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Executive Summary:
Russian authorities have mounted an unusually large containment operation around the death of an employee of the Irkutsk Anti-Plague Research Institute while issuing shifting accounts of the underlying event. According to Russian local reporting, 28-year-old Daria Shipilova was allegedly exposed while working with Yersinia pestis on September 25, developed severe pneumonia, and died in Shelekhov on October. The alleged laboratory exposure has not been officially confirmed (Euronews, October 4). The Shelekhov district hospital had already entered quarantine on October 1, and on October 2 an extraordinary regional sanitary and anti-epidemic commission met with Anna Popova, chief of federal public health agency Rospotrebnadzor; 197 possible contacts were subsequently identified and 189 reportedly placed in medical facilities for observation and treatment (Shelekhov District Administration; IRK.ru, October 2).
Russian public messaging then diverged sharply: the head of the neighboring Republic of Buryatia initially linked the death to plague; authorities in nearby Baikalsk briefly urged residents not to travel to Shelekhov before deleting the warning; and on October 4 Rospotrebnadzor said the employee had died from “pneumonia of unknown etiology,” that expanded testing found no microorganism connected to her professional work, and that no pathogenic microorganism incident had occurred at the institute (The Moscow Times, October 2; Euronews; Interfax, October 4). The incident would ordinarily be expected to register quickly with Beijing because Irkutsk is directly connected to multiple cities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by air. Yet as of October 4, Beijing had issued no public health warning or Russia-related travel advisory, the Chinese consulate in Irkutsk listed no new epidemic notice, and ordinary connectivity continued, with Irkutsk reporting on October 2 that as many as six flights a day continued to link the city with Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Manzhouli, and Harbin (PRC Consulate General in Irkutsk, accessed October 4; IRK.ru, October 2).
Beijing’s silence is particularly incongruous because the incident occurred during the late summer and early autumn plague surveillance season along the PRC’s northern border, when disease control authorities routinely intensify monitoring of rodent populations and vectors, alongside health screening of incoming passengers. In 2026, those seasonal measures coincided with an unusually large expansion of PRC–Russia cross-border infectious disease exercises, even as travel and tourism between the two sides accelerated. Moscow and Beijing held the first stage of their first joint exercises responding to infectious threats in Khabarovsk on June 9–11, followed on August 24–27 by a second, much larger exercise in Fuyuan, Heilongjiang, where more than 300 PRC personnel rehearsed an unknown tick-borne “Disease X”, an imported plague outbreak, epidemic notification, joint risk assessment, and coordinated control measures. Irkutsk Anti-Plague Research Institute director Sergey Balakhonov participated personally in the August exercise, while the PRC contingent included the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Northern Theater Command Disease Control Center (Rospotrebnadzor, August 26; Fuyuan Municipal Media Center; Heilongjiang Daily, August 27). From August 24 through September 10, PRC disease control authorities separately conducted rodent and ectoparasite surveillance along the Russia-facing Manzhouli border, a citywide plague response exercise, and a National Disease Control and Prevention Administration inspection of health declarations, temperature screening, vector monitoring, plague surveillance, epidemic early warning, emergency stocks, and information exchange with Russia (Manzhouli Municipal Health Commission, September 1; September 10; September 14).
On September 29—four days after Shipilova’s alleged exposure and around the time she was reportedly hospitalized—the 26th PRC-Russia Health Cooperation Subcommittee met with the PRC’s National Disease Control and Prevention Administration and CDC present and discussed infectious disease prevention and disaster medicine, but the meeting’s public readout made no reference to events in Irkutsk (PRC National Health Commission, September 30). Meanwhile, PRC officials and businesses were actively promoting greater movement through the same region: the PRC consulate hosted Irkutsk governor Igor Kobzev at its September 28 National Day reception, representatives of 11 leading PRC tourism companies toured Irkutsk, Buryatia, and Primorye and signed new cooperation agreements, and on October 2 Irkutsk customs reported that PRC-bound passenger traffic had risen more than 35 percent year-on-year (PRC Consulate General in Irkutsk, September 30; IRK.ru, October 1; October 2). Against that backdrop, the absence of any public PRC reference to the suspected incident at a Russian institution that had participated in bilateral biosecurity exercises only a month earlier is conspicuous.
The Irkutsk Anti-Plague Research Institute itself illustrates the persistent ambiguity—and accompanying secrecy—between civilian disease control and military biosecurity that characterizes PRC–Russia cooperation in this field. During the Soviet period, Irkutsk formed part of the Ministry of Health anti-plague system that was incorporated into the biological warfare defense program known as “Problem 5”; more contemporary histories assess Irkutsk as involved in that program to some degree, while noting that it lacked the direct institutional relationships with core Biopreparat facilities documented for other anti-plague institutes (Alibek and Handelman, 1999; Zilinskas, 2006; Zilinskas and Mauger 2018). [1] Its director from 1957–1964, Igor Domaradskij, simultaneously established working contacts with public health authorities in the PRC, Mongolia, and Vietnam and led research on high-risk pathogens and the biochemistry and pathogenesis of plague, before later becoming a senior figure in the secret structure directing Biopreparat’s offensive biological weapons work (Carleton J. Phillips et al., 2009; Zilinskas, 2006). [2] Former Biopreparat deputy director Ken Alibek (also known as Kanatjan Alibekov) subsequently alleged that Irkutsk was among the Soviet Ministry of Health anti-plague complexes given special funding for “weapons-oriented genetic research” (Alibek and Handelman, 1999). [3] PRC participation became more directly military-linked in the post-Soviet period: in 2008, Irkutsk researchers including Balakhonov coauthored a molecular genetic study of 125 Yersinia pestis strains from the PRC, the former Soviet Union, and Mongolia with Ruifu Yang and other researchers from Beijing’s State Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Biosecurity (病原微生物生物安全国家重点实验室), whose publications identify it as part of the PLA Academy of Military Medical Sciences (Cui Yujun et al., July 9, 2008; Hanping Yan et al., August 2008). [4]
The resulting mixture of civilian epidemiology, dangerous pathogen research, military medicine, biological defense, and cross-border pathogen and vector surveillance is not peculiar to Irkutsk, but increasingly characteristic of the wider architecture of PRC–Russia biosecurity cooperation.
From Leader-Level Directives to Operational Coordination
General Secretary Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin have progressively expanded biological security cooperation from infectious disease preparedness into a broader bilateral security and cross-border response agenda. In their June 28, 2021 joint statement marking the 20th anniversary of the PRC–Russia Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, the two leaders called for expanded cooperation on infectious disease early warning and response, pharmaceuticals, diagnostic reagents, and vaccines (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA], June 28, 2021). On February 4, 2022, Xi and Putin called for a border region joint prevention and control mechanism covering epidemic control, information sharing, and border infrastructure, while separately declaring that alleged U.S. and allied “military-biological activities” (生物军事化活动) posed a serious threat to the national security of both the PRC and Russia (MFA, February 4, 2022). Their May 16, 2024 joint statement went further, calling for cooperation on infectious disease prevention, domestic and cross-border transmission, and “biological disaster early warning and response” (生物灾害预警和应对), while stressing cooperation in the PRC–Russia border region and protection of each country’s sovereignty in the biological sphere (MFA, May 16, 2024). By May 21, 2026, the two leaders were explicitly directing their disease control authorities to expand cooperation on “biological security, infectious disease prevention and control, and cross-border transmission” (生物安全、传染病防控及跨境传播), while also endorsing continuing cooperation in disaster medicine and related medical research (MFA, May 21).
Xi and Putin’s instructions have been translated into increasingly specific work programs through premier-level meetings and subordinate health cooperation structures. In December 2020, the 25th such regular meeting called for joint vaccine research, infectious disease information exchange at the border, and a bilateral emergency exercise responding to an infectious disease outbreak in 2021 (MFA, December 3, 2020). The communiqué from the mechanism’s 26th meeting a year later expanded this agenda to laboratory testing, epidemiological research, border health quarantine, epidemic information exchange, laboratory networks, research bases, and “biological security early warning and emergency response control systems” (生物安全预警应急反应管控系统), while assigning cooperation to the PRC’s National Disease Control and Prevention Administration and Russia’s Rospotrebnadzor (MFA, December 1, 2021). In December 2022, Li Keqiang (李克强) and Mikhail Mishustin’s governments called for specialized disaster medicine exercises in the PRC and Russia, new interagency agreements between the two disease control systems, and a joint action plan between PRC Customs and Rospotrebnadzor covering border epidemic control and information exchange (MFA, December 2022). By August 2024 and November 2025, the premiers’ communiqués were calling respectively for joint operations to identify and eliminate sources of epidemic disease and for regular practical disaster medicine exercises, stronger cooperation among the PRC’s National Disease Control and Prevention Administration, General Administration of Customs, and Rospotrebnadzor, and deeper coordination on pandemic preparedness and biological security (MFA, August 22, 2024, November 4, 2025).
These arrangements rest on a longer-running network of joint pathogen research, field surveillance, and cross-border warning procedures. Beyond the July 2008 collaboration between researchers from the PLA-affiliated State Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Biosecurity and those in Irkutsk, in June 2014, Rospotrebnadzor’s Amur regional directorate and the PRC’s Heihe health inspection and quarantine authorities signed a 2014–2018 program for joint study of rodents and ticks carrying infectious agents along the two countries’ shared border. By 2015 they had also agreed on a unified procedure for responding when an infectious patient was detected at a border crossing, and by 2018 were discussing continued joint pathogen surveillance and comparative monitoring of influenza viruses in migratory birds (Rospotrebnadzor Amur Directorate, June 30, 2014, July 20, 2015, January 12, 2018). In December 2022, the PRC’s Center for Disease Control (CDC) and its State Key Laboratory for Infectious Disease Prevention and Control convened PRC, Russian, Mongolian, and Kazakh specialists to plan joint investigation of the Altai Mountain natural plague; Balakhonov presented Russia’s surveillance work; and participants discussed joint plague research, risk assessment, and a cross-border prevention and control mechanism (China CDC, December 15, 2022).
Military and Regional Biosecurity Networks Expand
The PRC and Russia have also developed a bilateral military channel for epidemic control, military medicine, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) preparedness alongside their civilian public health cooperation. On April 9, 2020, Russia’s S.M. Kirov Military Medical Academy and the PLA Military Medical University held a dedicated teleconference on infectious diseases involving Russian military scientists, hospital chiefs, infectious disease specialists, epidemiologists, and PRC military doctors who had worked in Wuhan; the agenda included epidemiology, virology, clinical laboratory diagnosis, treatment of severe disease, and measures to prevent the introduction and spread of COVID-19 infection within military units (S.M. Kirov Military Medical Academy, April 10, 2020). In May 2020, with Central Military Commission approval, the PLA provided epidemic control supplies directly to the Russian armed forces, while the PRC Ministry of National Defense (MND) later described high-level exchanges, epidemic control, and joint exercises as three major components of PRC–Russia military cooperation during the year (MND, May 25, 2020, December 31, 2020). The PRC and Russia have also trained together in Russia’s International Army Games “Safe Environment” nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance competition, and in 2019, Russian NBC troops used PRC reconnaissance vehicles and detection equipment in the PRC after PRC chemical defense troops had taken the same class of equipment to Russia the previous year (MND, August 13, 2019). Most recently, during the August 2026 Fuyuan cross-border exercise, the PLA Northern Theater Command Disease Control Center, PRC civilian disease control agencies, and Russian public health experts rehearsed responding to an unknown “tick-borne ‘Disease X’” (蜱传X疾病), imported bubonic plague, metagenomic identification of an unknown pathogen, specimen transport, decontamination, and bilateral risk assessment (Heilongjiang Daily, August 27).
Beijing has also gained exposure to Russia’s military biological response practices through multilateral exercises and third-party security relationships, particularly in Belarus. At the August 2022 meeting of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) defense ministers, Russia proposed that the planned Peace Mission-2023 exercise include prevention of terrorist attacks using chemical and biological weapons, though the proposed exercise does not appear to have been held (SCO, August 26, 2022). In September 2023, Belarus hosted the first “Barrier-2023” exercise of the Collective Security Treaty Organization’s (CSTO) new joint radiation, chemical, and biological defense and medical support formation, which rehearsed biological reconnaissance, collection and laboratory transfer of samples, examination and evacuation of exposed personnel, deployment of a special treatment center, and elimination and decontamination of a biological threat site. The same CSTO notice stated that the PRC, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Mongolia had been invited as observers to the Belarus exercise, which also tested the ability of the new radiation, chemical, and biological (RCB) defense and medical teams to respond to the rapid spread of dangerous infectious diseases (CSTO, August 28, 2023). Belarus appears to be developing a similar pattern, with military and biosecurity cooperation with the PRC deepening against the backdrop of Minsk’s continued integration into Russia-led CSTO biological defense structures. In August 2026, PRC and Belarusian airborne forces conducted the fourth “Swift Eagle” joint training exercise, using mixed formations and joint command procedures (MND, August 25). In parallel, the PRC Academy of Agricultural Sciences’ Shanghai Veterinary Research Institute and Belarus’s S.N. Vyshelessky Institute of Experimental Veterinary Medicine established the PRC–Belarus Joint Laboratory for Animal Disease Prevention and Control in May 2025, with research covering rapid diagnostics for major and emerging infectious diseases, vaccine development, and mechanisms for blocking cross-border disease transmission (Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, May 21, 2025).
The PRC–Russia biosecurity relationship is increasingly embedded in wider regional mechanisms that extend epidemic surveillance, research, and response outward through the SCO and overlapping bilateral partnerships. In June 2018, SCO heads of state called for reliable infectious disease information exchange, mobile anti-epidemic groups, stronger national laboratories, new research centers, joint research projects, and coordinated responses to major outbreaks; the November 2020 Moscow Declaration subsequently called for a multilateral mechanism for exchanging signs of infectious disease outbreaks, closer cooperation among research centers, joint development of diagnostics and preventive measures, and an Uzbekistan-proposed permanent SCO platform for responding to cross-border dangerous infections (SCO, June 10, 2018, November 10, 2020). By 2022–2023, the organization had added a Comprehensive Plan of Joint Measures to Counter Epidemic Threats, a Roadmap for Cooperation Between Medical Institutions on Preventing and Treating Infectious Diseases, a formal epidemiological information program, and regular meetings of national health and epidemiological services, while the PRC, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan jointly backed stronger Biological Weapons Convention mechanisms (MFA, July 29, 2022; SCO, October 26, 2023). The PRC has simultaneously built bilateral biosecurity cooperation with Kazakhstan: Xi Jinping and Kassym-Jomart Tokayev agreed in May 2023 to joint biological research and sharing of research results, and their July 2024 statement recorded continuing interagency biosecurity consultations, joint scientific projects, and support for Kazakhstan’s proposal for an international biological security agency (MFA, May 17, 2023, July 3, 2024). Military cooperation has begun to expand through the same concentric structure: the MND states that SCO militaries have institutionalized exchanges in military medicine, and in May 2025 the PRC hosted the first SCO Military Medicine Seminar in Xi’an with military health chiefs and experts from Russia and other participating states (MND, July 15, 2024, May 13, 2025).
Conclusion
The Irkutsk episode highlights the gap between the depth of PRC–Russia biosecurity coordination and the opacity surrounding how that coordination functions in practice. As these mechanisms extend through Belarus, the SCO, and Central Asia, they are beginning to form a wider regional architecture for surveillance, research, preparedness, and response. If this trajectory continues, that architecture is likely to develop alongside rather than fully integrate with existing international biosecurity regimes, carrying forward the information-sharing and coordination gaps exposed by the Irkutsk episode and complicating global pandemic monitoring and other countries’ biosecurity preparedness.
Notes
[1] Ken Alibek with Stephen Handelman, Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World—Told from the Inside by the Man Who Ran It (New York: Random House, 1999), https://www.nlm.nih.gov/nichsr/esmallpox/biohazard_alibek.pdf.
Raymond A. Zilinskas, “The Anti-Plague System and the Soviet Biological Warfare Program,” Critical Reviews in Microbiology 32, no. 1 (2006): 47–64, https://doi.org/10.1080/10408410500496896.
Raymond A. Zilinskas and Philippe Mauger, Biosecurity in Putin’s Russia (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1515/9781626377134.
[2] Carleton J. Phillips, Anne M. Harrington, Terry L. Yates, Gary L. Simpson, and Robert J. Baker, Global Disease Surveillance, Emergent Disease Preparedness, and National Security (Lubbock, TX: Museum of Texas Tech University, 2009), https://www.depts.ttu.edu/nsrl/publications/downloads/global-disease.pdf; Zilinskas, 2006.
[3] Alibek & Handelman, 1999.
[4] Cui, Yujun et al. “Insight into microevolution of Yersinia pestis by clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats.” PloS one vol. 3,7 e2652. 9 Jul. 2008, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002652; Han, Yanping et al. “Physiological and regulatory characterization of KatA and KatY in Yersinia pestis.” DNA and cell biology vol. 27,8 (2008): 453-62. doi:10.1089/dna.2007.0657.
[5] Cui, Yujun et al., 2008.
The post The PRC and Russia Deepen Biosecurity Integration appeared first on Jamestown.
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The scenarios below are, unfortunately, all possibilities for our near future. They have sprung from my imagination. It is not meant to scare people, but sticking your head in the sand won’t solve anything either. I am not an expert in this area; have not even served in the military. I do worry; because the West lives under the assumption that it can still do what it wants and still win against the Global South. That is a miscalculation, but there is no reasoning with idealists.
The Global South faces a difficult task. How long do you wait until the inevitable point when you have to intervene anyway? I don’t know. On the one hand I am afraid that intervening will lead to WW3, but on the other hand I also think that waiting to intervene will also lead to WW3. Maybe the way forward is the best way to prevent WW3. Fortunately that choice does not lie with me. If anyone can make that choice best, I feel it is Mr. Putin and Mr. Xi. I trust in that, then.
1. Israel bombs Iran
Israel feels supreme because they can continue their genocide in Gaza and the West Bank unhindered. The West continues to provide them with military resources and the Global South is silent while the UN is powerless. In this situation, Israel believes the time is ripe for a pre-emptive strike on Iran’s military bases and nuclear facilities. Israel assumes that the West with the US in the lead will then take their side and also participate in a subsequent blitz krieg to completely destroy Iran.
1a. The attack succeeds
Just as Syria fell in a short time, Iran can also disintegrate in a short time. Whether and how quickly Iran can then rise again will depend completely on its population. If the population is homogeneous and fully behind the leaders, then Iran can turn in on itself and start building from scratch. If the population is divided and not massively behind the elite, then the situation will be similar to that of Iraq and Libya, for example. In this scenario, however, Iran is eliminated and it depends on Israel how far it wants to go.
1b. The attack partially succeeds
Only a few targets are hit and Iran is able to fight back. Much will then depend on what Iran will do. If Iran maintains its current course of action and chooses to do little in return, then the situation is likely to escalate further into full-scale war (see further 1d). If, however, Iran chooses to go to maximum effort immediately, it could completely destroy Israel in a matter of days (see further 1e).
1c. The attack is answered pre-emptively
When Iran has prior knowledge of an attack by Israel, it has the choice to attack pre-emptively itself. Again, the choice is to deploy such a preemptive attack minimally or maximally. Minimal most likely means complete war (see further 1d). Maximum means complete destruction of Israel (see further 1e).
1d. Skirmishes lead to full-scale war
If Israel fails to carry out the first attack successfully and Iran responds as it has so far with minimal engagement, tensions do rise to the point where it will most likely turn into full-scale war. How it will turn out then depends mainly on the involvement of the U.S. and Russia. If the US and Russia remain relatively aloof, Iran will be able to overcome Israel in the foreseeable future. When the U.S. fully engages with Israel, then Iran will have a tough time. Iran can do a lot of damage, but ultimately will not be able to beat Israel and the U.S. together. If, on the other hand, Russia sides with Iran, then WW3 will be a reality.
1e. Iran destroys Israel
Iran is capable of wiping Israel off the map in a matter of days. The West will of course respond to this, but by then it will be too late for Israel. In this scenario, of course, many Palestinians and Arabs will also fall victim to Iranian bombing, because they are also present in Israeli cities. The US will attack Iran and then it depends again on Russia whether it will lead to the fall of Iran or WW3.
2. US installs troops on Taiwan
The elite in Taiwan is under the influence of the West and is bent on gaining independence from China. The US and the West are talking China’s mouth off when it says it respects the Chinese position of “One China,” but then acts as if Taiwan is its own state separate from China. There is a good chance that the US will want to install active troops on Taiwan and that the elite in Taiwan will want to declare independence with US and Western support. At that point, China will be faced with the choice of whether to accept this red line as well or finally have enough.
2a. China also swallows this red line and sticks to threats
Avoiding conflict when it is not necessary to get your way in the long run is China’s often wise choice. However, here we also see the other side exercising patience and moving little by little toward their desired outcome. One China so far has only moved further away and exposed the Taiwanese people to Western propaganda. In this scenario, there is very little chance that Taiwan will ever fully rejoin China. It is even more likely that other parts will want to split from China as well.
2b. China puts its money where its mouth is
Enough is enough and China violently conquers Taiwan and expels the US from the island. If this is done in time, then the damage will not be too bad. If China waits a long time for even more military resources to be delivered from the West, the damage will be many times greater with many more casualties. The longer the conflict lasts and the more casualties occur, the harder China will have it with the Taiwanese people. Also, the West will be more likely to participate if the conflict lasts longer. However, China will succeed in conquering Taiwan regardless.
2c. China no longer waits and intervenes pre-emptively
When it is clear that things are not changing or continue to move in the wrong direction, a scenario emerges that calls for intervention. Why wait until Taiwan has more military resources and active troops on the island. If China chooses to conquer Taiwan in a short time it will succeed with minimal damage to both sides. The US and the West can only stand by and condemn it, but that will be all. Sanctions are all they can do, but given its economic situation, China need not fear them. On the contrary, even these sanctions will be counterproductive.
3. German troops on the ground in Ukraine
It says “German,” but it could just as easily be French, British or American troops. However, Germany is now giving Ukraine permission to use their Taurus missiles to attack civilian targets and Moscow. Russia has been facing the choice of balancing their strategy with their red lines for three years. Strategically, step by step, the set goals are outlined and achieved. That strategy is now really challenged by possible hundreds and thousands of Russian civilian casualties. That red line requires that the gloves really come off.
3a. Russia waits too long to see what happens
A German Taurus missile comes down in central Moscow resulting in several hundred dead civilian casualties. Russia can now do nothing but declare war on Ukraine and bring it completely to its knees. By waiting (too) long, the West has become actively involved against the adopted strategy and Russia is now faced with the choice of actively fighting the West after all.
3b. Russia forces Ukraine to its knees in time
Now that it is known that the West will go further and further, eventually even delivering nuclear bombs to Ukraine as well as putting active troops on the ground, in this scenario Russia may choose to go full-on “pre-emptive” now. This rides roughshod over the current strategy, but potentially avoids many Russian civilian casualties. It will be a race against time, but may also be the scenario that had to happen sometime.
3c. Russia quickly succeeds in winning
If Russia quickly succeeds in getting Ukraine to surrender, then the West faces a difficult choice to still choose WW3. Fighting a proxy war is a lot easier than having to deliberately choose nuclear war. There is quite a chance that the West will then choose to condemn without active conflict. Especially since the US and EU are not on the same page and there are so many divisions within the EU as well. No EU country will want to be the first to get a nuclear bomb on their capital.
3d. Russia should also start fighting NATO in Ukraine
If Russia wants to maintain the current strategy and thinks it can take longer to achieve the SMO’s goals in Ukraine, eventually NATO will gain more and more momentum to actively participate resulting in WW3. Eventually it will escalate further and further to the inevitable.
3e. Russia conducts a rock-solid preventive action
In this scenario, Russia chooses to take pre-emptive action that shakes the world to its foundations. At once, it becomes clear that the gloves are off and Russia is not to be trifled with. This could include several very drastic actions, such as a tactical nuclear bomb on Lviv, taking out the entire Ukrainian government at once, largely destroying Western military satellites or flattening factories and installations for Taurus missiles in Germany. Also possible is an intended declaration of war on Germany that would be triggered if a Taurus missile hits civilian targets and Moscow. It is uncertain how the West will respond, but the question is whether this scenario can be avoided at all given the West’s course of action.
There are bound to be other scenarios. Branches and mixes. I think the big picture is especially important. Do you also see that big picture?
Nico Cost
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