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LA NEWSLETTER · GRATUITE
L'essentiel de l'actualité, passé au crible par les cinq plumes du Courrier. Dans votre boîte, chaque jour ouvré.
Gratuit. Vous restez libre de partir quand vous voulez.
JE M'INSCRIS lecourrierdesstrateges.frEntre le 29 mai et le 2 octobre 2026, soit 126 jours, l'once d'or est passée de 4 460 à 4 143,66 dollars, soit −7,09 %. Le Bitcoin est monté de 73 500 à 86 000 dollars, soit +17,01 %. Le bon du Trésor américain à trois mois rendait 4,00 % le 1er octobre, contre 3,75 % fin mai. Et l'euro s'est déprécié face au dollar, de 1,1644 à 1,1225.
Je reprends l'exercice dans l'ordre du bilan de juillet : ce que la doctrine a modifié, ce que l'allocation a produit, et ce que le chiffre cache.
ABONNEMENT
Deux grands formats par jour. Les cinq plumes du Courrier. La série Sécession, le dimanche.
Le monde commente. Vous, vous comprenez.
S'ABONNER lecourrierdesstrateges.frL'allocation de référence du 24 mai — 30 % or physique, 25 % T-bills, 20 % foncier de qualité, 5 % devises tierces pour la branche sûre ; 10 % Bitcoin, 5 % options longues, 5 % capital-risque pour la branche risquée — n'a pas varié d'un point depuis le 29 mai. Les quatre règles d'exécution posées en juin et juillet tiennent : les deux axes, l'épargne de précaution hors Barbell, le DCA accéléré sur correction de plus de 10 %, le rééquilibrage daté de janvier 2027.
Une seule chose s'est ajoutée, le 27 septembre puis le 4 octobre, et elle est négative : j'ai maintenu 0 % d'obligations souveraines de la zone euro alors que l'OAT à dix ans passait de 4,66 % à 4,92 %. C'est une position qui coûte visiblement de l'argent, et je la réaffirme ici pour qu'on ne puisse pas dire plus tard qu'elle a été discrètement abandonnée.
ABONNEMENT
Deux grands formats par jour. Les cinq plumes du Courrier. La série Sécession, le dimanche.
Le monde commente. Vous, vous comprenez.
S'ABONNER lecourrierdesstrateges.frValorisation au 2 octobre 2026 pour une entrée au 29 mai, aux taux de référence de la Banque centrale européenne.
| Poste | Investi | Valeur au 2 oct. | Écart | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Or physique (30 %) | 30 000 € | 28 913 € | −1 087 € | −3,62 % |
| T-bills 3-6 mois (25 %) | 25 000 € | 26 280 € | +1 280 € | +5,12 % |
| Foncier de qualité (20 %) | 20 000 € | 20 000 € | 0 € | 0,00 % |
| Bitcoin (10 %) | 10 000 € | 12 137 € | +2 137 € | +21,37 % |
| Devises tierces (5 %) | 5 000 € | 5 061 € | +61 € | +1,23 % |
| Sous-total valorisable | 90 000 € | 92 391 € | +2 391 € | +2,66 % |
| Options longues + capital-risque (10 %) | 10 000 € | non valorisables : primes non cotées, participations illiquides | ||
L'or supporte encore la perte, mais moins qu'en juillet. En dollars, le métal recule
LA NEWSLETTER · GRATUITE
L'essentiel de l'actualité, passé au crible par les cinq plumes du Courrier. Dans votre boîte, chaque jour ouvré.
Gratuit. Vous restez libre de partir quand vous voulez.
JE M'INSCRIS lecourrierdesstrateges.frMa réponse : non, et pas pour la raison que vous croyez.
Le Livret A sert 1,70 % depuis le 1er août 2026. Ce chiffre est net — ni impôt sur le revenu, ni prélèvements sociaux. C'est tout son intérêt, et c'est ce qu'on oublie en le comparant à un rendement brut.
En face, un fonds monétaire suit l'€STR (le taux auquel les banques de la zone euro se prêtent au jour le jour, référence du marché monétaire), qui s'établissait autour de 2,19 % fin août et converge vers 2,40 % après le relèvement du taux de dépôt de la BCE de 2,25 à 2,50 %, décidé le 10 septembre et applicable le 16. Retranchez les frais de gestion du fonds, de 0,10 à 0,50 % : vous obtenez entre 1,90 et 2,30 % bruts.
Puis appliquez le PFU — le prélèvement forfaitaire unique de 30 %, qui additionne 12,8 % d'impôt et 17,2 % de prélèvements sociaux, et qui frappe tout gain logé sur un compte-titres ordinaire. Il vous reste entre 1,33 et 1,61 % nets.
ABONNEMENT
Deux grands formats par jour. Les cinq plumes du Courrier. La série Sécession, le dimanche.
Le monde commente. Vous, vous comprenez.
S'ABONNER lecourrierdesstrateges.frC'est le calcul utile, et il tient en une division. Pour égaler 1,70 % nets, un fonds imposé au PFU doit servir 1,70 divisé par 0,70, soit 2,43 % nets de frais. Cela
Executive Summary:
Editor’s note: This is the final article in a four-part series. The previous three articles can be read here, here, and here.
For decades, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has placed the development and expansion of comprehensive national power (CNP; 综合国力) at the center of both Party ideological frameworks and its understanding of international competition. [1] Its current general secretary, Xi Jinping, has repeatedly tied CNP to core issues of Party legitimacy. In 2018, he explained that “liberating and developing social productive forces and enhancing the [CNP] of socialist countries is socialism’s essential demand and fundamental task” (解放和发展社会生产力，增强社会主义国家的综合国力，是社会主义的本质要求和根本任务), echoing a formulation established by Deng Xiaoping nearly 30 years earlier (Xinhua, December 18, 2018). [2] In 2021, he framed success in the Party’s core aim of achieving national rejuvenation in terms of winning the advantage in CNP competition, linking this directly to another pillar of the Party’s legitimacy (Xinhua, September 26, 2021). [3]
In the coming years, efforts to build CNP in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will increasingly emphasize dominating technological innovation. Recent statements by leading CCP figures and in top Party publications make a clear link between CNP as the key metric by which the leadership assesses PRC national strength and advances in strategic and emerging technologies. Politburo standing committee member Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥) recently described computing power as “an important manifestation of a nation’s CNP” (国家综合国力的重要体现); and shortly thereafter a People’s Daily article described leading science and technology talents as “a concentrated reflection of a country’s … CNP” (一个国家的 … 综合国力的集中体现) (People’s Daily, May 19, May 30).
Pinning success in developing CNP on the Party’s legitimacy narratives makes the stakes very high, particularly as its pursuit of CNP faces challenges, including from competition with the United States. A decline in the country’s comparative CNP and lost ground in its efforts to change the international order would reflect negatively on the Party leadership, perhaps in dangerous ways for either the leadership core or the Party more broadly. While the CCP continues to assess that it is on a long-term positive trajectory, that trajectory will not be linear. Bad policy choices could damage CNP growth, and provide openings that the United States or others could exploit.
Growing CNP Could Lead to More Aggressive Behavior
Evolving out of the 19th Party Congress in 2017, the CCP leadership has expressed increasing dissatisfaction with efforts to translate its accrued national strength as measured by CNP into a more powerful position globally. Efforts to date have focused on enhancing the country’s discourse power, but if this fails then Chinese leaders may turn to more assertive methods in the coming decade, perhaps leading to a far more dangerous PRC (China Brief, January 6). The combination of increased confidence in its comparative position globally, continued expansion of CNP across core elements of national strength, and growing dissatisfaction with the international order will likely change what deters Beijing over time, increasing the risk for those working to ensure that the CCP remains deterred from destabilizing military action in the region or coercive economic or political actions globally.
PRC behavior internationally has already changed as Chinese analysts and CCP leaders have become more confident in the PRC’s relative power in the international system. This shift will complicate how the lessons learned from Chinese behavior over the period 1978–2010 informs and enables prediction of how the country may act in the future. For example, a common perspective among China analysts is that Chinese leaders are so concerned with their international reputation that they will not take aggressive actions or can be shamed into “responsible” behavior as the West might define it. As Chinese confidence in its position globally continues to grow, however, Beijing instead will be less concerned with reputational costs. This has played out in recent years in the South China Sea, where significant public attention to destabilizing and aggressive Chinese actions against the Philippines has had little discernable impact on PRC behavior to date (China Brief, April 28, 2008, June 21, 2013, June 21, 2024, June 11). This publicity may even reinforce Beijing’s efforts to deter other actors in the region by demonstrating strength and will against potential adversaries.
Miscalculation Would be Dangerous
The PRC’s approach to measuring CNP could lead to dangerous miscalculation and overconfidence. Its current strategic buildup risks reaching a point at which the Chinese military finally assesses that it has accrued enough national defense power to deter the United States and/or U.S. allies from entering a conflict over Taiwan or elsewhere. Overconfidence in the deterrence capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army’s strategic forces, especially in combination with a rapidly expanding conventional force, risks leading to aggressive actions and miscalculation of the PRC’s own ability to deter the United States and others. Assessments made in 2020 noted that national defense strength was lagging behind economic strength, science and technology (S&T) strength, and CNP, all of which leaped ahead during the 13th five-year plan period (2016–2020) (Xinhua, November 26, 2020). This was despite the 2020 edition of the Science of Military Strategy discussing the critical importance of military strength to national defense strength within CNP as the “backbone of … war strength” (战争实力 … 的骨干力量) (Xiao, ed., 2020). [4]
Flaws in its approach to measuring CNP could at the same time lead to opportunities for the United States and its allies. For instance, the CCP believes that a lack of even and coordinated distribution of development across individual CNP subsystems will lead to instability (China Brief, September 26, 2025). Under this view, overinvestment in one area could come at the cost of other critical elements of CNP. This was a key factor in the downfall of the Soviet Union, which the United States drove to pursue unbalanced investment across its system. The CCP’s continued focus on the importance of balance across its subsystems suggests that a similar strategy could be applied to U.S.–PRC competition should competition grow that intense in the coming decades.
Another flaw in CNP calculations may lie in political sensitivities that could impact the measurement of CNP. This would lead to bad policies, which in turn could unintentionally worsen the country’s CNP. For instance, “soft power” elements of CNP—such as political strength, diplomatic strength, and culture and education strength—can be assigned negative values when calculating CNP, according to the theorist Huang Shuofeng (黄朔风). These elements are all far more politically sensitive than economic or S&T strength and are less easy to measure, though they also face degrees of political sensitivity (Huang, 2006). [5] A negative score in political strength would be reflective of poor leadership, poor management of the system, or policies and strategies that are not working. Although Huang’s is only one scale offered and may not reflect the current methodology used, any internal methodology would have trouble accurately measuring political strength due to the sensitive considerations involved. The same goes for national cohesion as described within CNP literature, which continues to be reinforced by the coercive power of the state. [6]
CNP Calculation Presents Avenues for Competitive Action
Soft spots in the PRC’s approach to calculating CNP are potential targets for competitive actions that undermine the Chinese leadership’s confidence in its assessments. [7] These could complicate its pursuit of CNP growth by forcing it to take policy and strategy decisions that derail its progress. For instance, if the CCP is unable to resolve current economic challenges, the country may never achieve the leading position in the international system as measured by CNP, which is a clear strategic objective. Moreover, if its economic slowdown continues for a decade or more, strict export controls, reduced access to the Western S&T ecosystem, and continued de-risking of U.S. and European S&Tfocused enterprises could force the PRC to overinvest in S&T at the expense of other CNP elements. This ultimately could undermine top leadership confidence in its status and suggest that the CCP, or at least relevant Party officials, are responsible for mismanagement.
Setbacks will not automatically spell the end of the PRC’s CNP growth, however, whether from a slowing economy or otherwise. If the system can find ways to effectively manage its problems, other drivers will ensure that the country’s rise can be maintained. The PRC as a result may be able to achieve preeminent status in CNP rank globally across all core elements of CNP without ever passing the United States in terms of total GDP. This is because CNP depends on how different constituent elements are weighted in the calculation of CNP and how they interact within the CNP system (and react to variables outside of the open system) (China Brief, September 5, 2025). Understanding Chinese calculations of comparative CNP should shed light on where CCP leaders perceive the PRC to be positioned in competition and how CCP approaches to risk may be evolving.
Deterring the PRC at the strategic level over the coming decades would require undermining Chinese confidence in its assessments of the “two trends” (两个大局)—national rejuvenation and changes unseen in a century—that Chinese analysts and CCP leaders assess reflect a shift in the global balance of power as measured by CNP. Deterrence is a critical element of national defense power, both for the PRC’s expanding capabilities, and for the United States and its allies and partners to continue deterring destabilizing Chinese actions.
In projecting the future of Chinese thinking on CNP competition, two critical elements will be important to assess. First, past experience does not predict future performance. The PRC’s impressive rise over the past 40 years does not mean that its rise will continue or that it will achieve its goals without any decline in power. Chinese scholars have discussed within the CNP literature the dangers of being the number two CNP power behind the United States, examining how both the Soviet Union and Japan stalled out and failed to surpass the United States during the 20th century. In this vein, Yan Xuetong (阎学通) warned in 2015 that bad policy decisions by the Chinese leadership can cause economic and military strength to decline (Yan, 2015). [8]
Second, challenges to certain CNP elements do not automatically entail an overall decline in CNP. The PRC has overcome significant challenges to date, or at least addressed them in ways that have enabled continued growth of CNP and modernization. Similarly, its path over the next 20 years is unlikely to be linear. The country has significant staying power and will remain a formidable economic, military, technological, and ideological challenger to the United States over the coming decades. Its emergence as a globally-leading innovation country will further impact its regional and global power in the coming decades, underpinning the CCP’s ability to continue challenging the international order.
Conclusion
CNP measurements play an important role in the PRC’s policymaking process but are poorly understood. This directly impacts how countries might respond to the PRC’s continued aggressive actions short of armed conflict. Often described as “gray zone tactics,” these actions are better considered within the context of CNP competition. Wu Chunqiu (吴春秋), a scholar at the Academy of Military Sciences, pointed out in 1998—in analysis that was reiterated over the years in other Chinese documents—that CNP competition focuses across core constituent strength elements of CNP, such as economic competition, political competition, and S&T competition. In that context, the PRC is waging strategic competition in the “gray zone,” trying to undermine U.S. power and improve the PRC’s relative position without crossing thresholds that would trigger the United States (or others) to respond in ways that damage Chinese pursuit of CNP. In 2002, Wu explained that “victory without war does not mean that there is not any war at all. The wars one must fight are political war, economic war, technological war … a war of comprehensive national power.” [9] This notion was also prevalent in the 2020 Science of Military Strategy. [10]
Understanding how the CCP and PRC scholars conceptualize CNP offers valuable insights into how Chinese leaders, policy makers, and strategists understand competition with the West, the PRC’s role in the world, and how the country is progressing toward rejuvenation. Tracking these estimates over time may enable the United States to be more strategic and targeted in its approach to competition.
Examining the PRC’s approach to CNP holistically should identify effective ways for integrated deterrence to target the PRC’s own identified vulnerabilities and drive perceptions that reduce CCP leadership confidence across all constituent elements of CNP. While a CCP that realizes it may fall short, or even go backwards in global CNP rank, suggests the potential for Beijing to lash out, the CCP’s ambitions and the world it seeks to develop are far more dangerous should they succeed in their mission to become the world leading CNP power by 2049.
All views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the views or policies of the U.S. government, Department of War, or U.S. Pacific Command.
Notes
[1] The PRC’s approach to building CNP should not be overstated. Although Chinese leaders and elites have long held the goal of making the country strong and rich, this is not to say they have always had a singular vision of what that means or how to get there. Despite CNP being a common frame over the past 40 years, bureaucratic infighting, contradictory self-interest of officials and government entities, and the complication of moving a system as large as the PRC’s in one singular direction is an enormous challenge. In addition, as is always the case within Chinese bureaucracy, while CNP is referenced and pointed to in documents across the system, it is often difficult to discern whether this is because of its central importance, or whether it is a code word of sorts that helps justify resource requests.
[2] This quote also appears in a volume published by the United Front Work Department of the Party Committee of China University of Mining and Technology, United Front Information, 2018 (2), p. 6–7.
[3] Xi is quoted as having said, “gaining the upper hand in [CNP] competition is key to national rejuvenation. It is precisely because we possess the greatest advantage of the Party’s leadership that we have become the greatest positive force shaping changes unseen in a century” (在综合国力的竞争中赢得先机是民族复兴的关键。正因为拥有党的领导这一最大优势，我们成为决定世界百年未有之大变局的最大正能量). To be sure, it remains difficult to discern how CNP measures influence CCP decision-making, whether they allocate resources based on CNP examination, as scholars in the 1990s emphasized, or the extent to which changes in foreign policy can be attributed to CCP assessments of comparative CNP. The body of literature examined in this series suggests they do change policy based on comparative CNP, but how that happens is less clear. The 2013 reassessment of the PRC’s development status as “unbalanced and uneven” (不平衡、不协调) and the formulation of the new “primary contradiction in Chinese society” (社会主要矛盾) outlined in 2017 would suggest that they are in fact using such measures to inform decisions, especially with the launching of new development strategies to address those assessments. Foreign policy behavior after 2010 would also suggest that Chinese assessments of having achieved the status of the second largest CNP-power in the world did in fact change Chinese foreign policy. CNP measures may simply be used to assess where the PRC is within global competition and to assess trend lines in comparative power.
[4] Lt. Gen. Xiao Tianliang, ed., The Science of Military Strategy (2020 Edition), January 2020, National Defense University Press, 2020, p. 26–32. The full sentence reads: “因此，综合国力是制定和实施战略的客观物质基础。它不仅是战略手段的基本依托，而且对战略目标的确定有着直接影响。一个国家的综合国力主要包括以下要素 … 其中军事能力是战争实力与潜力中的骨干力量，对战略具有直接影响和制约.”
[5] Huang Shuofeng, Rivalries Between Major Powers: A Comparison of World Powers’ Comprehensive National Power [大国较量：世界主要国家综合国力国际比较], (Beijing: World Affairs Press, August 2006), p. 103–104. Huang is a former scholar at National Defense University who published the first major study on the country’s CNP in 1984 and devised ways to calculate it. He explained in this 2006 work that the “soft power” elements of CNP are ranked on a sliding scale starting from negative one.
[6] Messaging, information, and education campaigns have worked for 30 years to craft a national and nationalistic identity. It remains unclear if cultural strength, which relies on national identity and cohesion, can be artificially created by the state, as the CCP hopes to engineer within the PRC. It also remains difficult to see how Chinese measures of CNP can accurately reflect cultural power and national cohesion without dangerously pointing to flaws within the CCP.
[7] The PRC is confident that information operations can undermine social cohesion. In 2020, cybersecurity firm Mandiant and Google reported that Chinese disinformation related to the killing of George Floyd sought to mobilize U.S. citizens to protest against their government. The Party likely assesses that similar operations against the PRC would pose a significant threat to the Party.
[8] Yan Xuetong, The Transfer of World Power: Political Leadership and Strategic Competition (Beijing: Peking University Press, September 2015). Yan was highlighting bad decisions made during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, but the point would still apply to today’s leadership and would fall under the core CNP element of political strength. Yan also wrote in 2013 that if the PRC stayed the course of reform and opening that had been the hallmark of Chinese policy from 1978–2013, it undoubtedly would continue to grow its CNP and close the gap with the United States. It is unclear both whether the significant policy changes over the last ten years have changed his assessment or whether he would be able to offer an accurate assessment of the effect of those changes on CNP.
[9] Wu Chunqiu, “Dialectics and the Study of Grand Strategy: A Chinese View,” Chinese Military Science, 2002 No. 3, p. 152.
[10] Supra [4].
The post CNP Part IV: Calculation Holds Keys to Strategic Competition appeared first on Jamestown.
La branche risquée représente 20 % de l'allocation, soit 100 000 euros sur le cas type. Son rôle est l'inverse de la branche sûre : encaisser disproportionnellement les discontinuités, au prix d'une volatilité élevée et d'un risque de perte totale sur chaque ligne. On n'y met que ce qu'on accepte de voir chuter de moitié sans vendre.
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Disons-le d'emblée, parce que c'est le point qui a prêté à confusion dans une chronique récente : le Bitcoin est un actif risqué, pas une protection défensive. Il a
La branche sûre représente 80 % de l'allocation, soit 400 000 euros sur le cas type. Son rôle n'est pas de rapporter : il est de ne pas perdre si le système se disloque. Quatre briques, dans l'ordre de poids.
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Aux niveaux de fin mai (environ 4 540 dollars l'once, soit autour de 4 200 euros), l'or a triplé en cinq ans, porté par les achats des banques centrales du Sud Global et par la complexification de la fiscalité du dollar. Il continue de jouer son rôle monétaire : préserver le pouvoir d'achat face à l'érosion des monnaies.
J'ouvre cette semaine une série en cinq volets sur la stratégie Barbell, parce que j'ai constaté, en relisant mes propres chroniques, que la doctrine méritait d'être reposée d'un bloc plutôt que par touches. Une lectrice m'a d'ailleurs signalé, à juste titre, une incohérence que je corrige explicitement vendredi. Commençons par le principe.
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Ces chiffres ont une conséquence patrimoniale que la plupart des épargnants français n'ont pas encore tirée. L'actif que la culture financière hexagonale présente depuis quarante ans comme le socle sans risque de toute épargne prudente — l'obligation d'État français, et le fonds en euros de l'assurance-vie qui en est gorgé — est précisément devenu le risque. Ce n'est pas un paradoxe rhétorique : c'est une lecture de bilan. Quand l'émetteur réputé le plus sûr voit sa note baisser, son besoin de financement battre des records et sa charge d'intérêts doubler en six ans, la « sécurité » qu'il vend à l'épargnant n'est plus qu'une habitude.
Je consacre la chronique de ce dimanche à un seul point de la doctrine Barbell : comment reconstruire la branche sûre de votre patrimoine quand la signature de votre propre État n'en fait plus partie. Je rappelle le principe pour les nouveaux lecteurs. La stratégie Barbell — l'haltère, en français — consiste à placer 70 à 80 % de son patrimoine dans des actifs très sûrs et 20 à 30 % dans des actifs à fort potentiel, en excluant tout le centre : pas de fonds diversifié, pas de portefeuille « équilibré » 60/40. Aujourd'hui, je ne traite que la branche sûre, parce que c'est elle que la dérive de l'État vient piéger.
Le Courrier des StratègesRédactionPour fixer les idées, je raisonne sur un patrimoine financier de 500 000 euros — le milieu de la fourchette de cette rubrique. Vous diviserez ou multiplierez selon le vôtre.
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L'utilisation d'une telle somme avec une logique de prudence, mais avec le souci de faire quelques profits, ne peut évidemment faire abstraction de la guerre régionale en pleine escalade (mais jusqu'où ?) au Moyen-Orient. Cette période de tension peut réserver quelques bonnes surprises, paradoxalement.
Voici pourquoi, pour l'allocation de ce capital de 150 000 € dont nous discutions récemment, j'exclus la tiédeur. Je recommande la stratégie de la "Barbell" (l'haltère) : d'un côté, votre socle antifragile déjà constitué ; de l'autre, une poche offensive radicale capable de capturer le chaos.
Ce week-end ne manquez pas le dossier opérationnel de Vincent Clairmont pour placer de façon antifragile 150.000€ d'héritage. Recevez gratuitement ce dossier pour tout abonnement à 79€ souscrit avec le 7 avril à 10h.
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Oubliez le secteur de la défense comme simple valeur cyclique. En 2026, la "War Tech" est la nouvelle tech.
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Le modèle classique de gestion de patrimoine né au XXe siècle est officiellement caduc. En ce mois de mars 2026, les cadres et entrepreneurs font face à un triptyque toxique :
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Inspirée des travaux de Nassim Nicholas Taleb, la stratégie que nous vous proposons repose sur un principe radical : éliminer le "milieu" de risque, ce ventre mou composé d'actifs vulnérables dont le potentiel est limité et le risque sous-estimé.
Notre Guide opérationnel d'allocation antifragile détaille une structure en deux piliers pour un capital type de 100 000 € :
Le Courrier des Stratèges s'adresse à ceux qui refusent d'être les victimes passives des cycles macroéconomiques. Ce guide n'est pas une simple analyse théorique ; c'est un plan d'action immédiat incluant :
Le chaos est une échelle. À vous de décider si vous voulez la descendre ou la grimper.
Retrouvez ci-dessous le Guide opérationnel de la Barbell Strategy mis à jour au 30 mars 2026 !
Retrouvez, en fin d'article, notre Guide initial de la Barbell Strategy (1er novembre 2025). Ce Guide opérationnel vous permet de mettre en place une stratégie de résistance de votre patrimoine aux crises. Il s'agit d'un élément indispensable à la sécession libertarienne que nous préconisons.
Le Courrier des StratègesÉric VerhaegheCe week-end, tout nouvel abonnement à 79€ vous donnera accès à notre tout nouveau Dossier opérationnel gratuit de l'épargne anti-stagflation. Ne le manquez pas !
L'offre est valable jusqu'à lundi 10h.
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Il s'agit d'un instrument financier dont le profil est asymétrique : le risque de perte est connu et limité à la mise initiale, mais le potentiel de gain est virtuellement illimité ou explosif en cas d'événement imprévu (un "Cygne Noir").
Dans une construction Barbell typique, environ 10 % du capital est alloué à ces actifs de chaos, tandis que les 90 % restants sont placés dans des actifs ultra-sécurisés (cash, obligations d'État à court terme, or). Ces actifs incluent généralement :
Le Courrier des StratègesRédactionL'objectif fondamental n'est pas simplement de "gagner de l'argent", mais d'atteindre l'antifragilité. Un système antifragile est un système qui ne se contente pas de résister aux chocs, mais qui se renforce grâce au désordre et à l'incertitude.
Le Courrier des StratègesÉric VerhaegheLe recours à cette stratégie est particulièrement pertinent dans le contexte économique actuel pour plusieurs raisons structurelles identifiées par les experts :
Le Courrier des StratègesRédactionUne volatilité accrue : Dans un monde marqué par des tensions géopolitiques persistantes, l'incertitude devient la norme. La stratégie Barbell est précisément conçue pour transformer cette imprévisibilité en avantage concurrentiel.
Pour tout savoir de la stratégie Barbell, téléchargez notre Guide Barbell ci-dessous.
Executive Summary:
On December 4, 2025, the White House released the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS). The document mentions Taiwan eight times, the third-most of any country, after the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia. It also attaches great importance to the prevention of a Taiwan Strait conflict, saying that “deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority,” and calling for the capacity to deny aggression “anywhere” in the first island chain (White House, December 4, 2025). In addition to focusing on Taiwan’s strategic value, it also notes Taiwan’s economic importance, due to its “dominance of semiconductor production.”
The document contains several subtle shifts in language on Taiwan from the Biden administration’s 2022 NSS. While the earlier document said that the United States would “oppose” any unilateral changes to the status quo, the new strategy simply says that it “does not support” any changes. The new NSS also drops language from the Biden administration’s strategy on not supporting Taiwan independence and on remaining committed to a “one China policy” (White House, October 12, 2022).
Initial Taiwanese reactions to the release of the NSS ranged from cautious optimism to outright skepticism. Some interpreted the language as signaling greater U.S. strategic clarity regarding the Taiwan Strait, while others focused on linguistic shifts in the NSS to argue that it may foreshadow higher expectations for Taiwan and greater uncertainty about Washington’s long-term intentions.
Incumbent Administration Optimistic
The day after the NSS was released, President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) remarked on social media that he “greatly appreciate[d]” the prioritization of deterring a conflict over Taiwan and securing the first island chain (X/@ChingteLai, December 5, 2025). Presidential Office Spokesperson Karen Kuo (郭雅慧) described preventing an assault on Taiwan as the strategy’s most important objective, saying that “as long as Taiwan is safe, the Indo-Pacific is safe” (台灣沒事，印太就沒事) (SETN, December 6, 2025). [1]
Cabinet-level officials also reacted positively. Taiwan’s foreign minister, Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍), broadened his comments to include reference to Taiwan’s role in key supply chains. He said that President Trump’s recent signing of the Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act and his approval of arms sale packages to Taiwan demonstrate continued U.S. commitment to Taiwan (Reuters, November 18, 2025; MoFA, December 6, 2025). Taiwan’s defense minister, Wellington Koo (顧立雄), remarked that “peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific is still the United States’s greatest core interest” (印太區域和平穩定還是美國最大的核心利益), emphasizing collective deterrence as well as Taiwan’s progress in its resolve and self-defense capabilities (LTN, December 6, 2025).
This tone was echoed among Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislators and DPP-affiliated experts. Wang Ting-yu (王定宇), who sits on the Legislative Yuan’s Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, said that Taiwan “is seen as an important core interest” (視為重要的核心利益) of the United States, and noted that Taiwan’s importance to the United States “is very clearly stated” (描述的非常清楚) in the NSS (SETN, December 6, 2025). Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲), director of the Defense Strategy and Resources Division (國防戰略與資源研究所) at the government-affiliated think tank Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR; 國防安全研究院) said that the NSS affirms U.S. strategic clarity and represents a fourth “period of strategic opportunity” (戰略機遇期) in Taiwan’s recent history. [2] Su noted that references in the NSS to “collective defense” and commitments to “denying aggression” in the first island chain should lead to a decrease in “skepticism of the United States” (疑美論) (LTN, December 7, 2025).
Other Figures Respond With Caution
The NSS makes clear that the burden of preventing conflict in the Taiwan Strait is not the unilateral responsibility of the United States. It says that U.S. allies “must step up and spend—and more importantly do—much more for collective defense,” and that the U.S. will “maintain our determined rhetoric on increased defense spending” in Taiwan.
This has caused some anxiety, even among politicians connected to the DPP administration. General Lee Hsiang-yu (李翔宙), who served as National Security Bureau director under President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and ambassador to Denmark under President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), interpreted the NSS as demanding that Taiwan develop “absolute deterrence” (絕對性嚇阻) (UDN, December 7, 2025). He also warned that Taiwan must avoid being a victim of great power competition.
On the other side of Taiwan’s political spectrum, the Kuomintang (KMT) leadership and local officials have been uncharacteristically quiet, giving no official response on the NSS. One legislator, Lee Yen-hsiu (李彥秀), acknowledged the language in the NSS but criticized delays in U.S. arms deliveries, urging Washington to pressure manufacturers to adhere to delivery timelines (Radio Taiwan International, December 7, 2025).
Some perspectives from the pro-PRC wing of the KMT overlapped with Beijing’s response to the NSS, particularly regarding the PRC’s interpretation of U.S. intentions in the Western Hemisphere (China Brief, December 17, 2025). Former KMT Legislator and media pundit Tsai Cheng-yuan (蔡正元) emphasized the NSS’s ambition to “reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine to restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere,” stating that the NSS represented a “strategic retreat” (戰略撤退) and that the United States was “hollowing out its Indo-Pacific strategy” (將印太戰略掏空化). This sentiment was reiterated by another former KMT legislator, Joanna Chien Lei (雷倩), who sees Trump as intending to rely on Taiwan and Japan to contain the PRC. Tsai also argued that the U.S. government is softening its view of the PRC from “enemy number one” (頭號敵人) to “a friend that they are not on good terms with” (不太好的朋友) (Storm Media Group, December 8, 2025).
Conclusion
Different stakeholders in Taiwan have reacted in different ways to the new U.S. National Security Strategy. Many are reassured of continued U.S. attention and support, especially those in the DPP administration. At the same time, the NSS has sharpened debates over burden sharing and Taiwan’s decision-making agency within the overall U.S. strategy. It has not resolved longstanding ambiguities surrounding U.S. commitments to Taiwan, but instead has reframed them in ways that have been interpreted either as opportunities or as challenges. Going forward, Taiwan will likely continue its ongoing military modernization and seek greater cooperation with Japan in recognition that it will not be able to rely solely on the United States in a future Taiwan contingency.
Notes
[1] The specific wording “台灣沒事，印太就沒事” is in reference to “台灣有事就是日本有事” (Any contingency for Taiwan is a contingency for Japan), first articulated by former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe in 2021 after leaving office. (The original Japanese is “台湾有事は日本有事.”) Recently, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi referenced the concept in response to a question in parliament that a PRC attack on Taiwan could constitute an “existential crisis” for Japan, allowing for Japan to resort to self-defense.
[2] The other three “periods of strategic opportunity,” according to Su, were President George W. Bush’s arms sale package to Taiwan in 2001 and his commitment to defend Taiwan; the Taiwan Travel Act, passed under the first Trump administration; and President Biden’s four public commitments to defending Taiwan (LTN, December 7, 2025).
The post Taiwan’s Cautious Optimism on U.S. National Security Strategy appeared first on Jamestown.
Executive Summary:
On December 4, the White House released its National Security Strategy (NSS), the first of three key strategy documents released by the Trump administration. (The other two are the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy.) (White House, December 4). The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the nation most frequently cited in the document, and Chinese observers have been quick to analyze its implications.
PRC Claims to Force ‘Strategic Stalemate’
Beijing’s official reaction to the NSS remains cautious. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has not commented beyond a careful statement from spokesperson Guo Jiakun (郭嘉昆) in response to questions. Guo avoided emotional escalation, reiterating that economic and trade relations remain the “ballast” (压舱石) of the relationship and generate “mutual benefit” (互利共赢) (MFA, December 8). This muted response might indicate that Beijing remains tactically committed to maintaining a diplomatic baseline. In doing so, the PRC side can preserve negotiating space for the anticipated presidential summit in April 2026 that, it hopes, will conclude with a favorable transactional deal.
PRC academia and think tanks are more cautiously triumphalist. They view the release of the NSS as further evidence of their long-held belief in the “rise of the East and the decline of the West” (东升西降). Reports from key state think tanks have not voiced alarm at the document, but instead view it as a signal that the United States has finally been forced to acknowledge the end of its unipolar hegemony, retreating from offensive liberalism to a posture of realism (WeChat/CICIR, December 9).
An analysis by Wang Wen (王文), Executive Dean of the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China, points out that after failing in “four successive offensives” (四轮攻势)—military, ideological, economic, and the initial trade war—the United States has been forced into a “strategic stalemate” (战略相持阶段) with the PRC (WeChat/Chongyang Institute, December 5). This assessment is reinforced by analysis from the cabinet-level think tank, the Development Research Center of the State Council (DRC), which highlights the NSS’s reclassification of the PRC from a strategic threat to a “near-peer” competitor. The DRC characterizes this terminological shift as “toning down without changing the tune” (降调不变调) (WeChat/DRC, December 12). Both analyses imply that Washington has realized the futility of broad ideological confrontation and has instead pivoted to a strategy of precise, high-tech suppression. This signifies an admission that Washington can no longer overwhelm the PRC across the board and must now concentrate all its resources on choking specific industrial bottlenecks.
Days before the NSS was released, Zheng Yongnian (郑永年), Dean of the Institute for International Affairs at CUHK-Shenzhen, characterized Trump as a “neorealist” (新现实主义). But unlike traditional neorealists, who see competition as baked into an anarchic international system, Zheng sees a development in neorealist thinking toward recognition that “the PRC has already risen and cannot be defeated” (中国已经崛起了，已经打不败中国了), leaving Washington with no choice but to “deal with and engage with” (打交道，打交往) Beijing (Guancha, December 5).
Commentary Highlights U.S. Rifts with Partners
The NSS has been poorly received by several U.S. partners. This presents an opportunity for Beijing, which is actively moving to exploit the document to drive wedges between the United States and its traditional partners.
An analysis from Xinhua characterized the strategy’s “Trump corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine—an assertion of dominance in the Western Hemisphere—as a “haughty” (趾高气扬) declaration of a “right to intervention” (干预权), arguing that it exposes U.S. hegemonic double standards to the Global South. It also highlighted the strategy’s attitude toward European politics, framing the NSS’s characterization of the “stark prospect of civilizational erasure” in Europe as “extremely combative” (火药味十足) rhetoric (Xinhua, December 6). [1]
Regional experts at the Ministry of State Security-affiliated China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) note that the NSS’s demands for Japan and South Korea to assume primary defense responsibilities, while ignoring allies like the Philippines, expose a systemic imbalance in which the United States demands “protection fees” (保护费) while effecting a global strategic retrenchment (全球战略的收缩) (CICIR, December 9). This provides a strategic opportunity for the PRC to stabilize its periphery through economic means while U.S. credibility erodes.
The NSS contains strong language on Taiwan, calling for “preserving military overmatch” as a priority. PRC responses to this section of the strategy exhibit a calm cynicism, focusing on its framing of Taiwan’s status as a geopolitical asset rather than a like-minded partner. Observers and scholars with military backgrounds note that the NSS focuses heavily on Taiwan’s centrality to semiconductor supply chains and global trade routes and ignores democratic values. Military commentator Shi Yang (施洋) described this as a “naked revelation of Taiwan’s strategic utility to the United States” (赤裸裸地把台湾对美国的战略利益和盘托出), implying that Washington views the island merely as a geopolitical token to be secured for its own self-interest (Guancha, December 7). Professor Zhang Jiadong (张家栋) from the Center for American Studies at Fudan University, meanwhile, contended that this section does not represent a display of strength but rather reflects U.S. anxiety over the diminishing marginal utility of its “Taiwan Card” (台湾牌) (Global Times, December 6).
Conclusion
Beijing’s reception of the 2025 NSS is characterized by calculated confidence. The PRC interprets the U.S. retreat toward “America First” as a confirmation of hegemonic decline. This assessment might drive Beijing to adopt a multi-layered strategy: globally, it can weaponize the “Trump Corollary” to fracture Washington and its allies and partners; regarding Taiwan, it can leverage a narrative that views the island as merely a geopolitical token rather than a democratic partner; and diplomatically, it can maintain a disciplined focus on its own economic core interests while minimizing overt criticism of the United States.
As both sides look toward the anticipated presidential summit in April 2026, Beijing appears convinced that the era of containment is yielding to an era of mutual transaction, positioning itself to negotiate a new global division of power with a Washington that it believes can no longer dictate the rules of the game.
Notes
[1] According to the NSS, the “Trump Corollary” refers to the administration’s ambition to “restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere.” This includes denying “non-Hemispheric competitors”—i.e., the PRC—the ability to “position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets,” in the region (White House, December 4).
The post Beijing Sees Opportunity in U.S. National Security Strategy appeared first on Jamestown.
Are we watching NATO’s Strategy of Tension plan unfolding right before our eyes? Two potential false-flag attacks over the weekend. One on Bondi Beach in Australia killing 15 people one in Rhode Island at Brown University where 2 students were killed. Both reportedly targeting jews.
And
Bondi Shooting Reporting is a Mess!
– Shooters are Indian Nationals not Pakistani
– Younger shooter’s mother is Italian & father is Indian
– Pakistani man wrongly labeled shooter, social media fails to correct
– Netanyahu falsely claims Ahmad al Ahmad (Syrian Muslim) aka the… https://t.co/pIdyINQ9aC pic.twitter.com/9Nx5h9xett— GenXGirl (@GenXGirl1994) December 15, 2025
The European ruling strata now stand isolated, widely unpopular and bereft.
Alastair Crooke at Strategic CultureA National Security Strategy (NSS) is produced periodically by U.S. Administrations (Trump authored one during his first term). Mostly these documents lay out an idealised version of an Administration’s foreign and security policy, and do not have great practical import – because of what is left out – i.e. entrenched U.S. political and economic interests; the deep foreign policy consensus overseen by the curator class of the deep security state; and the policies espoused by the mega donor collective.
Nonetheless, this recently-released NSS reads rather differently by putting a distinctive ‘America First’ gloss to U.S. foreign policy, eschewing global hegemony; ‘domination’ and ideological crusades in favour of pragmatic, transactional realism focused on protecting core national interests – homeland security, economic prosperity, and regional dominance in the Western Hemisphere. The U.S. thus will “no longer prop up the entire world order like ‘Atlas’ and expects Europe to shoulder more of its own defence burdens”.
It critiques the U.S.’ earlier pursuit of global primacy as ‘a failure’ that ended up weakening America – and situates Trump’s policy as a ‘necessary correction’ to the earlier stance. It therefore accepts the tilt towards a multipolar world.
Two key foreign policy aims are nuanced rather than radically recast:
First, China is downgraded from ‘primary threat’; ‘pacing threat’ to economic competitor (Taiwan is treated as an instrument of deterrence).
And in respect to Russia, it says,
“It is a core interest of the United States to negotiate an expeditious cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, in order to stabilize European economies, prevent unintended escalation or expansion of the war, and reestablish strategic stability with Russia, as well as to enable the post-hostilities reconstruction of Ukraine to enable its survival as a viable state”.
The document does not mention ‘strategic peace’ with Russia, but only a ‘cessation of hostilities’, i.e. a ceasefire. The careful choice of language used may signal that Trump does not intend a full settlement with Russia on its security concerns, but only a truce, a “cessation of hostilities”.
It terms European relations with Russia as “deeply attenuated”:
“The Trump Administration finds itself at odds with European officials who hold unrealistic expectations for the war perched in unstable minority governments, many of which trample on basic principles of democracy to suppress opposition. A large European majority wants peace, yet that desire is not translated into policy, in large measure because of those governments’ subversion of democratic processes. This is strategically important to the United States precisely because European states cannot reform themselves if they are trapped in political crisis”.
Essentially, Ukraine is pushed on the Europeans as their responsibility from now on. More generally, Allies are expected to foot the bills – as the U.S. builds at home.
One of the biggest NSS shifts is that America is defined now as a fortified hemisphere power in place of a global hegemon:
“We want a Hemisphere that remains free of hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets, and that supports critical supply chains; and we want to ensure our continued access to key strategic locations. In other words, we will assert and enforce a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine”.
In terms of military presence, the Strategy states that this entails “a readjustment of our global military presence to address urgent threats in our Hemisphere”.
Perhaps the most meaningful aspect in terms on practical impact is the reference to “ending NATO as an ever-expanding alliance” – and to Europe, which is critiqued in the most astringent terms:
The NSS is highly critical of Europe’s economic stagnation, its demographic decline, the loss of sovereignty to EU institutions and its “civilizational erasure”:
“We want Europe to remain European, to regain its civilizational self-confidence, and to abandon its failed focus on regulatory suffocation”.
The document declares the liberal/technocratic elites of the EU and many Member States to be a threat to Europe’s future, regional stability – and to American interests. It makes it clear that supporting the Patriotic Right in Europe, and “cultivating resistance” to Europe’s current trajectory are in the American interest.
It calls out population replacement (immigration) as the gravest long-term threat to Europe and American interests, openly questioning whether some European nations will remain reliable allies given their current trajectory.
The transatlantic relationship therefore remains in place but is no longer the centrepiece of U.S. foreign policy.
The European elite’s panic:
European leaders, including former Swedish PM Carl Bildt, called the NSS reference to Europe as being “to the Right of the extreme Right”. In the U.S., Democrats, such as Rep. Jason Crow, deemed it “catastrophic”. for alliances, i.e. for NATO.
To understand fully the panicked outcry issuing forth from Europe, a little context is required:
Liberal-woke identity politics allowed no ‘otherness’, not difference of opinion.
Washington Post columnist and MSNBC contributor Jennifer Rubin (long cited by the Washington Post as their ‘Republican columnist’ for ‘balance’), writing in September 2022, rejected the very notion of an argument having ‘sides’ since any contrary argument imputed a rationality to conservatives:
“We have to collectively, in essence, burn down the Republican Party. We have to level them – because if there are survivors, if there are people who weather this storm, they will do it again … The Kabuki dance in which Trump, his defenders and his supporters are treated as rational (clever even!) comes from a media establishment that refuses to discard … this false equivalence”.
And then-President Biden, in a speech that same month, said pretty much the same as Rubin: In a set-up bathed eerily in red and black light, at the historic Independence Hall, Biden unequivocally extended the threats from abroad to warn against the threat of a different terror, closer to home – from “Donald Trump and the MAGA Republicans”, who he said, “represent an extremism that threatens the very foundations of our republic”.
The core precept to this apocalyptic message duly crept across the Atlantic to capture and convert the Brussels’ leadership class. This should not be surprising: The EU’s regulation-based internal market was precisely intended to replace all political ‘contention’ with Tech-Managerialism. The Euro-élites were in desperate need of a Values System to fill the EU identity lacuna. The solution, however, was at hand:
“Appetites of the autocrat cannot be appeased. They must be opposed. Autocrats only understand one word: “No.” “No.” “No.” (Applause.). “No, you will not take my country.” “No, you will not take my freedom.” “No, you will not take my future … A dictator bent on rebuilding an empire will never be able to ease [erase] the people’s love of liberty. Brutality will never grind down the will of the free. And Ukraine — Ukraine will never be a victory for Russia. Never”. (Applause)”.
“Stand with us. We will stand with you. Let us move forward … with an abiding commitment to be allies not of darkness, but of light. Not of oppression, but of liberation. Not of captivity, but, yes, of freedom”.
Biden’s later speech (above) in Warsaw – complete with lighting effects and a dramatic backdrop reminiscent of his Liberty Hall speech – sought to portray the domestic MAGA opposition as a grave security threat to America and lent on radical Manicheanism to depict – this time – Russia (Russia being the external counterpoint to the related U.S. MAGA threat). This was his framing to the epic battle between the forces of light and of darkness that needed to be fought endlessly and won crushingly.
Once again, Biden was trying to cement America’s deep-seated missionary ethos as the ‘City on the Hill’ a beacon to the world – to a ‘forever’ cosmic war against Russian ‘evil’. He hoped to tie the American ruling class to the metaphysical struggle for the ‘light’.
David Brooks, author of Bobos in Paradise, (himself a liberal New York Times columnist), admits that initially he was taken by this liberal ideology, but later admitted this was a big mistake: “Whatever you want to call them [the liberals] have coalesced into an insular, intermarrying Brahmin élite that dominates culture, media, education, and tech”.
He acknowledges: “I didn’t anticipate how aggressively … we would seek to impose élite values through speech and thought codes. I underestimated the way the creative class would successfully raise barriers around itself to protect its economic privilege … And I underestimated our intolerance of ideological diversity”.
Put plainly, this thought-code precisely gave the Euro-élites their shiny new cult of absolute purity and stainless virtue – filling the for the EU its all too evident identity-gap lacuna. It resulted in the summoning of a vanguard whose proselytizing fury is to be focused on ‘the Other’.
Von der Leyen, in giving her ‘State of the Union’ address to the European Parliament in 2022 echoed Biden almost exactly:
“We should not lose sight of the way foreign autocrats are targeting our own countries. Foreign entities are funding institutes that undermine our values. Their disinformation is spreading from the internet to the halls of our universities … These lies are toxic for our democracies. Think about this: We introduced legislation to screen foreign direct investment for security concerns. If we do that for our economy, shouldn’t we do the same for ‘our values’? We need to better shield ourselves from malign interference … We will not allow any autocracy’s Trojan horses to attack ‘our democracies’ from within”.
Despite the cleaving together of the American ‘Bobos’ with the EU liberal warriors, many around the world nonetheless were astonished at the sheer alacrity by which the leadership in Brussels embraced the Biden ‘line’ advocating for a long war against Russia – a compliance that appeared so clearly to run contrary to European economic interests and social stability.
Simply put, it was a war of choice that seemed to be rooted ultimately in radical Manicheanism.
The initial formation of NATO in 1949 was generally opposed by the European Left due to its explicit anti-communist stance. However, with NATO’s bombing of Belgrade in 1999, the military alliance metamorphosed for some on the broader Left (including social democrats and liberals) as an instrument for liberal transmission and consolidation of ‘our democracy’ (this was Biden’s language at the time).
The fusion of the EU leadership to NATO and with the Biden project was complete. Germany’s Foreign Minister at the time Annalena Baerbock – every bit as intent on “ruining Russia”as Biden – in an address in New York in August 2022, sketched out a vision of a world dominated by the U.S. and Germany. In 1989, President George Bush famously offered Germany a “partnership in leadership”, Baerbock claimed. But at the time, Germany had been too busy with reunification to accept the offer. Today, she said, things had changed fundamentally: “Now the moment has come when we have to create it: A joint partnership in leadership”.
Harking on the ‘leadership partnership’ being understood in military terms, she said:
“In Germany, we have abandoned the long-held German belief in ‘change through trade’ … our goal is to further strengthen the European pillar of NATO… and the EU must become a Union capable of dealing with the United States on an equal footing: in a leadership partnership”.
Thus, the European élite’s outcry at the NSS’ devastating critique of Europe is not just that of America very obviously turning its back on an European ruling class who had dropped all to fawn on America. The NSS castigates their subversion of democracy – and even questions whether they will be suitable as allies for the future.
NATO is now declared to be “not forever”.
The European ruling strata now stand isolated, widely unpopular and bereft.
Pepe Escobar at Sputnik
FLORENCE, Italy – The new US National Security Strategy, the December 2025 version, is an intriguing, quirky, Bosch-style hybrid beast. It does not exactly look as it seems.
A tsunami of headlines across the discombobulated West focused on an apparent drive towards normalization between Washington and Moscow. But that’s far from the main focus of this Beauty and the Beast creation.
For starters, which Centaur designed the NSS Beast? Could it possibly be Trump? Unlikely. Could not be the clownish Secretary of Forever Wars. Could not be Marco Rubio – who can barely point to anything outside of Venezuela and Cuba on a map. So, who did it?
The fire in the belly of the NSS Beast is on the Russia-China strategic partnership: to try to undermine it by any means necessary. Trump, instinctively, and the old money, classic American ruling classes may have finally concluded that it’s idle to invest in a frontal war against twin, strategically-aligned peer competitors Russia-China. So it’s back, once again to Divide and Rule. And for everyone else, Plunder.
The NSS apparently offers Moscow a series of geoeconomic and geopolitical carrots while meticulously embedding the sticks in hybrid formats – prone to either provoke Russian elite fragmentation by attracting them back to the American market and American “values”, or to plunge the Russian Federation into ethnic “tensions”, coordinated by cyber-warfare.
There are no guarantees Team Trump 2.0 will be sophisticated enough to pull it off. In a nutshell, in no-diplo language, this would amount to simultaneously “isolate” Moscow all over again while “containing” China. Moscow and Beijing won’t fall for it.
What is clear so far is that with the new NSS, the Forever War ethos remains. But now rebranded: wars will be mostly hybrid, indirect and low cost.
Welcome to Managed Multipolarity
Even stripping down the NSS to the role of yet another narrative – the Empire of Chaos is a master producer of narratives – substantial rhetorical shifts seem to be afoot. The former “indispensable nation” now is characterized no more as a Global Robocop enforcing its hegemony, but as a Regional Robocop, in selected latitudes (mostly the Western Hemisphere). Europe and West Asia have been downgraded to the status of second-tier priorities.
To compound the (pragmatic?) realpolitik shift, this is now, at least in thesis, a Non-Ideological Empire. “Autocracies” are fine, as long as they play the imperial game; now it’s the EU chihuahuas who are branded as “anti-democratic”. Trump 2.0 will support a slew of “patriotic” European parties: that predictably set off serial heart attacks all across the vassalized Brussels sphere.
The NSS also brands its own version of the multipolar world. Call it Managed Multipolarity – as in Japan “managing” East Asia and Israel-Arab vassals “managing” West Asia via the Abraham Accords, with “counter-terrorism” enforced by the slimy Gulf petro-monarchies. In both cases, we will have the Empire of Chaos leading from behind.
NATO has been thrown, for all practical purposes, into Beggars Banquet territory. The Empire monopolizes everything: weapons, distribution of funding, nuclear guarantees. It’s up to the vassal collection to adjust to every imperial demand, especially 5% of their puny budgets for weapons purchases.
There will be no more NATO expansion: after all the real priorities are the Western Hemisphere and the “Indo-Pacific”, that non-existing formulation applied to the real-life Asia-Pacific.
The NATO/EU combo from now on qualifies at best as a nuisance – like mosquitoes in a five-star resort. Even with Article 5 and the nuclear umbrella still in place. Yet it’s up to the Euro-chihuahuas to pay, and pay and pay. Otherwise, the Empire will punish you.
The Global South/Global Majority can barely contain their expectations when the day will come – and it will come – of Russia sealing the definitive strategic defeat of the collective West in the black soil of Novorossiya.
In a sense, the NSS is already anticipating that day, with the new narrative making it clear the Empire has already moved on.
Containing China all over again
Latin America, as in the Western Hemisphere, will be under maximum pressure per the NSS – which explicitly reasserts a “Trump corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. The Empire wants its own backyard back – the whole combo, so it can be properly looted.
This is all about natural resources: it applies to Venezuela and Colombia, but also, ominously, to Brazil and Mexico. “Non-hemispheric rivals” – as in China – will be “countered”. Hybrid War in effect – all over again.
The NSS narrative does its best to mask the obsession with China. The mask falls when it addresses the First Island Chain”:
“We will build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain. But the American military cannot, and should not have to, do this alone. Our allies must step up and spend – and more importantly do – much more for collective defense.”
Translation: the “First Island Chain” – from the Kuril islands in Russia, through Okinawa and Taiwan, across the Philippines, and down to Borneo – will be the Apex of Militarization in Asia-Pacific. The NSS being a narrative, it presents this Cold War encirclement strategy as a protection shield. Beijing will not be fooled: this is for all practical purposes China containment in Asia-Pacific on overdrive.
Is Beijing impressed? Not really. Especially when China’s trade surplus for the first time has shot up beyond $1 trillion, even considering the fall of exports to the US under Trump’s Tariff Temper Tantrum. Make Trade, Not Containment.
Back to Chihuahuastan. The whole planet now knows that the EU/NATO combo is preparing for war with Russia before 2030; it could even be next year. And they are also considering a pre-emptive attack against the world’s number one nuclear and hypersonic power.
Away from the comic relief inbuilt in the European slow motion political suicide, in real life both the US and vassal Japan refused to join the European obsession in stealing Russian funds.
The collapse of the EU – an artificial construct to start with – is as inevitable as death and taxes: looming in the dark horizon is a toxic cloud of Brexit-style exits; an ungovernable euro-zone; serial capital flights; rising and rising bond yields; unsustainable public debt; a collapse of the single market; institutional paralysis; and total, irretrievable, final loss of the legitimacy they never had in the first place.
A book just published in Italy by a young economist, Gabrielle Guzzi, tells it all in the title: Eurosuicidio. Spengler remarked that every civilization sooner or later dies; this current European project may be the swansong – political, military, spiritual – of a geographical area, a peninsula of Eurasia, playing its final role in History, after learning nothing from two previous suicide attempts:
WWI and WWII.
Does the Empire care? Not at all. The Beauty expires as the Beast moves on.
Jeff J. Brown writing for Sputnik
Svetlana Ekimenko
The 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) may look softer on paper, recasting China from a “threat” into a “near-peer competitor” with seeming potential to “reshape” US-China relations, Dr. John Gong, economics professor at the University of International Business and Economics in Beijing, tells Sputnik.
The wording in the new US NSS is just a thin veneer of peaceful “palliatives,” China expert Jeff J. Brown tells Sputnik.
In reality, US allies “Japan, Taiwan, Philippines and Australia, are being armed for confrontation, and a hot war is still likely in the next 2-3 years,” says Brown, who is also founder of Seek Truth From Facts Foundation.
Washington “still flogs the Asian Quad – “obviously structured to counter China militarily,” he notes, adding that the NSS:
Australia, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea urged to “spend more on arms to ‘deter adversaries’ “which are obviously China, DPRK and Russia”
US tariffs also remain in force.
‘Behind-The-Scene Rogue Actors’
The CIA, US Departments of War and State, US Legislature, and Israel’s Mossad don’t want to relinquish the profits generated by forever wars, noted the expert.
These Western deep state actors learned a long time ago to ignore or sabotage any directives that threaten their filthy lucre,” he says.
No Shift in West’s Power Pyramid
The US plans to keep its allies buying its weapons to “contain China,” believes Brown. US “fealty” to the West’s war machine has been bought by billionaire donors who “don’t get richer with peace.”
Since 1963 and the presidency of John F. Kennedy, “no US president has been free to be ‘presidential’ in their governance, like Putin and Xi are,” he remarks.
Since 1963 and the presidency of John F. Kennedy, “no US president has been free to be ‘presidential’ in their governance, like Putin and Xi are,” he remarks.
As far as China is concerned, it will likely “play to Trump’s megalomania,” while quietly prepping for a potential hot war,” concludes Brown.
Original Q&A with Sputnik
1 Do you think the new strategy changes the US policy towards China? If yes, how? Is it possible that it is paving the way for some new steps from the US?
No, not really. While congratulating himself as the greatest peacemaker since Jesus Christ and pro-offering a few palliatives about the necessity of avoiding war with China, Trump is still flogging the awkward Asian Quad (US, India, Australia and Japan). It was Trump who revived this 2004’s dead grouping in 2017 and he can’t put it down. It is obviously structured to counter China militarily on all of its flanks, except the north, which is brother-in-arms Russia.
This National Security Strategy still insists on arming Taiwan to the hilt, to counter China with “military overmatch”. It still insists on militarily occupying the vast South China Sea (SCS), using the completely absurd notion of preventing a hostile country (obviously China) from forcing maritime shipping to pay passage tolls!
The SCS is not Malacca, Bering or Hormuz Straits. Since most of its traffic comes and leaves the Mainland, it would be a self-imposed tax on the Chinese people. It’s an utterly farcical excuse to keep up NATO’s naval and air presence there.
Trump wants to push Australia, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea to spend more on arms,
“…to deter adversaries and protect the First Island Chain. We will also harden and strengthen our military presence in the Western Pacific, while in our dealings with Taiwan and Australia we maintain our determined rhetoric on increased defense spending”.
“Adversaries” are obviously China, DPRK and Russia.
Trump further lists all the Sino-bogey bears that afflict America, including,
For Beijing, what is there to like?
2 How might the updated US security strategy influence the trade tensions between the US and China — exacerbate or resolve them?
China will play to Trump’s narcissism and megalomania, by spinning it as positively as possible, but tariffs are still in force, Japan, Taiwan, Philippines and Australia are being armed for confrontation and a hot war is still likely in the next 2-3 years. Mossad-CIA, US Departments of War and State, and the US Legislature are behind-the-scene rogue actors with too much profit and corruption to give up, and all that grift comes from forever wars. These Western Deep State actors learned a long time ago to ignore or sabotage any directives that threaten their filthy lucre.
3 What reaction do you expect from China to the new US strategy? What actions might China undertake?
China has been practicing statecraft diplomacy for 5,000 years and has endured many Trumps, Bidens and Macrons over the millennia. Good diplomats are eternally optimistic, patient and communicative. Just ask the Russians, who are also at this level of expertise. Beijing will publicly be positive and complimentary, while preparing for the worse – hot war.
4 How could the strategy shift the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific Region? What message does it send to US allies in the region, such as South Korea and Japan?
There will be no change in the West’s balance of power. Uncle Sam still expects to be the Big Kahuna and its “allies” (repeated 31 times in the NSS) are to be second-class vassals. For South Korea, Philippines, Taiwan, Japan, India and Australia, the message is clear: buy more and more US weapons to contain China.
An important and overlooked observation
In closing, there is something important to note. The National Security Strategy reports by Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barak Obama and Joe Biden (I did not go further back) did not address anyone in particular. The reports just started off with impersonal, expository writing.
Trump’s 2025 NSS starts out with, “My Fellow Americans”. This is very telling. He knows that since reassuming office, his forever wars in Palestine, Ukraine, Yemen, Iran, Venezuela and elsewhere have alienated his MAGA base and he risks losing their support. The NSS talks to the American people, not policy wonks, explaining the meaning of strategy, diplomacy and policy, like a classroom text. In this sense, it is very similar to how Beijing communicates governance to the Chinese people, treating them like adults and not talking down to them like children, which is the Western norm.
This NSS is at least as much of an effort to shore up his in-country popularity – probably more so – as it is to communicate with foreign friends and foes alike.
It will be very difficult for Trump to realize this NSS’s main goals of avoiding forever wars. His fealty to this Western cancer has been bought, to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars in “campaign donations” by influential and powerful (mostly Jewish) billionaires, who don’t get richer with peace. War means usury, arms and resource theft, which fill their and the Judeo-City of London’s coffers with trillions of your preferred currency.
I think Trump is sincere in trying to stop this imperial-colonial train, but the last US president who tried to do so was John F. Kennedy, and the Deep State blew his brains out in Dallas, Texas. Since 1963, every US president knows what happened, and has not been free to be “presidential” in their governance, like Putin and Xi are.
The first comment from China’s Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson yesterday, is perfectly down China’s well-known diplomacy line. No new comments of any nature were spken out, only what has been said before. This may be an indication that they are going to flatly ignore it as if it is more bluster.
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/fyrbt/202512/t20251208_11768841.html
Reuters: What is the Foreign Ministry’s reaction to the Trump administration’s newly released National Security Strategy, given that it says that the U.S. does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and also discusses the U.S. and its allies’ capacity to deny any attempt to seize Taiwan? What do you make of the document’s mentioning of the Quad grouping of nations as well?
Guo Jiakun: We noted the “National Security Strategy” report released by the U.S. government. China always believes that China and the U.S. stand to gain from cooperation and lose from confrontation. Upholding mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation is the right way for China and the U.S. to get along with each other and is the only right and realistic choice. China stands ready to work with the U.S. to sustain the steady development of the bilateral relationship and at the same time will firmly defend its sovereignty, security and development interests. We hope the U.S. will work with China in the same direction, act on the important common understandings reached between heads of state of the two countries, step up dialogue and cooperation, properly manage differences, promote the steady, sound and sustainable development of China-U.S. relations, and inject more certainty and stability into the world.
On the Taiwan question, we stress that Taiwan is China’s Taiwan and is an inalienable part of China’s territory. The Taiwan question is at the core of China’s core interests and the first red line that must not be crossed in China-U.S. relations. Resolving the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese people and Chinese people only that brooks no external interference. The U.S. needs to earnestly abide by the one-China principle and the three China-U.S. joint communiqués, honor its leaders’ commitment, approach the Taiwan question with extra prudence, stop abetting and aiding separatist forces’ attempt to seek “Taiwan independence” and resist reunification through military buildup. China will never flinch in defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
I was waiting for Brian Berletic to speak his piece, but there is more. I find a bunch of Americans liking this, but not understanding it. We wanna believe a US strategy because they say so? Where have they been over the past years, after, say, the 2nd WW, to bracket a timespan? Dmitry Medvedev recognized a diplomatic break for Russia (for now). But we have not heard from China. And the ‘western hemisphere’ is being claimed, as is West Asia.
It is primacy, but selected for this moment and changeable, as they decide with the required ‘burden-sharing’ to share US proxy wars. They’re going to sqeeze the hell out of so-called allies.
East Calling has provided this for us, quickly. Thank-you!
Before we go there, let’s take a quick look at Dmitry Peskov: Peskov’s first comment after the publication of the updated US national security strategy:
And this, of course, is a very gratifying, on the one hand, but on the one hand, we know what happens when everything is written very beautifully as a concept, but what they call a deep state does everything differently. <…>
Therefore, of course, it is necessary to closely monitor what kind of implementation this concept will find.
Deputy Chairman of the Security Counsel of the Russian Federation – Dmitry Anatolievich Medvedev on his VK:
The Americans continue to tame the crazed European Union. Naturally, so that the sick animal remembers who’s the real boss. Even Musk (in response to the fine against X) contributed to this, wishing for the EU’s disintegration. Not bad! Overall, this is to our benefit. Better Trump’s great-power pragmatism than Biden’s globalist insanity.
In this regard, the new National Security Strategy prepared by the current White House administration stands out. It is notable for its realistic assessment of many modern challenges. I should point out that the significance of such a strategy should not be exaggerated. It is merely a collection of political declarations. What matters is what’s in their heads. And not only in the minds of the inconsistent Washington brass, but also in the notorious “deep state.” And yet…
1. This time, a very interesting document has emerged from the depths of the White House. This is not just another pile of arrogant American diplomatic formulas. It’s more like an attempt to turn around a huge ship that has been sailing along by inertia for a long time and has finally decided to change course. For the first time in many years, Washington is openly talking about the need to restore “strategic stability” in Eurasia and improve relations with Russia.
This is no longer the language of the money-grubbing Derzhimorda, who, under Biden, declared a virtual crusade against Moscow. The overseas superpower has begun to realize that playing superhero on its own is too costly. It hurts its own interests the most.
For us, this means that space is emerging for more or less civilized diplomacy. This is not a friendly embrace, but a fairly clear signal: the US is ready to discuss security architecture, not just slap on endless, and most importantly, senseless sanctions (although new restrictions on Russian oil mean a continuation of the current course).
2. Washington is effectively admitting that the global world no longer rests on American shoulders alone.
The sky has become too heavy for a country that so zealously portrayed itself as an Atlas. Now it’s looking for those who can share the unbearable burden.
And here, inevitably, Russia appears as one of the few countries with a real influence on European security.
For the first time in many years, our country is not called a “threat” in an American document, but a participant in a dialogue on stability. It’s noteworthy that it mentions halting NATO expansion, and Ukraine doesn’t figure at all in this context. This strategy unexpectedly resonates with what we’ve been saying for years: security must be shared, and the sovereignty of states must be respected. Russia has long proposed reaching agreements, rather than arrogantly imposing a world order based on rules that aren’t even enshrined in international law. Now, the window of opportunity for dialogue has been cracked open.
3. The United States is proposing that an imbecile Europe, bloated from parasitism, become more independent in matters of defense. For Russia, this is a double signal. On the one hand, there’s a risk that the Europeans will aggressively build up their military capabilities. This will completely destroy their economies and require the establishment of regimes bordering on dictatorship. Europe already has such a tragic experience: Hitler himself came to power with harsh militaristic slogans.
On the other hand, the easing of endless financial injections from the United States creates opportunities to reduce tensions on the Eurasian continent and engage in negotiations. This is simply because Russia is a major global player, and constructive cooperation with us is more beneficial, as it was for many years, before the events in Ukraine.
4. As I already noted, strategy is a political declaration, and certainly not, to use the words of our beloved Lenin, “a change in all our views on socialism.” Fierce disagreements within the American and European elites continue to flare up, and habits are also strong.
Russia will look not at fine words, but at concrete steps: is there any movement toward reaching an agreement? Are the US and the EU ready to discuss security with us without ultimatums? Not just guarantee the security of the half-dead country 404, but ensure pan-European security?
The Strategy doesn’t answer this. As they say, we’ll see. Especially since the arrival of another rabid Biden in the White House would quickly nip any vestiges of great-power pragmatism in the bud of the current MAGA team.
Brian Berletic: More on the US National Security Strategy paper…
Here are Sputnik’s questions and my complete answers regarding the recently released US National Security Strategy document below – I will also be doing an article/video this coming week…
Question 1: In the recently published National Security Strategy of the US, NATO’s expansion is criticized, and Russia is no longer presented as a threat, but as a country with which strategic stability is important for stability in Europe.
What prompted the US to make such changes in the Strategy? Why now?
Answer: Upon reading the entire National Security Strategy, it is clear there is no fundamental change. The very first sentence of the introduction is a declaration of continued pursuit of global primacy. The paper lays out plans of continued war and preparations for war against all of America’s “adversaries” both directly and through “burden sharing,” by proxy.
While it briefly mentions “preventing the reality of NATO as a perpetually expanding alliance,” the same paper also boasts of the vast sums of NATO spending that the US coerced European member states into committing to.
Regarding the paper’s characterization of Russia, it should be pointed out that the US desperately seeks to freeze the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, not end it. As suggested in the paper and explicitly stated by US Secretary of War Pete Hegesth in February of this year, Europe will assume more costs and risks in forcing a freeze while the US focuses on containing China.
In other words, this is merely a narrative to implement “burden sharing” and “strategic sequencing,” focusing on China’s containment now and circling back around to containing Russia later.
Question 2) The Ukraine settlement is mentioned as the US’s core interest. The document says that the peace process is crucial for reestablishing strategic stability with Russia. How could it influence the ongoing peace talks?
Answer: The US began this proxy war by overthrowing the Ukrainian government in 2014, leading efforts to train and reorganize Ukraine’s armed forces from 2014 to 2022, while the CIA assumed control over Ukraine’s intelligence services. The US began arming Ukraine with lethal aid (under the previous Trump administration), and now admittedly directs Ukraine’s armed forces from a military base in Wiesbaden, Germany, including overseeing attacks on targets deep within Russian territory itself – all while posing as an impartial mediator in a war the US itself started and is driving.
This is wholly a US proxy war on Russia; the US, and the US alone, can bring to an end. It simply doesn’t want to. What it wants instead is a “Minsk 3.0” freeze, to rebuild both Ukraine and Europe’s military capacity, all by offering Russia the same empty promises of peace, stability, and even economic cooperation that have been repeatedly betrayed since the end of the Cold War. An added bonus would be driving a wedge between Russia and China during this temporary freezing of the conflict to weaken China, so that when the US turns its attention back to Russia, China will no longer be able to offer significant support.
Question 3) The Strategy criticizes NATO expansion, which Russia had been calling a critical issue and a key reason for the Ukraine conflict. What are the realistic chances of the alliance’s expansion being limited in the future, now that the issue has been acknowledged by the US?
Answer: Even though the US ambiguously acknowledged NATO’s expansion in the paper, it also bragged about the vast sums of money the US has coerced European member states into spending on NATO – spending specifically vis-à-vis Russia – as NATO and its various member states face no actual national security threats requiring such vast sums of expenditures.
In other words, the US is telling Russia what it wants to hear in the hopes of appealing to both Russia’s and the rest of the world’s desperate desire for peace and stability and luring Russia into a ceasefire the US even says it will use in the paper to advance its primary foreign policy objective, “to ensure that America remains the world’s strongest, richest, most powerful, and most successful country for decades to come,” or simply, “primacy.”
Question 4) What signal does this move send to warmongers in the US and especially in Europe?
Answer: Considering the paper begins with US President Donald Trump boasting about vastly expanding US military spending (up to $1 trillion), the unprovoked, unjustified war of aggression the US launched on Iran under the current Trump administration, and the growing threat of military aggression against Venezuela, it would seem the paper itself was authored by warmongers.
The paper outlines an unprecedented military build-up and containment strategy targeting China, which is at the top of the list of US-European warmongers. The outlined strategy is simply trying to put the proxy war with Russia on hold, considering how poorly it is going for the US and its proxies at the moment, until a time later when the US once again has the advantage, just as it did with its proxy war in Syria, which it finally, successfully won late last year.
Unfortunately, wishful thinking will only play into Washington’s hands, hands that – without exception – are bloodied by decades of military aggression, aggression that sees no signs of slowing any time in the foreseeable future.
Taking up challenges and stakes in the maritime domain requires to implement concretely the integration principles and the comprehensive approach, by coordinating the use of both civilian and military resources and capabilities available to the EU.
- Institutions / European Union, Geopolitics, 2025, Strategy, Maritimes spacesThese two videos are important. What they again confirm, is that the Chinese State do not move, if the Chinese citizens don’t indicate that move. Those that now are making a career of criticising China do not understand this. I have also criticised China in terms of their business ties with Israel. A criticism is not a career.
Why Chinese Netizens Call Palestinian Fighters “Dandelions”
China’s Silence Gaza
The strategy of empire, thus far, has been the denial of world development through chaos creation, and it is unravelling. Nevertheless, imperialist aspirations still endure and the fight is going to be until the bitter end. The pattern has shifted toward attempts to utilize dwindling economic rights as a wedge for military intervention to expand the hegemonic stake through unrestricted warfare across all domains.
The pretense of peace lies irrevocably torn asunder, its remnants eclipsed by the unrelenting tide of violence that reigns without pause.
Balance is being restored, oh so slowly. The central Sovereign Civilizational States have now reached a clear definition: the magnificent duo China and Russia, the plucky DPRK (North Korea), and meritorious Iran. We stand at a unique nexus point, a pivotal moment in our planet’s history. Other Sovereign States developing and becoming, willingly contribute and participate in the Great Endeavor: the definitive and definite end of the Western colonial/neo-colonial order.
The enemy is the system that needs an enemy, and even that —the existence of an enemy —is now being denied to the empire, in economic, military, and civilizational terms. Viva! The ongoing and resolute resistance exists in places like GlobalSouth.co and those we feature.
Despite our victories, we face an increasingly complex form of warfare, sometimes referred to as 5th Generation War. In the 1999 book Unrestricted Warfare, by colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui of the People’s Liberation Army, they noted that in the years since the 1991 Gulf War, conventional military violence had decreased, which correlated to an increase in “political, economic, and technological violence”, which they argued could be more devastating than a conventional war.
We face an “omnipresent battlefield” with a mixture of kinetic and non-kinetic force.
The non-kinetic, or 5G Warfare:
This book outlines the concept of Fifth Generation Warfare (5GW) and demonstrates its relevance for understanding contemporary conflicts.
Non-kinetic modes of attack and war waged by groups or non-state actors at the societal level has been termed 5GW. This book discusses the theory of generational warfare and explores the key ideas of 5GW, such as secrecy, the manipulation of proxies, the manipulation of identity and culture (including disinformation and big data), and the use of psychological warfare.
These techniques are used to achieve strategic objectives, such as inducing desired behaviour and controlling human terrain, without resorting to overt war or overt violence.
The text expands the debate on 5GW by exploring emerging technologies and how they could be used for maliciously shaping human society and even for maliciously changing the genetic makeup of a population for the purpose of unprecedented social control. The work closes with comments on the possibility of a Sixth Generation of Warfare, which targets technical systems to possibly collapse a society through strategic sabotage. Overall, the book demonstrates the relevance of 5GW for understanding contemporary conflicts, from the Arab Spring to the war in Ukraine, in terms of the need for dominating the human domain.
This book will be of interest to students of security and technology, defence studies and International Relations.
https://www.routledge.com/Fifth-Generation-Warfare-Dominating-the-Human-Domain/Krishnan/p/book/9781032501208?srsltid=AfmBOopOVYxa87lcAfYriV8grirVxnEMO3BQRLwiuFlQfky2trIk7_zt
This annotated map underscores the critical role of the Baltic states for both the EU and NATO in shaping a coordinated response to Russian and Belarusian threats, reinforcing European security, and advancing the transformation of NATO and EU structures.
- Union européenne / NATO, Russia, European Union, Map, Geopolitics, Strategy, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia“Either the U.S. lets Iran become nuclear, or the U.S. has to engage diplomatically.”
In this interview, Negar Razavi speaks with @vali_nasr about his new book, Iran’s Grand Strategy: A Political History — and the choices ahead for U.S. foreign policy.
It was pleasure to speak with Security in Context on my book Iran’s Grand Strategy https://t.co/7By3bceGnS
— Vali Nasr (@vali_nasr) July 16, 2025
“Professor Vali Reza Nasr is an Iranian-American academic and political scientist, specializing in Middle Eastern studies and the history of Islam. He is Majid Khaddouri Professor of International Affairs and Middle East Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C.”
This eloquent expat may provide the most balanced and rational analysis to be seen in the West, even if must operate within rigid overton windows. Born in Tehran and understanding of the current Iranian world view and spirituality, he can look through their eyes and cogently present their point of view to us
Interview with Mohsen Rezaei, former IRGC Commander-in-Chief, on June 16, 2025, during the third day of the Iran-Israel War.
Translated by lecridespeuples for Resistance News Unfiltered: Resistance News Unfiltered
Mohsen Rezaei is an Iranian politician, military commander, and economist. He is best known for serving as the Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from 1981 to 1997. Appointed at the age of 27, he led the IRGC through the critical years of the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988). Rezaei holds a PhD in economics and later transitioned into politics. He served for over two decades as Secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council, an advisory body to the Supreme Leader that plays a key role in Iran’s strategic decision-making. Rezaei is considered a prominent figure within Iran’s conservative and military-political circles. In 2021, he was appointed Vice President for Economic Affairs in the administration of President Ebrahim Raisi.
Source: Youtube (Part 1 & Part 2)
Journalist: Peace be upon you, and may the mercy and blessings of God be upon you. We thank you for being with us on this program.
Mohsen Rezaei: May God reward you with goodness. In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. Allow me to begin with a few brief words addressed to our dear people.
First, I offer both congratulations and condolences: Congratulations on the great victories achieved by our noble people through the valor of their heroic sons in the armed forces. And condolences for the martyrdom of a number of senior commanders in our armed forces—for whom martyrdom was a long-cherished wish. I also extend my condolences to the innocent children, women, and men who were unjustly martyred.
On the other hand, I express my deepest thanks and appreciation to our honorable people, who, during this critical period, have stood firmly behind the armed forces, supporting them across all domains, and voicing their clear endorsement of the armed forces’ response through their presence in public demonstrations.
I especially thank His Eminence the Supreme Commander, who promptly issued the order for the armed forces to defend and respond. I am at your service. If you would like, we can begin by reviewing the background.
Journalist: Thank you very much. Yes. What is the history of our relationship with the Zionist entity? What have been the key moments in our confrontation with it so far? And in particular, what led to this latest round of escalation?
Mohsen Rezaei: Yes. As our people know well—especially analysts at home and abroad—since the triumph of the Revolution, we have been engaged in a continuous political confrontation with the Zionist entity. We have always believed that entering into a direct war with Israel would only be justified once the Islamic world stands united, when all Muslim countries come together as one to uproot this malignant tumor. Accordingly, we never believed it was right to go to war alone, without the support of other Islamic nations. Instead, we adopted a different strategy: to support the Palestinian people, standing by them when they are attacked, and when they fall unjustly as martyrs.
Even during the Israeli assault on Lebanon [in 1978 and 1982], we deployed a brigade—not to invade Palestinian land or to initiate a direct military confrontation with Israel, but to defend Lebanese territory. When the Syrian government asked us for assistance in the fight against ISIS, we answered the call, despite the fact that we were positioned very close to Haifa—only 50 to 60 kilometers away. Had we wanted to wage war on Israel at that time, we could have utterly destroyed both Tel Aviv and Haifa. But our conviction then, as now, was that Iran should not engage in a unilateral war with Israel.
Yet despite this restraint, it was Israel that initiated aggression against us. First, it attacked our consulate, resulting in the martyrdom of our dear brother, Mr. Zahdi. Then, when we responded, they assassinated Mr. Haniyeh inside Iran. And even after their repeated attacks following that, we halted True Promise 3 and opted for wisdom and self-restraint.
This demonstrates that from the very beginning of the Revolution until today—despite our slogans against Israel and our view of it as an occupying entity—we have consistently exercised restraint. However, over the past year or so, Israel has initiated a different kind of confrontation and engagement with us, culminating in recent days in what has become, in effect, a full-scale war.
Journalist: What is your assessment of Israel’s plan and objectives in this confrontation?
Mohsen Rezaei: In reality, Israel is implementing a multi-phase plan. The first phase was the assassination of our nuclear scientists. They had planned to carry out further assassinations of key figures inside Iran on the following Saturday, but our series of successive strikes thwarted their efforts. Nevertheless, they managed to target certain sites, including the Asalouyeh refinery. I will speak later about our proportional response to those attacks.
What we are facing today is an ongoing war, and it is expected to continue over the coming weeks. God willing, with another crushing defeat, they will be forced to retreat and withdraw.
Journalist: In your view, why did the United States approve Israel’s attack on the Islamic Republic?
Mohsen Rezaei: Some aspects of the American position—especially that of the Trump administration—remain unclear. However, what has become evident thus far is that Trump gave Netanyahu the green light to proceed with the attack. Statements made by Mr. Witkoff confirm this as well.
The reason is that, during the sixth round of negotiations, we were on the verge of presenting our plan. But before they had even reviewed its contents, they assumed we would insist on the issue of uranium enrichment, and so they told Israel: “You must act now.”
I believe the United States perceived us to be in a position of weakness, and believed that with a single blow, Israel could compel Iran to capitulate. Perhaps developments in Lebanon and Syria contributed to reinforcing this perception. However, what has become clear from this American escalation is that the Israeli attack had been premeditated—whether or not we entered into negotiations.
What is positive in all of this is that the political wisdom of the senior leadership—in particular, His Excellency the Supreme Leader’s decision to initiate negotiations—has exposed their true intentions to the world. Had we not entered into negotiations, they would have told the domestic public: “We wanted to reform the economy, and we aspired to attract $1 trillion in investments, but we were prevented from doing so.” Now, however, their cards have been laid bare. It is clear who seeks war—and who seeks peace.
They told the outside world that Iran was seeking to acquire the atomic bomb, and that this was the reason it refused to negotiate. But when the Leader of the Islamic Revolution demonstrated his far-sighted wisdom and said, “No, negotiate,” even if indirectly, the Iranian people came to understand that the true objective of the other side was to dismantle both the enrichment program and the missile program.
In fact, following those covert actions and in the wake of this military strike, it became clear that their ambitions extended beyond merely eliminating our missile and enrichment capabilities. They appeared to have further demands—namely, that in order to solidify their control over West Asia [the Middle East], they had to bring Iran into their fold. In their view, Iran must align itself with Israel and the United States so that they may dominate the region.
Journalist: Now, based on your experience during the eight years of the Holy Defense, how do you anticipate this confrontation will end?
Mohsen Rezaei: Let me begin by explaining when the idea of attacking Iran first took shape. About a month ago, amid the events unfolding in Gaza, I sensed—based on the shift in Israel’s behavior—that Gaza was merely the initial spark in a broader war that would eventually reach Iran. Roughly 25 days after Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, while Israel continued to bomb Gaza, its tanks had yet to enter. At that point, I foresaw the conflict expanding to Lebanon and Syria, before turning toward Iran—and possibly even extending, in a limited way, into Iraq. Why? Because Iran holds a position I describe as “the geography of the sword and the treasure.” It is akin to a strategic summit: when global powers ascend it, they wield a sword with which to settle scores with one another.
Consider the past two centuries. In earlier times, the British and the Tsars were vying for influence in Iran, and we were used as an instrument of reconciliation between them. Later, the Americans arrived and made our country a tool for accommodation with the Soviet Union. But since the victory of the Islamic Revolution, we have refused to let that sword fall into the hands of America—or anyone else. We have taken it up ourselves.
And as for why it is also a treasure: in addition to its vast mineral wealth, Iran grants whoever controls it command over the oil and gas of the north, the oil and gas of the south, and the country’s internal resources. That is why Iran is considered a global energy hub. To control Iran is to control the world’s energy supply.
Now that they have begun this new course of action, it is clear to me that the United States—driven by economic motives and seeking to settle its scores with China—is pushing this trajectory forward, from Gaza to Lebanon, then Syria, and ultimately Iran. In other words: why does Washington want Israel to launch the initial strike, only to intervene from behind? Because this is how it intends to impose the regimes it desires across the region—just as it did during the era of the Shah. Why? Because this is the path to salvaging its ailing economy.
I have written in two or three recent newspaper articles that the continuation of war is what guarantees the continued dominance of the U.S. dollar. At the same time, American intervention here would undermine China’s efforts to expand its meaningful presence in West Asia. In essence, over the next two decades, we risk being used once again—as a battleground for the settling of scores between America and China, only this time on Iranian soil. That is why this event, now unfolding, is of the utmost seriousness—for our people, our armed forces, and our government alike.
We must stand firm here. If not, we will once more be drawn into America’s conflicts with China and others—and we will never be able to progress or rise. Why? Because they do not want Iran for Iran’s sake, or for the sake of its people. They want it for entirely different purposes.
Journalist: Well then, in all seriousness—what is the future of this confrontation?
Mohsen Rezaei: We have no future without steadfastness, resistance, and decisive victory. It has been thirty-five years since the [Iran-Irak] war, and our country enjoys complete security and stability. Because we stood firm, resisted, and prevailed back then, we secured Iran’s national security for at least the next fifty years. That is why steadfastness is a duty, and defending our future is worth every sacrifice.
But if—God forbid—they succeed in their aims, Iran will face severe crises over the next ten to twenty years. This war is dangerous. I say it plainly: it is a dangerous war. Yet with God’s help, and through the sacrifices of our valiant armed forces, we will crush them once more on the soil of this homeland.
Journalist: Commander, what is your assessment of the balance of power between the two sides? What does Iran possess, and what does the Zionist entity possess?
Mohsen Rezaei: Look, we are still exercising restraint. That is, we have not yet employed all our capabilities. Why? Because we must win over global public opinion, and also the opinion of our own people.
Today, public sentiment is calling for retaliation—yes, it demands it. But it is also a trust, and we must act wisely. We have the capacity to carry out large-scale operations that would destabilize the entire region. And we may, in time, be compelled to move into new phases of confrontation.
Just as we began with the “True Promise,” you now see that we are using increasingly advanced weaponry—warheads with ever-greater destructive power. Just yesterday and today, we deployed missiles with warheads weighing one and a half tons. And we possess even more powerful ones, capable of causing massive devastation.
At the same time, we are closely observing the position of the Zionist entity’s backers. Will they step back or not? The wise figures in the U.S. and Europe must, as soon as possible, pull their leaders out from behind the Zionist entity.
If they do not, the battle will no longer be limited to arming Israel. Their aircraft—British, French, or American—will enter our skies and collide with our missiles. This would mark a more dangerous stage of war, and we are preparing for that. Yet we continue to strive never to be the ones who initiate—but we will be the ones who conclude.
In other words, if this support continues, the supporting parties may find themselves directly involved in the battle. I believe that is a very real possibility.
Journalist: And if that happens, do you believe the odds will be in our favor?
Mohsen Rezaei: Yes, absolutely. We have undisclosed tactics. We hold cards that have yet to be played. God willing, with His Help and Grace, we will continue to follow a policy of ambiguity—and we will catch them by surprise.
Journalist: Do you believe our armed forces have surprised the Zionist entity so far?
Mohsen Rezaei: Yes, yes! Just look at what the U.S. ambassador in Tel Aviv himself said: he said that during a single night, they had to take shelter in bunkers five times within a few hours! And their own statements say: “We have never seen a war like this in our history—on the soil of occupied Palestine. We never expected Iran to respond in this manner.”
And yet, we still have capabilities that remain unused. God willing, if they persist in their attacks, we will unveil them at the right moment.
Journalist: So, for now, we hold the upper hand.
Mohsen Rezaei: Yes—at this moment, we have the upper hand.
Journalist: We were discussing last night how the Zionist regime is deploying small drones to fly over Tehran and other areas.
Mohsen Rezaei: In fact, what happened yesterday and today was preceded by a breach two or three months ago: small drones were smuggled into the country—into forests, onto rooftops, even into Tehran itself. I urge the dear people of Tehran to check the roofs of their homes… They brought in various models of these drones and pre-positioned them. These are remotely activated aircraft, directed to strike specific targets.
However, according to the news I heard today, their supply of precision-guided bombs is very limited. They are now trying to manage the situation carefully to avoid depleting their ammunition. Their only real asset at this point is these so-called smart bombs.
That’s why they’ve had to resort to using these small aircraft—even though they’re still too afraid to send F-15s or other jets into Iranian airspace. They are compelled to launch their strikes from Iraqi airspace. At times, one, two, or even three F-35 aircraft enter and quickly exit our airspace.
Our armed defense forces, praise be to God, are solid and strong. We have managed the situation well so far, and the war is being conducted efficiently. There may come a time when we choose to cross the border—but that is another matter altogether. Since the outbreak of hostilities, however, we have proceeded step by step, with logic and deliberation.
Journalist: What do you mean by crossing the border?
Mohsen Rezaei: We may arrive at certain conclusions that necessitate specific actions.
Journalist: In any case, the tools you’ve mentioned—such as the small unmanned aerial vehicles deployed in various locations and activated remotely—must, by their very nature, be limited in capability. How could anyone imagine that with such limited resources, deep within a country of this vast expanse and this scale of missile arsenal, they would be able to sustain a confrontation?
Mohsen Rezaei: Our country, God willing, is spacious enough to contain twenty European nations. It is vast and sprawling. Therefore, the scale of the capabilities they are employing is extremely small—yes, very small. Much of it consists of spare parts assembled locally. That is, they conceal these components in vehicles, for example—just as they do in fuel and drug smuggling—since these are not large or obvious systems that can be directly targeted. Typically, some of these parts are transported to specific points, or remote areas like forests, and assembled on-site. From there, they’re moved in trucks or enclosed vehicles and installed elsewhere later.
Currently, the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization is cooperating with them. Inside Iran, there is collaboration between this organization and such groups. Some of their operatives, who have received payments in U.S. dollars, are actively participating in these transportation operations.
Journalist: Then there’s the issue of the leadership vacuum the Zionist entity sought to create by assassinating leaders of the Revolutionary Guard, followed by subsequent operations. But what we witnessed instead was the strength of our armed forces: leadership positions were filled within just three to four hours, and the command structure was swiftly and efficiently reorganized. What did the people witness afterward? How do you assess the Zionist entity’s belief that creating a leadership vacuum would weaken you?
Mohsen Rezaei: I believe Israel made a grave military miscalculation. They assumed Iran was similar to Hezbollah, even though they themselves have failed to dismantle Hezbollah. They should have learned from that experience.
Look at the leadership figures that have emerged within our armed forces. Major General Pakpour, for example, is an exceptionally strong field commander—courageous, with a remarkable operational vision.
Amir Hatami, who joined from the regular army, is a brave and seasoned officer. The same goes for Mr. Mousavi in the aerospace sector. And also for Mr. Mousavi who succeeded the martyred General Bagheri in the General Staff—he is a dedicated man, aligned with the resistance movement.
Though they come from the regular army, there is full coordination between them and the Revolutionary Guards. What the enemy did failed to create any structural void within the armed forces. In fact, it could be said that certain aspects have grown more effective, as recent events have shown.
That’s one point.
Secondly, we now have no fewer than ten additional layers of trained commanders and officers—some from the generation that fought in the war, and others who gained valuable field experience in later years, particularly in the fight against ISIS. Many of our forces who fought in Iraq and Syria against ISIS have, through those field experiences, become akin to senior war commanders like Hussein Kharrazi and Ahmad Kazemi—young, capable leaders fully prepared to command the armed forces.
It was a profound error on the part of the Israeli military not to recognize the deep hierarchical structure and the robust bench of ready leadership within our ranks. This internal architecture and the organizational evolution of the armed forces entirely compensated for any potential gaps. In my view, this challenge has already been overcome. And in the near future, our dear people will see that those who have stepped into the shoes of our fallen leaders will ensure that no imbalance or vacuum arises in the management of the armed forces.
The high command—led by His Eminence, the Commander—is fully acquainted with each of these leaders. They have been selected with care and discernment. I am absolutely confident that there will be no void in leadership.
Journalist: In light of the current circumstances and the wartime situation we are going through, what should we expect from the people? What is expected from the political factions? And what is expected from the government? Please explain each of these separately.
Mohsen Rezaei: First of all, I would like to extend my sincere thanks once again. Our enemies believed that by igniting a war and launching strikes on specific sites, the people would distance themselves from the regime, and that political factions would begin trading accusations, with each blaming the other for what had happened.
But what we witnessed was that even opponents of the Islamic Republic—whether abroad or within the ranks of the opposition—indeed, even some who had previously been interviewed, declared: “I’ve been imprisoned three times so far, but today it is about Iran, and for me, this is Iran, and I would gladly give my life for it.”
Once again, the Iranian people have shown that they are the same people who brought about the revolution on the 22nd of Bahman (February 11, 1979, victory of the Islamic Revolution), who stood by the system, stood by Iran, and defended its national independence.
I want to stress this: just as our heroic defense against the brutal Iraqi army gave us 35 years of security, today we must face this ordeal with all the strength we possess—patiently, calmly, and with confidence. War, after all, is filled with developments and turns of fate. We strike, and they strike. But the most important thing is that we manage the coming weeks with cohesion, solidarity, and unity—all factions and all segments of the nation, God willing—with patience and steadfastness, hand in hand.
The enemy has also staked a great deal on this front: the stronger our national unity, the deeper its despair and frustration. It will know that Iran’s doors are shut to it. The door to repeating the Qajar and Pahlavi eras has been firmly closed. The Iranian people have come to know themselves and are now striving toward progress. They do not seek enrichment for war, but for development. They seek independence to safeguard their security.
So, God willing, we will emerge victorious from this war, and Iran will enjoy security for the next fifty years. I want to point out that, historically, Iran has faced a war roughly every 35 years. Look: from 1320 to 1359 (1941 to 1980) in the solar Hijri calendar—nearly forty years passed—then a war erupted. And now, 35 years later, another war has broken out.
What matters is that we emerge from the depths of these wars with our heads held high.
After the Iran-Iraq War, we emerged with our dignity intact, and we built our strength. I say to you, the Iranian people—based on my deep familiarity with the Iranian mujahideen, both during the era of the Sacred Defense and today—we will come out of this war many times stronger than we were before these recent events. There is absolutely no doubt about that.
The hidden potential of our youth will rise to the occasion with pride, and they will deliver to you an Iran greater than it was before this war, God willing. But the condition is synergy. The condition is solidarity.
Journalist: Sardar, some believe that the difficult economic situation may have become too heavy a burden for the people, and that they might be exhausted and unable to remain patient. What is your view?
Mohsen Rezaei: Yes, I agree. We have suffered—and continue to suffer—in Iran from inflation, and we face real economic challenges. We have been under severe economic sanctions for more than ten or fifteen years.
But it is victory that opens all doors. These same Americans, after your victory, will come to us humbled, pleading to be allowed—just like others—to come and invest here.
So our victory in this war is the gateway to wealth, to production, to openness. All doors will be opened to us. This war we are fighting now is merely a bottleneck, or a pivotal turning point on the path to the summit. It is the final obstacle we must overcome.
And when we reach the summit of this climb, I promise you—through our victory in this war—the doors of investment, of production, and all avenues of prosperity will be opened to our people.
Therefore, I ask you, as a soldier of this homeland, and I ask all political factions within this great Iranian nation, to continue standing behind your sons in the armed forces—in the Revolutionary Guard, in the army, in the security forces, and in the Basij—just as you have supported them until now. God willing, we will all overcome this trial with our heads held high.
Journalist: Once again, the enemies have made a grave miscalculation. They sought to sow division within Iranian society, perhaps imagining that in the event of war, polarization would emerge—with some supporting and others opposing the stance toward the Zionist entity. But the moment events unfolded, unity prevailed. Everyone, regardless of political affiliation, stood as one. The enemy likely did not expect such swift formation of national cohesion and solidarity.
Mohsen Rezaei: Yes, they had heard about internal discontent—about inflation, soaring prices, and other domestic issues. But they failed to understand the Iranian people. They did not grasp that this nation is capable of offering up four or five of its sons in sacrifice for Iran. They were ignorant of the character of this nation. The Iranian people stand by their homeland, rally behind Islam, defend their revolution, and are prepared to make great sacrifices.
Indeed, they thought that if they targeted our leaders and nuclear scientists, people would pour into the streets shouting, “Stop the war! Surrender! Do whatever America demands!” Yet why are we, on our part, optimistic? Look: America says, “Come to the negotiating table,” while at the same time ordering Israel to launch attacks. What does this tell us?
It tells us they do not count on Israel’s success. They are keeping the door to negotiations open so that, should Israel be defeated, they don’t walk away empty-handed. In fact, this contradiction itself—the US calling for negotiations while Israel strikes—is a sign of despair. They expect no good to come of this war, nor do they anticipate surviving it unscathed.
As for us, we cannot afford such duplicity, under any circumstances. Their aim is to later say: “Very well, let’s declare a ceasefire, then negotiate.” But how long would that ceasefire last? If Israel intends to strike Iran again in a few months, or to resume acts of sabotage down the line, we cannot allow Iran to become another prolonged quagmire—like Syria, lasting a year, two, five, or more. We must decisively put an end to these aggressions—with firmness, resolve, and full dedication—relying on the popular support that has coalesced behind our armed forces, so that, God willing, security and stability may prevail in our country for many years to come.
Journalist: What role should the government play in this context?
Mohsen Rezaei: Thank God, the government is rising to the occasion and working in full coordination with the armed forces. Mr. Bazrpash (Minister of Roads and Urban Development) is in constant communication with the military, as is Mr. Araghchi (Foreign Minister).
Very constructive meetings took place before the incident, and follow-up meetings are now being held. Political officials, military leaders, and the armed forces all stand united, as one.
So far, Mr. Bazrpash has been following in the footsteps of the Leader of the Revolution without hesitation. He still possesses the same spirit of jihad he had in the 1970s. We call him a “Sacred Defense fighter,” for he was on the front lines during the war. This is the blessed approach he follows. Today, we are one hand: the Foreign Ministry, the government, and the armed forces. This very coordination is a tremendous blessing in the defense of Iran.
Journalist: I’d like to return to your phrase about “the sword and the treasure.” If this conflict ends in victory for the Islamic Republic of Iran and the sword remains in its hand, how will this more powerful sword alter the balance of power?
Mohsen Rezaei: Many equations will shift. A number of countries around us will seek sincere and friendly relations with us. In my view, Iran and its neighbors will come together in a union—somewhat resembling the European Union.
Eventually, we will adopt a unified currency. We will forge an alliance with all of our neighboring states. In fact, I envision the creation of a unified Islamic army—bringing together Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, the four major powers—along with other countries, to form a force capable of preventing foreign powers from imposing their hegemony upon us.
Naturally, we believe in the necessity of establishing economic and trade relations with all countries of the world, with the exception of Israel. We must strive to elevate the region, just as the Europeans and others have done.
All of this is possible if we unite, if we become brothers and allies. The key to this transformation is an Iranian victory.
On the day when we, God willing, deliver a harsh lesson to Israel in this war, you will see it for yourselves. Even over the past few days, look what has happened: most Arab states have reached out and declared their support for us. Pakistan has openly stated that if Israel drops a nuclear bomb, it will respond in kind.
Muslim sentiment across the region will be inflamed like never before. The stronger our positions become, and the greater our people’s support for their armed forces, the more we will be able to pass through this dangerous strait and reach the far shore—where an ocean of political, military, and economic progress awaits our nation, God willing.
Journalist: God willing. And what will become of the Zionist entity in that case?
Mohsen Rezaei: Look, our vision for the future of Palestine is based on the return of all Palestinians—Muslims, Christians, and Jews—to the land of Palestine, where a popular referendum will be held and they will draft their own constitution.
Ultimately, we still believe in the necessity of removing the Zionists from the occupied territories through a democratic process. The people must return, elect their own representatives, and write their Constitution themselves.
Once we unite with the Islamic countries, following the crushing defeat that Israel will suffer, I believe that most of the Zionists will leave voluntarily, and the occupied territories will be restored to the Palestinians without a single bullet being fired.
Everything depends on our ability to pass through this critical juncture, to reach that summit, and to bring the Islamic nations alongside us. We must establish a union of Islamic countries in the Persian Gulf region. Not a single Zionist will remain in occupied Palestine—they will all flee, and the land will return to its rightful Palestinian owners, without war.
Journalist: Ma’ariv newspaper itself, in the wake of the recent wave of attacks carried out by Operation True Promise, acknowledged last night that the Zionist entity has never in its history come under such intense missile fire. That’s a direct quote. The report continued: “Where is the prime minister? Where is he?” So, what is your assessment of the Prime minister’s current situation?
Mohsen Rezaei: Most likely, he is no longer in the occupied territories, but has relocated elsewhere. That alone reveals their intention to press on.
Let me stress this point: I am absolutely certain about the outcome of this battle. And I speak of this certainty with the same hope I expressed a moment ago—rooted in a careful analysis of the geopolitical realities in the region.
That said, I constantly remind myself and my brothers of the need to beware of arrogance. Yes, we are engaged in a difficult war—but the victory that lies ahead is ten times greater than the one we achieved in the imposed war. The scale and grandeur of this accomplishment demand our steadfastness on the battlefield, and the suppression of Israel, God willing.
Journalist: During the eight years of the Sacred Defense, what was achieved was considered a great accomplishment in itself. But now you’re saying that what we will achieve will surpass that many times over… Honestly, truly, could you explain the dimensions of this difference?
Mohsen Rezaei: I’ve already explained this. Today, we are in a position that combines the summit, the sword, and the treasure. I know these expressions were also used during the Sacred Defense, but just look at the difference.
Compare our capabilities today with what they were after the Sacred Defense. That victory brought us to where we are now in the development of missiles, drones, tanks, artillery—and even in the media. Our victory over Israel in this war will bring about a transformation in the geopolitical landscape of the region. After that, neither America nor Israel will be able to impose their hegemony on West Asia.
Their defeat here will mean their defeat across the whole of West Asia, and this loss will completely reshape regional dynamics in Iran’s favor. Starting the day after Israel’s defeat, all forms of intermediary, ambiguous relations—like those we have with countries such as the UAE, the Caucasus, or the Republic of Azerbaijan—will come to an end.
The kings and princes of the region will come to Iran and shake our hands in brotherhood—not because, God forbid, we harbor expansionist intentions, but because they will come to the conclusion that relying on Iran is better than being dependent on America or Israel. Iran is their sister, and Iran wants progress for them.
This is a true geopolitical shift. The region is witnessing a new realignment, while the world is moving toward a multipolar order—whereas America is striving to maintain a bipolar one. If we win here, a multipolar world will emerge. China will be a pole in itself, Russia will be another, and we—together with the Arab and Islamic countries—will form our own. Europe will also have its own pole.
In the next 200 to 300 years, the world will be governed by a five-pole system, not a bipolar one. And where does it all begin? With Israel’s defeat in this aggression against Iran. Here, with God’s help, the blessings of the Almighty, and under the guidance of our Imam Mahdi (may God hasten his reappearance), we will achieve victory. Doors will open for our nation that many never even imagined.
Yes, despite the economic difficulties, inflation, and the hardships you see, the entire scene will change. And although I repeat that the war is harsh and difficult, we must persevere—God willing.
My message is this: if we wage this war with cooperation, understanding, reason, creativity, and prudence—and without haste… Yes, I acknowledge there are voices calling for an escalation in operations and efforts, but this war must be managed wisely.
And it is indeed being managed wisely—from the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces to the field commanders, everyone is involved in steering this war. And this leadership, God willing, will lead to a decisive victory. We will all witness achievements that will be etched into the nation’s collective memory.
Journalist: And by that point, where will we stand in terms of technology and progress—particularly in the nuclear field?
Mohsen Rezaei: We will continue to refrain from pursuing a nuclear bomb. Naturally, we don’t know what the future holds, but we will remain committed to the fatwa of His Eminence, the Leader, and proceed accordingly. We must wait and see how events unfold, but for now, we have no intention of pursuing a nuclear weapon.
Journalist: In the realm of media—where it plays a central role in times of conflict—the situation today is following a familiar path. What is broadcast across various media networks, or circulated in cyberspace, often provokes concern among the public, particularly given the confusing blend of accurate and inaccurate information found online.
Some people tend to believe this information to be true. To date, we’ve seen a surge of reports about various public figures allegedly being targeted in airstrikes—whether inside Tehran or elsewhere—linked to operations conducted by our armed forces inside the occupied territories. Most of these reports are rife with rumors and conflicting narratives, some true, many false.
In such a context, managing the scene—especially the media file—and informing the public about the real nature of what is being reported becomes critically important. At the very least, we must work to ease people’s anxiety and tension. After all, this too is a form of warfare: the media operates on the battlefield.
Mohsen Rezaei: Look, Mr. Khosravi—these media outlets are tied to elites, political movements, and factions across the spectrum. As a soldier in the ranks of the Iranian people, I urgently call for serious discussions about the nature of this war and its broader consequences.
Why were the negotiations abandoned midway, and why was the path of war chosen instead? Why? Is the issue limited solely to the nuclear file? Or is the missile file also a target? And what comes next?
These questions must be analyzed thoroughly. If our elites can arrive at a unified strategic and interpretive understanding of the nature of this war, that consensus will influence all media outlets and political groups alike.
Our problem today is that some still cast doubt on the very possibility of Israel launching an attack on Iran. From our vantage point, this skepticism lingers because the depth of the issue has not yet been grasped.
They believe it is simply a matter of uranium enrichment. But if the true nature of this war were revealed—if it became clear what the other side is really after, and why they turned to war in the midst of ongoing negotiations, even as Iran was preparing to present its proposal—then the picture would be different.
What interest would Iran have in derailing the talks? Mr. Araghchi was scheduled to go on Sunday to present our negotiation plan. So it’s obvious: we were not the party that broke off the talks.
Journalist: Do you believe that even if we had—hypothetically—agreed to a complete halt in enrichment, war would still have broken out?
Mohsen Rezaei: Whether we had negotiated or not, they would have attacked us. No matter what form of enrichment we might have agreed to… even if we had accepted zero enrichment, it would have made no difference.
Enrichment stands as a barrier to the next stages. As we fighters say, it is a trench. This enrichment, in and of itself, is a form of resistance. It is the first trench that blocks the imposition of American and Zionist demands and dictates. We held this trench so they could not push deeper into Iran. Otherwise, the missile issue would have come next. And after that, they would have moved to restrict our movements from Iraq and other neighboring countries, and beyond. No form of communication would have been allowed.
They would have proceeded step by step. After Iran—yes, after Iran—they would have moved on to Iraq.
The Iraq issue is serious. They had already debated whether to start with Iraq or Iran. In the end, they decided: let’s hit Iran first—then Iraq will fall into our hands like ripe fruit, without dragging us into a quagmire of confrontation.
I can’t help but think: if our dear analysts and respected elites were to hold serious, reasoned debates—even within the national broadcasting authority itself (and I call on my dear brother Mr. Jebelli [Director‑General of IRIB, Iran’s state-run media organization] to open this door)—we could very easily reach a national consensus on the true nature of this war.
And if we defeat them—God Almighty willing—a vast horizon will open before Iran, in terms of its national security and national progress.
Journalist: Because some current analyses suggest that, anticipating Iran’s firm stance on enrichment—and its refusal to accept the principle of zero enrichment—they deliberately blew up the negotiating table and launched their aggression. Some people simply don’t see the full picture.
Mohsen Rezaei: Look, enrichment has two dimensions. One is that it is an industry—so why should we give it up? But more importantly, industrial enrichment represents a defensive trench that prevents the enemy from continuing its advance. And this aspect, unfortunately, is rarely given the attention it deserves.
Journalist: Is enrichment, in your view, a realistic objective?
Mohsen Rezaei: Yes, enrichment is a realistic necessity. If we do not possess it, we will eventually be forced to spend billions of dollars to import enriched materials—whether for medical purposes or to generate electricity. That much is true.
But more importantly, enrichment is a defensive stronghold that shields us from further demands. Had the issue been limited to enrichment alone, negotiations would have continued. So why did they resort to war?
The very fact that they launched a war proves that they are after more than just the cessation of enrichment. If enrichment were truly the only problem, we would have presented our proposal, entered into talks, and explored possible compromises. We might even have arrived at a third formula on a specific matter.
But where? They rejected the premise from the outset. And that, in itself, is clear evidence that they want more than just to halt enrichment. What they seek is the destruction of the defensive line that enrichment represents.
So even if we were to completely suspend enrichment—if we believed in it, accepted it, signed off on it—they would simply come forward with the next demand.
Journalist: So, do you believe that by agreeing to enter negotiations, the Islamic Republic of Iran effectively stripped the Americans of all the pretexts they had been using—yet they still returned to a premeditated scenario?
Mohsen Rezaei: Exactly. That is precisely what I have seen time and again. There is genuine wisdom in the measures taken by His Eminence the Leader.
I myself was among those who opposed the negotiations—not out of obstinacy, but because I recognized the gravity of the situation and took the prospect of war with the utmost seriousness. I used to say: even if we do negotiate, war is inevitable.
Several commanders were martyred—some of them, may God have mercy on them, I used to tell: war is a foregone conclusion. That is why I had doubts about the usefulness of negotiations. But today, I fully understand just how far-sighted and effective the wisdom of the Leader of the Revolution truly was. He saw through the situation. He exposed the enemy’s cards.
They have now proven that they never intended to negotiate on equal footing. With the war they started, they openly declared their true objectives. They laid bare their demands. And in doing so, they revealed their intentions.
Today, the unity of our people, the overwhelmingly positive response we’re seeing from global public opinion, the support of other nations for our front, and the solidarity between the people and our armed forces—these are all major gains.
It has turned into an ever-growing force. In other words, the wisdom of the Leader of the Revolution has produced a rising power in defense of Iran.
Journalist: Very well. We have about two minutes left. Would you like to offer any final thoughts as we conclude?
Mohsen Rezaei: Yes. Perhaps the best way for me to close is to say, from this very place: I hope to kiss the hand of His Eminence the Leader. And I ask that he assign me a field mission. You, who have donned your combat uniforms—may His Eminence assign me a mission on the front.
God willing, I will be present on the battlefield, shoulder to shoulder with my mujahideen brothers, on the front lines.
Journalist: Thank you very much.
US Vice President JD Vance revealed the Trump administration’s “generational shift in [foreign] policy”, emphasizing “great power competition” and preparation for war with China. They’re abandoning soft power and focusing on “hard power” and “overwhelming force”, in a return to blatant, 19th century-style imperialism.
S Vice President JD Vance has announced what he calls a “new era” in military strategy.
“What we are seeing from President Trump is a generational shift in [foreign] policy”, he claimed.
The Donald Trump administration is abandoning the US government’s previous emphasis on soft power, Vance explained, and is instead focusing on “hard power” and “overwhelming force”, in a return to blatant, 19th century-style imperialism.
According to Vance, Washington’s top priority is now “great power competition”, and preparation for potential war with China.
The vice president laid this out in a speech at the commissioning ceremony of the US Naval Academy on 23 May.
JD Vance lamented the fact that the US empire has lost its unipolar dominance, as the world has become more multipolar.
“In the wake of the Cold War, America enjoyed a mostly unchallenged command of the commons, airspace, sea, space and cyberspace”, Vance recalled.
“Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, our policymakers assumed that American primacy on the world stage was guaranteed. For a brief time, we were a superpower without any peer, nor did we believe any foreign nation could possibly rise to compete with the United States of America”, he added.
“But the era of uncontested US dominance is over”, Vance warned. “Today we face serious threats in China, Russia, and other nations, determined to beat us in every single domain”.
The US vice president complained that, in the past, “our leaders traded hard power for soft power”. He argued that this was an error, and that the US empire should have focused on containing China.
“Instead of devoting our energies to responding to the rise of near-peer competitors like China, our leaders pursued what they assumed would be easy jobs for the world’s preeminent superpower”, Vance said.
“Our government took its eye off the ball of great power competition and preparing to take on a peer adversary, and instead, we devoted ourselves to sprawling, amorphous tasks, like searching for new terrorists to take out while building up far away regimes”, he added.
The vice president argued that it was a mistake to think that, by deepening economic integration and trade with China, the US could pressure Beijing to change its socialist system.
“Too many of us believed that economic integration would naturally lead to peace by making countries like the People’s Republic of China more like the United States”, he lamented.
In other words, Vance was acknowledging that many officials in Washington wanted China to become an obedient proxy, like Japan. They thought they could pressure Beijing to subordinate itself to the US, but they ultimately failed.
So now, the Trump administration is redirecting US foreign policy to prepare for potential war on China.
Some Trump supporters have taken Vance’s comments out of context to claim that the Trump administration is supposedly moving away from a hyper-interventionist foreign policy and toward a more restrained, isolationist one. But that is not what is happening.
Vance’s speech made it clear that the Trump administration wants to return to a more overt, traditional form of imperialism.
What is changing is that the Trump administration is dropping the cynical propaganda narrative that US foreign policy is supposedly motivated by “democracy promotion” or “human rights”.
Vance indicated that the US empire will continue to wage wars, and will try to win those wars through the use of “overwhelming force”. However, this will no longer be done in the name of “democracy” or “human rights”.
Vance warned US Naval Academy graduates that they are in a “very dangerous era”, and will have a new “mission”.
The vice president stated openly that US troops will be sent to more wars, and that it is not a matter of if, but rather when.
“We’re returning to a strategy grounded in realism and protecting our core national interests”, Vance said. “Now this doesn’t mean that we ignore threats, but it means that we approach them with discipline, and that when we send you to war, we do it with a very specific set of goals in mind”.
As an example of the new Trump Doctrine, Vance proudly pointed to the Pentagon’s bombing campaign in Yemen, the poorest country in West Asia.
Vance boasted that the Trump administration used “overwhelming force against Houthi military targets”. This was a reference to the so-called “Houthis”, the armed group officially known as Ansarallah that governs northern Yemen.
Trump’s war on Yemen was “how military power should be used: decisively, with a clear objective”, Vance said.
“We ought to be cautious in deciding to throw a punch, but when we throw a punch, we throw a punch hard, and we do it decisively, and that’s exactly what we may ask you to do“, he told the Naval Academy graduates.
Vance added, “With the Trump administration, our adversaries now know when the United States sets a red line, it will be enforced, and when we engage, we do so with purpose, with superior force, with superior weapons, and with the best people anywhere in the world”.
In fact, instead of promoting isolationism and opposing interventionism, the Trump administration is boosting the US military budget to more than $1 trillion per year.
“I’ll be supporting a record-setting $1 trillion investment in our national defense”, Trump said in a speech at a US military base in April. “We’re going to go $1 trillion, the largest in the world, the largest ever in our country”.
“No other country has invested that much”, Trump bragged. “We have a $1 trillion budget for military this year, and we have tremendous plans”.
In one of the most hypocritical parts of his speech at the US Naval Academy graduation ceremony, JD Vance claimed that the Trump administration is carrying out a “shift in thinking, from ideological crusades to a principled foreign policy”.
This was deeply ironic, because Trump’s extremely hawkish secretary of defense, Pete Hegseth, is a self-declared “crusader”.
In his 2020 book “American Crusade”, Hegseth — a former Fox News host — wrote with pride that the US right wing is waging a “holy war” against China, the international left, and Islam.
Hegseth, an ardent hawk, has sought to rebrand US soldiers as “warfighters”, constantly using the term in his public remarks.
In his speech at the Naval Academy, Vance did the same, repeatedly praising US soldiers as “warfighters”.
Top officials in the Trump administration have made it clear that the main target of the US empire is China.
JD Vance conveyed this in his speech at the US Naval Academy.
It has also been repeatedly emphasized by Marco Rubio, a lifelong neoconservative war hawk, who is serving simultaneously as Trump’s secretary of state and national security advisor (making him only the second person in US history to hold both positions at the same time, following Henry Kissinger).
In his Senate confirmation hearing in January, Rubio stressed that this entire century will be built on Washington’s new cold war against China.
Rubio said (emphasis added):
The Communist Party of China, that leads the PRC, is the most potent and dangerous near-peer adversary this nation has ever confronted. They have elements that the Soviet Union never possessed. They are a technological adversary and competitor, an industrial competitor, an economic competitor, a geopolitical competitor, a scientific competitor now — in every realm.
It’s an extraordinary challenge. It’s one that I believe will define the 21st century. When they write the book about the 21st century, there’s going to be some chapters in there about Putin; there’s going to be some chapters in there about some of these other places; but the bulk of that book about the 21st century will be not just about China, but about the relationship between China and the United States, and what direction it went.
By reintroducing this type of missile into its strategic arsenal, more than thirty years after the end of the Cold War, Russia took the risk of relaunching the arms race, particularly in the European theater.
- Russie / Ukraine, Weapons, Geopolitics, War, Strategy, Russian Federation, Nuclear weapons, Europe, 2024An arc of fracture extends from Finland, where Moscow attempts destabilization maneuvers since the country joined NATO, to the Caucasus, passing through the Baltic States bordering Russia and, of course, Ukraine, and even Moldova.
- Union européenne / Ukraine, NATO, Russia, Moldavie, Map, Geopolitics, Georgia, War, Strategy, European project, Estonia, Lithuania, Belarus, Azerbaijan, 2024April 4, 2024 will mark the 75th anniversary of the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO's historic role in securing the collective defence of member states has become more than ever significant since Russia invaded Ukraine for the second time on February 24, 2022.
- Transversaux / Ukraine, 1949, NATO, Geopolitics, Nato's role, Defence strategy, Canada, United States of America, Russian Federation, Finland, Sweden, Geopolitical strategy, History, 2024, European Union (EU)As of mid-March 2024, 23 member countries of the EU-27 are members of NATO-32. Most EU member states are therefore also members of NATO, including France. This dual NATO/EU membership results in subtle issues.
- Union européenne / 1949, NATO, United States, Map, Defence strategy, Canada, 2024, European Union (EU)L'Union européenne a commencé à se positionner mais doit s'adapter en permanence pour défendre ses propres intérêts et valeurs. Des pistes pour animer un nécessaire réflexion dans la perspective de la PFUE.
- Institutions / Union européenne, China, United States, Russia, European Union, Strategy, Geopolitical strategy, Frontiers, Global Commons
There is a current dynamics on "European Strategic Autonomy". It is the result of two years of proactive action by the EEAS to expand this French military concept to economic, finance and trade issues.
- Institutions / Power, Crisis, European Union, Geopolitics, Strategy, 2020, Coronavirus COVID-19
Between 1989 and 2019 what are the dynamics that have taken European strategy from the break-up of the Eastern Block to the potential prospect of NATO's implosion ?
- Institutions / 1949, 1989, 1999, NATO, Russia, Crisis, Geopolitics, Strategy, France, Nato's role, United States of America, NATO reform, Distinguished Professor of Geopolitics , History, 2019
The EU is bound to revisit its foreign policy in order to integrate major political trends that are here to stay. The EU is not the mirror of EU MS. It is more than that. It has to become a responsible international actor.
- Institutions / China, Russia, European Union, Geopolitics, Geopolitical balance, United States of America, Geopolitical strategy, European External Action Service (EEAS), European Council, 2019
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