Connexion
Executive Summary:
In the past two years, analysts writing in the PLA Daily have begun to discuss what they call “battlefield execution” (战场执行). After the topic was introduced in February 2025, PLA Daily published a second Military Forum (军事论坛) article on the topic on June 4 of this year (PLA Daily, February 6, 2025, June 4). [1] Official People’s Liberation Army (PLA) writings describe battlefield execution as the bridge that connects “operational intent” (作战意图) with operational effects, translating a superior commander’s expected operational outcome into realized outcomes. In other words, it is the key to generating a unit’s combat power, thus directly affecting the strength of operational capability. [2]
The PLA’s recent emphasis on battlefield execution suggests that the PLA still recognizes deficiencies in its joint operations capability, and the need to hone operational processes for warfighting. This entails improving the PLA’s ability to execute, which involves the will, timeliness, resources, methods, results, and other factors required to complete a mission. [3] It is likely related to the PLA’s 2027 centenary goal, which requires the Chinese armed forces to complete joint operations training reforms and establish a certain level of joint operational capability.
Gaps Remain in Joint Operations Capability
In June, the PLA continued to advocate for the establishment of a normalized joint training mechanism (常态化联合训练机制), aligning with the recent trend of promoting joint training and showing that the PLA’s training reforms remain underway and incomplete (China Brief, January 24, January 26; CLSC Quick Look, February 12).
The PLA Daily reiterated the PLA’s understanding of contemporary warfare; namely, that it should be understood as systems warfare under informatized and intelligentized conditions. It also noted that the modern battlefield space has become complex and the operational tempo has accelerated. In the PLA’s view, these developments have created new challenges for battlefield execution capability, with realistic training as the key to improvement. The closer training comes to actual war, the more the PLA believes it can integrate the operational effectiveness of all units and ensure that command, coordination, and control personnel can promptly understand a commander’s intent during wartime (PLA Daily, February 6, 2025, June 4).
Discourse around battlefield execution takes place in the context of remaining gaps around joint operations capability. The recent PLA Daily article outlined the need to implement an all-element, integrated model of capability generation, establish a normalized joint training mechanism, organize multi-service and multi-branch coordinated training around joint operations, and improve units’ “system-of-systems confrontation capability” (体系对抗能力). It also called for standardized operating manuals that cover the full operational process and clarify responsibilities, authorities, rules of action, and coordination requirements (PLA Daily, June 4).
Logistics Key to Sustaining Battlefield Execution
Logistics are critical to ensuring the PLA can sustain battlefield execution without interruption throughout a conflict. According to the PLA Daily, any delay on the modern battlefield can lead to missed opportunities and affect the entire operating environment. The military therefore needs all levels to act with a unified intent and plan (PLA Daily, February 6, 2025). Developing a logistics information system and implementation of modularized support that can flexibly combine resources according to operational missions would enable the PLA to achieve the necessary material requirements, inventory conditions, and transportation status in real time to rapidly adapt to operational needs (PLA Daily, June 4). This includes units’ requirements for ammunition, fuel, and other supplies; available stocks in logistics depots; and the location and status of transport assets and deliveries.
This year, the PLA has issued several regulations related to logistics support. At first glance, these measures appear to focus on anti-corruption safeguards, but they could also substantially improve logistics operations. Examples include full-process oversight measures for military fuel support (军队油料保障全流程监管措施), military health supervision regulations (军队卫生监督规定), methods to improve the efficient use of storage resources, and improvements in the throughput capacity of administrative troop transportation (PLA Daily, January 27, February 7, May 23, May 25). These measures involve stronger management of logistics materials and medical capacity, as well as improved data collection capabilities and situational awareness.
The PLA also emphasizes resilience in its logistics capacity. It seeks to ensure that wartime logistics systems can continue to sustain necessary operations even after enemy strikes, thereby maintaining a certain level of battlefield execution. The June PLA Daily article argued for the need to build a decentralized and networked material distribution system and establish a rapid repair mechanism to ensure that damaged equipment can quickly return to operation (PLA Daily, June 4).
Emphasizing Autonomy and Flexibility of Front-Line Commanders
The ability for front-line commanders to independently plan actual implementation measures according to higher-level objectives, rather than simply follow higher-level orders, is critical to the PLA’s understanding of battlefield execution capability. Since the purges of senior PLA officers in 2025 and 2026, the PLA has continued to strengthen political control and compliance with higher-level orders. In theory, one could reasonably infer that this would lead to political control having more sway over battlefield execution capability—especially following 2025 discussions regarding the “center of gravity” (作战重心) in military operations, where the process for changing an action plan placed greater emphasis on obtaining approval from higher levels (China Brief, October 17, 2025, [1], [2], March 18, April 16). In practice, however, this has not been the case.
Front-line commanders still clearly hold the responsibility for turning higher-level operational objectives into detailed task lists and operational indicators. At the same time, the PLA makes clear that these commanders must conduct command and control according to actual conditions, employ multiple operational methods, adapt to the enemy and the situation, and independently use operational forces to achieve the higher-level operational purpose (PLA Daily, February 6, 2025).
This approach will likely appear in specific regulations that define clear authorities for on-the-spot decision-making (临机处置权限) and delineate the scope within which units may act. If carried out, higher levels would only set principled requirements for operational objectives, while each executing unit would make independent decisions on tactical methods. This aims to improve units’ ability and proficiency in completing missions within a regulated framework (PLA Daily, June 4).
This arrangement still oscillates between strengthening political control and ensuring operational capability. While the PLA now seeks to strengthen political control, effective battlefield execution demands a degree of regulated autonomy for front-line commanders. This autonomy remains limited to specific wartime areas, rather than giving commanders freedom to act as they wish.
Conclusion
Although the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community states that “Chinese leaders do not currently plan to execute an invasion of Taiwan in 2027,” the PLA maintains its 2027 centennial goal for military modernization (ODNI, March 18). The recent discussion of battlefield execution capability in the PLA Daily likely represents a conceptual and component-level discussion under this objective.
The two PLA Daily articles on battlefield execution have only explained its requirements. Even when they discuss current battlefield execution capability, they only show that it remains under construction and has not yet produced clear progress. Other PLA Daily reporting likewise indicates that joint operations training reforms remain underway and that logistics work continues to improve, without showing major progress or results. Given the approaching 2027 centennial goal for military modernization, the PLA will likely conduct some form of large-scale exercise, training drills, or conference on battlefield execution capability or joint operations capability to demonstrate results.
Notes
[1] In May of this year, the PLA Daily adjusted its website settings, with general readers now only able to access report pages from 2026. Older articles may appear in search results, but the full text is unavailable. The February 6, 2025 article was reviewed by the author before this change.
[2] Academy of Military Science [军事科学院], ed., Chinese People’s Liberation Army Military Terminology [中国人民解放军军语] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 2011), p. 64. The relevant entries are “operational purpose” [作战目的], “operational intention” [作战意图], and “operational decision” [作战决心].
[3] Academy of Military Science [军事科学院], ed., Chinese People’s Liberation Army Military Terminology [中国人民解放军军语] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 2011), p. 96.
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Executive Summary:
On March 13, the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) released the Outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (国民经济和社会发展第十五个五年规划纲要) (Xinhua, March 13). As with all five-year plans, the outline included a chapter on national defense; but unlike the defense-related chapters of previous plans, whose content often overlap substantially, this latest plan contains new and different material.
Chapter 15 in the plan’s outline contains two “sections” (章)—sections 55 and 56—of which the former contains two additional “subsections” (节). These prioritize advancing military theory, military governance, and military–civil fusion. They also establish relevant regulations to ensure implementation that, if done effectively, could bolster the country’s military strength significantly over the next five years, building on progress made in the past decade.
New Focus on Military Governance and Enhanced Military–Civil Fusion Efforts
Five-year plans are traditionally finalized during the Two Sessions meetings in March, but are preceded by several months with the publication of a set of recommendations from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee. The outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan contains changes from both the recommendations released in November 2025 and the outlines of the 14th and 13th five-year plans (see Table 1 below) (Xinhua, March 17, 2016; March 13, 2021; March 28, 2025; March 13).
Table 1: Comparison of Defense-Related Content in Xi-era Five-Year Plans
| 15th Five-Year Plan | Previous Five-Year Plans | ||
| Included | Not Included | ||
| 2025 Recommendations | Mentioned | Combat capability: strategic deterrence, new-domain and new-type operational forces, networked information systems, modern logistics, military personnel, military theory, strategic and operational design, realistic combat training Military governance: military procurement system, military rule of law Military-civil fusion: national defense science, technology, and industrial system, standardization between military and civilian sectors, full integration of national defense requirements into major infrastructure, national defense mobilization capability, reserve forces, border, maritime, and air defense development, nationwide national defense education | Combat capability: unmanned and intelligent warfare, upgrades and transformation of traditional combat forces, development of data resources, intelligentized military system Military governance: military leadership and management system and mechanisms, strategic management, military budget management Military-civil fusion: submission of military requirements for national defense development and civil-military coordination |
| Not Mentioned | Military-civil fusion: sharing of military and local resources, military-civil integration, peacetime-wartime integration, honor incentives and rights protection for service members and their families | Military-civil fusion: integrated planning of military and local strategic plans, alignment of policies and institutions, cross civil-military reforms, improvement of green channels for spin-on for cutting-edge technologies, protection capabilities for critical targets | |
(Source: Compiled by the author)
One key difference with previous five-year plans is the inclusion of a subsection on military governance, which is titled “promoting the modernization of military governance” (推进军事治理现代化). Some of the subsection’s content overlaps with that contained in previous plans, but pulling this content together into a dedicated subsection is significant, and stands in contrast with sections and subsections covering combat capability and military–civil fusion, which largely repeat earlier language and include few new developments. [1] New material in this subsection includes mentions of the military leadership and management system and mechanism, strategic management (covered below), and military budget management.
Other items that appear for the first time in a five-year plan since General Secretary Xi Jinping came to power represent key focus areas for force development within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). For instance, a subsection on “accelerating the construction of advanced combat forces” (加快先进战斗力建设) references unmanned and intelligent warfare, upgrades to and the transformation of traditional combat forces, the development of data resources, and an intelligentized military system. Section 56 on military–civil fusion, meanwhile, discusses for the first time the submission of military requirements for defense development and military–civil coordination, integrated planning between military and local strategic plans, the improvement of “green channels” (绿色通道) to accelerate the “spin-on” (民参军) of cutting-edge technologies from the civilian sector for military use, and protection capabilities for critical targets. [2]
Some parts of the section on military–civil fusion were novel additions, even from the Central Committee recommendations released in November. These include language consolidating existing priorities such as resource sharing, military–civil integration, peacetime–wartime integration, and service member protections. These updates appear to originate more from local governments and enterprises than from senior military leadership. The PLA operates as a central institution and bears primary responsibility for national defense development, so the original recommendations likely come primarily from the military. At the same time, however, military–civil fusion, especially spin-on efforts, often faces constraints because civilian firms remain excluded from participation in the defense industrial chain for various reasons. This suggests persistent issues within the military equipment and military–civil fusion systems despite recent purges in the Equipment Development Department that have sought to resolve such issues (Xinhua, March 30).
Reforms Flagged in Operations, Governance, and Military-Civil Fusion
Three items that appear in the plan’s outline merit particular attention: military theory (军事理论), strategic management (战略管理), and green channels for spin-on (民参军绿色信道).
Military theory has appeared in previous five-year plans, but its persistence in the latest plan indicates that senior leadership does not feel satisfied with past modernization efforts. Calls in the plan’s outline to “implement a military theory modernization advancement program” (实施军事理论现代化推进工程) appear in addition to language from the previous plan’s outline to “accelerate the modernization of military theory” (加快军事理论现代化). This suggests that the leadership remains dissatisfied with the development of military theory to date. Modernization of military theory goes beyond academic development, and will drive major changes in the PLA’s operational concepts and doctrine over the next several years. According to the authoritative reference publication PLA Military Terminology (中国人民解放军军语), military theory is a system of rational understanding and knowledge regarding war and national defense issues; it emerges from, guides, and undergoes validation through military practice.
The calls for modernizing military theory likely foreshadow changes to military practice in the coming years. [3] This is because modernizing military theory involves deepening “strategic and operational design” (战略和作战筹划), signaling potential shifts in PLA operational concepts and doctrine. In PLA terminology, strategic design refers to planning guiding principles and strategies for war or other emergencies and contingencies, while operational design refers to the planning and orchestration of operations conducted by commanders, including operational objectives, force disposition, and tactics based on comprehensive situation analysis, forming the basic operations concepts. [4] The inclusion of this phrase in the plan likely relates to the PLA’s ongoing military training reform, especially its current exploration of joint operations training models (China Brief, January 24; January 26; CLSC Quick Takes, February 12).
Changes in military theory—including in strategic and operational design—will therefore be reflected in shifts in practice and doctrine. Given that the PLA is currently pursuing reform and experimentation due to dissatisfaction with its current joint operations model, future PLA operational patterns likely will differ from those observed in recent years. Efforts by the PLA National Defense University to develop and train joint operations, as well as joint operations training conducted by frontline theater forces, demonstrate that the military is already implementing this shift (PLA Daily, March 7; March 29). “Regulations on Military Theory Work” (军事理论工作条例) took effect on March 1 and support this effort by stipulating guiding principles, annual plans, and organizational procedures for its development (Xinhua, January 22).
A second area mooted for reform is “strategic management,” which indicates that the Chinese military seeks to strengthen the management of the PLA in a more focused manner. Strategic management appears in the military governance subsection of the outline and marks its first inclusion in a Xi-era five-year plan. In PLA terminology, strategic management refers to a series of activities conducted by senior military leadership to plan, organize, coordinate, and control the overall development of military building. This includes strategic forecasting, planning, and assessment. [5] Its inclusion is not necessarily a surprise, as Xi publicly emphasized strategic managements while formulating the previous 14th Five-Year Plan; but it represents a step beyond previous military development planning reforms. More surprising was the fact that it was not formally included in the 14th Five-Year Plan, which instead referred to “military management” (军事管理), while strategic management in practice serves as the core of military management and provides macro-level and directional guidance. This was despite a June 2020 strategic management training session for the entire military (全军战略管理集训) that focused on implementing the 13th Five-Year Plan and formulating the 14th (PLA Daily, June 19, 2020).
The new outline calls for “strengthening and improving” (加强和改进) strategic management. This signals that the entire military development process, from future forecasting to budget execution, will undergo reform. According to a military expert writing in the PLA Daily in 2022, the strategic management cycle spans “requirements–planning–budgeting–execution–assessment” (需求-规划-预算-执行-评估) and is intended to operate continuously with ongoing adjustments (PLA Daily, November 3, 2022). Improving this cycle will lead to deeper integration of operations, force development, and readiness, stronger demand-driven planning, enhanced military system efficiency, military budget reform, and a more robust military development assessment system.
The third notable addition to the outline is the reference to “green channels” for the “spin-on” of civilian technologies into the military. This aims to step up support for civilian participation in military programs, despite years of military–civil fusion and defense industry reform. Civilian involvement in military development has been a core policy goal of Xi’s since the established the Military–Civil Fusion Development Commission in 2017, but progress has lagged as many core policies have not advanced smoothly (China Brief, January 19, 2023; April 14, 2023; March 19, 2025). The PLA Daily warned of implementation issues as far back as 2019, noting that uptake was slow or even stalling in some regions, despite, in theory, full civilian access to participation in military programs (PLA Daily, March 2, 2019). By 2025, policies to encourage participation were still optimizing qualification certification procedures and improving channels to leverage local resources for national defense and military development (PLA Daily, March 10, 2025). The 15th Five-Year Plan’s emphasis on improving green channels seeks to streamline and accelerate specific types of civilian participation in military programs—exceptional measures that hint at persistent obstacles to civilian participation within the system.
More Stringent Implementation Preparations Compared to Previous Iterations
One reading of the latest outline is that progress has been slow in areas highlighted in previous plans, hence the promotion of more fundamental approaches and comprehensive supporting measures. Policies relating to military theory, military governance, and military–civil fusion have been in place for many years; but while long-term policy promotion allows for stability in force development, it also indicates that past policies have failed to achieve expected results.
A series of recent regulations demonstrate Xi’s commitment to addressing these issues more thoroughly. These set out relevant supporting measures with a level of clarity that reduces the room for superficial compliance or resistance in the chain of command. For instance, the Regulations on Military Theory Work establishes standards for theory development, including metrics to assess contributions to combat effectiveness (People’s Daily, January 23; PLA Daily, January 30). These developments are likely the outcome of an October 2024 military theory work conference, but the timing of the announcement of the regulations, which took effect the same week as the Two Sessions began this year, reinforces their importance for the next five-year plan period (Xinhua, October 15, 2024). The sections on military governance and military–civil fusion are similarly reinforced by regulations enacted since the start of 2026. These include the “full-process supervision measures for military fuel support” (军队油料保障全流程监管措施), the “provisions on approval authority and procedures for disciplinary actions by military Party organizations” (军队党组织实施党纪处分批准权限和程序规定), and efforts to strengthen litigation efficiency between the military and local procuratorial organs (PLA Daily, January 27, February 3, February 7, March 9).
Conclusion
Five-year plans always include objectives that are never fully implemented within the five-year window. This may explain why sections related to national defense and the military typically show a high degree of continuity with previous iterations. For the 15th Five-Year Plan period, Xi Jinping has made additional efforts to ensure the defense-related prioritizes are achieved by pairing policy statements with specific regulations—concrete rules that obligate policy implementation. Adhering to policy objectives has also been reinforced by recent purges of senior officers, which to some extent have reduced the potential for superficial compliance or resistance by demonstrating the consequences of disobedience.
Military planners should always work on the assumption that they will face a capable adversary, in order to maximize the chances of prevailing in a potential conflict. If the 2026–2030 Five-Year Plan achieves a higher level of success in its implementation than previous iterations, the PRC’s military capabilities, especially in joint operations and military–civil fusion, could see another significant leap. Such leaps could exceed current expectations, given that the substantial progress seen in the past decade occurred despite inefficiencies in the military system.
Notes
[1] Much of the military-related content in the latest plan is rolled over from previous iterations. This in part indicates continuity in national defense development priorities. The section on combat capability, for instance, discusses strategic deterrence, new-domain and new-type operational forces, networked information systems, military theory, strategic and operational planning, and realistic combat training, among others. The military governance section, meanwhile, references the military procurement system and rule by law in the military, and the military–civil fusion section addresses topics such as the national defense science, technology, and industrial system, standardization between military and civilian sectors, full integration of national defense requirements into major infrastructure, national defense mobilization capability, nationwide defense education, sharing of military and local resources and factors, and military–civil integration.
[2] The PRC views MCF as implementing a bidirectional flow of technology via “mutual transformation systems for military and civilian science and technology achievements” (推动军民科技成果相互转化体系建设). These systems facilitate the “spin on” (民参军) of civilian technologies into the military, as well as the “spin off” (军转民) of military technologies into civilian applications (MOST, April 12, 2017; Weinstein, March 19, 2021).
[3] Academy of Military Science [军事科学院], ed. Military Terminology of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army [中国人民解放军军语]. (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 2011), p.1.
[4] Ibid., p.54, p.179.
[5] Ibid., p.52.
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Executive Summary:
On February 28, shortly before the opening of the Two Sessions (两会), PLA Daily, the most authoritative internal newspaper and political study platform of the Chinese military, launched a special column titled “Study and Education on Establishing and Practicing the Correct View of Political Performance (树立和践行正确政绩观学习教育).” This column supported a February 23 notice issued by the Central Committee’s General Office on the same theme, and aimed to hammer home the required ideological orientation for all Party members within the military (Xinhua, February 23; PLA Daily, February 28).
These pronouncements set the theme for the military meetings at this year’s Two Sessions, which placed particularly strong emphasis on General Secretary Xi Jinping’s political control over the armed forces. As several variations on this theme elaborated over the course of the meetings, Xi aims to ensure that all officers and soldiers follow and implement his directives, so as to resolve long-standing problems within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). A comparison with military-related events at previous Two Sessions since the 20th Party Congress in October 2022 indicate that this year’s operational priorities for the PLA and the People’s Armed Police (PAP) were unusual in their narrow focus.
Stronger Demands for Political Obedience
Each year, the news release on the PLA delegation’s establishment meeting for the Two Sessions follows the same structure. It announces the “election” results for the head and deputy heads of the delegation, highlights the overall significance of that year’s Two Sessions, and then details the requirements placed on military delegates, the guidelines for proposals submitted by the delegates, and the expectations for discipline and conduct among the representatives. In this year’s release, most sections conformed to this typical structure. But the sections on requirements for military delegates and guidelines for proposals contained notable differences. Table 1 compares the news releases issued since the 20th Party Congress (PLA Daily, March 4, 2023, March 4, 2024, March 4, 2025, March 4).
Table 1: Comparison of News Releases on the Establishment of the PLA Delegation
| Year | Requirements for Military Delegates | Guidelines for Proposals |
| 2026 | Thoroughly study and implement Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era Participate in the meetings with a strong sense of political responsibility and full political enthusiasm Elevate political stance (政治站位) and firmly uphold the correct political direction in deliberation and decision-making | Offer proposals and recommendations on advancing political awareness of the military (政治建军), deepening political rectification (政治整训), strengthening combat training and war preparedness, and improving military governance |
| 2025 | Follow Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era as the guiding framework, implement Xi Jinping’s thought on strengthening the military, and faithfully represent the interests and will of the people Grasp the requirements of building a strong country and a strong military from a political and strategic perspective | Submit proposals and recommendations on major issues including political awareness of the military (政治建军), combat training and war preparedness, deepening reform, and military governance |
| 2024 | Thoroughly study and implement Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, remember the trust placed by the Party and the people, and faithfully fulfill the duties of a National People’s Congress delegate Elevate political stance (政治站位), adapt to the process of Chinese-style modernization, and grasp the requirements of building a strong country and a strong military | Conduct in-depth research on major issues such as strengthening combat training and war preparedness, promoting high-quality development, and consolidating and improving the integrated national strategic system and capabilities |
| 2023 | Thoroughly study and implement Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, and fully implement the spirit of the 20th Party Congress and the First and Second Plenary Sessions of the 20th Central Committee Grasp the profound significance of this meeting, strengthen political responsibility, and shoulder the responsibilities of the era | Focus on achieving the centenary goal of building the military, perform duties conscientiously in accordance with the law, and actively submit proposals and recommendations |
(Source: Compiled by the author)
This year’s meeting made requirements for political obedience among military delegates more explicit. For the first time, the Party set expectations regarding the political obedience of delegates and their participation during the meetings. These include participating in the meetings with a strong sense of political responsibility and full political enthusiasm, raising one’s political stance, and firmly maintaining the correct political direction in deliberation and decision-making. In previous years, requirements mainly emphasized implementing certain political ideas and understanding the political demands of the era.
Another new development was the inclusion of “political rectification” (政治整训) in the proposal guidelines for the first time since the 20th Party Congress. Among three other areas highlighted this year, combat training and war preparedness appeared for the third consecutive year, and political awareness of the military (政治建军) and military governance appeared for the second consecutive year.
Xi’s insistent political demands stem from dissatisfaction with the operation of the military and with the military’s implementation of his requirements for improving performance. This dissatisfaction has accumulated over many years—the military delegation at the Two Sessions in 2025 included demands to improve the PLA’s overall performance, including building the military with frugality, allocating national defense resources scientifically, and conducting professional evaluation throughout the entire process of plan implementation while building a complete and effective supervision system. These requirements initially appeared during the military delegation meeting in 2019 (China Brief, March 19, 2025). Xi’s continued focus on these areas suggests that he sees a lack of progress.
Grassroots Suggestions Also Highlight Strengthening Political Control
Xi always delivers a speech at the plenary meeting of the PLA and PAP delegations during the Two Sessions, at which six or more military representatives also typically deliver remarks. Compared with previous years, which featured senior PLA officers or generals from functional departments of the Central Military Commission (CMC), this year’s speakers were all mid- and lower-ranking officers and enlisted personnel (China Brief, March 19, 2025). [1] For example, Deputy Commander of the Air Force Zheng Yuanlin (郑元林) spoke in 2025, Vice President of the Academy of Military Science Yao Dangnai (姚党鼐) spoke in 2024, and Deputy Director of the CMC Equipment Development Department Rao Wenmin (饶文敏) spoke in 2023. This year, however, the most senior officer to deliver remarks was Hao Jingwen (郝井文), a major general in the PLA Air Force (CCTV, March 7). [2] This selection suggests that Xi seeks advice from lower-grade personnel, perhaps as much due to a lack of trust in his senior generals as to ensure that political directives reach grassroots units directly. Xi wants to prevent superficial compliance, prevent senior officers from mixing personal or factional interests into military affairs, and prevent the growth of power or organizational networks that could challenge his authority.
Xi’s remarks this year emphasized both positive and negative measures to further strengthen control over the military. He called for tightening supervision and strengthening management systems through restrictive and negative measures, as well as promoting historical education through inspirational and positive messaging (PLA Daily, March 8). The most prominent portion of his speech prioritized handling political problems within the military. In a sign that the recent purges have rattled the leadership, Xi stressed that “it is the military who holds the gun, and the armed forces must never include individuals who harbor divided loyalty toward the Party” (军队是拿枪杆子的，军中绝不能有对党怀有二心之人) (PLA Daily, March 8). This represented a departure from previous occasions, where his remarks have largely focused on the overall priorities of military development for the given year, such as emerging technology or military-civil fusion (PLA Daily, March 9, 2023; March 8, 2024; March 8, 2025). Table 2 compares the news releases from these meetings across different years.
Table 2. Comparison of News Releases on Xi Jinping’s Participation in the PLA Delegation Meetings
| Year | Main Theme of Xi Jinping’s Remarks | Key Points in Specific Details |
| 2026 | Since the 18th Party Congress, the Party Central Committee has led the people’s military with unprecedented determination and intensity to deepen political rectification and advance political awareness of the military, and these efforts have achieved major results. The military holds the guns, and the armed forces must not include anyone who harbors divided loyalty toward the Party, and must not provide any place for corrupt individuals to hide. | Strengthen oversight of major projects, strengthen supervision of military–local integration, and advance reforms in military budget management Comprehensively strengthen the Party’s leadership and Party building in the military Strengthen the development of revolutionary and professional talent within the armed forces Strongly preserve and promote the fine traditions of our Party and our military |
| 2025 | The implementation of the military’s 14th Five-Year Plan for development has achieved a series of major results over more than four years, while it also faces many contradictions and problems. Handle the relationships between progress and quality, cost and effectiveness, overall priorities and key tasks, development and supervision, and plan implementation and capability formation. Follow a path of high-quality, high-efficiency, low-cost, and sustainable development. | Strengthen coordination across departments, across fields, and between the military and local authorities, build the military with frugality, and allocate national defense resources scientifically in terms of direction and scale Strengthen joint military–local efforts and make full use of the advantages and resources of local authorities Conduct professional evaluation throughout the entire process of plan implementation and build a complete and effective supervision system |
| 2024 | Since the 18th Party Congress, we have coordinated the development of strategic emerging industries and new types of combat forces, and these efforts have produced a series of major achievements. After the 20th Party Congress, the Party Central Committee proposed accelerating the development of new productive forces from the overall objective of promoting high-quality development. Seize the current momentum, grasp the characteristics and development patterns of emerging sectors, and promote the efficient integration and mutual reinforcement of new productive forces and new combat capabilities. | Enhance the capacity to manage and develop the maritime domain, improve the capability to safeguard national cybersecurity, and strengthen major projects in intelligent technology Promote independent innovation and original innovation, and strengthen integrated innovation and comprehensive application Improve institutional mechanisms for demand coordination, planning alignment, and resource sharing Deepen reforms in the national defense science and technology industry system |
| 2023 | Consolidate and strengthen the integrated national strategic system and capabilities. Focus on integration and maximize national strategic capabilities Uphold the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee. Strengthen the integrated alignment of strategic planning across sectors, the integrated coordination of strategic resources, and the integrated employment of strategic forces Systematically enhance China’s overall capacity to respond to strategic risks, safeguard strategic interests, and achieve strategic objectives | Improve the integrated national strategic system and capabilities |
(Source: Compiled by the author)
Delegate Proposals Center on Political Control
Beyond the main military-related meeting, the military delegation to the Two Sessions also holds separate plenary meetings where representatives present their own opinions and proposals. Remarks from the second such meeting this year continued to focus on political control over the military. Speakers presented proposals on strengthening ideological and political education, accelerating improvements in combat capability, strengthening supervision across different sectors and fields, and strengthening grassroots-level development (PLA Daily, March 10).
This focus differs from equivalent meetings in previous years, which emphasized broader aspects of military development. In 2025, for instance, discussions addressed joint operations command capability, battlefield medical capacity, national defense mobilization, network and information system development, and military theory research; while 2024 included discussions addressing joint operations capability, defense technology innovation, application of emerging technologies, new equipment capability development, reserve force organization, frugal military construction, and grassroots combat training and readiness (PLA Daily, March 10, 2024, March 10, 2025).
Conclusion
Meetings related to the PLA during this year’s Two Sessions show that Xi Jinping is unrelenting in his efforts to further strengthen political control over the military. This is partly a response to recent purges of senior generals—Xi seeks to strengthen political awareness in order to ensure control over generals, officers, and soldiers who remain in service. In the longer term, Xi hopes that comprehensive political control across the entire military will address problems that appear to have dissatisfied him for many years. The unusual focus on political awareness of the military and political rectification during this year’s Two Sessions represents an even broader effort to consolidate Xi’s control over the PLA.
It is still too early to assess how effective these efforts will be, but one thing seems clear: despite several years of purges among senior officers, the continued need for military-wide political education and bottom-up supervision suggests that Xi still has a high level of distrust toward the PLA. This helps explain why many senior positions have remained unfilled for months and are still being held in an acting capacity—a situation that may persist for some time, at least until ongoing personnel reviews are completed and the latest round of political education and control measures begins to show some results.
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Executive Summary:
Beijing has lost the last combat-tested leaders from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) high command. The removal of Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia (张又侠) and Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Department Liu Zhenli (刘振立), both veterans of the Sino-Vietnamese conflicts, has narrowed the experience pool Beijing can call upon to prepare for a Taiwan contingency. [1] It also severs the PLA’s link to officers who have commanded under fire, maneuvered units in combat, and translated doctrine into practice amid real battlefield friction. Their departure raises questions about how a rapidly modernizing but largely untested force preserves and transmits tactical and operational knowledge. It also prompts reconsideration of how CMC Chairman Xi Jinping’s political timeline for “solving the Taiwan question” (解决台湾问题) via unification can be reconciled with the PLA’s actual pace of force development (Xinhua, March 8).
Losing Combat Experience Impacts Tactical and Operational Knowledge
Some may argue that the Sino-Vietnamese conflicts that Zhang and Liu experienced are decades removed from the modern battlefield, but this does not diminish the value their combat experience brought to the CMC. While technology has strongly influenced the character of war, the fundamental concepts remain the same. As a result, on a tactical level, battle drills have not changed significantly, and excellent officers are still those who can lead and maneuver their units to approach and destroy the enemy. On the operational level, excellent officers are those who can coordinate the warfighting functions.
If not applicable for strategic planning, Zhang and Liu’s combat experiences—both tactical and operational—would be useful at least for evaluating realistic training standards, as they have commanded units and coordinated with adjacent formations under the stress of combat. Reports suggest Zhang Youxia coordinated indirect fires in the Battle of Song Mao Ling (松毛岭之战) to prevent his headquarters from being overrun, while Liu Zhenli successfully mounted 36 defenses with his company, earning numerous merit decorations (Jinri Toutiao, January 11, 2022; Baidu, August 28, 2022; Zhihu, April 29, 2024). This lends credence to the idea that their dismissal is tied to disagreements with Xi over force development and modernization (China Brief, January 26). It is possible that Zhang and Liu did not believe that the PLA would be ready according to Xi’s timeline, and Xi could not abide by this counsel.
Gray Zone Operations Provide Value to Full Campaigns
The PLA’s gray zone activities constitute “dress rehearsals for forced reunification,” according to senior U.S. military officers, and present invaluable opportunities for rehearsing complex operations and fundamental skills (House Armed Services Committee, April 2025; China Brief, January 24). Probes of Taiwanese defenses and combat patrols allow the PLA Navy and Air Force to practice pre-combat checks and inspections, maintenance drills, and sorties, in preparation for performing these tasks rapidly under stress. Combat reconnaissance and relaying collected intelligence to higher headquarters also enables units to practice the joint targeting cycle. [2] With the sample data provided by combat reconnaissance, staffs across echelons can practice their executing functions through increasingly realistic command post exercises. These exercises are crucial to allowing the PLA to practice their own version of the military decision-making process and understanding how to make use of capabilities by warfighting function. Lulls in gray zone operations consequently can be attributed to the purges, by creating manpower gaps in the ranks of PLA planners. The high training value that these activities confer, however, mean that they will likely continue in frequency and scale.
Delayed Davidson Window
With Zhang and Liu removed from their posts, the previous assessment that the PLA would be partial to a particular type of campaign for unification with Taiwan is no longer applicable (China Brief, November 11, 2025). Only Zhang Shengmin (张升民) now remains on the CMC, and his political commissar background means that he has limited influence on campaign planning. As a result, the PLA will not be able to meet its modernization goals by 2027, the so-called “Davidson Window,” and will not be ready to stage an invasion of Taiwan in the near term.
The PLA’s execution of scheduled year-round military exercises in the Taiwan Strait nevertheless indicate that its tactical and operational-level units and leaders are largely insulated from the effects of the anti-graft probe and are capable of conducting combat operations that span a short timeframe (China Brief, November 11, 2025). However, a Taiwan campaign is unlikely to conclude within a matter of weeks and will probably be protracted beyond a month. A broad elimination of strategic-level leaders will be detrimental to the PLA’s decision-making capability, at least until positions are backfilled and officers are sufficiently trained. Even though the PLA has operational plans for multiple contingencies against Taiwan already prepared, it is extremely difficult to coordinate and resource all of the arms, equipment, and capabilities needed to sustain the fight, given that PLA joint training is still in its early phases (China Landpower Studies Center, January 12, February 12).
Joint capabilities have been further undermined by the removal of Liu, who was the head of the CMC Joint Staff Department, which serves as the command interface between the CMC and the theater commands, responsible for allocating and coordinating resources across theaters (The Paper, January 11, 2016; Military Review, September 2023; PRC Ministry of National Defense, accessed March 3). While the Eastern Theater Command is responsible for a Taiwan scenario, the PLA’s support branches—the aerospace, cyberspace, information, and joint logistics support forces—remain centralized because of their resource scarcity, and must be readily available to support other theater operations in any kind of contingency (Joint Forces Quarterly, October 14, 2021, April 17, 2025). Absent competent and experienced management, this precludes the Eastern Theater Command from successfully integrating these capabilities into training, and creates wartime challenges due to competing priorities (National Defense University, April 17, 2025).
Conclusion
Erosion of combat-experienced, strategic-level personnel at the top of the PLA, coupled with slower than anticipated progress on joint training, extending the potential timeline and success of a campaign to unify with Taiwan. Xi is not getting any younger, however, and feels the constraints of time on his ambition to take Taiwan (Foreign Affairs, January 30). In the medium term, as positions are backfilled and officers become accustomed to their new roles, analysts should not rule out the possibility that Xi may assume risk and embark on a campaign against Taiwan, whether the PLA is fully ready or not.
Notes
[1] Zhang was recorded to have served as a company commander (tactical) in the initial 1979 invasion of Vietnam, and attained a regimental command (operational) during the 1984 Two Mountain Border War of Laoshan. Liu was noted to have served as a company commander in the 1984 war.
[2] For more information on the joint targeting cycle and joint targeting in general, see Joint Publication 3-60 Joint Targeting (National Defense University, January 31, 2013). Targeting does not exclusively refer to indirect fire and is not restricted to the PLA Army and Rocket Force, but those examples are illustrative.
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Executive Summary:
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is currently transitioning between “informatization” (信息化) and “intelligentization” (智能化) as part of its modernization agenda. As an important intermediate step—and following the 2024 reorganization of the Strategic Support Force into three separate arms (兵种) directly subordinate to the Central Military Commission (CMC)—it is transitioning the military space information support and assurance mission area from the Aerospace Force (ASF) to the Information Support Force (ISF). This will reduce organizational and technological “bottlenecks” (卡脖子) that impede timely fusion of multi-sensor information for joint warfighting. The transition is not yet complete, and it is unclear whether the PLA intends a full transition.
A new civilian university in Jinan, the Aerospace Information University (空天信息大学), is part of this overhaul. The institution aims to train ISF talent and the growing commercial space sector with the requisite capabilities to achieve PLA and broader Chinese Communist Party (CCP) goals in the 15th Five-Year Plan period (2026–2030). This will support deepening the “integration of communication, navigation, and remote sensing” (通导遥一体化) (Chinese Academy of Sciences [CAS], August 18, 2025; Xinhua; Jinan Daily, January 9).
PLA Reorganizes Space Operations
In recent years, the PLA has gradually adjusted the mission areas it includes under space operations. [1] According to a key 2024 text, Introduction to Space Operations (太空作战概论), space information support and assurance operations (太空信息支援保障作战) is now one of five such mission areas. [2] This newer mission is a combination of space information support, one of the oldest mission areas, and assurance, which previous PLA texts had described as needed but lacking. [3]
The CMC, the military’s top decision-making organization, is currently transitioning units responsible for the space information support and assurance mission to the ISF, which oversees PLA network information systems and provides force-wide communications support, including secure strategic and tactical communications. This move is a logical one, as one of the CMC’s goals for the ISF is to address the PRC’s patchwork of information security and assurance efforts. The CMC also expects the ISF to lead integration and fusion of survey, mapping, remote sensing, meteorological, and positioning ground and space-based sensor data to provide battlefield intelligence support to PLA theater commands and services (U.S. Department of Defense, December 23, 2025). It is not transitioning all space information support units to the ISF, however, due to the PLA’s division of units to support mission areas. For example, telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C) for satellite and launch operations that underpin separate PLA mission areas will remain under the ASF.
The PLA has traditionally organized units under the space information support and assurance mission area into five or six functional groups. This has been done to create a division of labor for managing its space-based and ground-based infrastructure. [4] As of February 2026, most but not all of the space information support and assurance functional groups listed below have transitioned to the ISF. The groups are as follows:
The CMC requires these functional groups to create workflows to support four space information support requirements for joint warfighting, according to the 2020edition of the PLA’s Science of Military Strategy (战略学). These requirements are as follows: [5]
Incremental Transition of Space Information Support and Assurance to the ISF
The PLA likely continues to organize its space information support and assurance mission area in this way, using the above six groups to support the four joint warfighting space information requirements (see Figure 1). The CMC has probably transitioned all spectrum and communications management to the ISF, including ground-to-ground connections and ground-to-space SATCOM links. But the ISF’s control of space information support for other joint warfighting requirements is incomplete. Going forward, it may remain shared with the ASF and the growing civilian sector.
Figure 1: ASF and ISF Space Information Support and Assurance Missions Under Transition (2026)
Source: 王勇平 (Wang Yongping), (ed.), 空间信息支援作战 (Space Information Support Operations), 北京 (Beijing): 国防大学出版社 (National Defense University Press), 2014, 57–58.
The ISF is involved to varying degrees in all four of the PLA’s joint warfighting requirements. Its role in supporting the first likely centers on managing the former Strategic Support Force’s Base 35 (战略支援部队第三十五基地) and subordinate battlefield environment support brigades (战场环境保障大队) (China Brief, July 11, 2025; author research, 2026). Current Western understanding of the ISF and PLA military unit cover designators (MUCD) implies that the CMC would reorganize Base 35 under the ISF. But there are multiple indications that the transition is incomplete or that Base 35 will remain a joint ASF and ISF base in the near term. First, the ISF’s new military unit cover designators (MUCDs) start at 32001; and the MUCD for Base 35 is 32020, which starts to abut what current Western researchers believe to be ASF MUCDs (CASI, December 11, 2023; China Brief, July 11, 2025). [6] As of February 2026, the author could not find clear designation of new Base 35 MUCDs as ISF units, which is inconsistent with the availability of information on the ISF more generally (author research, 2026). Second, while it is clear that the PLA’s meteorological, survey, and mapping brigades fall under Base 35, the ASF and the ISF both continue to recruit applied meteorological technology experts (DXSBB, May 2025). Given that the ASF does not build meteorological satellites, they are likely recruiting meteorologists for launch centers.
The ISF’s primary role in ensuring the second joint warfighting requirement is reflected in its management of the Information Communications Base (ICB) and subordinate communications and spectrum brigades (Xinhua, June 30, 2011; China Brief, April 26, 2024; PLA Daily, May 19, 2024; Xinhua July 25, 2025). This was evident during the September 2025 military parade, which featured mobile SATCOM trucks within the ISF column. These trucks equip troops and theater commands with secure SATCOM links (CASI, September 15, 2025). The ICB primarily manages terrestrial communication infrastructure but also some ground-to-space links. It is too early to determine the fate of space-to-space links.
The ISF’s role in ensuring the third requirement centers on positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) applications. Remote sensing, mapping, and meteorology satellites all require PNT data from Beidou satellites to provide battlefield environment intelligence to commanders. But it is unclear if Base 35 currently manages the entire Beidou ground segment outside of receiving stations. This would include TT&C satellite control still under the ASF and time correction stations, which the PRC refers to as “injection stations” (China Argo Real-Time Data Center, October 8, 2018). These injection stations correlate all Beidou downlink data and then process and correct for normal timing errors before sending updates directly to satellites. Facilitating the Beidou inter-satellite data links and short message service that contribute to PLA missile reconnaissance and targeting will likely remain a joint effort.
For the fourth requirement, the ISF’s role is probably a catch-all for the remaining and still evolving ways that spectrum management and space information support and assurance interface for joint warfighting. Potential indicators for this could include fusion between Beidou missile guidance and missile early warning satellite links, wider use of space-based space situational awareness in theater command planning, and adaptation to accelerating trends in remote sensing and communications satellites in Very Low Earth Orbit (VLEO). [7]
New Aerospace Information University
The restructuring of the PLA and national space information support and assurance mission area is ongoing. One piece of evidence for this is the approval in 2020 of a new civilian university in Jinan City, Shandong Province: Aerospace Information University. The project is a joint venture by Shandong Province and the Aerospace Information Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS). Since its approval, the university’s construction was highlighted as a part of the province’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025) and it has recruited its leadership team (Shandong Higher Education Circle, July 6, 2023; Baidu, July 23, 2025). But it is yet to properly begin operations.
Aerospace Information University will contribute to the PRC’s national education ecosystem with a focus on “aerospace information networks, aerospace information materials and devices, earth observation, satellite navigation, and the Internet of Things” (空天信息网络、空天信息材料与器件、对地观测、卫星导航与物联网等领域) (Shandong Provincial Government, March 1, 2024). It is actively engaging with the PLA’s Base 35, and other Wuhan City and Hubei Province-based universities, to support the base’s geospatial and spatiotemporal workforce needs, both directly and through its collaboration with other Shandong-based universities (Shandong University, May 19, 2020; author research, 2026).
Approval for the university does more than support PLA readiness and promote the economic efficiencies of dual-use technologies. It signals the progress that the PRC has made on what it calls “air–space–ground integration” (空天地一体化) over the last decade (Posts & Telecom Press, November 11, 2025). The 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020) envisioned connecting the space, low-altitude, and ground economies with 5G, Beidou, and quantum security capability.
The new university is well positioned for its work on remote sensing technologies to contribute to this goal. Its leadership team includes Wu Yirong (吴一戎), the president of the CAS institute involved in the project. Wu recently led the development of the country’s first VLEO synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite, Haishao-1 (海哨一号) (CAS, June 4, 2025). The world’s first quantum microsatellite, Jinan-1 (济南一号), is also named for the city of Jinan. If successful, it could lead to enhanced security for the PLA’s tactical and strategic communications, as well as national border and public security (Shandong TV News, August 1, 2022). The university is also one of a handful of projects supporting Shandong Province’s Aerospace Industry Development Plan (山东省航空航天产业发展规划) for 2035. This plan focuses on creating applications for the integration of communications, navigation, and remote sensing data (通导遥一体化) (Shandong Provincial Government, March 1, 2024).
Conclusion
The organization of the PLA’s information support and assurance units is an important signpost of PLA joint warfighting readiness and of the extent to which the ASF can deepen its expertise in other areas. Transitioning large portions of this mission to both the ISF and the growing commercial space sector frees bandwidth for the ASF to develop techniques, tactics, procedures, and operational plans for terrestrial and space-based operations. These are plans the ASF is obliged to make, given that the world has not yet experienced a war with tactical space-based confrontations and there are no historical lessons from which the PLA can draw.
The CCP’s goals for the national space program extend well beyond the PLA’s needs. Deepening civilian use and reliance on space systems beyond traditional PNT integration is aligned with CCP national innovation and economic development goals. These intertwining goals create research opportunities to understand the state of PLA readiness and Beijing’s risk tolerance for instability in space.
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air University, the Department of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.
Notes
[1] Joel Wuthnow et al., eds., The PLA Beyond Borders: Chinese Military Operations in Regional and Global Context (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2021), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Books/PLA-Beyond-Borders/.
[2] Jiang Lianju [姜连举], Taikong Zuozhan Gailun [太空作战概论] (Introduction to Space Operations) (Shanghai: Shanghai Shehui Kexueyuan Chubanshe, 2024), 136–144. Jiang is also the editor of Kongjian Zuozhan Xue Jiaocheng [空间作战学教程] (Lectures on the Science of Space Operations) (2013).
[3] Wang Yongping [王勇平], ed., Kongjian Xinxi Zhiyuan Zuozhan [空间信息支援作战] (Space Information Support Operations) (Beijing: Guofang Daxue Chubanshe, 2014), 57–58.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Xiao Tianliang, ed., The Science of Military Strategy, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2020), 397 (PDF 410), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/2913216/in-their-own-words-2020-science-of-military-strategy.
[6] Kristin Burke, PLA Counterspace Command and Control (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: USAF Air University, China Aerospace Studies Institute [CASI], 2023), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/3612979/pla-counterspace-command-and-control/
[7] VLEO refers to altitudes below 400 kilometers.
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Executive Summary:
Chinese leader Xi Jinping has decimated the Central Military Commission (CMC). In 2012, the military’s highest decision-making body comprised 10 individuals, in addition to Xi himself. Today, that figure is down to one. The most recent stage in Xi’s purge, removing CMC vice chair Zhang Youxia (张又侠) and Joint Staff Department chief Liu Zhenli (刘振立), marks one of the most consequential rounds of elite military discipline in years (Ministry of National Defense, January 24). This development has significant ramifications on how the PLA will move forward with force modernization.
The most likely next step for Xi is to set about rebuilding the CMC, not least to remedy a sense of anxiety pervading the military that even he has implicitly acknowledged (People’s Daily, February 6; China Military Online, February 11). In doing so, he will need officers with operational command experience in combat arms branches within their respective service. But he will require those officers to be sufficiently loyal (China Brief, February 11). This may lead him to turn to individuals he knew when he was a provincial official. He might also look to the PLA Air Force or Navy, as any PLA Army officers would likely be close to Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, given the two generals’ respective backgrounds. Another possibility is that Xi selects officers who have been sent to Russian command and general staff colleges for professional military education. Xi has already handpicked these officers once for their competence and loyalty; he might be inclined to do so again (LinkedIn/Dennis Wilder, February 1). Surveying senior PLA officers, only one individual meets all of the above criteria and therefore should be considered a strong contender for elevation to a new-look CMC. That individual is the current defense minister, Admiral Dong Jun (董军).
Defense Minister Top Candidate for New CMC
Dong Jun’s professional résumé makes him a suitable candidate for the CMC. He was previously deputy commander of the Eastern Theater Command Navy, deputy commander of the Southern Theater Command, and commander of the PLA Navy (China Brief, February 2, 2024). His assignments with strategically vital theater commands handling the PRC’s most salient national security interests make him a desired candidate for promotion by conventional force standards alone. Dong also has extensive experience overseeing gray zone activities, which are often conducted by the PLA Navy in the eastern and southern theater commands’ areas of responsibility (Irregular Warfare Initiative, July 25, 2024). The ability to execute aggressive gray zone operations facilitates conventional force development by practicing applicable skills that can be transferred to kinetic combat scenarios (China Brief, March 25, 2022). If Dong were moved from his current, largely ceremonial role, his experience suggests he could help enhance PLA combat power generation.
Another reason why Xi might be willing to elevate Dong Jun to the CMC is that he seems to have a level of trust in his defense minister. Dong is the only three-star flag officer who appears to have reemerged with his position intact after being placed under investigation. [1] Dong’s naval background also insulates him from Zhang Youxia’s camp, which is composed of ground force, logistics/acquisitions, and rocket force personnel. He is also insulated by his ties to the “Fujian Clique” (福建系), a patronage network of officers whom Xi has personally cultivated since working with them while a provincial official in Fujian (China Brief, March 15, 2025). This clique, however, was associated with He Weidong (何卫东) and Miao Hua (苗华), whom Xi purged from the CMC in October 2025.
The notion that Xi trusts Dong might therefore seem counterintuitive. It also contrasts with the analytic consensus when he was appointed to defense minister at the end of 2023. A common argument at the time was that Xi’s decision not to include him as a member on the CMC or as a state councilor indicated a lack of trust (China Brief, January 17, 2025). But the decision not to promote Dong to the CMC earlier is not necessarily an indication of a lack of trust. It could reflect an intentional act to downgrade the office of the Minister of National Defense, perhaps out of a desire to signal that military diplomacy, especially with the United States, is a low priority (RAND, August 14, 2024; China Brief, October 4, 2024). In this reading, Dong Jun is not distrusted; rather, he simply has assumed a position whose duties have been limited to suit changing priorities.
Dong also meets the niche potential criterion of being an officer selected to attend professional military education courses in Russia. During his tenure as deputy chief of staff of the navy in 2014, Xi selected him to attend the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (China Times, February 8, 2024; Radio Free Asia, February 12, 2024). The analyst Dennis Wilder has argued that officers chosen to attend Russian command and general staff colleges exhibit clear leadership ability (LinkedIn/Dennis Wilder, February 1). No complete list of PLA officers selected for these professional military education opportunities exists in open sources, but Dong is the most senior officer known to have studied in Russia.
Beyond Dong Jun, Major General Zhou Hongxu (周洪许) stands out as another potential addition. Xi broke precedent in selecting Zhou to lead the Central Guards Bureau in 2021. Zhou also was reportedly responsible for the arrest of Zhang Youxia (LinkedIn/Dennis Wilder, February 1; China Brief, August 23, 2021). The bureau he leads is responsible for protecting the Party leadership and is therefore considered highly trusted (Sohu, January 7, 2025; Baidu Baike/中央警卫局, accessed February 12).
Xi could also elevate a younger generation of officers to the CMC. Purges have depleted the pool of three-star flag officers, requiring him to reach into the ranks of one- and two-star generals and admirals to backfill theater command, staff, and CMC positions.
Conclusion
The removal of all but one military member of the CMC leaves a hollow institution that Xi Jinping can shape as he desires. He may decide not to fill it to capacity at seven personnel (as he did in 2017 and 2022) or with exclusively military personnel. Dong Jun is the most likely candidate among the limited pool of remaining flag officers, though other possibilities include Zhou Hongxu and generals of lower grade and rank. Full confirmation will have to wait until the next plenary session of the Central Committee later this year. In the meantime, deeper study of the PLA’s stock of senior officers should yield further insights into what the future of the Chinese military leadership might look like.
The views expressed are solely personal and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the United States Military Academy at West Point, the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
Notes
[1] In late 2024, Western media reported, based on U.S. government sources, that Dong was being investigated. This reporting was substantiated by Dong’s absence from certain duties (China Maritime Studies Institute, November 29, 2024). PRC officials denied that this was the case, however, and Dong later resumed his role as minister of defense. This episode could indicate that Xi feels able to trust Dong.
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Executive Summary:
The military high command in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is not in good shape. Two weeks after the purge of generals Zhang Youxia (张又侠) and Liu Zhenli (刘振立), the composition of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and its Joint Staff Department (JSD) remains uncertain. There have been no signs of new appointments to the CMC, and the position of JSD chief of staff remains vacant (Lianhe Zaobao, February 7).
This situation, in which it is unclear who is managing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on a day-to-day basis or advising CMC Chairman Xi Jinping on military affairs, is abnormal for any modern military. Yet it may persist until the next Party plenum later this year, which allows for new promotions, although acting members could be appointed in the interim. When Xi does move to repopulate the CMC, he is likely to elevate politically loyal officers who pose no threat. Even after that point, the negative impact of the current saga on elite officers will continue, as low morale and high mistrust are set to endure.
CMC and JSD Remain Operationally Significant
The crippling of CMC and JSD leadership is concerning precisely due to the centrality of these organizations in daily PLA operations. First established nearly 100 years ago, the CMC remains the highest national defense decision-making body in the PRC (People’s Daily, June 16, 2016). During the Mao era, veteran revolutionaries staffed the CMC until their displacement during the chaos of the Cultural Revolution (Gu, 2019). [1] From the reform era up until Xi came to power, the CMC has been characterized by relative stability and regularized promotion patterns. Xi has since subverted these conventions. [2]
Before mid-January 2026, it was still possible that the CMC continued to function normally. Zhang and Liu—two seasoned professional officers with combat experience—were still in place to assist Xi. With them out of the picture, the CMC is arguably now in a state of dysfunction. The two remaining members, Xi Jinping and anti-corruption czar Zhang Shengmin (张升民), are not professionally trained military officers and it is beyond their capacity to make optimal decisions for the world’s largest military (The Diplomat, October 27, 2025). Xi has secured the CMC Chairman Responsibility System he has long desired, and power has become unprecedently concentrated in his hands (Breaking Defense, February 6; Sinocism, February 8). Yet without institutional checks, critical feedback, and honest military advice, such maximal centralization might not benefit the PLA in the long run.
The JSD is the PLA’s second most important institutional organ. Led by a chief of staff and several deputies, it comprises bureaus responsible for overseeing the PLA’s C4ISR system and executing CMC orders pertaining to military operations. [3] Thus, while the JSD is vital in a time of peace, its prominence is further magnified in a time of war. Since the purge of Liu Zhenli, it remains unclear how the JSD is currently functioning, or how it reports up to the CMC or Xi personally. Its planning, coordination, and advisory duties have almost certainly been disrupted.
Xi Prioritizes Loyalty Over Competence
It is impossible for any single person to run a large organization, let alone one comprising over two million personnel. Xi, already in charge of the Party-state, does not have the bandwidth to manage the PLA by himself, even with assistance from Zhang Shengmin. As a result, despite the enormous power he wields, Xi must soon re-staff the high command and delegate responsibilities accordingly.
The most important question going forward concerns the type of officers Xi is likely to promote, as these choices will directly impact the PLA’s future capabilities. The concept of “red and expert” (又红又专), a Mao-era formulation used to describe the gold standard for professionals as both technically competent and firmly committed to Maoist ideology, will likely influence such choices (Doyon & Yang, 2024). [4] This paradigm was especially rigid within the PLA, where many capable officers ended up sidelined or even purged due to perceived lack of deference to Maoist dogmas or to Mao himself (Engelsberg Ideas, January 26). [5]
As PLA politics increasingly exhibit Mao-era features, Xi may consider new promotions based on such criteria. Certainly, Xi would like to find capable officers who are also loyal to his Party line. Yet the inherent tension between disciplined professional modus operandi and unreserved personal loyalty makes perfectly balanced “red and expert” types uncommon. In the absence of ideal candidates, Xi is likely to prioritize loyal officers over the professionally capable, even at the expense of negative consequences for the PLA. [6]
The military remains the most potent coercive institution in the PRC, reinforcing the need for loyal command. This concern seems to be central to the recent purge. Official statements have blasted Zhang and Liu for challenging Xi’s authority, suggesting acute disagreements between Xi and the two veterans who represented the professional officer class (PLA Daily, January 25). It is plausible that this incident substantially eroded Xi’s confidence in professionally oriented commanders, strengthening his preference for loyalty above all else. Even if Xi leans more toward “expert” in positions that require highly competent professionals, such as the JSD chief of staff, he will likely compensate by tightening monitoring mechanisms to ensure obedience.
High Command Likely Growing Anxious
Purges are designed to enforce fear-based compliance, often demoralizing a team and prospective members. The rolling purges that have devastated the CMC are therefore bound to produce ripple effects on the psychology and behavior of individuals remaining at the high command. At present, the PLA top brass is likely in a state of anxiety. The fall of Zhang Youxia shows that personal safety is not guaranteed even for a fellow princeling and apparent childhood associate of Xi who served as his right-hand man for eight years (Straits Times, February 4). The fall of Liu Zhenli, meanwhile, illustrates that maintaining a low profile and focusing on professional military matters also offer no protection (China-Arms, June 2, 2024). In a resulting climate of fear, the safest course of action is to agree with Xi’s opinions and suppress professional judgement when it contradicts his views, devote more time to parsing political trends than pursuing professional enrichment, and downplay one’s strengths to avoid unnecessary attention.
Elite fragmentation also leads to intensifying interpersonal differences, adverse effects on jointness, and the rise of information silos. High-ranking officers will fear informants in their midst, or harbor concerns that frequent interactions could be interpreted as clique formation, an unforgivable offense in the Party-state system. A breakdown of interdependence among officers could lead to devastating consequences, since militaries are built on collective spirit (USNI, November 2021). When mistrust and wariness dominate interpersonal relationships, the officer corps will face growing challenges in functioning as a cohesive team.
Frequent purges also fundamentally alter the nature of relations between Xi and the high command. By inflating Xi’s authority while minimizing officers’ professional autonomy, the high command risks become an echo chamber without dissenting voices or critical feedback. Once a leader shows that he has a penchant to use purges as a problem-solving tool, subordinates are incentivized to avoid acts that might elicit a negative reaction. Professional officers are less likely to provide forthright advice and will consistently endorse Xi’s perspectives, even submitting distorted information to maintain goodwill. [7] The PRC’s own history offers a stark warning: the Great Leap Forward, which resulted in the deadliest famine in human history, was largely an outcome of previous political campaigns that silenced all dissent (Education about Asia, Winter 2012). Global military history is similarly littered with examples of leaders making misguided decisions after insulating themselves from honest criticisms (Brookings, April 2, 2025).
Conclusion
Just as the October 2025 purge constrained the leadership capacity of the Eastern Theater Command, the latest purge of the CMC will impair high-level decision-making affecting the whole PLA (China Brief, November 25, 2025). The new status quo is one where Xi wields unprecedented power while important institutions have been undermined. This highly imbalanced composition prioritizes Xi’s personal aptitude over the collective wisdom and expertise of senior military officers.
In selecting new military elites to refill the high command, the need for political security is likely to drive Xi toward opting for loyalty over expertise. But true security will be hard to achieve while the PLA’s officer class operates in an environment marked by regular purges, anxiety, frayed personal ties, and fundamentally altered relations between the CMC chairman and his subordinates. Instead, officers are less inclined to take initiative, camaraderie is fading, and blind obedience to the leader is creating an echo chamber that fosters overconfidence and miscalculation, eventually undercutting high-level decision-making capacity and overall PLA effectiveness.
Notes
[1] Gu, Anlin, ed. 2019. Zhongguo Gongchandang Lishi Zuzhi Jigou Cidian [Dictionary of Historical Organizations and Institutions of the Chinese Communist Party]. Chinese Communist Party History Publishing House & Party-Building Literature Publishing House, p. 480.
[2] In the reform period, in addition to the chairman and two vice chairmen, the CMC usually comprised four general departments heads, service chiefs, and the minister of national defense (Reform Data, September 1, 2002). China Brief has previously published on the shifting composition of the CMC in the 21st century (China Brief, January 17, 2025). Changes under Xi began in the 2012–2017 CMC, which saw two sitting members purged: JSD Chief of Staff Fang Fenghui (房峰辉) was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2019 and CMC Political Work Department Director Zhang Yang (张阳) committed suicide while under house arrest in November 2017 (People’s Daily, November 28, 2017; PRC Procuratorate, February 21, 2019). The current CMC has been devastated by successive purges (China Brief, July, 26 2025, October 17, 2025, November 14, 2025).
[3] Important C4ISR-relevant bureaus within the JSD are: Operations Bureau (作战局), Strategic and Campaign Training Bureau (战略战役训练局), Intelligence Bureau (情报局), Navigation Bureau (导航局), Information and Communications Bureau (信息通信局), Network and Electronic Bureau (网络电子局), Network Information Bureau (网络信息局), Battlefield Environment Support Bureau (战场环境保障局), and Military Supplies Bureau (军事需求局) (163, March 30, 2023). See also Miller, Frank, Tung Ho, Kenneth Allen, and Arran Hope, eds. The People’s Liberation Army as Organization Volume 3.0. Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation; Vienna: Exovera, 2025., p.34.
[4] Jérôme Doyon and Long Yang, “Shades of Red: Changing Understandings of Political Loyalty in the Chinese Communist Party, 1921–2021”, in Jérôme Doyon and Chloé Froissart, eds., The Chinese Communist Party: A 100-Year Trajectory, ANU Press, pp. 125-154, 2024.
[5] While there were many purges of military officers during the Mao era, one of the first major campaigns targeting capable commanders was the so-called “Anti-Dogmatism Struggle” (反教条主义斗争) of 1958. This campaign demoted highly accomplished, reform-minded officers, including Liu Bocheng (刘伯承), Su Yu (粟裕), Li Da (李达), Xiao Ke (萧克), and Song Shilun (宋时轮). Remarkably, Zhang Youxia’s father Zhang Zongxun (张宗逊) spearheaded personal attacks on some of these generals. See History of the People’s Liberation Army Writing Group, ed. Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Junshi [History of the People’s Liberation Army]. Vol. 5. Military Science Press, 2010, pp. 167–173; Xiao Ke. Xiao Ke Huiyilu [Memoirs of Xiao Ke]. Liberation Army Press. 1997, p. 452.
[6] For more on the loyalty versus competence dilemma, see Mattingly, Daniel C. “How the Party Commands the Gun: The Foreign–Domestic Threat Dilemma in China.” American Journal of Political Science 68, no. 1 (2024): 227–42.
[7] This phenomenon is otherwise known as the Dictator’s Dilemma. See Putkaradze, Vakhtang, “The Dictator’s Dilemma: The Distortion of Information Flow in Autocratic Regimes and Its Consequences.” Physica. D, Vol. 462, June 2024.
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Executive Summary:
On January 24, authorities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced investigations into Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia (张又侠) and Joint Staff Department chief Liu Zhenli (刘振立). Additional articles published on January 31 and February 2 by the PLA Daily, the flagship newspaper of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), have revealed substantial new information (PLA Daily, January 31, February 2).
These articles reinforce the thesis that Zhang’s purge was due to differences with CMC Chairman Xi Jinping over military development, which is also a significant political threat to Xi. Two pieces of evidence indicate that this thesis—a plausible reading of the initial January 25 PLA Daily editorial that followed the announcement of the investigation into Zhang—now appears more likely: direct references to the 2027 centenary goal, and further divergences from coverage of the purge of former CMC vice chairman He Weidong (何卫东) (China Brief, January 26). [1]
Falling Behind Centenary Goal Schedule
Developing joint combat capabilities is a core part of the PLA’s centenary goal, which first appeared in the communiqué of the Fifth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee in 2020 (Xinhua, October 29, 2020; November 26, 2020). Authoritative interpretations of the goal specifically addressed combat capability development. An article penned by former CMC vice chairman Xu Qiliang (许其亮) in the People’s Daily in November 2022 listed five major objectives required to achieve the centenary goal (People’s Daily, November 7, 2022). Two of these—building a high-level strategic deterrence and joint operations system and promoting the transformation and upgrading of military training—clearly emphasized joint operations. More recently, an article Xi Jinping personally authored in Qiushi in July 2024 on achieving the PLA centenary goal similarly emphasized joint operations and training in its discussion of warfighting and victory capability (Qiushi, July 31, 2024).
A credible joint operations capability would be a prerequisite for an attack on Taiwan. Western observers, including former CIA Director William Burns and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), have stated that the 2027 goal includes an order from Xi for the PLA to develop the capability to conduct such an attack (CBS, February 3, 2023; DoD, December 23, 2025). It is therefore reasonable to infer that Xi views the military training for which Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were responsible as exceptionally important. The two generals oversaw critical tasks directly tied to the PLA’s principal strategic goal. However, since the centenary goal was declared more than five years ago, joint operations training has progressed more slowly than a 2027 timeline would require (China Brief, January 26).
Linking Zhang’s Purge and 2027 Force-Building Planning
The January 31 and February 2 PLA Daily articles link the purges of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli directly to advancing the PLA centenary goal and removing obstacles to building combat capability. While the initial PLA Daily article, published on January 25, did not mention 2027, the January 31 article did make the link in the same sentence. It claimed that the decision to open an investigation into Zhang “constitutes a resolute and powerful push to win the critical battle to achieve the PLA centenary goal” (是打好实现建军一百年奋斗目标攻坚战的强力推动) (PLA Daily, January 31). Earlier PLA Daily articles criticizing He Weidong also mentioned the 2027 goal, but did not directly link it to his purge, or the purges of other officials.
The February 2 article, meanwhile, stated that Zhang and others had had a negative impact on the PLA’s combat capability and had acted as obstacles to military development: “By resolutely investigating corrupt elements such as Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli,” it said, “roadblocks and stumbling stones that hinder the development of the military cause and squeeze out the inflated elements in combat capability building have been removed” (坚决查处张又侠、刘振立等腐败分子，清除的是影响事业发展的拦路虎、绊脚石，挤去的是战斗力建设的水分)” (PLA Daily, February 2). This constitutes another divergence from criticism of He Weidong, which did not accuse him of hindering progress in building combat capability.
Both articles both used language implying the existence of issues in the planning and implementation of force building, areas in which Zhang Youxia had been intimately involved. For instance, the January 31 commentary acknowledged that the purge of Zhang and others could bring short-term difficulties, but argued that everyone in the military must obey the Party leadership and treat the Party’s strategic design and implementation planning as a shared consensus (PLA Daily, January 31). This again contrasts with PLA Daily articles related to the purge of He Weidong, which did not use this or similar language, and suggests that Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli faced real problems in this area and that these problems reflected disagreements with Xi Jinping.
The February 2 article clearly emphasizes the primacy of political control over the military, indicating that this lies at the heart of the latest purges. It states that “political awareness” (政治建军) must run through “the entire process of planning formulation and implementation” (规划编制和实施全过程), a phrase that also appeared in articles following the opening of an investigation into He Weidong. But unlike the coverage of He, in which this phrase was followed by an 88 character series of general policy slogans, in Zhang’s case, it was immediately followed by a clear and concise 22-character formulation: “accelerate force transformation and construction, and advance high quality national defense and military modernization” (加快部队转型建设，高质量推进国防和军队现代化). This contrast, coupled with the stronger accusation that Zhang damaged both the political ecology of the PLA and “political awareness” (He Weidong was only accused of damaging political ecology), suggests that Zhang did violate the requirements of political control over the military and caused problems related to the full process of planning formulation and implementation (PLA Daily, October 24, 2025; February 2; China Brief, January 26).
Conclusion
Parsing PLA Daily coverage of the fall of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli reveals a clear contrast with similar coverage of the fall of He Weidong in October 2025. The differences in language used suggest that Zhang (and Liu) disagreed with Xi Jinping over force-building plans, specifically over achieving the 2027 PLA centenary goal, and that these differences had negative effects on PLA combat capability development.
This situation presents a military problem in form, but it constitutes a serious political problem in substance. Once it became clear that Zhang was at odds with Xi, and that Xi’s authority was being undermined, only one option was available. Purging Zhang, an alleged obstacle to military development, was ultimately a political decision. Even if newly appointed senior commanders declare the PLA’s centenary goals met in 2027, its joint operational capability is unlikely to have been substantively achieved—much as Zhang Youxia, a competent and experienced commander, appears to have recognized (Substack/Drew Thompson, January 26).
Notes
[1] The PLA’s centenary goal refers to the “military building centenary struggle goal” (建军百年奋斗目标).
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Executive Summary:
At 3:00 p.m. Beijing time on Saturday, January 24, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced that Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia (张又侠) and Chief of Staff of the CMC Joint Staff Department Liu Zhenli (刘振立) face investigation for “serious disciplinary and legal violations” (严重违纪违法) (MND, January 24). At first glance, this move fits General Secretary Xi Jinping’s pattern of using distrust-driven anti-corruption purges to secure power, with clear parallels across communist regimes. Some anonymous sources cited in Western media have claimed that Zhang Youxia had leaked nuclear secrets to the United States and was implicated in bribery-for-promotion schemes linked to former defense minister Li Shangfu (李尚福) and others (Wall Street Journal, January 25).
Senior officials in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) almost always carry some exposure to legal or corruption issues. Whether Xi Jinping chooses to act is decisive, as the 2023 Equipment Development Department probe that stopped at Li Shangfu but spared Zhang Youxia illustrates (China Brief, September 20, 2023). Based on official statements and recent developments in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), one can identify the probable core reasons and internal logic behind this purge. Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli most likely fell from power due to disagreements with Xi Jinping over PLA development, particularly the joint operations training timeline, and may have pursued policies or issued orders that ran counter to Xi’s directives. (The simultaneous announcement of investigations into Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli indicates the decision stemmed from the same underlying cause.)
Seven Differences With He Weidong Readout Indicate Zhang Youxia’s Defiance of Xi
A comparison of the PLA Daily editorials published the day after the announced purges of former CMC vice chairman He Weidong (何卫东) and of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli reveals four political and three military differences (see Table 1 below) (PLA Daily, October 18, 2025, January 25).
The four political indicators suggest that Zhang and Liu likely defied Xi Jinping’s directives on military affairs in an open manner. First, official statements described He Weidong and others as having “abandoned their original mission, lost party principles, suffered a collapse of belief, and betrayed loyalty” (背弃初心使命、丧失党性原则，信仰坍塌、忠诚失节). Authorities did not apply this language to Zhang and Liu. This could indicate that personal corruption or private gain did not drive the purge of Zhang and Liu.
Second, while both cases cited damage to the PLA’s “political ecology” (政治生态), Zhang was additionally described as causing “severe damage to the military’s political awareness” (政治建军). This wording suggests that Zhang did not prioritize political loyalty as the guiding principle of military building. Given the absence of major personal corruption allegations, the core issue likely involved placing military effectiveness above political control.
Third, descriptions of violations of the chairman responsibility system (军委主席负责制) differed in severity in the two cases. Authorities accused He Weidong and others of “seriously undermining” (破坏) the system, while they accused Zhang and Liu of “seriously trampling” (践踏) it. The former implies obstruction that diluted Xi’s orders, while the latter implies direct defiance or disregard.
Fourth, official language stated that He Weidong “severely damaged the image” (形象) of senior cadres, whereas Zhang Youxia “seriously undermined the image and authority” (形象威信) of the CMC leadership. This distinction suggests that Zhang and Liu’s disagreements with Xi reached a visible and widely recognized level within the PLA.
Table 1: Differences Between the Purges of He Weidong and Zhang Youxia
| Dimension | He Weidong and Others | Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli |
| Personal Interests | Abandoned their original mission, lost party principles, suffered a collapse of belief, and betrayed loyalty | |
| Political Impact | Seriously damaged the political ecology of the force | Caused severe damage to political awareness and the political ecology |
| CMC Chairman Responsibility System | Seriously undermined | Seriously trampled and undermined |
| Image and Authority | Caused severe damage to the image of senior cadres | Seriously undermined the authority and image of the CMC leadership |
| Combat Capability | Caused severe damage to combat capability | |
| Degree of Betraying Trust | Seriously betrayed the trust of the Party Central and the CMC | Seriously betrayed the trust and heavy responsibility entrusted by the Party Central and the CMC |
| Overall Impact Assessment | Caused severe damage to the Party’s cause and to national defense and military development | Caused extremely serious harm to the Party, the state, and the military |
(Source: Compiled by the author)
The three military indicators, meanwhile, suggest that Zhang and Liu fell from power because their results in force building and war preparation failed to meet expectations and may have jeopardized Xi Jinping’s requirement that the PLA be capable of invading Taiwan by 2027. First, the official statement explicitly accused Zhang and Liu of causing “severe damage to combat capability development” (战斗力建设), a charge absent from the case of He Weidong. This distinction indicates that the CCP leadership viewed Zhang and Liu’s actions as having a direct negative impact on PLA military capability.
Second, the language describing their relationship with the Party center differed in weight. Authorities said He Weidong and others “betrayed trust” (信任), while they said Zhang and Liu “betrayed a trust and heavy responsibility” (信任重托). At the 20th Party Congress in late 2022, Xi broke age norms by shifting Zhang from political oversight to operational command as CMC vice chairman. Xi likely sought to rely on Zhang’s combat experience and senior status to push forward the new military training system that Xi personally announced in 2020 to correct long-standing PLA training deficiencies (Xinhua, November 25, 2020). This role clearly carried a heavier level of trust than was granted to He Weidong and others.
Third, both cases cited negative effects on the Party and the military, but they differed in scope. He Weidong and others “caused severe damage to … national defense construction” (给 … 国防 … 造成极大损害) while Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli “caused serious harm to … the state” (对 … 国家 … 造成极为恶劣影响). References to the “state” point to broader national development. In military terms, this concept centers on resisting external threats or, in the PRC’s specific context, achieving unification with Taiwan. [1]
Zhang’s Focused Approach Denied Xi’s 2027 Timeline
Based on publicly available information, Zhang and Liu likely failed to meet Xi Jinping’s requirements for force building related to a Taiwan invasion, and may even have engaged in open disagreement or defiance within the PLA. Other official statements indicate that the root cause of slow progress and resistance likely lay in a fundamental divergence in Zhang’s and Xi’s views over the timeline for military development.
PLA joint operations training progressed slowly through early 2026 (China Brief, January 24). The PLA established a new basic training model in June 2023 and a new combined training model in October 2024, but as of early 2026 had not finalized a joint training model (Xinhua, June 20, 2023, October 22, 2024). Xi Jinping’s requirement that the PLA be ready to invade Taiwan likely rests on it achieving a baseline level of joint operational capability, but the absence of a new joint training model makes it difficult for the PLA to reach an appropriate level of joint capability by 2027.
These implementation problems likely stemmed from a divergence between Zhang and Xi over military development concepts. Xi’s preference has been to pursue speed and scale, while Zhang favored a more focused and deliberate approach. A key indicator appeared in the defense section of the 15th Five-Year Plan recommendations released in October 2025. Two clear differences emerged between the priorities announced by the Party center and Xi’s requirements at the 2025 Two Sessions on the one hand, and Zhang Youxia’s own articulation of “key tasks” (重点任务) for national defense modernization in November 2025 on the other (Xinhua, March 7, 2025; October 28, 2025; People’s Daily, November 12, 2025).
The first point of divergence concerned “accelerating advanced combat power” (加快先进战斗力). The Party center’s version listed a wide range of construction tasks and called for stronger targeting, initiative, and shaping in military struggle (斗争). Zhang Youxia’s version instead identified networked information systems and unmanned, intelligent warfare as urgent priorities, and called for the full rollout of new models of basic, combined, and joint training. In Zhang’s framework, “shaping the struggle” (斗争塑势) appeared as part of joint exercises, joint training, and diversified military employment rather than as a standalone objective. The second point of divergence related to advancing the modernization of military governance. The party center’s version and Xi Jinping’s 2025 Two Sessions remarks emphasized a “frugal force-building approach” (勤俭建军方针) and a path of high efficiency, low cost, and sustainability. Zhang Youxia did not include these themes in his list of priority tasks, and instead placed them in sections outlining broader guiding principles. In short, Xi sought expansive and assertive military construction and placed heavy emphasis on military struggle. Zhang favored a narrower focus, downplayed struggle as an independent priority, and embedded it within training and exercises.
Xi’s greater haste can be seen in his aim to achieve joint operational capability for a Taiwan invasion by 2027, whereas Zhang clearly placed this goal closer to 2035. In a November 2025 article, Zhang stated that key tasks to complete by 2027 included consolidating and expanding advantages, breaking through bottlenecks, and strengthening weak points, while goals to achieve before 2035 would include building on the 2027 outcomes to significantly enhance joint operations based on networked information systems and all-domain operational capabilities (People’s Daily, November 12, 2025). This framing indicates that Zhang prioritized resolving long-standing training deficiencies in the near term and did not support moving aggressively into full joint operations training to meet Xi’s 2027 deadline.
Notably, signs of tension between Xi Jinping and Zhang Youxia had already surfaced during the 2025 Two Sessions, a critical period for drafting the 15th Five-Year Plan (Xinhua, October 28, 2025). First, in Xi’s annual address to the PLA delegation, he unusually invited speakers who did not come from the CMC or senior command institutions. This departure from past practice suggested Xi’s distrust of senior officers’ views, likely including Zhang and other top commanders (China Brief, March 15, 2025). (Note that He Weidong disappeared shortly after the Two Sessions concluded.) Second, when Xi departed the closing session of the Two Sessions, Zhang Youxia stood with his back to Xi. In Chinese elite politics, especially since Xi consolidated power following the 19th Party Congress, such behavior is highly unusual and politically risky (HKTKWW, March 11, 2025). Third, during routine individual speeches by CMC members at the Two Sessions, neither Zhang nor Liu mentioned the “CMC chairman responsibility system,” despite having done so in previous years (China Brief, April 11, 2025). Publicly affirming this principle serves as a basic signal of loyalty to Xi. Their silence suggests significant disagreement with Xi and may even reflect opposition to the system itself.
Taken together, political and military evidence points to disagreements between Zhang and Xi over the pace and method of joint training. Both officers possess real operational experience and likely held firm views on combat and training requirements. They may have judged some of Xi’s objectives, including the force-building timeline, as unrealistic, and resisted or declined to implement them on professional military grounds.
Xi Moved to Act by Shortening Timelines
January 2026 marked the start of the final annual training plan before 2027 and the initial implementation phase of the 15th Five-Year Plan. Earlier frictions reflected disagreements in planning and rhetoric, but as they shifted into concrete disputes over implementation, they appear to have become explicit, public, and potentially irreversible acts of defiance against Xi Jinping’s directives.
Xi likely focused most on the annual training plan because it directly revealed whether Zhang and Liu intended to meet the 2027 requirement. Each January sees the launch of a new training cycle. The disclosure of training content, schedules, and execution would have exposed the gap between Xi’s demands and Zhang’s approach. These differences, and signs of open noncompliance by Zhang and Liu, likely circulated within the PLA. Joint training progress was already lagging behind Xi’s targets, and the new plan showed no correction to this trend. As the divergence became visible, Xi was prompted to move quickly: the launch of the 15th Five-Year Plan in 2026 would have further clarified implementation gaps.
The timing underscores Xi’s urgency and resolve. Zhang and Liu last appeared publicly on December 22, 2025, and authorities announced their purge on January 24. Officials released the announcement on a Saturday afternoon, and PLA Daily even published its follow-on editorial in advance via Xinhua late the previous night (Xinhua, January 24).
Conclusion
Observers can frame this case through the broad lens of power struggles common to CCP politics. Recent PLA developments, however, reveal concrete and specific indicators that clarify the underlying dynamics.
The impact of removing Zhang and Liu on the PLA’s ability to invade Taiwan likely did not rank as Xi Jinping’s primary concern. Their approach to war preparation did not align with Xi’s objectives, and whether they remained in office or not would not have enabled the PLA to meet the 2027 target. Their continued presence instead posed a challenge to Xi’s authority. Given that Zhang could not deliver the rapid development of joint operational capability that Xi demanded, Xi had little reason to justify Zhang’s exceptional age waiver or extended tenure.
Although the probability of achieving the 2027 Taiwan invasion capability remains extremely low, Xi Jinping will likely appoint successors who are willing to execute his military blueprint in place of Zhang and Liu. Under intense pressure, these successors may accelerate the pace of joint operations training and push forward joint drills or even exercises in a more rushed manner. As a result, while the Chinese military remains unlikely to invade Taiwan in the near term, PLA training and exercise activity may become more aggressive and more frequent than in recent years.
Notes
[1] Taiwan has long been viewed by the PLA as lost territory that must be unified, making training around Taiwan highly relevant for realistic combat preparation. Given that 2027 marks the PLA’s centenary, Xi Jinping has repeatedly linked military readiness to safeguarding sovereignty and achieving national rejuvenation, which explicitly includes complete national unification (see CMSI Notes, March 13, 2025). A critical reference point came in 2023, when CIA Director William Burns stated that Xi Jinping had instructed the PLA to be ready by 2027 to conduct a successful invasion (CBS News, February 3, 2023).
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Executive Summary:
The Jiutian (九天) unmanned aerial system (UAS), the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) newest drone, made its first flight in December 2025. Capable of carrying a 6,000-kilogram payload, it was tested releasing 100 smaller loitering drones (Xinhua; CCTV, December 11, 2025). Akin to the rest of the PLA’s drone fleet, however, it remains to be seen whether it can withstand electromagnetic pulses (EMP) to counter it.
EMP weapons deliver pulses of radiation that induce electrical charges in conductive materials, which can disable or destroy electronic systems. While EMPs can be produced via nuclear or non-nuclear methods, non-nuclear EMPs are more targeted, with a narrower range, and focus on specific frequency bands. A recent article in PLA Daily notes that EMP weapons are rapidly moving from theory to reality, citing recent tests of prototype microwave-based counter-UAS systems and overseas trials that disabled large drone groups (PLA Daily, November 28, 2025). The article underscores the importance of EMP weapons as a speed-of-light, non-kinetic “electronics-kill” (以电能为主要“弹药”) option that can scale against drone swarms and other electronics-dependent targets. As the People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to electrify its civilian infrastructure, and the PLA continues to “informatize” (信息化) its operations, vulnerabilities to EMPs continue to grow (PLA Daily, May 2, 2024).
Recent Operations Indicate EMP Efficacy
PLA strategy over the past decade has entailed increasing dependence on integrated digital networks that consist of sensors, radars, and data links used to create “kill webs” (杀伤网). [1] As a result, the PLA’s electronic nodes are increasingly vulnerable to EMP attacks. The use of electronic warfare by U.S. forces against Chinese radars and other command and control systems during the recent arrest of President Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela is a case in point (Army Technology, December 19, 2025; ExecutiveGov, January 13).
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been illustrative, with Ukraine downing hundreds of Russian drones through electronic warfare measures such as GPS jamming and, according to some accounts, high-power microwave (HPM) electronic attack (IEEE Spectrum, July 30, 2022). EMPs can also be effective against systems guided by fiber-optic cables, as first-person view drone motors and their cameras are composed of conductive materials. [2] The PLA is likely aware of these vulnerabilities, as the Science of Military Strategy makes direct reference to the potential of EMP bombs to destroy electronic systems, but strategic documents stop short of explaining any defensive measures it has taken. This is likely due to the difficulty in adequately hardening against these threats and the sensitive nature of EMP regulations (China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2020).
Systems can be hardened against the threat of EMP attacks, but only up to a point. State-affiliated scientists in the PRC have expressed doubts as to the effectiveness of hardening measures to fully protect electronics against EMP effects, given the difficulty in combining protection methods against multi-vector EMP attacks (Wu Zhaofeng et al., 2024). [3] But many PLA systems, especially legacy platforms or civilian dual-use infrastructure and equipment, are not hardened at all. [4]
The extent to which the PLA has integrated civilian technology into its capabilities means that a significant portion of its electronic systems may be vulnerable to cyberattacks and other types of electronic warfare (Guangming Daily, March 13, 2018). State-affiliated scientists acknowledge that electromagnetic security measures have not yet been clearly planned by the state (Wu Qi et al., 2022). [5] EMP protection is not addressed in the PRC’s “Regulations on the Security Protection of Critical Information Infrastructure” (关键信息基础设施安全保护条例) (Chinese Government Net, August 17, 2021).
Initial PLA Attack Phase Vulnerable to EMP Response
In the initial phase of an attack on Taiwan, the PLA likely would launch a massive number of missiles, rockets, and air, surface, and subsurface drones (CNA, October 2025). A series of EMP weapons could disrupt the electronics of these weapons, preventing them from reaching their intended destinations.
Long- and mid-range targets can be countered with electromagnetic bombs (e-bombs) and EMP-mounted missiles. E-bombs—essentially extremely fast conventional explosions that convert the blast’s energy into an EMP—have long been in existence, though they have never been fielded (Kopp, 1996; INSS, September 11, 2025). [6] With the emergence of aerial and naval drone swarms, e-bombs may see a resurgence. Cheap and convenient to build using civilian-grade technology, they can be mass-produced at scale and used to attack waves of drone swarms, similar to anti-aircraft artillery (IEEE Spectrum, April 1, 2009). They also can be fitted onto artillery shells or missiles (America’s Seed Fund, accessed January 16).
HPM-mounted missiles can also be used against distant targets. [7] Unlike e-bombs, these weapons produce a focused EMP beam against specified targets. PLA drones or missiles are all vulnerable to vehicle-mounted HPMs, hand-held anti-drone guns, including those Taiwan has begun fielding, and lasers (Taiwan News, November 5, 2025). [8] Taiwan has also developed its own vehicle-mounted lasers capable of disabling drones and missiles. These produce an EMP when they interact with a target, creating focused electromagnetic interference that disrupts electronics (Newsweek, March 12, 2024). [9]
EMP weapons do have potential drawbacks. Fratricide is a challenge, with cell phone networks and other electronics becoming collateral damage when EMP weapons are used near one’s own urban environment. They are also expensive: two systems cost upward of $44 million, though this will likely drop as HPM research and development advances (Epirus, July 17, 2025).
PRC Vulnerable to EMP Counterforce and Countervalue Strikes
Numerous PLA assets are vulnerable to EMP attacks. Seaports, air bases, missile launch sites, and command and control centers, including in the Nanjing area where the Eastern Theater Command Headquarters is located, are all exposed. If struck, the PLA’s ability to launch attacks or retaliate would be severely limited (Taipei Times, June 23, 2025). Similarly, EMP strikes against ground-controlled intercept centers or airborne early warning platforms could limit airborne platforms from launching across the Taiwan Strait or vectoring fighter aircraft to conduct defensive and offensive counter-air operations, while disabling the electronics within missile launchers would deprive attackers of a critical method of attack.
Even fortified targets, such as bunkers, are somewhat vulnerable. Conventional strikes may fail to penetrate many C4ISR facilities, which are hardened to withstand large conventional strikes (Financial Times, January 30, 2025). [10] But radar, antennae, external wiring, and other conductive materials linking these facilities to the outside are exposed to a potential attack (PLA Daily, October 16, 2020). As noted above, PRC scientists have argued that it is extremely difficult to completely harden facilities (Wu Zhaofeng et al., 2024).
Civilian infrastructure that directly or indirectly assists military operations are also vulnerable to countervalue EMP strikes (Qi Wu Qi et al.l, 2022). Energy infrastructure in particular is deeply integrated with electronics, making the PRC highly susceptible to paralyzing strikes (Ember, 2025). The PRC’s increasingly electrified energy system, which includes an ultra-high-voltage grid network linking energy production in its western regions with the population- and industry-dense eastern regions, is highly interconnected, enhancing system-wide vulnerability (Baker Institute, accessed January 16). Strikes to critical choke points in its power grid could produce widespread blackouts, slowing military operations and increasing public pressure to resolve the conflict as the civilian population faces prolonged energy shortages.
Conclusion
Rapid increases in investments for research and development by all great powers indicate the growing importance of EMP weapons to future warfare. The utility of these weapons, especially in countering the drones and guided missile systems that dominate the landscape of modern warfare, is clear.
The PLA’s lack of recent combat experience, especially in a heavily contested electromagnetic spectrum environment, may also hinder its ability to effectively coordinate C4ISR under electronic attack.
The PRC’s expanding electronic infrastructure and informatized combat capabilities make its vulnerabilities increasingly acute, presenting opportunities for adversaries to rapidly paralyze PLA operations, and even PRC critical civilian infrastructure, should a conflict erupt.
Notes
[1] This strategy has been geared toward “winning informatized local wars” (打赢信息化局部战争) and succeeding in “systems confrontation” (体系对抗). See: China Brief, July 2, 2015; Xiao Tianliang, ed. The Science of Military Strategy, trans. China Aerospace Studies Institute. Military Science Press, 2020.
[2] For missiles, both the Ukrainians and Russians have been effective at electronically jamming advanced guided missiles, revealing their vulnerability to electronic interference (United24media, April 8, 2025).
[3] Wu Zhaofeng [毋召锋], Xu Yanlin [徐延林], Liu Peiguo [刘培国], et al. “Review and prospect of electromagnetic protection technology development” [电磁防护技术发展综述与展望]. High Power Laser and Particle Beams [强激光与粒子束], 2024, 36: 043001. doi: 10.11884/HPLPB202436.230375.
[4] This includes PLA tactical gear, such as radios and GPS receivers.
[5] Wu Qi [吴琦], Yuanan Liu [刘元安], Yinghong Wen [闻映红], Mingmin Zhao [赵明敏], Weimin Wang [王卫民], Jinbao Zhang [张金宝], and Donglin Su [苏东林], “Non-nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse Threat of Critical Infrastructures and Protection Strategies [重大基础设施非核强电磁脉冲威胁与防护策略研究],” Chinese Engineering Science [中国工程科学] 24, no. 4 (2022): 249–258, https://doi.org/10.15302/J-SSCAE-2022.04.022.
[6] Kopp, Carlo. “The electromagnetic bomb—a weapon of electrical mass destruction.” Airpower Journal, March, 1996. E-bombs are single-shot weapons that use explosively pumped flux compression generators (EPFCG) to generate a strong electrical charge that is funneled through a device called a vircator, which produces a high-powered microwave (HPM).
[7] The US fielded such weapons with its Counter-Electronics High Power Microwave Advanced Missile Project (CHAMP) in 2012 and later improved it and tested the High-Powered Joint Electromagnetic Non-Kinetic Strike Weapon (HiJENKS) in 2022 (Foreign Policy, October 22, 2012; Department of Defense). The missile used to carry the HiJENKS’s HPM system is reportedly an AGM-158B Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile. The use of a cruise missile as the delivery system allowed the HiJENKS to successfully strike multiple targets in a single launch.
[8] Hand-held jamming devices are not technically EMP weapons, but these devices are useful force multipliers.
[9] The United States has developed advanced HPM anti-drone weapons in the form of its Leonidas and Mjölnir HPMs, designed by Epirus. In August 2025, Epirus’s Leonidas system killed 49 out of 49 drones in a swarm with one shot in less than a second (Air & Space Force Magazine, September 29, 2025).
[10] C4ISR stands for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
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Executive Summary:
According to data released by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND), People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft sorties and naval vessel deployments around Taiwan reached new record highs in 2025. At first glance, this suggests an intensification of gray-zone pressure compared with 2024. Closer examination of disaggregated data, however, shows that the growth rate of aircraft and naval activity in 2025 was lower than the increase observed in 2024. Aircraft and naval activity in the second half of 2025 was also generally lower than in the first half, which contrasts with patterns seen in previous years.
This shift may reflect a reduced emphasis on gray-zone coercion against Taiwan following the purge of the former Central Military Commission (CMC) second vice chairman He Weidong (何卫东), as well as the PLA’s increased focus on exploring new models of joint operations training. This training emphasis likely redirected resources and forces toward joint training areas located farther from Taiwan, thereby reducing the intensity of PLA air and naval activity in Taiwan’s immediate vicinity.
Trends Indicate a Decline in PLA Activity Levels in the Second Half of 2025
Trend One: Rate of growth slowed compared with previous years.
In 2025, Taiwan detected a total of 5,446 PLA aircraft sorties, of which 3,763 crossed the median line, as well as 2,613 PLA naval vessels operating around Taiwan, all of which represent record highs. [1] More detailed indicators suggest that PLA air and naval activity around Taiwan may have reached a saturation point, as shown in Table 1. This pattern was already observable in 2024 and became more pronounced in 2025 (China Brief, January 17, 2025).
Table 1: Recent PLA Air and Naval Activity Around Taiwan
| Year | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | |
| Median line–crossing aircraft sorties | Number of sorties | 1,703 | 3,070 | 3,763 |
| Percentage relative to the previous year | 180.3% | 122.6% | ||
| Detected aircraft sorties | Number of sorties | 4,711 | 5,105 | 5,446 |
| Percentage relative to the previous year | 108.4% | 106.7% | ||
| Percentage of median line-crossing aircraft sorties | 36.1% | 60.1% | 69.1% | |
| Naval vessels | Number of vessels | 1,915 | 2,501 | 2,613 |
| Percentage relative to the previous year | 130.6% | 104.5% | ||
(Source: Compilation by K. Tristan Tang based on ROC MND press releases)
The annual growth rate of total detected aircraft sorties remained limited and was similar to the previous year’s increase. The total number of aircraft sorties in 2024 increased by just over 108 percent from 2023, while the 2025 total represented an increase of 106.7 percent over 2024.
In contrast, the growth rate of aircraft sorties crossing the median line declined sharply compared with the previous year. In 2024, median line–crossing sorties increased by over 180 percent from 2023, while in 2025 they increased by just under 123 percent from 2024.
A combined examination of total aircraft sorties and median line–crossing sorties shows a clear slowdown in the growth of median line crossings. In 2023, 36 percent of PLA aircraft operating around Taiwan crossed the median line. This share rose sharply to 60 percent in 2024, representing an increase of 1,367 sorties. In 2025, the share increased by a smaller margin to 69 percent, an increase of 693 sorties.
The growth rate of PLA naval vessel activity around Taiwan also declined in 2025. There was a more than 130 percent increase in the number of naval vessels operating around Taiwan in 2024 compared to 2023. This narrowed to less than 105 percent growth in 2025.
Another point worth noting is that in both 2023 and 2024, the number of aircraft sorties and naval vessels detected in the second half of the year exceeded those in the first half. In contrast, in 2025, activity levels were higher in the first half of the year than in the second half, as shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Aircraft Sorties and Naval Vessel Activity Between the First and Second Halves of the Year
| Year | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | ||
| Aircraft sorties | First half of the year | 2,308 | 2,129 | 2,754 | |
| Second half of the year | 2,406 | 2,976 | 2,695 | ||
| Naval vessels | First half of the year | 812 | 1,166 | 1,351 | |
| Second half of the year | 1,103 | 1,335 | 1,279 | ||
(Source: Compilation by K. Tristan Tang based on ROC MND press releases)
Trend Two: Frequency of single-day peaks in aircraft sorties increased, while frequency of single-day peaks in naval activity declined. [2]
The number of aircraft peak days, which are defined as days with more than 30 PLA aircraft sorties, rose from 28 in 2023, to 32 in 2024, and up to 46 in 2025. By contrast, the number of naval vessel peak days, which are defined as days with at least 10 PLA naval vessels in waters surrounding Taiwan, rose from 24 in 2023 to 38 in 2024, but declined in 2025 back down to 32.
The distribution of peak days between the first and second halves of the year also changed in 2025. While peak activity days in both 2023 and 2024 were clearly concentrated in the second half of the year, this pattern switched in 2025. For aircraft activity, 2025 saw 27 peak aircraft days in the first half of the year and only 19 in the second half. For naval vessels, there were 14 peak days in the first half of the year and 19 in the second, as shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Aircraft Sorties and Naval Vessel Peak Days Between the First and Second Halves of the Year
| Year | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | |
| Aircraft sorties | First half of the year | 12 | 12 | 27 |
| Second half of the year | 16 | 20 | 19 | |
| Naval vessels | First half of the year | 7 | 11 | 14 |
| Second half of the year | 17 | 27 | 19 | |
(Source: Compilation by K. Tristan Tang based on ROC MND press releases)
Trend Three: Number and frequency of joint combat readiness patrols did not increase. [3]
In 2025, the frequency of joint combat readiness patrols did not clearly exceed those observed in 2024. According to PRC statements, joint combat readiness patrols are meant to assess the integrated operations capabilities of multiple military branches. The preparations before the exercise are equivalent to combat readiness activities, and the patrols themselves are considered to be conducted in a combat state.
The PLA conducted 40 joint combat readiness patrols around Taiwan in both 2024 and 2025, according to press releases from Taiwan’s MND. This corresponds to an average of one patrol every 1–2 weeks. Instances in which the interval between two consecutive patrols was less than one week occurred 15 times in 2024 and 14 times in 2025.
Joint combat readiness patrols were fairly evenly distributed throughout 2025, though reinforced the pattern of higher activitiy in the first half of the year seen in other PLA activity around Taiwan. While 2024 saw 20 patrols in each half of the year, the first half of 2025 saw 22 patrols, compared with 18 in the second half.
Personnel Changes and Shift to Developing Joint Training
The data reveal two clear trends. First, while PLA air and naval activity around Taiwan increased in 2025 in absolute terms, the rate of growth was lower than in previous years. Second, in a departure from recent years, activity levels in the first half of 2025 were higher than those in the second half. These trends suggest that some important internal factors may have changed around mid-2025, altering the PLA’s operational patterns around Taiwan.
One set of factors that could have impacted PLA activity is political. The past year has seen significant personnel changes within both the CMC and the Eastern Theater Command. These purges likely disrupted operational patterns and reduced the intensity of gray-zone coercion. In recent years, dozens of senior PLA officers have been removed, and the disappearance of He Weidong some time in March 2025, followed by his formal removal months later, appears to have been a critical turning point (China Brief, November 25, 2025).
He’s career background likely led him to place greater emphasis on military pressure against Taiwan than the CMC’s other vice chairman, Zhang Youxia (张又侠), and he could position himself to advance this preference in CMC or other PLA internal meetings. PLA units likely aligned their behavior, at least in part, with his views. There is a meaningful correlation between the decline in intensity and frequency of PLA harassment around Taiwan following his investigation and removal.
He’s first decade or more of service was in reconnaissance units. This likely led reconnaissance doctrines and operational norms to become deeply internalized early in his career and to remain priorities as he rose to senior positions (Eastday, February 13, 2015). According to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Military Terms (中国人民解放军军语), the PLA’s authoritative dictionary, reconnaissance includes combat reconnaissance (战斗侦察), which involves reconnaissance conducted by combat units through offensive operations or feints to induce enemy actions and thereby identify force deployments and firepower configurations. It also includes combat readiness reconnaissance (战备侦察), which consists of reconnaissance activities conducted in peacetime to respond in a timely manner to potential wars or sudden contingencies. [4]
He’s background likely led to him placing strong emphasis at senior levels on rapid force deployment, close proximity to adversaries, and efforts to probe an opponent’s real capabilities and intentions. In the Taiwan context, PLA air and naval gray-zone operations serve a similar function. These activities allow the PLA to assess Taiwan’s response time and operational procedures when PLA forces approach, and they also provide insights into the Taiwan government’s resolve in responding to persistent PLA pressure.
By contrast, Zhang Youxia likely places greater emphasis on rigorous military training and more conventional operational planning. His experience commanding regiment-level units during the Sino-Vietnamese War likely shaped a strong appreciation for the brutality of real combat and the importance of force quality. This background may have inclined him to prioritize disciplined training and readiness over persistent gray-zone pressure.
While He Weidong focused primarily on political affairs during his tenure as a CMC vice chairman, Zhang has overseen operational matters and led major training reform initiatives since 2022. When CMC Chairman Xi Jinping announced the reform of the PLA military training system in 2020 due to dissatisfaction with existing training standards and combat capabilities, he appointed Zhang to take the lead. The new training initiatives included a 2023 on-site conference on basic training (全军基础训练现场会) and a 2024 on-site conference on combined training (全军合成训练现场会) (Xinhua, June 20, 2023; October 22, 2024). While gray-zone operations against Taiwan have allowed PLA air and naval forces to accumulate experience in confronting Taiwan’s military, these activities have also consumed time and resources that could have been devoted to focused training. Zhang likely places greater priority on force training than on sustained gray-zone pressure against Taiwan, especially when compared with He Weidong.
A second set of factors that could have impacted PLA activity around Taiwan in 2025 is military in nature and is directly related to training priorities. The PLA has recently emphasized the exploration and expansion of joint training, and military activities outside the training domain have not been the primary focus during this period. After holding the 2023 and 2024 on-site training conferences, the PLA appears to have identified approaches to basic training and combined training that satisfy senior leadership. However, an effective model for joint training is yet to be fully developed. On May 28, 2025, Zhang Youxia chaired a “training ground construction observation and exchange event” (全军训练场地建设观摩交流活动) in Beijing. The significance of this event lay in laying the groundwork for transitioning PLA training reform from basic training and combined training toward joint training reform (Xinhua, May 28, 2025; PLA Daily, October 10, 2025).
This sequence indicates that the PLA remains in an exploratory phase with respect to joint training and has therefore not yet convened an on-site conference on joint training. This assessment is also reflected in reporting from the PLA Daily. For example, one PLA Navy unit reportedly had conducted only eight joint training sessions at sea with units from other services by early January 2026 (PLA Daily, January 11). Another report has described joint training as something that is “about to become a norm (将成为一种常态),” rather than already being an established practice (PLA Daily, January 13). These accounts indicate that the frequency and depth of PLA joint training remain limited and that a model suitable for force-wide adoption is still under development.
Although past PLA naval and air activities around Taiwan also had training value, current joint training appears focused on overcoming bottlenecks in earlier training models, with many activities likely experimental in nature. Under these conditions, the PLA may prefer to train closer to the mainland rather than near Taiwan, reducing exposure to Taiwanese or foreign forces, lowering accident risks, and limiting external observation of its joint training progress.
Conclusion
The political and military factors that appear to have impacted PLA activity patterns around Taiwan were likely triggered between March and May 2025. This would help explain why PLA activity in the second half of the year diverged from patterns seen in previous years, with PLA air and naval activity around Taiwan falling below first-half levels. It likely also explains why the annual growth rate of PLA operational activity around Taiwan was lower than in previous years.
The current level of PLA pressure represents only a transitional phase. The growth rate of increased air and naval activity around Taiwan may have decelerated in 2025, but this does not indicate a reduction in threat. Rather, it reflects a stabilization of operational output. PLA activity around Taiwan continues to grow in absolute terms, but the key issue lies in the underlying dynamics and future implications concealed beneath these surface-level figures. As PLA joint training becomes more mature and joint operational capabilities improve, the scale and intensity of gray-zone coercion against Taiwan and neighboring countries are likely to increase to levels higher than in the past.
Notes
[1] The data are compiled from Chinese-language press releases issued by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND), and the English wording follows translations from the original Chinese texts. Notably, in its most recent reporting format, MND no longer uses the term “air defense identification zone (ADIZ; 防空識別區).” Instead, it refers only to aircraft “crossing the median line” (逾越中線). Even when aircraft do not cross the officially disclosed coordinates of the median line but enter its extended area or the eastern sector, such movements are still classified as “crossing the median line.”
[2] “Peak incursion periods” in aircraft sorties refer to instances where the number of Chinese military aircraft detected by Taiwan exceeds a certain threshold, causing greater-than-usual pressure on Taiwan through their coercive capacity. In this case, we define the threshold as at least 30 aircraft. This is equivalent to roughly one-tenth of Taiwan’s fleet of approximately 300 main fighter aircraft. (For related analysis published by the author, see: China Brief, January 7, 2025.) In the naval domain, Taiwan’s navy currently operates four destroyers and 21 frigates, for a total of 25 major surface combatants. In practice, however, not all combatants are available for operations at the same time, because warships must regularly undergo maintenance and upgrades at varying levels. On this basis, this article adopts a conservative estimate that roughly 20 major surface combatants are available for deployment at any given time. As a general rule, when the PLA Navy operates around Taiwan, Taiwan’s navy is likely required to deploy a comparable number of ships in response. Accordingly, when more than ten Chinese naval vessels operate around Taiwan on a given day, this situation implies that Taiwan’s navy must commit at least half of its major surface combatants to sea in order to monitor PLA navy activities. (For related analysis published by the author, see: Pacific Forum, September 23, 2024.)
[3] The term “joint” at the very least refers to the involvement of both the PLAAF and PLAN in the combat readiness patrols. (For related analysis published by the author, see: CMSI, March 13, 2025.)
[4] All-Army Military Terminology Committee, AMS [全军军事术语管理委员会，军事科学院], Chinese People’s Liberation Army Military Terms [中国人民解放军 军语], Military Science Publishing House Publication [军事科学出版社出版], 2011. The CMC released this book in 2011. As of December 2023, this edition was still the most recent version (PLA Daily, December 1, 2023). Page 203 provides the definition of combat readiness reconnaissance, and Page 207 provides the definition of combat reconnaissance.
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Executive Summary:
Tensions between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Japan have risen dramatically after Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks on how Japan might react to an attack on Taiwan. Responding to a question at a budget committee meeting on November 7, Takaichi said that a Taiwan contingency involving the use of force could constitute an “existential risk” for Japan (Nikkei, November 7). [1] This comment was met with threats from online PRC commentators. Most notably, the PRC’s consul general in Osaka, Xue Jian (薛剣), inflamed the situation by posting on the social media platform X to say that “the dirty neck that sticks itself in must be cut off” (UDN, November 10). [2]
The PRC government subsequently discouraged its citizens from visiting Japan and deployed People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ships to waters south of Japan’s Kyushu Island (South China Morning Post [SCMP], November 14). The PLA’s theater commands have also mobilized, producing bellicose videos with the goal of intimidation (Sina, November 19).
The PRC’s aggressive rhetoric raises questions about the readiness of the PLA Eastern Theater Command (TC), given its strategic focus on both Japan and Taiwan. Recent purges have impacted its leadership, however, to the detriment of command stability. This suggests military escalation is unlikely in the near future.
The TC Leadership Structure
In the PLA, “the Party commands the gun” (党指挥枪). Each PLA theater command operates under its own Party committee, and every unit is led jointly by a military commander and a political commissar (Lianhe Zaobao, July 6, 2023). Within each TC party committee, the political commissar represents the interests of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and serves as the committee’s chair. The commander, meanwhile, serves as the deputy chair. The rest of the committee includes a chief of staff, deputy political commissars, and deputy commanders who usually also serve as commanders and commissars of the TC Army, Navy, Air Force, and possibly the Rocket Force. [3] Decisions made at committee meetings guide the TC as a whole.
In wartime, the committee functions as a war council. It executes orders from the Central Military Commission (CMC) and directs joint operations across the services, except the Rocket Force, which remains under direct CMC control (960th Cyberspace Wing, October 14, 2021). [4]
Eastern TC Missing Top Officials
Military operations are not only contests between equipment but also competitions of leadership quality. The PLA currently fields the most advanced military hardware in its history. But the quality and stability of its leadership remain dubious.
An ongoing purge of the PLA high command has exacerbated these challenges. On October 17, the Party announced the expulsion of nine generals and admirals, including the Eastern TC’s commander Lin Xiangyang (林向阳) (China Brief Notes, October 17). At the subsequent fourth plenary of the 20th CCP Central Committee, an additional 18 members with backgrounds in the armed forces failed to attend, including Eastern TC Political Commissar Liu Qingsong (刘青松). This unprecedented number of absences has fueled speculation about the full extent of the purge.
Lin Xiangyang was a career Army officer, serving as the commander of the Central TC before becoming the Eastern TC commander in 2022. He was once seen as a rising star from the 31st Group Army, a unit closely associated with Xi (CNA, October 24). The reason for his expulsion from the Party and the PLA is unclear. Official statements point to “serious violations of Party discipline” (严重违反党的纪律) as well as corruption charges (Xinhua, October 17). Still, others suspect that factional conflicts played a role (The Diplomat, October 21; China Brief, November 14).
Liu Qingsong (刘青松), a PLA Navy admiral, is yet to be purged, but is likely involved with ongoing investigations into his links with Lin Xiangyang. This would explain his absence from the fourth plenum—an event where attendance is mandatory. It would also account for his public disappearance since early October (BBC, November 7).
With Lin and Liu out of action, the Eastern TC, which is the PLA’s frontline force for operations in the East China Sea and Taiwan Strait, currently has no official commander or political commissar in place. Based on standard succession practices within the PLA, the Eastern TC’s acting commander is likely one of Lin Xiangyang’s four deputy commanders:
It is not known who among these four is currently serving as acting commander, but Hong’s close personal ties with Lin might put him at risk of investigation.
The three Eastern TC deputy political commissars—Tang Xinghua (唐兴华), Mei Wen (梅文), Zhong Weiguo (钟卫国)—concurrently serve as the political commissars of the TC Army, Navy, and Air Force, respectively. It is also difficult to determine who might be shouldering Liu Qingsong’s responsibilities, and it is not known if they have been implicated in the Lin Xiangyang case. While the full scope of the purge within the Eastern TC remains opaque, such investigations seldom stop with a single individual. More purges are likely to follow in the coming months.
Conclusion
The Eastern TC’s leadership has been seriously disrupted by the ongoing PLA purge. The TC formally lacks a commander and its political commissar has vanished. It is unclear who is acting in either role, and the Eastern TC Party Committee is hollowed out. Restoring leadership competence will take time. Given this turbulence, the TC Party Committee is likely functioning at substandard capacity, with remaining leaders lacking substantial experience leading a TC. They also are likely working under acute anxiety due to the ongoing purge of their colleagues.
This level of senior command instability inevitably erodes readiness, disrupts decision-making, and damages cohesion and morale among officers. As tensions rise between the PRC and Japan, concern over a possible military conflict also grows. But the Eastern TC’s destabilized leadership likely constrains the PRC’s ability and willingness to escalate, providing a glimmer of hope that the latest tensions will remain below the threshold of war.
Notes
[1] In the original Japanese, Takaichi said, “武力行使伴うなら存立危機事態なり得る.”
[2] In the original Japanese, Xue Jian wrote, “勝手に突っ込んできたその汚い首は一瞬の躊躇もなく斬ってやるしかない.”
[3] The TC Party Committee also controls core TC organizations, including the Joint Staff Department (战区联合参谋部), Political Work Department (战区政治工作部), Political and Legal Affairs Commission (战区政法委), and the Joint Operations Command Center (战区联合作战指挥中心).
[4] Under conditions of war, the TC commander might hold greater sway at TC Party Committee meetings and have greater operational discretion. But ultimate authority remains with the TC political commissar, whose primary task is to ensure that the TC commander does not betray the Party in any way.
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Executive Summary:
On October 17, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) of the People’s Republic China (PRC) released a statement by video and text detailing disciplinary actions against nine PLA general officers. [1] The ministry revoked their Party memberships and military rank, and they now await further consequences (MND, October 17). Of the nine generals listed, seven held major commands in the former Nanjing Military Region Command, with He Weidong (何卫东), Miao Hua (苗华), Lin Xiangyang (林向阳), Qin Shutong (秦树桐), and Wang Xiubin (王秀斌) all serving in the former 31st Group Army (BBC News, October 23). He Weidong, Miao Hua, and He Hongjun (何宏军) controlled personnel selection, promoting the interests of their network of officers (China Brief Notes, October 17).
The purge of general officers responsible for planning and operations related to the unification of Taiwan has prompted a possible temporary strategic realignment. Given that the highest ranks of the PLA experienced an overhaul of officers in the PLA Navy and Eastern Theater Command, the probability of success for a protracted blockade or joint amphibious landing campaign has decreased. The remaining PLA leadership has incentives to pursue other strategies for unification, such as a joint firepower strike campaign or decapitation strikes. The purges therefore may influence a shift in PLA strategic decision-making, at least in the short-term.
Vague Statements Call For Party Discipline
The Party communicated the flurry of purges as a continuation of a centralized effort to root out corruption in the Party ranks, no matter the level of the suspect (Newtalk, October 17). The wording of the announcement, however, suggests that the true reason for these purges extends beyond corruption. Vague accusations indicate factionalism in the Party and the PLA (China Brief Notes, October 17). [2]
Following the announcement, the PLA Daily published several articles and commentaries on the state of political discipline in the PLA. The first, published on October 18, called for rooting out corruption in the military “until the end” (到底). It stated that everyone is equal before the Party and state law (在党纪国法面前一律平等) and that no official would be exempt from punishment, irrespective of their achievements or position. To make this point, it used the phrases “iron certificates” (丹书铁券) and “iron-cap princes” (铁帽子王). These refer to ways in which Chinese emperors rewarded their most prized officials, protecting them from criminal prosecution (PLA Daily, October 18). The article specifically called out He Weidong, Miao Hua, and He Hongjun, who enjoyed connections to Xi Jinping from his time as a Fujian provincial official, and may have seen themselves as unimpeachable.
A second PLA Daily article stated that the post-purge PLA should refocus its thinking and see itself as the army of the people and the Party. It said that PLA actions should be based on the decisions of the Central Committee, Central Military Commission (CMC), and Xi Jinping, with a call to “use the Party’s flag as our own, the Party’s direction as our direction, and the Party’s intentions as our intentions” (党的旗帜为旗帜、以党的方向为方向、以党的意志为意志). It directly referred to purged military leaders’ self-interest in an effort to discourage other officials from cultivating their own personal interests, and noted the importance of “setting the tone on the need to ensure that the gun is always directed by the Party” (枪杆子永远听党指挥) (PLA Daily, October 24).
More recently, the October 27 issue of PLA Daily ran a special feature across pages 5–8 on “Promoting Fine Traditions and Deepening Political Rectification” (弘扬优良传统 深化政治整训) in the military. The first article, which similarly called on the whole PLA to revisit its roots as a revolutionary army, made clear that it must reflect on its original mission (以初心为镜) and prepare for the discomfort of rooting out corruption. The article encouraged soldiers to “frequently reflect on our thoughts, frequently remove the poison in our hearts, frequently remember the responsibility of our mission, and frequently repair our virtue according to the Party” (常拂思想之尘、常刮心底之毒、常思使命之责、常修党性之德) (PLA Daily, October 27).
Finally, an October 30tharticle in PLA Daily drove home the warning against special interest groups. It stressed objectivity and impartiality in relationships, advocating for the frequent use of “comrade” (同志) as a title in order to “oppose thinking based on relationships, break the use of unspoken rules, abandon the prioritization of officials, and oppose privileged thinking and behavior” (反对庸俗 “关系学”，破除各种 “潜规则”，摒弃“官本位”思想，反对特权思想和特权行为). The article also emphasized the importance of regulating interpersonal behavior, saying that PLA service members should seek to achieve unity rather than forming interest groups (做到团结而不“结团”). It ends with an exhortation to “properly handle the relationship between public and private interests, righteousness and profit, and personal sentiments and the law when interacting with comrades” (正确处理同志交往中公与私、义与利、情与法的关系，做到交心而不交利) (PLA Daily, October 30).
In the aftermath of the expulsion of the nine generals, the column inches devoted to military corruption signals a fundamental problem within the PLA leadership. The particularly harsh punishment meted out to the generals may also suggest a symbolic nature to the takedown; a warning to others of the perils of violating Party discipline.
Shaanxi Gang Appears Ascendant
Corruption purges in the military have persisted for two years but have not outwardly affected Xi Jinping’s control over the PLA and PRC. Xi has cycled through and expelled a number of officers. This has cast doubt on his judgment but does not seem to have resulted in serious threats to his power. If any further political maneuvering is taking place, it is not visible to those outside of CCP politics.
The expulsion of general officers with ties to He Weidong and Miao Hua—something that may continue past the fourth plenum—lends credence to the idea that factionalism within the PLA is at least a partial impetus for the corruption purges (The Diplomat, October 21). This factionalism is not necessarily in favor of or against Xi but may reflect a recurring trend in CCP and PLA politics in which cliques (小圈子) and personal relations(关系) drive bureaucratic politics. Extensive patronage networks extending from current CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia (张又侠) and former Vice Chairman He Weidong are the roots of these factions, and the repeated and systematic purging of individuals related to one network or the other suggests a power struggle (China Brief, October 17). Zhang Youxia is a putative member of the “Shaanxi gang,” which refers to officials who either grew up or spent portions of their career in Shaanxi Province. Beyond Zhang, it also includes Xi Jinping himself, as well as CMC member Zhang Shengmin (张升民), and Liu Zhenli (刘振立) (China Brief, March 15).
Recent developments suggest that the Shaanxi gang has the upper hand in any factional struggle currently being waged, though it has not yet fully won out. Zhang Shengmin has been promoted to CMC Vice Chairman and is concurrently acting as Secretary of the CMC Commission for Discipline Inspection. Unlike He Weidong, however, Zhang has not been appointed simultaneously to the Politburo. A second data point is the purging of Rocket Force general Zhang Fengzhong (张凤中), also ostensibly a Shaanxi gang member (South China Morning Post, October 23). Still, the exclusive presence of Shaanxi Gang members on the CMC, and the widespread purges of He Weidong and Miao Hua’s clique would suggest that the Shaanxi Gang at least has the upper hand in the PLA. Minister of National Defense Dong Jun (董军), who is not part of the Shaanxi Gang and is known instead to have ties to Miao Hua, remains without a seat on the CMC or a State Councilor rank (CMSI, January 24).
Unification Strategy May Shift Toward Decapitation Strikes
High turnover of PLA flag officers has consequences for force readiness. To get a sense of what those consequences might be, it is worth considering how the PLA intends to achieve major CCP objectives, including unification with Taiwan. The October 27 PLA Daily article noted that uncomfortable changes are needed to maintain the PLA’s mission capabilities. This can be extended to strategic decision making.
The PLA has demonstrated growing proficiency and is developing capabilities to take Taiwan in any contingency. The PLA Navy (PLAN) has largely shielded tactical and operational level formations from corruption and anti-graft purges. Policies and procedures adopted by its units ensure that commanders are chosen on merit and have little room for corruption. As a result, the PLAN has been able to rapidly develop combat power (CMSI, August 13). Military exercises in suboptimal environmental conditions like the “Joint Sword” (联合利剑) series attest to Beijing’s determination to unify with Taiwan regardless of the circumstances and are proof of tactical- and operational-level proficiency (Taipei Times, December 18, 2024; CMSI, January 24). The PLA’s continued improvement in these domains indicates a level of insulation from endemic graft. This has not extended to strategic-level PLA leaders, however, who have been purged extensively.
A lack of command continuity and a shortage of staff indicates that the PLA will suffer from a short-term deficit in strategic planning and coordination, making any protracted conflict a risky endeavor. The kinds of campaigns the PRC would be willing to wage against Taiwan, should it decide to pursue unification in the near future, warrants further exploration. But the lack of experienced officers holding strategic level postings in the PLA, in conjunction with members of the Shaanxi Gang in the CMC, may indicate a decreased risk of blockades and joint amphibious landing campaigns in the near-term. Instead, the PLA could turn to joint firepower strike campaigns, decapitation strikes, or subversion campaigns. Some analysts have suggested that, as a direct result of the purges, the readiness time window to take Taiwan by a joint amphibious landing campaign has now shifted from 2027 to a 2029–2031 timeframe (Vermillion China, December 20, 2024).
Joint firepower strike campaigns are one of the PRC’s most viable options for attempting unification. These are offensive operations between multiple armed services coordinating long-range precision strikes to intimidate an adversary’s leadership and population, break their morale, and force them to alter their strategic intentions (National Defense University, 2022). The PRC can scale these campaigns according to strategic objectives. It can use them as a diplomatic tool, with limited strikes demonstrating Beijing’s displeasure with Taipei and its partners. As a military tool, they can cripple Taiwan’s infrastructure. They can also be employed in isolation or along with other campaigns as an antecedent to more complex operations.
Advances in modern technology and conflicts in 2025 have illustrated the viability of joint firepower strike campaigns for pursuing geopolitical interests. They have also shown the need to expand such campaigns to incorporate weapon systems beyond long-range fires. In addition to PLA artillery, rockets, and aircraft, Taiwan must also contend with potential attacks from cyber and electromagnetic pulse weapons, fifth column sabotage and subversion, and planned political assassinations of Taiwanese leaders (Atlantic Council, July 2024; Taipei Times, January 14; The Diplomat, May 7). In the aftermath of such an attack, the Taiwanese people and the world might doubt Taiwan’s ability to resist the PRC, creating a possible window for unification.
Profiles of officers comprising the Shaanxi Gang, particularly those on the CMC, suggest they may be willing to consider joint firepower strike campaigns or similar decapitation strikes against Taiwan. Both Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shengmin have ties to PLA services involved in procuring advanced technologies that would enable a decapitation strike, such as those in the aerospace and cyberspace domains (The Diplomat, January 3, 2024; China Brief, March 15). He Weidong’s recently ousted network, by contrast, was comprised of officers who made their careers in the Nanjing Military Region and Eastern Theater Command. It included a high concentration of PLA Navy officers—individuals who spent decades preparing for a joint amphibious landing or a blockade campaign against Taiwan (China Brief, March 15).
On November 11, Zhang Youxia authored an article in People’s Daily. He emphasized the need to accelerate military modernization and overcome “bottlenecks and blockages” (破瓶颈堵点) in developing strategic capabilities. In order to gain the advantage in critical military functions, he said, the PLA needs to solve essential “technological chokepoints” (技术 “卡脖子”). Zhang’s interest in technologies that would enable a decapitation strike is best evidenced by his assertion that the PLA must accelerate the development of advanced weapons, equipment, and research and build more “assassin’s mace”-type weapons and equipment” (“杀手锏”武器装备) (People’s Daily, November 11). The phrase “assassin’s mace” is widely applied to describe advanced PLA weapon systems that are believed to confer a marked asymmetric advantage over the PLA’s adversaries (U.S. Army War College, September 1, 2004). [3]
A shift may already be taking place. Coinciding with the purge of He Weidong’s clique, analysts have observed a decrease in military gray-zone activities against Taiwan (China Brief, October 31). Personal experiences may also contribute to a preference for joint firepower strike campaigns. Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, the only two CMC members with combat experience, both fought at the Two Mountain Border War of Laoshan in 1984 against Vietnam. As company commanders in the PLA Army, both witnessed firsthand the poor performance of the PLA against an outnumbered Vietnamese enemy (South China Morning Post, October 13, 2022, [a], [b]). During the war, they would have been privy to a sort of proto-joint firepower strike campaign known as “artillery diplomacy” (O’Dowd, 2007). [4] This “artillery diplomacy” was ultimately unsuccessful in achieving the PRC’s objectives. But areas within range of the PLA’s artillery were mountainous and heavily forested provinces with relatively small populations and little economic value (Bureau of Intelligence and Research, December 15, 1978). This is not the case with Taiwan. Due to advances in weapon systems and Taiwan’s geographic constraints, Taiwan is far more vulnerable to the impact of a joint firepower strike than Vietnam was. The lived experiences of these men may influence their decisions when planning for future contingencies. Coupled with the recent purging of PLA personnel with expertise in conducting an invasion or blockade of Taiwan, this suggests that decapitation strikes are now the operations that the PLA has the greatest capability to perform.
Conclusion
The latest purges and the language with which they were announced suggest that, at a minimum, factionalism cannot be ruled out as a contributing factor to the downfall of the nine PLA generals. Looking ahead, an organizational reshuffling on this scale has the potential to influence PLA strategy. This could lead to a shift in the preferred military approach to Taiwan away from a naval blockade or amphibious assault and toward a decapitation strike. The precise positions and motivations of individuals within the system in relation to the purges cannot be fully ascertained—including that of Xi Jinping. But continuing to monitor personnel shifts and observable changes to military posture may provide a better understanding of ongoing changes in the PLA and reveal new patterns in PRC politics.
The views expressed are solely personal and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the United States Military Academy at West Point, the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Notes
[1] These officers were He Weidong (何卫东), Miao Hua (苗华), He Hongjun (何宏军), Wang Xiubin (王秀斌), Lin Xiangyang (林向阳), Qin Shutong (秦树桐), Yuan Huazhi (袁华智), Wang Houbin (王厚斌), and Wang Chunning (王春宁).
[2] The stated charges were “serious violations of party discipline” (严重违反党的纪律), “serious misuse of occupational power” (严重职务犯罪), “crimes of a serious nature” (性质极为严重), and “especially negative impacts” (影响极其恶劣) that involved large sums of money (数额特别巨大) (MND, October 17). These charges previously have not been used under Xi to describe crimes committed by members of the Central Military Commission (IISS, October 27).
[3] Weapon systems that have been considered “assassin’s mace” weapons include ballistic missiles, electromagnetic jamming, and others capable of achieving deterrence, decapitation, blinding, paralysis, and disintegration effects on the battlefield. In particular, the PLA Rocket Force and some components of the PLA Navy are considered “assassin’s mace” forces.
[4] Edward C. O’Dowd. “Artillery Diplomacy: Waiting for the ‘Second Lesson.’” In Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The Last Maoist War, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2007), 89–108, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203088968.
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