatie, Géographie, Géopolitique, Stratégie, Infrastructures, Commerce extérieur, 2020, Economie, 2019
Les chiffres de la téléphonie mobile en Afrique sont difficiles à obtenir et à exploiter, mais le boom évident.
- Afrique & M.-O. / Cartes géopolitiques, Géopolitique, Afrique, Cartographie, Développement, Communication, Infrastructures, 2017, Géographie économique, 2020
Au delà du mythe, découvrez un projet polymorphe, une route maritime, des routes terrestres, une zone de progrès rapides ? Cernez une mise en œuvre parfois chaotique et complexe ; et les défis géopolitiques et géoéconomiques des Nouvelles routes de la soie.
- Chine / Chine , Cartes géopolitiques, Géopolitique, Géoéconomie, Route de la soie, Ports, Stratégie, Infrastructures, Fonds d'investissement, 2020, Route, Economie, Programme d'histoire-géographie, géopolitique et sciences politiques
Une carte - rare - de la Mongolie. Le point sur ses ressources minières et ses problématiques de désenclavement.
- Asie / Cartes géopolitiques, Matières premières, Réserves prouvées d'une ressource naturelle, Ressources naturelles, Stratégie, Infrastructures
Les États-Unis sont une nation qui ne se perçoit pas autrement qu'hégémonique, dans le domaine culturel comme dans les autres. L'Internet n'a fait que renforcer cette position, d'autant plus que l'industrie des matériels de réseau était aussi très bien placée.
- L'Internet, vecteur de puissance des Etats-Unis ? / Monde, Etats-Unis, Géopolitique, Internet, Culture, Stratégie, Infrastructures, Cyberespace, Economie, 2019
Série Un été stratégique. La mer Baltique est un point de contact entre la Russie et des pays de l'Union européenne voire de l'OTAN. Deux cartes commentées pour en saisir l'importance stratégique.
- Union européenne / Danemark , Estonie , Finlande , Lettonie , Lituanie , Norvège, Suède, Allemagne , Pologne , Russie , Cartes géopolitiques, Frontière, OTAN, Villes, centre-périphérie, fait urbain, Guerre froide, Gazoducs, Marine, Infrastructures, Mer, Gazoduc Nord Stream, PortL'essentiel de l'actualité internationale d'octobre 2018, avec tous nos encouragements pour les candidats des concours à venir !
- Transversaux / Monde, Etats-Unis, Chine , Géopolitique, Frontière, Elections, Afrique, Actualité, Programme géopolitique classes prépas HEC, Infrastructures, Violences, Programme géopolitique classes prépa ECS, Programme géopolitique classes prépas, Europe, 2018
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