Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac “didn’t purchase the high-risk mortgages due to pressure, but because they were participants reading from the same script as Goldman, Sachs. These institutions weren’t naive victims but rather active participants in a coordinated worldwide scheme to loot and plunder.”
By Larry Romanoff at Blue Moon of Shanghai.
Three Perpetrator-Victims:
![]()
1. Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac
This is a crucial piece of the 2008 puzzle. The institutions of Fannie Mae (Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation) were Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs). They were not original lenders but existed to provide liquidity and stability to the US mortgage market. They would buy mortgages from banks and other lenders then pool those mortgages to create Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS), and sell these MBSs to investors (like pension funds) worldwide.
But there was a crucial difference between them and all other participants in the mortgage market in that they purchased only high-quality mortgages, and they fully guaranteed these investments. Both institutions guaranteed to pay the principal and interest on the underlying mortgages even if the homeowner defaulted. Thus, a 100% guarantee of the value of the investment. It is a matter of record that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac owned or guaranteed about half of all US mortgages, a figure that rose to over 80% after the crisis began. In reality, it was rather like buying a government bond in that no investor could ever lose money because the US government provided a backstop to these two entities, if they were unable to meet their obligations. Their “securitisation” process served two vital functions. It freed up capital for banks and other lenders, allowing them to issue new mortgages. Also, it standardised mortgage underwriting while providing a massive, steady flow of capital into the US housing system. It is important that these two institutions were privately owned, but with a US government sponsorship and a federal backstop, the eventual guarantee provided by the US government itself.
As things unfolded, the “guarantee” inherent in their securities became a poison pill, and was the cause of their destruction. Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac had purchased – and guaranteed – trillions of dollars of securitised NINJA mortgages and, when the bubble burst, those guarantees were called. They were then contractually obligated to make investors whole, paying out the missing principal and interest from the defaulted mortgages. This turned their massive, steady stream of income into a catastrophic, unending cash outflow. They were actually hit by a double whammy. The first was being obligated to cover the losses on the defaulting mortgages they had guaranteed. The second was that they held many of those low-quality mortgage-related assets in their own investment portfolio and, when the market collapsed, the value of these assets plummeted, forcing them to write down their value and realise massive losses.
They were not just the guarantors of the market; they were also one of its largest, most highly leveraged speculators. They bet on the US housing market with an implicit government guarantee, and they lost. In September 2008, the US government was forced to place both companies into a form of bankruptcy where they were put under federal control and propped up with around $200 billion in taxpayer funds to prevent their total collapse from annihilating the global financial system.
Prior to the bankruptcies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were classified as Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) but, in reality, they were publicly traded, private businesses. They had a diverse base of institutional shareholders. Capital Research Global Investors was the largest single shareholder of both companies, with other shareholders including Fidelity Investments, American Funds, and many other funds having significant stakes. These two firms were the pillars of the US housing market, owning or guaranteeing over 80% of all US mortgages after the crisis began. Their debt was held by central banks and financial institutions worldwide.
A Look Backward at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
A “standard narrative” was being promoted that Fannie and Freddie caused the subprime crisis by buying risky loans, but the reality was different. As the housing bubble inflated in the early 2000s, the private-label (and low-quality) MBS market (led by Wall Street firms like Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers) exploded. The official story for the gullible public was that the “prime” sector of the market where these two GSE firms lived, was nearly stagnating while the “subprime” portion was growing exponentially. And because of this, Fannie and Freddie’s market share shrank dramatically. We were told that to maintain relevance and profitability, they felt immense pressure to lower their own underwriting standards and buy these riskier securitised loans to package into their own MBS.
There is something very wrong with the official story which says they felt “pressured” to purchase vast amounts of the toxic securities. It is not possible their purchases resulted from pressure of any kind. These institutions were owned and controlled by firms like Capital Group, who are the largest fund managers in the world, managing more than $3 trillion. Given the sophisticated ownership and management, to suggest that public pressure forced them to purchase enough garbage securities to bankrupt themselves, is an insult to intelligence. These people, of all people, had to fully understand the nature of the CDOs and the risks. They were not children.
The only theory that fits all the known facts is that these firms were active participants along with Goldman, Sachs, Lehman Brothers and the other investment banks in the massive fraud underlying the housing crisis. And that means their purchase and sale of the toxic securities was just another “financialisation project” where they helped firms like Goldman, Sachs privatise the profits and socialise the losses by using Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as tools. Given their social mandate, there was no valid reason for these two institutions to have knowingly purchased toxic securities when they were full guarantors. They knew they were bound by law to make investors whole, but they also knew the government backstopped them. They didn’t purchase the high-risk mortgages due to pressure, but because they were participants reading from the same script as Goldman, Sachs. These institutions weren’t naive victims but rather active participants in a coordinated worldwide scheme to loot and plunder.
It is not possible to definitively confirm or deny a coordinated script with firms like Goldman Sachs, but an assessment of all the small details of the framework and incentives, creates a compelling argument that this was a massive and deliberate fraud. The argument is that the shareholders of these firms saw such immense and immediate profits in the subprime market that they jumped in with both feet. And they were not sacrificing the companies in the process: they knew they would be unable to fulfill their obligations, but the government would bail them out and they would survive, having looted investors and the US government of hundreds of billions of dollars. And that is precisely what happened. The People’s Bank of China published an assessment of Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac that you might care to read. [1]
The market operated under a long-standing belief in an implicit government guarantee—that the US would not allow the GSEs to fail because of their vital role in the housing market. This created a “heads we win, tails the taxpayer loses” dynamic, encouraging risk-taking with the understanding that the downside would be borne by the public.
Well before the 2008 collapse, there were clear signals that the GSEs were engaging in dangerously aggressive behavior. Warren Buffett was a major investor in Freddie Mac but sold nearly all of his holdings starting in 2000, when the scheme had barely begun. Buffett expressed a fundamental loss of confidence in their management and, crucially, detected signs that Freddie Mac’s management was “cooking the books” and providing misleading financial reports. This action from one of history’s most astute investors is a powerful piece of circumstantial evidence that the problems were known internally. Before the crisis even unfolded, Buffett said the company had “the signs and the smell of death“. [2] [3] Buffett also sensed the increasing danger from the “derivative” securities that were being so aggressively marketed (the CDSs); he said they were “financial weapons of mass destruction”.
Insiders were also keenly aware of the impending doom. Internal documents and subsequent investigations revealed that the GSEs were aware of the risks they were taking. There were many internal warnings: As early as 2004, a Fannie Mae risk manager warned in an internal presentation that the company was so excessively leveraged on subprime mortgages that even a 5% decline in house prices would wipe out their capital and leave them bankrupt. That warning was ignored, but it wasn’t a case of ignorance. There is much evidence of knowing complicity in what was essentially a huge criminal fraud. The executives and shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac knew precisely what they were doing, knew the inevitable end result, but were executing a plan to loot trillions from investors and the public and leave the US government holding the bag when the bubble burst.
As the housing bubble inflated in the early 2000s, Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers aggressively securitised subprime loans—the very risky, high-yielding mortgages that fell outside Fannie and Freddie’s traditional “conforming” standards. The official narrative about their market share shrinking, was both irrelevant and untrue. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had never taken part in this segment of the market, and the borrowers with good credit did not disappear, so their market share could not shrink.
The official story says that if they lost market share, they would no longer the dominant players in the fastest-growing part of the market, and facing a threat to their dominance and profitability. But that entire line of reasoning is irrelevant, a false “official story” that does not explain WHY these two agencies would want to buy toxic mortgages. These were not normal commercial enterprises like Ford and VW fighting for “market share”, and they cannot be compared to normal corporations. Their legislated function was fundamentally social and economic, to provide a stable mortgage market, not to dominate a market or to maximise profits for the next quarter.
Their only concern about the explosion of the subprime sector should have been to minimise it, not to participate in it.
There is no rational reason they should have purchased securities they knew were high-risk, which went entirely against their stated purpose. The only logical explanation that fits all the known facts, is that the owners of these two companies were part of the plot, cooperating with Goldman and Lehman to plunder the US Treasury, knowing that they could extract enormous profits today and, when they failed, the government would assume the guarantees on all the toxic mortgages they held. Thus, the owners and shareholders could afford to be reckless. They sucked tens of billions of investor money into their pockets, paid billions in bonuses to their staff to purchase these toxic investments, then left the US government holding the bag for hundreds of billions more. Their actions perfectly mirror those of Goldman, Sachs, Citibank, Lehman Brothers, Bear Sterns, Citibank, and all the others. All players were reading from precisely the same script. When we connect all the pieces, we can’t avoid concluding this was a deliberate fraud, with all available evidence supporting that interpretation.
It is important that Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac were not normal commercial companies. Their congressional charters established them for a public purpose: to provide liquidity, stability, and affordability to the US mortgage market. To suddenly begin chasing market share in the subprime sector was a direct betrayal of that mission. Their hybrid public-private structure proved fatal because that structure created a perfect environment for criminal behavior. They used their government-backed advantage not just for market stability, but for aggressive looting to please their private shareholders. This was in many ways reminiscent of the giant Savings and Loan fraud of the early 1980s.
When the fraud began, executives at Fannie and Freddie were paid like private Wall Street CEOs, with their compensation heavily tied to metrics like earnings per share and market share growth. In the early 2000s, CEO compensation at the GSEs reached tens of millions of dollars. To hit the targets that would generate these massive bonuses, they had dive into the pool of private subprime mortgages. The accurate and damning story is that the Jewish owners, shareholders, and management of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac hijacked these two institutions with a plan to deceive investors and to loot the US government of hundreds of billions of dollars. The record is clear that they created a perverse incentive and bonus structure to ensure this, bonuses not aligned with their public mission, but with private greed. Taking advantage of their private ownership and government backing, they knowingly abandoned their role as a stabilising force and became a primary accelerator of the crisis, secure in the belief that the American taxpayer would be forced to cover their losses. The tragedy is that the “privatise profits, socialise losses” model I have identified, is not an anomaly in modern finance. But the 2008 crisis was its most spectacular and devastating manifestation.
While proving criminal intent is difficult, the evidence overwhelmingly supports a conclusion of gross, calculated negligence and a breach of fiduciary duty. We have no choice but to conclude that this was a massive betrayal of trust. The leaders of these institutions foresaw the potential for massive losses but proceeded anyway, believing the profits would be theirs and the losses would be borne by the taxpayer. The fact that this was a foreseeable consequence of their actions is the very definition of the moral hazard I described – where foreseeable consequences imply intent.
From left, Henry Paulson, secretary of the Treasury; Ben Bernanke, Fed chairman; and Timothy Geithner, head of the New York Fed, at a news conference in 2008, as global finances faced ruin. Meeting transcripts from the period were released Friday. CreditHyungwon Kang/Reuters. Source
2. The Strange Case of Lehman Brothers
This is a profound and troubling point that ventures into one of the most controversial aspects of the 2008 crisis. From assembling and connecting the pieces of evidence, it appears that Lehman Brothers was permitted (or, more accurately, chosen and pushed) to go bankrupt, in large part to frighten the US Congress into bailing out the other big banks. It is a bit of a question why Lehman was actively disliked in some powerful segments of the international Jewish banking fraternity.
Lehman had 158 years of history, and was the fourth largest investment bank in the United States. When it filed for bankruptcy protection, it had assets of $635 billion and liabilities of $613 billion. [4] Throughout the summer of 2008, due to the deterioration of the real estate market, the crisis in the financial market became more and more serious, and Lehman’s problems became more and more obvious: Lehman held too many non-performing housing loans which it couldn’t divest. The most important thing is that the scale of these non-performing assets was extraordinary: Lehman lost as much as $7 billion in commercial housing loans alone, and its stock price plummeted by 90%. [5] [6]
The official narrative was that Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail because the government lacked the legal authority to bail it out, and perhaps secondarily wanted to teach the market a lesson about moral hazard. The theory was that if Lehman were rescued, it would encourage financial institutions to engage in high-risk business recklessly, thereby seriously damaging market self-discipline mechanisms. In addition, multiple bailouts of financial companies were bound to cause other industries in trouble to ask the US government to rescue them. But the actual Lehman events that unfolded, suggest a far more calculated and cynical operation. I cannot conclusively verify all the specifics, but we can still analyse the plausibility of this scenario based on known facts, financial mechanics, and historical patterns.
Lehman was definitely an exception to the US government largess of bailout money, and this could only have been a deliberate decision. The suspicion that Lehman Brothers was “chosen” to go bankrupt is supported by the historical record, a stark contrast to the US Treasury’s actions with other similar institutions. Only months earlier, in March of 2008, the FED had facilitated JPMorgan‘s takeover of Bear Stearns by agreeing to back $30 billion of its risky assets. When Lehman found itself in an identical crisis by September, its CEO, Richard Fuld, desperately sought a similar deal. However, the US government’s stance on Lehman was not determined by the US government, but by Henry Paulson who was “totally in charge” and who made a conscious choice not to save Lehman. Paulson called investment bank executives on Wall Street and said he would not use taxpayer funds to rescue Lehman.
After that, the Treasury Department and the FED made it clear that the federal government would not provide any financial support for investors to acquire Lehman. Paulson’s main stated reasons were that the US had no authority to prevent a Lehman failure, and that a bailout would create a “moral hazard” – rewarding risky behavior and setting a dangerous precedent for future crises. But this public rationale deserved only ridicule at best. If the US had no authority to bail out Lehman, and if Lehman didn’t deserve a bailout due to moral hazard, then what was Goldman, Sachs? And what “right” did the FED or the Treasury have, to bail out AIG, Bear Sterns and the others? The suspicion that Lehman Brothers was “chosen” to go bankrupt is supported by the historical record.
The then-President of the NYC FED, Timothy Geithner, (a junior to Paulson) arranged a private sale to Barclays bank in the UK, but the deal collapsed when UK regulators suddenly refused to approve it. Paulson apparently traveled to “Europe” (i.e. the UK) and informed various parties that the US would not use “taxpayer funds” to bail out Lehman Brothers. But the official narrative was nonsense; Paulson’s statements were a warning to others that any attempt to bail out Lehman would not be appreciated. The UK government were not objecting to this bailout, and indeed had bailed out other banks. But, after Paulson’s intervention, the UK government abruptly backed away.
Without a government backstop to absorb Lehman’s worst assets, no other buyer was willing to take on the risk. It was Henry Paulson who definitively killed the rescue of Lehman Brothers. Geithner published a book revealing the inside story of Lehman’s collapse. [7] In that text he wrote, “This was one of the few estrangements between me and Henry during the crisis. There was even some estrangement between me and [then-Fed Chairman] Ben [Bernanke].” Ultimately, Paulson declared that the FED “did not have the right” to save Lehman.
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley had the strength to acquire Lehman, but both had suffered heavy losses in the subprime mortgage crisis, and were taking care of themselves. Private equity funds such as J.C. Flowers, KKR (Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co), Carlyle Group and Blackstone Group also had the strength to buy, but those institutions were not interested in acquiring Lehman as a whole, but hoped to acquire some of Lehman’s high-quality assets at a low price after the bank was liquidated.
WASHINGTON – FEBRUARY 11: Executives from the financial institutions who received TARP funds, (L-R) Goldman Sachs Chairman and CEO Lloyd Blankfein, JPMorgan Chase & Co CEO and Chairman Jamie Dimon, The Bank of New York Mellon CEO Robert P. Kelly, Bank of America CEO Ken Lewis (obsucred), and State Street Corporation CEO and Chairman Ronald Logue testify before the House Financial Services Committee February 11, 2009 in Washington, DC. The hearing focused on how financial institutions have spent funds received from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). (Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images). Source
The bankruptcy raised many questions and offered much to confound observers. One is whether Lehman was pushed into bankruptcy as a planned “Sacrificial Lamb”. This is the most strategic layer since it tries to explain why Lehman was singled out for destruction while AIG, Bear Stearns, Citigroup, and Bank of America were saved. The most plausible answer is what we term the “Controlled Demolition” theory. Many analysts have argued that the system needed a catastrophic event to shock Congress and the public into accepting unprecedented bailouts (the TARP program) for the bankers. Letting Lehman fail provided the necessary “heart attack” to justify the “open-heart surgery” on the rest of the banking system. In this view, Lehman’s failure was a tactical sacrifice to save the whole – and socialising some of the largest collective losses in history.
The chaotic aftermath of Lehman’s bankruptcy truly did terrify global markets and the US Congress, and was what spurred Congress to approve the $700 billion TARP program, and also to become much more aggressive in bailing out other firms, like the insurance giant AIG. It is of course possible that Lehman was simply the weakest link with the least political clout or the most disagreeable management in the eyes of the Treasury and the FED. The notion that its collapse was “planned” implies a level of coordination that is hard to prove. However, the outcome was the same: its failure served as a justification for a massive, no-strings-attached rescue of its competitors.
When Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the US, its global operations were frozen and began a long, complex process of liquidation. However, its European operations, based in London, were placed into administration (the UK equivalent of bankruptcy) under different rules. The administrators for Lehman Brothers International (Europe) have so far (to the end of 2025) spent over a decade unwinding its positions and returning assets to creditors. What remains today is not “Lehman Brothers” the active investment bank, but a shell of its former self, managed by teams of lawyers and administrators who are still settling claims.
There is something else here, that was strange. I encountered credible information that “someone” was selling bonds in Lehman Brothers right until the day of the bankruptcy, and were selling them not at a discount but at a high price, claiming that Lehman was in good health. My sources in Hong Kong claimed that at least several billions of US$ of Lehman bonds were sold to investors in Hong Kong right up until the day of the bankruptcy. This raises some interesting questions. If billions of dollars of Lehman bonds were sold, the money would normally have gone into Lehman’s treasury and the firm could not have gone bankrupt. But the money from those bond sales clearly did not go into Lehman Brothers treasury, which means it went into the pockets of the private owners of the company. There is justification for a belief that insiders knowingly sold Lehman bonds at inflated prices right up to the bankruptcy, diverting funds to private pockets rather than the company treasury. I saw documents that claimed, with some good (circumstantial) evidence that, although Lehman was planned and permitted to go bankrupt as a kind of sacrificial lamb, the owners would not necessarily be losers.
I haven’t enough evidence to jump to conclusions, but it appears possible, if not likely, that the Lehman bankruptcy holds yet another financial fraud, and where the bankruptcy was a kind of “controlled demolition” of Lehman, done for greater purposes. Certainly, the historical context gives plausibility to this thesis. In financial crises, there are almost always suspicious trading patterns before collapses. The bond sales in Hong Kong align with known issues of offshore financial opacity, and we can draw comfort from documented patterns from other financial scandals. If we think of the bond sales, the sacrificial lamb theory, and the strange afterlife of Lehman Brothers in London, we can easily tie this back to the broader theme of deliberate wealth transfer.
First, the plausibility is high that “someone” really was selling Lehman bonds until the end. This would be entirely consistent with the “Greater Fool” theory and the incentive structures we’ve examined. When the insiders knew a bankruptcy was imminent, their primary goal would be to raise and extract as much cash as possible through any means before the doors shut. Selling bonds, especially in distant markets like Hong Kong where information asymmetry was high, is a classic tactic the Jews have used repeatedly.
The most damning part of this is that selling a distressed asset at a deep discount is one thing; fraudulently marketing it as a safe investment at par value is another, and would obviously constitute securities fraud. To support this thesis, there were numerous civil cases after the fact alleging that Lehman and others misled investors about the health of their assets right up to the collapse.
The critical distinction is perhaps the destination of the funds obtained from the sales. If Lehman Brothers the corporation issued new bonds, the cash would go to the corporate treasury to fund its operations, even if those operations were doomed. However, if major shareholders or partners (the “private owners”) were selling their personal holdings of existing Lehman bonds to unsuspecting buyers, then the cash would go directly into their pockets, not the company’s. This would be a direct transfer of wealth from the new buyers to the insiders liquidating their positions. Proving this on a large scale is difficult, but it is a known phenomenon in dying companies. As one easy example, insiders often use their superior knowledge to dump their stock before bad news becomes public, and Lehman would be essentially the same thing – but with lies attached.
The scenario outlined above, fits a recognisable pattern of financial predation. There is always insider knowledge prior to such a collapse, where the apex players at the doomed institution know the true state of its balance sheet. When we examine these cases, it seems almost inevitable that the insiders used this knowledge to offload toxic assets onto less-informed investors in offshore and distant markets at inflated prices. And the cash from these final sales extracted from the system went directly into the pockets of insiders selling their personal stakes. The institution is then allowed to fail.
![]()
3. American Insurance Group (AIG)
AIG was the largest insurance company in the world, operating in more than 130 countries. The company’s CEO for nearly 40 years, was Maurice Greenberg, who was part of the Jewish financial elite and well-known to all the players. Greenberg built AIG and, under his leadership, AIG’s market value soared from $3 billion to $1.7 trillion. The man was known for his obsessive control, relentless drive, and sophisticated understanding of risk and financial innovation. Greenberg was also a financial criminal. His reign as CEO ended abruptly in 2005 when a New York investigation uncovered accounting irregularities, forcing his resignation and a $1.6 billion regulatory settlement. AIG did indeed engage in fraudulent accounting. In 2000, AIG engaged in a complex transaction with Warren Bufffet’s General Re that regulators concluded was not true insurance, but a $500 million deal designed to artificially bolster AIG’s financial appearance. [8]
This would suggest that Greenberg was a perfect partner in the massive 2008 mortgage fraud, and he was certainly no stranger to either risk or profit. However it happened, Greenberg and AIG became so deeply involved in the US housing CDO fraud that it bankrupted the company and needed a bailout by the FED and US Treasury.
To recap, the heart of the 2008 crisis was the process of securitising mortgages into complex financial products. Because the bankers conspired to loot the entire known world, this process interconnected the entire global financial system to the US housing market. First, banks issued trillions of dollars of subprime mortgages to totally unqualified borrowers. Then, the investment banks (like Goldman and Lehman) bought these mortgages and bundled them into bonds called Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS).
Maurice Greenberg, former CEO of American International Group, in better days in 2005. Greenberg believes the 2008 government bailouts left him and other AIG shareholders poorer. Photograph: STEPHEN CHERNIN/AP.
They then took these MBSs and split them into new, even more complex products called Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs). These contained tiers, or “tranches,” with different levels of risk and return. The complexity of these (repeatedly sliced and diced securities) was not well known; the prospectus was more than 200 pages and there were probably few who could, or would, read that document. These MBSs and CDOs were sold to investors worldwide (pension funds, foreign banks, etc.).
To make these risky products seem safe, two additional frauds were perpetrated. The rating agencies like S&P and Moody’s falsely gave the subprime rubbish packages a rating of AAA. The second fraud was that AIG sold insurance on securities through instruments called Credit Default Swaps (CDSs). AIG wasn’t a buyer of the toxic securities, but a seller of a kind of insurance on them.
Through a small, 377-person unit in London called AIG Financial Products (AIGFP), the company sold CDS contracts to major banks and investors worldwide. In simple terms, AIG promised investors that if their complex bundles of mortgages (MBSs and CDOs) were to default, AIG would cover the losses. The company appeared to believe that the only risk was in a severe and nationwide crash in US housing prices, a condition considered to be a “once in a million” event for which the possibility was essentially zero.
WASHINGTON – MARCH 18: Code Pink protesters hold signs as Chairman and CEO of the American International Group Edward Liddy prepares to testify before the House Financial Services Committee March 18, 2009 in Washington, DC. Hired after AIG accepted billions of dollars in aid from the federal government, Liddy faced intense scrutiny from members of Congress over $165 million in bonuses paid to employees of the insurance giant. (Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images). Source
For AIG, this seemed like “free money.” They collected billions in lucrative insurance premiums, believing that they would never have to pay out. AGIFP stated openly that there was essentially zero risk that they would ever have to pay “even $1.00”. For the banks, buying this insurance from a top-rated firm like AIG made their risky assets appear safe, allowing them to meet regulatory requirements.
This “insurance” from AIG, added to the fraudulent AAA ratings from the rating agencies, is what convinced investors to participate.
AIGFP’s models were built on the assumption that a crisis affecting all regions and housing market segments was virtually impossible. They grew this business to an enormous scale, at one point providing CDS protection on over $600 billion in bonds, creating a huge, undiversified risk that eventually threatened the entire company. When the “once in a million” housing market collapse occurred and the securities AIG had insured plummeted in value, three things happened simultaneously: (1) The risk of default skyrocketed, meaning AIG’s potential insurance liabilities became enormous. (2) AIG’s own credit rating was downgraded. (3) These two events triggered clauses in the CDS contracts that forced AIG to immediately post billions of dollars in cash collateral. Despite being a massive company, AIG was not a bank and did not have tens of billions in liquid cash on hand. It was this liquidity crisis—the inability to meet its immediate collateral calls—that pushed it to the brink of bankruptcy within days.
![]()
4. The Bailout
The US government decided that AIG was “too interconnected to fail”. Its collapse would have caused catastrophic losses for the countless banks and pension funds that had bought its insurance, potentially triggering a domino effect through the entire global system. In September 2008, the Federal Reserve stepped in with an $85 billion emergency loan to keep AIG afloat. Then, the US government took an 80% ownership stake in AIG, effectively nationalising it. There is an interesting article from Peking University that gives a clear explanation of why AIG was bailed out when Lehman wasn’t. [9]
There were many investigations and much public anger about AIG’s collapse and the subsequent bailout. There were reports of FBI investigations into several financial firms, including AIG, for potential fraud, and there was also widespread public outrage over the use of taxpayer funds for bailouts while the same firms continued to pay million-dollar bonuses to their staff.
The Supreme Court declined to review a challenge to the government’s actions during the crisis-era bailout of insurer American International Group Inc. Source
There were enormous controversies about the bailout of AIG, primarily because that money did not go to AIG. Instead, nearly all the bailout funds were passed through AIG to its counterparties who were the banks that originated the fraud but had exposure to AIG. Of the money supposedly paid to bail out AIG, $12 billion went to Goldman, Sachs, another $12 billion to the Bank of America & Merrill Lynch, $16 billion to Societe Generale in France, and $8.5 billion to Deutsche Bank, among many others. Another $12 billion went to various US states and municipalities. None of it remained with AIG.
The decision to fully repay AIG’s counterparties was contentious for several reasons. One was that the “bailout” of AIG appeared to fraudulently divert funds from their stated purpose to in fact bail out the same banks that caused the crisis (the so-called “counterparties”). And these banks were refunded 100% of AIG’s obligations to them, making them whole on their own risky bets. This was all done with questionable justification. The New York FED defended its actions by stating that it aimed to avoid destabilising the financial system and that the banks needed full payment to avoid failure.
Another contention was the intense lack of transparency. The entire process was initially conducted in secret, with the Federal Reserve refusing to publicly disclose the recipients. This secrecy, combined with the fact that many of these banks had already received direct government bailouts, led to intense criticism from lawmakers and the public, who saw it as a “backdoor bailout” for Wall Street at the expense of the people.
Perhaps the most politically explosive part of the bailout was that the US government, through AIG, effectively bailed out European banks like Societe Generale and Deutsche Bank. The official justification was not about saving them, but about saving the American financial system from them.
![]()
Because of the massive volume of “insurance” contracts it had sold, AIG was at the center of a global web of financial contracts. If it had declared bankruptcy and defaulted on its CDS obligations, the massive, sudden losses would have instantly crippled its major counterparties, including Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, and Merrill Lynch. These US banks would have then been unable to meet their own obligations to others, causing a cascade of failures. The European banks, holding billions in claims from these now-failing US banks, would have pulled their capital out of the US. system, freezing credit completely. The theory was that letting AIG fail would have been an uncontrolled, catastrophic explosion. By bailing out AIG and paying its counterparties at 100 cents on the dollar, they were performing a “controlled demolition.” They were stabilising the entire system by ensuring that the failure of one firm (AIG) did not trigger a dozen more. In their view, letting European banks fail from their exposure to AIG would have caused a feedback loop that would have annihilated the American banks intertwined with them.
When the housing market collapsed, the mechanism that destroyed AIG was not a slow bleed, but a sudden financial heart attack.
5. The Official Story
There are many problems with the official story of AIG. One is that median US house prices had doubled by 2006, and tripled since 1997. If that isn’t a housing bubble, I don’t know what would be, but we are told that no one at AIG or AIGFP believed the bubble would burst. In normal circumstances, house prices might continue a steady upward climb, but these were not normal times. Almost the entire housing frenzy that pushed prices to such high levels, was artificial. It was not a reflection of real demand for housing, but a demand for high-yield and high-risk mortgages. This demand was instigated by “no down payment”, virtually zero interest rates, and an apparent total abandonment of sane lending practices. Most of the mortgages were “subprime” and most borrowers substandard. There was no realistic way this environment could sustain a stable, long-term rise in house prices.
Another is their apparent belief there was no possibility they would have to pay out “even $1”. Yet the underlying mortgages were mostly subprime LIAR and NINJA loans that carried serious risk of default. Even the fact that those mortgages were issued with artificially low initial rates, meant there would be substantial defaults when the interest rates reset in two years.
Another is that AIG broke the fundamental rule of insurance, which is to spread the risk through some form of reinsurance. But AIG kept all the risk to itself instead of reinsuring and spreading that risk. Also, since the credit default swaps (derivatives) did not qualify as insurance products, they were not subject to insurance regulations and thus no requirement to hold reserves. And AGIFP kept no reserves. All its premium income was factually considered as “free money” and was paid out to the owners and shareholders. There was nothing left in the bank when the real estate market crashed and the real liabilities emerged.
When banks issue mortgages, they don’t insure the contracts because their lending practices are restrictive and the risk of default (in normal times) is virtually zero. And in any case, the value of the home is always greater than the mortgage amount, so a default carries no prospect of loss.
The “Quants” (the geniuses at AGIFP) said publicly there was zero chance they would have to pay out even $1 in claims. We must take them at their word. But how could these derivatives be constructed so that could be possible? It seems that the actual “insurance” was only on the top tranche of mortgages or securities that contained only prime mortgages and would have no particular risk of default. Thus, the only apparent risk lay in the prospect of even the highest-quality mortgages defaulting, and that would happen only if house prices collapsed by perhaps 50% or more – which was exactly what happened.
There was a kind of “Too-Safe-to-Fail” arrogance. The quants at AIGFP had such supreme confidence in their mathematical models that they believed the risk was negligible. Their models, which assumed a nationwide housing downturn was a statistical impossibility, told them the probability of having to pay out was so remote that paying reinsurance premiums would be like throwing money away. Also, they seemed to view themselves as “The Ultimate Reinsurer”. AIG was one of the few institutions with a AAA credit rating, strong enough to take on risks others couldn’t. In their view, they were the end of the line. Who could they possibly reinsure with? They believed they were the smartest ones in the room, absorbing risk that others were too timid to touch.
When the housing market collapsed, the mechanism that destroyed AIG was not a slow bleed, but a sudden financial heart attack. The prime result came from collateral calls. The CDS contracts AIG sold had clauses that required them to post billions of dollars in cash collateral if the value of the insured securities fell, or if their own credit rating was downgraded. In 2008, both of these things happened at once. AIG, despite its vast assets, did not have the liquid cash to meet these immediate demands.
AIG’s leadership, operating in a culture of arrogance and short-term greed, made a calculated bet that they could profit from a massive, systemic risk, secure in the belief that their own sophistication would allow them to exit in time, and comforted by the implicit backstop of their own indispensability. This was not a failure of intelligence or risk assessment. It was a catastrophic failure of ethics, systemic design, and ultimately, of hubris.
May 13, 1985: Depositors line up to withdraw money from a Baltimore bank following the court order that limited depositors’ cash withdrawals until a purchaser was found for the troubled savings and loan. (Photo: Bettmann/Bettmann/Getty Images) Source
6. Rinse and Repeat
If we compare the Savings & Loan US mortgage fraud of the 1980s to the mortgage fraud of 2008, they are essentially the same animal, differing only in the method of looting the US Treasury and taxpayer. Both were massive frauds, both used the US housing stock as the tool; both involved an immense transfer of wealth from the lower classes to the elite class; both depended on prior “deregulation” of laws and policies in order to permit the perpetration. This sounds like the same players doing something twice, but with different methods. The parallels between the 1980s Savings and Loan (S&L) Crisis and the 2008 Financial Crisis are profound, the evidence strongly supporting the view that they represent a repeating pattern of systemic fraud enabled by deregulation, resulting in a massive transfer of wealth. And again, entirely Jewish in origin.
In both cases, financial innovation and deregulation created an opportunity for a massive financial fraud. The 1980s S&L crisis was billed as “the biggest financial fraud in American history.” The “looting” occurred when insiders realised they could make high-risk bets, extract enormous fees and profits upfront, and leave the inevitable losses to the government-backed insurance funds.
Privatise the profits and socialise the losses.
I would point out that these events occur so regularly and share such a similar pattern, that it is difficult to consider them as “one-off” events or due to accidental causes. When we examine the repeating patterns, it very much appears all those events were orchestrated (by the same group of persons) to produce precisely the results they produced – a bubble, a crash, and an immense transfer of wealth. These have occurred repeatedly with housing, with the stock markets, with the oil markets, and others.
≈≈≈
Mr. Romanoff’s writing has been translated into 34 languages and his articles posted on more than 150 foreign-language news and politics websites in more than 30 countries, as well as more than 100 English language platforms. Larry Romanoff is a retired management consultant and businessman. He has held senior executive positions in international consulting firms, and owned an international import-export business. He has been a visiting professor at Shanghai’s Fudan University, presenting case studies in international affairs to senior EMBA classes. Mr. Romanoff lives in Shanghai and is currently writing a series of ten books generally related to China and the West. He is one of the contributing authors to Cynthia McKinney’s new anthology ‘When China Sneezes’. (Chap. 2 — Dealing with Demons).
His full archive can be seen at
https://www.bluemoonofshanghai.com/ + https://www.moonofshanghai.com/
He can be contacted at: 2186604556@qq.com
≈≈≈
NOTES [Part 6] – Perpetrator-Victims
[01] Background knowledge questions and answers about the “two rooms” in the United States
[02] Buffett: Before the crisis, the company had signs of “death” and smelled that it was about to withdraw……
[03] Buffett’s biggest enlightenment from investing in Freddie Mac: Before the crisis, the company had signs of “death”
[04] Geithner published a book revealing the inside story of Lehman’s collapse
[05] Let Lehman Brothers go bankrupt
[06] Lehman Brothers once again tested the wisdom of U.S. financial regulation
[07] Geithner published a book revealing the inside story of Lehman’s collapse
[08] America’s most greedy CEO
[09] Xie Shiqing: Save the American insurance giant AIG
≈≈≈
This article may contain copyrighted material, the use of which has not been specifically authorised by the copyright owner. This content is being made available under the Fair Use doctrine, and is for educational and information purposes only. There is no commercial use of this content.
Other Works by this Author
“This event of the housing bubble, crash, and crisis, was not an accident. We need to dig a little deeper, to trace this event from its inception … and to the broader category of the War on Humanity.”
By Larry Romanoff at Blue Moon of Shanghai.
This essay is about housing, and the Khazar Jews’ plan to eliminate home ownership for all but the (primarily) Jewish financier and industrial classes. Yes, I know. It sounds like just another conspiracy theory, but reserve your judgment until the end.
It can be hard to figure out who actually owns a building. Homes being treated like major sources of capital, instead of places for people to live.
British banker Montagu Collet Norman (1871 – 1950), 1st Baron Norman, Governor of the Bank of England. Source
I would remind readers here again about the statement by Montagu Norman, who was the Governor of the Rothschild-owned Bank of England, to the United States Bankers’ Association in 1924, often referred to as “The Bankers’ Manifesto”:
“Capital must protect itself in every possible way, both by combination and legislation. Debts must be collected, mortgages foreclosed as rapidly as possible. When, through the process of law, the common people lose their homes, they will become more docile and more easily governed through the strong arm of government applied by a central power of wealth under leading financiers. These truths are well known among our principal men who are now engaged in forming an imperialism to govern the world. By dividing the voter through the political party system, we can get them to expend their energies in fighting for questions of no importance. It is thus by discreet action we can secure for ourselves that which has been so well planned and so successfully accomplished.” [1]
There is no way to misunderstand the man’s words. The quote contains several distinct ideas, all of which are truly ominous for people in almost every country.
“We shall have world government, whether or not we like it. The only question is whether world government will be achieved by conquest or consent.” James Paul Warburg (1896-1969) was the son of Paul Moritz Warburg, nephew of Felix Warburg and of Jacob Schiff, both of Kuhn, Loeb & Company which financed the Russian Revolution through James’ brother Max, banker to the government of Germany. Source
I would remind you of James Paul Warburg, Jewish Banker, who in 1950 testimony to the U.S. Senate, said, “We shall have world government, whether or not we like it. The only question is whether world government will be achieved by conquest or consent.” [2] I would remind you also of David Rockefeller, Chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, who stated in 1991 during a Bilderberg Meeting, “We are grateful to The Washington Post, The New York Times, Time Magazine, and other great publications… for their commitment to global governance. The supranational sovereignty of an intellectual elite and world bankers is surely preferable to the national auto-determination practiced in past centuries.” [3] Rockefeller explicitly endorsed a “supranational sovereignty” led by bankers and elites, dismissing national sovereignty as outdated. This is directly connected to the Jews’ War on Humanity, because we will first be subjugated and colonised, one representation of this condition is us being homeless renters. This is not a joke.
To fully appreciate the extreme ferocity of this intent and the power and influence that lie behind it, we need to take a closer look at the 2008 housing crisis and financial meltdown. This is a complex topic with much detail necessary, so I have divided it into 4 parts.
The “housing problem” is a social boil that has been festering for many decades, and it emerged in full force (yet again) in 2007-2008 in the so-called “financial meltdown”. The 2008 financial crisis resulted in tens of millions of families in the US and some other nations losing their homes. This was generally referred to in the mass media as a “housing bubble”, insinuating that the problem somehow “just happened”.
But it didn’t just happen. It resulted from the confluence of processes consciously and deliberately executed by established capital, primarily the US FED, firms like Goldman Sachs, many banks, and some other participants, and of legislation and policies effected by the US government. We needn’t pretend to consider this a conspiracy between the major players. It is sufficient that they were all on the same page at the same time, each acting in their own interest, but with their actions complementing each other and magnifying the result. We can think of it as a sharp confluence of interests rather than a secret conspiracy. Nevertheless, when we examine the details, it is inescapable that the “housing bubble” was deliberately created and executed by a select group of actors with a willing and supporting cast, and that the end result was clearly foreseen at the inception of this process.
And that leads us to the inconvenient truth that foreseeable consequences imply deliberate intent. I can foresee the consequences of striking a window with a hammer; it does me no good to claim I didn’t mean to break the glass. Foreseeable consequences imply deliberate intent.
It is necessary to emphasise that, while the bubble was being inflated, all the participants had to be aware of that fact, and also aware of the inevitable result. First, the US FED opened the credit taps wide, providing virtually unlimited credit for home purchases. Next, mortgage interest rates were reduced to an all-time a low, not only making home purchases possible for many otherwise unenfranchised families but also encouraging widespread speculation. At one point in Canada, the mortgage interest rate at the major banks was 0%. If that isn’t a warning sign of something, then what would be? How can a bank lend money at 0% interest and remain solvent? As another indication, particularly in the US, the normal conditions required to qualify for obtaining a mortgage, were totally deleted. As the bubble inflated, mortgage applications contained no requirement for a minimum income, nor even for the applicant to have a job. House mortgages were available with no down payment, the banks willingly lending the entire appraised value of a dwelling. Further, the normal legal fees and real estate commissions were simply added to the mortgage amount. All the normal requirements for obtaining a home mortgage were suspended, along with all the cautious lending practices of banks.
At the end, the mortgage market was flooded with what were termed “LIAR” loans and “NINJA” loans. The LIAR mortgages were loans made with no documentation: borrowers could state their income or assets without verification. The NINJA Loans meant “No Income, No Job, no Assets.” The situation became so ludicrous that, at the end, homeless unemployed drifters – with zero assets – were obtaining mortgages on $500,000 homes. Given that every participant in the financial industry had to be fully aware of these conditions, we can hardly claim the housing bubble was an unexpected accident.
To summarise: (1) Credit was easily available to anyone, with virtually no limitations; (2) you could purchase a home at an extraordinarily low interest rate – sometimes zero; (3) you could purchase a home of almost any size or selling price; (4) you needn’t have had sufficient income to qualify for the mortgage payments, and in fact needn’t have had any income at all; (5) you didn’t need to be employed, nor to even have a fixed address; (6) you needn’t have had a down payment; you could borrow not only 100% of the selling price of a house, but also additional funds to cover the legal fees and real estate commissions, all included in the mortgage loan. Countless qualified (and unqualified) purchasers bought a house with the intention of flipping it within weeks at a higher price. This was the situation that actually existed at the time. It shouldn’t require much mental effort to conclude that something was very wrong with this picture.
There were many “customer-friendly” advertisements stating, for example, “It doesn’t matter if you can’t pay the loan every month, you only need to pay interest for the first 24 months, and the principal of the loan can be paid after two years!” [4]
To additionally entice speculative purchases, advertisements promoting “zero down payment” and initially low “teaser” interest rates became common. Billboards everywhere yelled out “Why rent when you can own?”, drawing more buyers into the market and fueling demand. The teaser interest rates meant that mortgage loans were offered at unreasonably low interest rates (sometimes zero) that would “re-set” to much higher levels after perhaps two years. The combination of low interest rates and easy credit led to an increase in speculative buying. Investors purchased homes with the expectation of selling them for a quick profit, contributing to the rapid rise in home prices. Given the frenzied speculation in the housing market, the borrowers essentially relied on “the greater fool theory” which assures us that we will be able to flip this property to yet a greater fool in the near future. Caution was therefore eventually thrown to the wind.
Now think, what would be the natural, inevitable result of this combined set of circumstances? The first is that housing became financialised as an investment commodity, totally detached from the social good of dwellings for people. The second, and most obvious, would be a literal tsunami of home buyers. With free money and no restrictions, and with house prices promising to rise rapidly, why not purchase a house? The third result, stemming from the first two, was a dramatic increase in selling prices. This didn’t occur overnight; the bubble was being inflated since about the year 2000, and by 2008, or even 2006, the median selling price of homes in the US had doubled, and tripled from 1997 prices when the scheming first began for this fraud.
The bubble was obvious to everyone, but greed prevailed. Goldman, Sachs executives slept with dreams of riches far beyond the limitations of mere avarice, while the intermediary financial institutions had the same disease to a lesser extent. The local banks appear to have been totally overcome with equal portions of greed and recklessness, to the point where their lending practices became insanely unrestricted. And the eventual real losers, the individuals who purchased the homes, saw an innocent (and easy) opportunity for profit by purchasing a real estate asset that was rapidly appreciating. Everyone saw only the upside; no one seemed to consider that most hills have a downside.
But this wasn’t the whole story. Goldman, Sachs created something new that was critical to the scheme, and in hindsight appears to have been their main purpose, and also unquestionably the cause of the financial meltdown. Through intermediaries like Countrywide, Washington Mutual, and Wells Fargo, Goldman, Lehman Brothers, and others, purchased these “subprime” mortgage loans from the original lending banks, mixed the good mortgages together with the subprime debt (the trash), Then sliced, diced, and repackaged them as AAA-quality bundled securities called CDOs, and sold them off to innocent pension funds, national social security funds, and other investors. With these bundles being marketed aggressively throughout the world, the demand for mortgages increased almost exponentially, serving to increasingly corrupt lending practices while further inflating the US housing market.
In case it isn’t obvious, I should state that a very significant percentage of the mortgages issued by the various banks were clearly substandard in terms of quality, with potentially millions of borrowers having no hope of making the required mortgage payments. And in fact, by the end of the bubble inflation, nearly all mortgages would have met this description. Yet it is crucial to note that as Goldman, Sachs and others heavily promoted these bundled securities, they assured purchasers the securities were “Grade AAA”. To assist in the fraud, the major stock and securities-rating firms, Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch, cooperated to rate these “securitised investment packages” as Grade AAA. It should have been obvious to investors that AAA could not be possible under these circumstances, but few knew the details of the mortgage securitisation until after the bubble burst.
By 2006, the market reached its limit. As borrowing costs reset higher and household budgets were squeezed, people began to default on their mortgages. This led to a surge in foreclosures, which flooded the market with homes and caused prices to fall sharply. Documented reports were that house prices quickly plunged by 30% to 50% in many US states. [5] [6] To compound the effect, the FED raised interest rates in 2006, claiming an attempt to slow the growth of the housing market, but surreptitiously this was a deliberate act to burst the bubble and to effectively force the desired collapse in house prices. And, as house prices collapsed, the Jewish vulture funds and billionaires swooped into the market to buy up all those foreclosed homes at very low prices. More later.
You can see from the chart below, drawn from the St. Louis FED, what happened to US home sales. Note the dramatic increase from 2000 to 2005/2006, and the plunge to 2010. Note also the repetitive rises and plunges from 1970 onward. None of these were accidents either.
Commensurate with this, the banks and financial institutions faced significant losses on those same mortgage-backed securities, and that led to a widespread credit freeze. This credit freeze, and the subsequent realisation that trillions of dollars’ worth of mortgage securities were of seriously questionable value, led to our “2008 financial crisis”.
Everything I have written above, is generally well-known. But with these details fresh in our minds, we are no closer to being enlightened. We still have no understanding of WHY this disaster occurred, nor in fact HOW it occurred. We need to dig a little deeper, to trace this event from its inception, and to relate it properly to the agenda of the dispossession of the world’s Gentile housing, and to the broader category of the War on Humanity.
This event of the housing bubble, crash, and crisis, was not an accident. When we examine the entire circumstances and connect all the dots, it becomes very clear that the “crisis” was an orchestrated event meant to produce precisely the results that obtained from it. When we examine the details and put all the pieces into proper place, there is no way to avoid the conclusion that the entire 2008 housing event was a planned criminal fraud executed by a small group of players. This is where we will go first.
![]()
What Really Happened to Create 2008?
From all the available evidence, this debacle originated somewhere in the bowels of Goldman, Sachs, probably around 1995, when one of their officers or officials conceived the idea of securitising high-interest-rate and high-risk mortgages, and selling them off in tranches that would later be termed “Collateralised Debt Obligations“, or CDOs. Despite the fact that this enormous fraud had many deeply-involved active participants, it needn’t be seen as a conspiracy in any real sense. The impetus for the hatched plan likely originated during a casual discussion over lunch between a Goldman employee and someone from perhaps the Treasury Department. Given the attractiveness of the scheme and its potential for vast profits, and the fact that all the potential actors at this level were reading from the same playbook, the scheme likely took on a life of its own after that discussion. There were many pieces to put into place to create the environment and set the stage for this housing bubble-to-come, but much of this could have been accomplished through casual discussions among the necessary key players. Treasury could have spoken to the FED, the lobbyists from AIPAC to members of Congress, others to the intermediary banks, and some to the local banks as well.
![]()
Setting the Stage, Step 1 – The curse of Financialisation
It may not be well understood, but also is not a secret, that the Khazar Jews financialise almost everything. For example, this is the root of the push for privatisation, basically converting public goods into private profit streams. This applies to railroads, airports, prisons, electrical, water and gas utilities, toll highways, and much else. For more background on the severe dangers of this ideology, you may care to read “A Further Look at Privatisation” [7] and “World Map of Privatisation“. [8]
It is the cause of the increasingly short-term vision exemplified by American and most Western multi-national companies, where “long-term” is the next financial quarter. This, in turn, has led to stock buybacks, call centers relocating to India, the offshoring of American manufacturing, huge unemployment, and much more. Simply put, due to financialisation, companies no longer exist to manufacture and provide products, but to avoid taxes and pay high dividends to stockholders. As Steve Ballmer of Microsoft so eloquently said, “Our purpose is not to make good software. Our purpose is to make money.”
The Financialisation of Housing
Returning to housing, the core issue here is that the 2008 crisis really stemmed from a deliberately-programmed fundamental shift in what housing is: from an essential social good to a financial asset. This shift was not an accident, but the consequence of decisions and systems that evolved in planned measure over time. This process that we call “financialisation,” is a complex transformation driven by very specific mechanisms and by very specific actors (all Jewish), with profound implications for economies and societies.
There were several key mechanisms that prioritised the investment value of a house over its use as a home. A classic sign is what we term the “price-rent disconnect”, when housing prices rise far beyond what can be supported by their rental income. When the cost of buying a home is not justified by the potential rent, it indicates that prices are being driven by speculation on future resale value, not by the fundamental value of providing shelter. This speculation creates a dangerous cycle, a kind of self-reinforcing feedback loop. As prices rise, housing becomes a more attractive “investment”, drawing more capital into the market. This influx of money further drives up prices, which in turn attracts even more investment, rapidly inflating a price bubble. This is where the role of easy credit and leverage come into play. This process is deliberately fueled by easy credit, where buyers are encouraged to take on large amounts of debt, betting that future price increases will justify the loans. This of course amplifies both the boom and the eventual bust. This shift to the financialisation of American housing wasn’t an accident; it was propelled by the actions and incentives of several key groups. And, it is important to point out, this wasn’t the first time.
The consequences of the financialisation of housing are very serious. Speculative “investment” in housing, as opposed to normal purchases, seriously distorts other sectors of a nation’s economy, depriving “real” sectors of needed capital. The attraction is vast immediate profits, even though the activity contributes nothing to a nation’s economy and in real life distorts it badly. Also, housing financialisation worsens the gap between the rich and the poor. It creates a situation where those who already own property assets see their wealth grow effortlessly, while younger generations and lower-income families find it nearly impossible to get on the property ladder. This is one of the main factors that has destroyed the prospect of social mobility in the US and many Western countries. Those who can never accumulate a down payment – and pay off – a home, are almost certainly condemned to remain in the lower class. And of course, a financialised housing market is fragile. When a real estate bubble finally bursts, it will most often trigger a full-blown financial crisis with lasting damage to the entire economy, leaving behind a mess that takes years or decades to clean up. Think of Japan in the 1990s or the US after 2008.
One inevitable result is the abrupt plunge into the lower class by former members of the middle class, and another is the inevitable transfer of wealth from the middle and lower classes to the 1/10th of 1% who engineer these booms and busts. But it is very important to understand the process: the hundreds of billions and even trillions of dollars in losses from a collapsed housing market, are not really ‘lost”; they become profits for the billionaire class who purchase these depreciated assets at pennies on the dollar. The main result of the collapse of any bubble, but here especially a housing bubble, is a transfer of wealth of almost unimaginable proportion from the lower and middle classes to the elite financial class. As I mentioned earlier, as house prices collapsed, the Jewish vulture funds and billionaires swooped into the market to buy up all those foreclosed homes at very low prices. Thus, the equity and value of all those homes (and families) were transferred from tens of millions of Americans into the hands of a few dozen Jews and their hedge funds.
I would note here that China’s approach to this issue is astute. Chinese policymakers and analysts have explicitly identified “real estate financialisation” as a major risk. Official discourse consistently warns that it is as addictive and dangerous as a narcotic to the economy and emphasises that the fundamental positioning of a house is for living, not for speculation. This represents a conscious effort to resist the global trend of financialisation and re-anchor housing policy to its social function. Still, all of this is just background to help us understand the social and financial travesties that were created. We are still lacking the necessary enlightenment.
Roosevelt signs the Glass-Steagall Act on June 16, 1933 to fix banking issues that had led to the Great Depression. Source
Setting the Stage, Step 2 – Regulatory Changes
There were two critical objectives necessary to be accomplished for this fraud to come to life. First, since Goldman’s scheme was clearly prohibited by law at the time it was hatched, Congress would have to be enlisted as a Shabbos Goy agent (servant of the Jews) at some point. Secondly, since the scheme would depend in very large part on stealth and secrecy as to the content (and quality) of the securities to be marketed, this required special legislative protection as well, involving Congress yet again.
For the first point, the Glass-Steagall Act was a law that had long separated commercial banking (taking deposits, making loans) from investment banking (underwriting securities, making speculative bets). That meant that Goldman, Sachs could not proceed with this housing securities fraud with the Glass-Steagall Act still in force. The movers and shakers of this scheme used their “bought and paid for” influence over Congress and the White House, utilising the extortionate abilities of AIPAC and similar pressure groups, and President Bill Clinton signed the repeal into law in November 1999. [9] [10] This repeal not only permitted Goldman, Sachs and friends to plunder the Gentile world unmolested, but it allowed the creation of megabanks like Citigroup that could originate mortgages, package them into securities, and then bet against them, creating catastrophic conflicts of interest.
The second point required laws that were “friendly” to the kind of securitisation that Goldman had in mind. To this point in time, the securitisation of assets, and the various complex insurance policies used to bet on, or bet against, those same securities, were tightly supervised by law. There was no possibility of Goldman, Sachs or Citibank executing this fraud in the dark. This situation clearly had to change and, courtesy again to AIPAC and Bill Clinton, it did change. In 2000, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (which Clinton again signed into law) explicitly prevented the regulation of Credit Default Swaps (CDS), the insurance policies on CDOs. This allowed the securitised mortgage market to grow in the shadows, completely unregulated. [11] [12] And not only unregulated, but with the ability to completely hide the fraudulent nature of the scheme behind an impenetrable veil of secrecy. There was actually additional protection created to ensure the ability of these Jewish financiers to work in the dark: federal regulators actively preempted state-level attempts to interfere with or disrupt the execution of this fraud by warning them off in advance. The message from the top was clear: do not interfere.
This would be a good place for you to ask yourself WHY Goldman, Sachs and the other initial participants wanted the Class-Steagall act repealed. You might also want to ask yourself WHY the US Congress would, suddenly and without apparent need or provocation, enact legislation prohibiting the supervision of, or investigation into, precisely such schemes as the bankers envisaged. Keep in mind that it is primarily such schemes that demand supervision and investigation. You might also care to ask yourself WHY federal regulators would want to warn the state-level regulators against investigation or interference in the bubble-to-be.
Bill Clinton repealed the Glass-Steagall Act on November 12, 1999. Source
Setting the Stage, Step 3 – Taking The Fraud Worldwide
Something else very important happened that was apparently missed by the media, but that was excruciatingly important to the mortgage fraud. You will recall the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act which permitted these vultures to loot the American people and the US government of trillions of dollars (to say nothing of the unimaginable social cost). But ambition and greed are unlimited, or at least they were unlimited in this case. Our banker friends actually wanted to loot the entire world, not just the US, but they had a problem in that most countries had their own version of the Glass-Steagall Act, preventing our parasites from exercising their plan outside the US. To re-state, all other countries had laws prohibiting the confluence of commercial and investment banking and also prohibiting the issuance of precisely the toxic and fraudulent securities these bankers wanted to issue. What to do?
At the same time that Henry Paulson became Goldman’s CEO, he apparently conspired (evidenced by a now-public memo) with Lawrence Summers, [13] who was then US Treasury Secretary, and also with a handful of other financial vultures, to remove banking and securities regulation worldwide – just as he had done in the US. While he was Treasury Secretary, Summers was instrumental in blocking all attempts by the US government and society to restrict or even supervise the creation and distribution of this new category of financial assets. He succeeded, but this was insufficient for the worldwide plan. To achieve their goal, Henry Paulson and Lawrence Summers conspired in a scheme to eliminate controls on banks in every country in the world.
To accomplish this, they used the WTO as a platform in what may have been the most egregious campaign of bullying and extortion in world history. In simple terms, the WTO was designed for trade in goods. But Summers and the other bankers concocted an amendment that would force all nations to specifically include banking “services”, and more specifically the trade in derivatives and other toxic financial instruments. Summers and the bankers did a re-draft of the Financial Services Agreement portion of the WTO, with new rules that would force all nations to open their borders to these same banks and their imaginative new financial products. [14] Readers should note that all of the articles and documents critical of this WTO “liberalisation” of financial “services” appear to have been deleted from the Internet. At one time, there were many of these. They may still exist, but the search engines refuse to supply them. The only articles remaining are documents from the WTO or BIS, which present only a sanitised, fairytale narrative. This clearly is a sensitive topic that powerful people want suppressed. Some may still be available on the Wayback Machine at archive.org, although the US is suing to have many documents deleted.
But no nation was sufficiently crazy to willingly enact or accept such changes. Hence, the bullying and extortion. All nations, one by one, were presented with a “Hobson’s choice”; two alternatives equally disastrous and unappealing. Any country refusing to accept the new rules was threatened with economic hell – financial “sanctions”, a total trade embargo, total dislocation from the world’s financial system, confiscation of their US assets, and more. Eventually, almost every nation in the world was bullied into agreement by these Jewish bankers employing typical American “diplomacy”. And thus, the people who arranged the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in the US, accomplished the same result worldwide. And now the fraud-based calamity that faced the US people and the US economy, could be inflicted mercilessly on the rest of the world.
Sources: Paulson – Goldman, Sachs; Corzine – Goldman, Sachs; Kamanski – Merrill Lynch – ; Coulter – Bank of America; Reed – Citibank; Shipley – Chase Manhattan
The Horsemen of the Apocalypse
The record indicates there were 5 banks involved initially in this worldwide scheme, but it is important to realise that “banks” do not bully and extort; it is the “bankers” who do that, real people with names. These are the banks and bankers, and their names
Setting the Stage, Step 4 – The “Revolving Door”
You have no doubt read about the constant two-way traffic in the US between the regulators and the regulated. The head of the FDA approves for public sale a questionable but highly-profitable new drug (Think of the Sackler family and their Oxycontin), and six months later is hired by that same pharmaceutical firm at a high salary for a position with no particular duties. It works in reverse, too: A pharmaceutical company wants to distribute a questionable but highly-profitable new drug, but cannot obtain government approval. Suddenly the company’s CEO is appointed as head of the FDA who then magically approve the new drug for sale. Six months later, the man quietly returns to his former position at the pharmaceutical company. There are literally dozens of such examples, each with a purpose that would be obvious even to a child.
I raise the Revolving Door here, because the 2008 housing boom and bust could not have happened without it, and this leads us back to Henry Paulson, the CEO of Goldman, Sachs. Paulson joined Goldman in 1974, became a partner in 1982 and a managing partner in 1988. He co-headed the firm’s investment banking division from 1990 to 1994, when he was named president and chief operating officer. He became Chairman and CEO of Goldman Sachs in 1999, which is almost certainly when the housing mortgage fraud scheme was nearing fruition and being promoted among the select group of bankers. Paulson was promoted to those positions around the time the Glass-Steagall act was repealed, and when the “Act to Protect Criminal Bankers From Scrutiny” was passed.
In May of 2006, when the housing crisis was nearing its peak and the impending explosion was becoming obvious, US then-President George W. Bush chose Paulson as Treasury Secretary, a nomination surprisingly and unconscionably confirmed unanimously by the Senate. Then, in 2008, when the bubble finally burst, Paulson was placed specifically in charge of the US government’s attempts to prevent a full-blown, world-wide credit crisis “resulting from widespread losses on faulty or subprime mortgage loans made by financial institutions”. That is actually an astonishingly euphemistic statement that magically disperses all the blame. Henry Paulson was the Chairman and CEO of Goldman, Sachs in 1999 when the mortgage fraud was implemented there, and remained at the helm through all of its execution, until it was obvious the entire house of cards would soon collapse. At precisely that moment, George Bush opened the revolving door and made Henry Paulson the US Treasury Secretary, where he would now be in a position to protect the bankers from the consequences of their criminality. This is like hiring the bank robber as CEO to now come in and save the bank from insolvency. But without returning the money he stole.
U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission Christopher Cox, and director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency James Lockhart III, testify during a hearing before the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee September 23, 2008 on Capitol Hill in Washington, DC. Source
In this new position, Paulson was given enormous, almost unlimited power over the financial scene, despite his almost unlimited conflicts of interest. One of Paulson’s first acts: “He quickly pushed through the federal takeover of the quasi-government mortgage-loan agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.” In other words, Paulson engineered the US government takeover of the two massive mortgage agencies that he more or less personally bankrupted while at Goldman, Sachs. Then Paulson worked closely with FED Chairman Ben “helicopter” Bernanke to create a “credit facility”, i.e. quantitative easing (QE), i.e. the sudden issuing of trillions of dollars of free money to all the criminal banks involved in the fraud to enable them to escape with all their profits intact. Paulson and Bernanke especially convinced Congress to quickly pass an act to bail out the insurance company American International Group (AIG). At one point, Paulson was actually on his knees in Congress, begging them to approve the funds for the bailout. [15]
It should warm your heart to know that Paulson was also instrumental in the creation of the “HOPE NOW Alliance”, which was proclaimed as an effort by the same bankers “to assist struggling homeowners during the crisis”. Sadly, it bore no fruit and tens of millions of Americans lost their homes with no banker or government assistance anywhere to be seen. But it played well in the media as an effort to put a human face on the same bankers who caused all those tens of millions to lose their homes in the first place. [16] After having saved all his Jewish banking and insurance friends from bankruptcy, and after expressing appropriate sympathies for all the Gentiles who lost their homes, Paulson was replaced as Treasury Secretary by Timothy Geitner, who carried Paulson’s “financier resurrection programs” to their conclusion.
Stephen Friedman, left, was co-chairman of Goldman, Sachs in 1991 with Robert E. Rubin. Credit Gary Spector. Source
Yet More Background
We could profitably step back a bit further in time, to determine the onset of the planning for this immense worldwide fraud. Robert Rubin was the US Treasury Secretary from 1995 to 1999, and by 1997 he had been already exerting considerable pressure on US officials to “de-regulate” the banks. His first push was to dismantle the barrier between commercial and investment banks, which required the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act. As one observer noted, this “was like replacing bank vaults with roulette wheels”. Rubin was also part of the Revolving Door, having been a Vice-Chairman of Goldman, Sachs along with Stephen Friedman, and Chairman of the firm’s management committee. [17] According to the Goldman, Sachs website, “Robert Rubin has led both the US Treasury and Goldman Sachs, which gives him a rare perspective on interactions between the financial and political systems.” [18] In this article, Rubin claims “The biggest risks to the US economy are political, not financial”. On this, he is 50% right because it is nearly entirely the Jews’ political influence and parasitical control of the US political system that leads to all these debacles – of which the 2008 meltdown was only one of many. But he was 50% wrong in that, because of the Jews’ control of the US political system, they create most of their disasters through the financial system.
But let’s not lose the main point, which is that the scheme which was being hatched by the bankers to loot the entire world, began around 1995 and required years of pressure on the US Congress to finally create the necessary legal environment for the execution of their massive fraud. And it should be noted that within weeks of leaving his position as Treasury Secretary, Rubin was named the Chairman of Citigroup. This is notable for reasons in addition to the Revolving Door, since it was expressly Rubin’s efforts to “de-regulate” the banks, that permitted the creation of the monstrosity later known as Citigroup.
![]()
Setting The Stage, Step 5 – The specialised Mortgage Companies
I stated above that “banks” were the originators of the subprime loans, but that was not entirely accurate. Our friends at Goldman, Sachs et al had conceived the idea of obtaining toxic mortgages in the trillions of dollars, bundling and re-packaging them, stamping them with AAA ratings, and selling them off to unsuspecting buyers all over the world. But there was one bottleneck in this “supply chain”; the investment banks (Goldman, et al) could not depend on the normal inhabitants of the US commercial banking system to cooperate in this fraud. Normal and sane bankers would resist providing mortgages to unemployed drifters, meaning that Henry Paulson’s dreams of unlimited avarice would go unrequited.
The solution was that the investment banks who were behind this fraudulent scheme took matters into their own hands and bought up several dozens of the seedy mortgage companies that lived in the nether world of low-quality high-risk borrowers. For example, Merrill Lynch acquired First Franklin Financial Company, a major subprime lender, and others did something similar. These were not passive investments; they were a strategic move to directly secure and control a steady supply of the high-yield raw material they needed for their CDOs. In cases where they couldn’t find a substandard, subprime mortgage company to purchase, the investment banks created, or financed the creation of, “specialised mortgage companies” to do the dirty work for them. The process functioned much like a manufacturing supply chain.
The record indicates that most of those “specialised” lenders went bankrupt after the bubble burst, and it seems clear that this was the plan, that these mortgage companies were specifically created (or purchased) as “one-trick ponies”, solely to vacuum up every substandard borrower in the US, issue them a mortgage, and supply Goldman and Lehman with the high-yield assets they wanted. Many (perhaps all) of the subprime specialists like New Century Financial and American Home Mortgage Investment Corporation went bankrupt when the bubble burst, confirming the conclusion about these companies being temporary one-purpose tools. This was the actual structure of the subprime mortgage machine. The specialised mortgage companies were the crucial, and disposable, engine designed to generate the specific “product” that investment banks wanted.
It is vitally important to appreciate that the huge contrived demand created by the bankers was not for “housing” or “homes”, but for high-yield mortgages.
Setting The Stage, Step 6 – “Weapons Manufacturing” by Investment Banks
This is where the focus of the scheme could now actively turn to housing. The financial engineers on Wall Street had created in their imaginations a very lucrative and high-yielding securitisation machine, and the housing stock of the United States would now be used as the raw material to feed it. [19]
It is very important for readers to understand this next point: The “demand” in the 2008 bubble was not for “housing”, but for “mortgage investments”, specifically high-yielding (and high risk) mortgages. The creation of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) would create an insatiable demand for high-yield mortgages. But the only way to obtain mortgages in sufficient numbers was to encourage hugely increased activity in house purchases. The problem was that traditional, safe, 30-year fixed mortgages weren’t sufficiently profitable, and thus unattractive, for what Goldman, Sachs and their friends had in mind. You cannot generate and execute a worldwide financial fraud by offering investors 3% or 5% on their money. You need the temptation of exceptionally high returns and, in the housing market, this could come only from subprime loans. The high yields were available only with high risk – the LIAR loans and the NINJA loans. And now we move into the fraud with a vengeance.
To meet this demand for high-yield mortgages, lenders were incentivised to create a new high-yield product – the subprime mortgage – meaning low quality loans made at high interest rates to those with poor or no credit. This was the root cause of normal banks dumping all their lending restrictions and throwing caution to the winds. It was from this contrived “demand” for high-yield mortgages that mortgage companies began promoting zero down payment and initially low teaser interest rates, intended to draw more buyers – and especially substandard buyers – into the market, thus fueling an almost completely artificial demand for “housing” while providing the high-yield (and very high risk) mortgages. These subprime LIAR and NINJA mortgages were specifically designed according to specifications dictated by Goldman, Sachs.
When the real world is functioning normally, a bank lends its money to a borrower and maintains that loan on its books. It is therefore of considerable interest to the bank that the borrower have the capacity to repay the loan. No bank officer, even one mentally challenged or high on drugs, would issue a mortgage of $500,000 on a house worth $450,000, to an unemployed drifter with no income and no fixed address. But they did. And the reason they did, was that these mortgages were never designed to be retained by the bank. They were issued only for sale to Goldman, Sachs, Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, and other financial wizards (parasitic vultures, actually) to be securitised and sold. Thus, the lending banks didn’t care if the borrower could afford the payments because they would have sold off the loan to Wall Street within weeks. You can appreciate that this represented a fundamental shift from traditional lending. [20]
The mortgages did not go from the local banks or mortgage companies directly to Goldman and others similar. There were financial intermediaries like Countrywide, Washington Mutual, and Wells Fargo. It was these intermediaries, acting on explicit instructions from the wizards of Wall Street, who dealt with the local banks. It was they who would communicate in strict and direct terms the kind of mortgage, the size, and the yield required. If the local bank produced the specific high-yield, high-risk mortgages the intermediaries demanded, they were guaranteed purchase by the intermediary and thus these outstandingly risky loans carried no risk for the bank doing the lending.
It was only this guarantee of immediate purchase by Wall Street that prompted the local banks to ignore their normal lending practices.
As if we weren’t already sufficiently deeply embedded in a fraud, there were two powerful supporting frauds in terms of “quality assurance”, and this involved the corruption of the rating agencies and insurance policies from AIG. For Goldman, Sachs and friends to perpetuate this fraud on a global scale, the severely toxic securitised mortgages had to be mislabeled as “safe”, and this first required the conscious, paid complicity of Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch. The profits offered to these agencies were enormous, provided they did what they were told to do. And they did. This was clearly and entirely a criminal fraud, involving willful ignorance and complicity by the rating agencies. Internal emails proved that rating agency analysts knew the models were flawed and referred internally to the securitised mortgage products as “dogshit.” [21] [22] But they rated them AAA anyway because they were knowingly and willingly an important part of the scheme, and were paid handsomely for their fraudulent mislabeling. The rating agencies provided the scientific-looking stamp of approval that made the entire fraud seem legitimate to pension funds and foreign investors. More about the complicity of AIG later.
It should be more than obvious by this time that a Jewish merchant bank hatched a scheme for an immense financial and social fraud, and enlisted many participants as active players. We cannot know exactly how this unfolded. At this distance in time, we will never know who said what to whom. We don’t know who exerted pressure on the US Congress to repeal the Glass-Steagall act, although we know pressure must have been exerted, since Congress would never have originated this abomination its own. And certainly, Bill Clinton was sufficiently compromised and pressured to sign it. We will never know precisely the circumstances that led the US Congress to pass the Commodity Futures Act that prohibited supervision, examination – and even knowledge – of dangerous financial schemes. This was by any measure one of the most recklessly stupid pieces of legislation ever passed by any government anywhere. It was an act that permitted a select few financiers to create financial instruments with a high likelihood of being not only financially disastrous, but also fraudulent and criminal, and specifically prohibiting any government oversight.
Looking back on this immense treasonous criminal scheme, I would conclude that there was no single meeting in which it was created or expanded. Instead, there was most likely a series of conscious decisions by different individuals in different sectors, all reading from the same ideological script of deregulation, profit-maximisation, and obscene greed. There would have been some distinct coordination between the large merchant banks and the intermediaries and between the latter and the local banks, but these might well have been one-on-one conversations. When we have a distinct group of persons, all members of the same small tribe, all of whom are known to each other, and all of whom share the same ideology and “values”, it is easily possible for them to act in coordination without meeting the test of a “conspiracy”. Although, I would say that this distinction is largely academic since the result is the same.
Once again, it is vitally important to appreciate that the huge contrived demand created by the bankers was not for “housing” or “homes”, but for high-yield mortgages that could be bundled as CDOs and sold as high-quality investments to unsuspecting buyers.
The financial system itself was at fault, but this must be personalised to individuals. It is not “the FED” that lowered interest rates to create the bubble and then raised them to burst it, but specific individuals at the FED, all under the watchful eye of Alan Greenspan. It was not “Goldman, Sachs” that created the bundled securities, but senior individuals within that organisation, most likely Henry Paulson who was Chairman and CEO. Identified individuals at banks and other institutions played a key role by providing ample credit for housing purchases, with extremely relaxed lending standards. The widespread securitisation of mortgages was performed by specific individuals at the very large merchant banks – real people with names. There is also a matter of US government policies and legislation; Certainly, Bill Clinton can claim major responsibility for the crisis, but so can most members of the US Congress. And of course, there were specific individuals with names at the rating agencies who actively and knowingly cooperated to fleece the public and investors alike.
Important Reading
≈≈≈
Mr. Romanoff’s writing has been translated into 34 languages and his articles posted on more than 150 foreign-language news and politics websites in more than 30 countries, as well as more than 100 English language platforms. Larry Romanoff is a retired management consultant and businessman. He has held senior executive positions in international consulting firms, and owned an international import-export business. He has been a visiting professor at Shanghai’s Fudan University, presenting case studies in international affairs to senior EMBA classes. Mr. Romanoff lives in Shanghai and is currently writing a series of ten books generally related to China and the West. He is one of the contributing authors to Cynthia McKinney’s new anthology ‘When China Sneezes’. (Chap. 2 — Dealing with Demons).
His full archive can be seen at
https://www.bluemoonofshanghai.com/ + https://www.moonofshanghai.com/
He can be contacted at: 2186604556@qq.com
≈≈≈
NOTES – Part 4
[01] Capital must protect itself in every possible way
[02] The flow of money creates a path to a world group
[03] The flow of money creates a path to a world group
[04] With strong demand support, U.S. real estate will not fall hard
[05] US housing prices fell halfway
[06] The S&P 1 Home Price Index shows that housing prices in major cities in the US are falling at an accelerated pace
[07] A Further Look at Privatisation
[08] World Map of Privatisation
[09] Glass-Steagall Act of 1933: Definition, Effects, and Repeal
[10] Glass-Steagall Act Repealed, USA | 1999-11-12
[11] How Deregulating Derivatives Led to Disaster, and Why Re-Regulating Them Can Prevent Another
[12] Transforming big banks into bucket shops
[13] The Confidential Memo at the Heart of the Global Financial Crisis
[14] The GATS agreement on financial services – liberalisation
[15] “Business leaders in crisis” No. 4: U.S. Treasury Secretary Paulson
[16] Henry Paulson
[17] Rubin and Friedman Become Co-Heads
[18] Robert Rubin: The biggest risks to the US economy are political, not financial
[19] The causes, disposal and enlightenment of the 2008 real estate crisis in the United States: the second part of the overseas real estate series
[20] Why does Bank of America dare to lend high-risk loans?
[21] Dogshit ratings
[22] Dogshit ratings
≈≈≈
This article may contain copyrighted material, the use of which has not been specifically authorised by the copyright owner. This content is being made available under the Fair Use doctrine, and is for educational and information purposes only. There is no commercial use of this content.
Other Works by this Author