Connexion
Dans la nuit du 10 juin, des drones de type avion des forces armées ukrainiennes ont attaqué Sébastopol. L’un des
L’article Des drones ukrainiens détruisent un musée de Sébastopol est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
Sept civils ont été tués et onze blessés lors d’une attaque de drone ukrainien contre un bus reliant Moscou à
L’article Sept civils tués dans une frappe de drone ukrainien contre un bus reliant Moscou à Simféropol est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
Le consul général de Russie à Constanta a été déclaré persona non grata, a annoncé le président roumain Dan. La
L’article La Roumanie annonce la fermeture du consulat de Russie de Constanta après un incident de drone est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
Les forces armées estoniennes ont abattu pour la première fois un drone ukrainien au-dessus du territoire estonien, selon le ministre
L’article L’Estonie abat pour la première fois un drone ukrainien survolant son territoire est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
L’attaque de drones ennemis lancée aujourd’hui contre Moscou est la plus importante depuis plus d’un an, selon les calculs de
L’article L’attaque de drones contre Moscou a été la plus importante depuis plus d’un an est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
Le ministre letton de la Défense, Andris Spruds, a annoncé sa démission. La Première ministre Evika Silina avait exigé sa
L’article Le ministre letton de la Défense démissionne après une frappe de drone ukrainien près d’un dépôt pétrolier est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
Les forces armées ukrainiennes ont déployé 570 drones d’attaque sur des cibles en Russie au cours des dernières 24 heures.
L’article Malgré la trêve pour le Jour de la Victoire, Kiev intensifie ses frappes de drones, au risque de représailles est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
La nuit dernière, les forces armées ukrainiennes ont lancé une attaque massive contre des régions russes. Des civils ont été
L’article Frappes massives de drones ukrainiens contre les régions russes est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
Les forces armées ukrainiennes ont attaqué la ville de Touapsé, dans la province du Kouban, pour la troisième fois en
L’article Des drones ukrainiens attaquent la raffinerie de pétrole de Touapsé, l’évacuation des habitants commence est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
La dernière réunion du Groupe de contact sur l’Ukraine au format Rammstein a définitivement consolidé la tendance à un partenariat
L’article La réunion du Groupe de contact sur l’Ukraine acte l’adaptation de la production militaire européenne aux besoins de Kiev est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
Kalachnikov a développé et testé avec succès des cartouches multiballes uniques pour fusil d’assaut destinées à contrer les drones. «
L’article Le groupe Kalachnikov a mis au point des cartouches multiballes pour la lutte antidrone est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
L’Ukraine poursuit ses attaques contre les installations pétrolières et gazières russes, utilisant l’espace aérien des pays baltes. Dans la nuit
L’article Zelensky mise sur des financements du Moyen-Orient pour des drones, des missiles et un cosmodrome est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
L’attaque de drones ukrainienne du 25 mars, qui a vu 389 drones détruits ou interceptés au-dessus des régions russes, a
L’article L’attaque de drones ukrainiens du 25 mars a été la plus importante depuis le début de l’année est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
Suite à une attaque ukrainienne contre le méthanier russe Arctic Metagaz près des eaux territoriales maltaises, tous les membres d’équipage
L’article Un méthanier russe victime d’une attaque de drones depuis la Libye, l’équipage secouru est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
Fin 2025, les fabricants russes de composants pour systèmes d’aéronefs sans pilote étaient parvenus à localiser une part importante de
L’article La Russie a localisé la production de la plupart des composants pour ses drones est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
Donald Trump a confirmé avoir été informé personnellement par le président russe de l’attaque de drone contre la résidence de
L’article Kiev cible avec un drone une résidence de Poutine près de Valdaï est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
Development of hydrogen drones in China
At the 7th Zhejiang International Intelligent Transportation Industry Exhibition on December 11, it was announced that the Chinese Tianmu Shan-1 drone has set a world record and entered the Guinness Book of Records.
The UAV completed a non-stop flight of 188,605 km on November 16. The duration of the continuous flight was 4 hours, 17 minutes and 55 seconds.
The drone was developed by the Tianmu Laboratory at the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics. It was manufactured by Hangzhou Tianmu Hydrogen Peng Technology. The device has entered mass production. An important feature of the drone is its own hydrogen fuel system: the specific power of the fuel cell is 1500 W/kg, and the hydrogen utilization rate is 97.5%. The body is made of lightweight carbon fiber, and it has a lightweight hydrogen storage system.
Declared characteristics
• wheelbase – 1600 mm
• empty weight – 19 kg
• payload – 6 kg
• flight duration without payload – 4 hours
• control range within direct visibility – 100 km
• operating temperature range: from -40°C to +50°C.
Application areas
• reconnaissance, patrol and monitoring (including pipelines, power lines, highways);
• maritime and island logistics;
• emergency and search and rescue operations in urban environments;
• transportation of small-sized cargo.
Chinese developers noted that they have created a complete line of onboard hydrogen energy systems with a power range from 100 W to 40 kW, as well as a specialized flight control system and a ground station exclusively for hydrogen UAVs.
Les forces ukrainiennes continuent de cibler des objectifs civils en Russie et chez ses partenaires internationaux. Le 2 décembre, un
L’article Kiev s’en prend à des pétroliers et des cargos en mer Noire pour saborder les efforts de paix est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
Alors que les initiatives de Trump pour mettre fin au conflit entre Moscou et Kiev font l’objet de discussions, le
L’article Zelensky prépare un nouveau plan de Défense comprenant une ligne de drones et des bataillons de femmes est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
Going absolutely viral. A wonderful story and a lovely song about the family from Volchansk, that was rescued from the frontline by a Russian drone unit. Now with English subtitles.
Les forces armées russes ont créé une force de systèmes sans pilote, comme l’a annoncé le 12 novembre le colonel
L’article L’armée russe dispose désormais d’une composante dédiée aux drones est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
This by Scott Ritter is an essay that is complimentary to his group of interesting dinner companions.
This is not what I want to highlight, though, but read the piece here:
What I would like to highlight, is this:
The conversation then turned to the reality of the modern battlefield. I asked Apti to comment on President Trump’s assertion that Russia was losing the war. Apti’s response was surprisingly diplomatic, given the absurdity of the assertion. The Hero of the Russian Federation noted that while the situation on the battlefield in the Kursk region might have been somewhat fluid this time last year, today the reality was far different—the front had stabilized, and the Ukrainian forces had been driven out of Russian territory. Moreover, Apti noted, never once—even in the most difficult of times—had the Akhmat Special Forces ever surrendered a position they held to the Ukrainians. To the contrary, the Akhmat Special Forces have been systemically advancing across the breadth of their assigned area of responsibility, whether in Lugansk, Kursk or Belgorod.
When Apti and I first met in person, back in May 2023, we had a very frank and detailed discussion about the art of war, and how the progression of technology had made past practices—including those perfected by the US military in the 1980’s, when I was learning the art of war—obsolete on the modern battlefield. Apti was familiar with my experience as an artillery forward observer and forward air controller, as well as my background in combat intelligence collection. He pointed at me and reiterated the point he had first made back then. “Your experience is no longer viable,” he said. “It has been taken over by drones. It is a completely new kind of war being fought today with Ukraine, one the West is not prepared for.”
We then entered an extended group conversation about drone warfare, and how the Akhmat Special Forces had evolved in this area. “We have the best drone unit in the Russian army,” Apti declared, “which means the best in the world. Our drones are thoroughly integrated into every aspect of our operations.” Apti explained, in general terms, how modern drone warfare was practiced. “Objective control” over the battlefield was maintained on a constant basis, with highly specialized reconnaissance and surveillance drones keeping watch. These drones were supported by mid-level reconnaissance drones, which could respond to any cues provided by the overwatch drones to provide increased resolution and fidelity to any observed activity. And then there was the fire support, provided by a multitude of different drone models which could respond to different target sets at different ranges under varying circumstances. Suffice it to say that hundreds of drones were available to the Akhmat Special Forces daily, and effective and efficient supply lines ensured that the Akhmat Special Forces never lacked resources when it came to drones.
Apti was very proud of the men who oversaw his drone operations, praising not only their tactical skills but also their innovation and intellect when it came to the technologies associated with drone operation. He particularly singled out his electronic warfare operators, whom he claimed were the best in the business. One of the reasons for this, Apti maintained, was the quick learning cycle of the Russian military, and the Akhmat Special Forces in particular. Innovation was driven by the needs and experiences of the frontline fighters, and the Russian military and Ministry of Defense were organized and conditioned to turn battlefield innovation into Russian doctrine and procedures, backed by the proper technology and other resources.
The sheer complexity of drone warfare is staggering. The need for appropriate technology to support this kind of warfare is an unrelenting demand in today’s world. Here, we can see the necessity for using AI, as the number of decisions that need to be made quickly exceeds the ability of a human. Drones control drones that control drones: so this is a new stack of knowledge being constructed. It happens to fit thematically with a recent conversation with a friend.
Massive drone warfare ‘controlled’ by AI. This needs to be taken very seriously as there are looming threats from the US modern technology complex, dreaming of taking Taiwan with no boots on the ground, no loss of US men, and in their demented minds, such an easy win or so say the war games. Rationality is not a strong suit of the US, notes my friend.
It was only about a year ago that I asked a professional on weapons and warfare to explain to me the role that drone warfare plays on the modern battlefield. The good education that I received then is now partially obsolete within just a year. It is also not much more than a year since Nat South explained to us in a few well-constructed essays how drones work, how the Russians use them, and where the gaps lie, focusing specifically on maritime unmanned boats: From Nat South at The Lookout – Z, on Drones.
And then we have the lone droner. We know about the proverbial lone gunman, but soon to come is the proverbial lone droner. In the current sphere of Late Stage Barbarism, we will see high-level people taken out using this method. The concept was already used with one of the attempts to take out Nicholas Maduro of Venezuela, by flying a drone right at his head at the podium while he was making a speech. It was older technology, and he ducked. These days, that simple strategy will not work.
With the fast rise of robotics in China and the incredible development of military robotics, will we soon see a war fought with robots and drones? We already have robotic Olympics. Such a war, compared with other wars, is literally a cheap war. We saw in Gaza the IDF using cheap small drones, hanging ladders on them stuffed with explosives and dropping that onto buildings and people, doubling, tripling, and quadrupling the percussive and killing power, cheaply.
AI is often written about as a threat to humanity. Technology is, of course, generally neutral. It is the application that makes it evil or good. With AI, drones controlling drones in a stack of functions, and military robotics, we have truly landed in a dystopian reality, and Brain Rot is proceeding.
There is new research indicating that Large AI Language Models, fed by trivial and stupid internet chat, literally suffer from brain rot. The research is literally called LLM Brain Rot. These models become stupid and silly, and take on the characteristics of a stupid and foolish audience. Even when changing the input later, the models repair only slightly and remain dumb. Foolishness and stupidity are indeed transmissible diseases. We’re even infecting the software around us.
AIs with brain rot, drones controlling drones controlling more drones, and robotics: It is not only a new multipolarity; the sheer lineaments of our world are being shaken up. In terms of warfare, it is now clear that the one with the most effective drone technology, AI, and techniques will gain the edge for a win.
… it’s not so easy to escape from a war you started yourself, leaving your allies to fend for themselves.
By Rostislav Ishchenko at Ukraine.ru.
(machine translation)
We are currently facing a moment of truth: either Russia will be able to complete its military operation in Ukraine within the next three to five months with a victory that will be unassailable by even the most ardent domestic skeptics, or the danger of a global confrontation will increase dramatically. On the external front, criticism will always be present, and our achievements will always be subject to discrediting, as there will always be forces seeking revenge and continuing the global confrontation. The format of peace in Ukraine should not leave any chance for foreign revanchists to ignite a new conflict in the next 10-20 years (it is impossible to make realistic plans for a longer period under the current conditions).
Until recently, the pace and direction of the Russian Armed Forces’ offensive indicated their intention, under favorable conditions, to defeat the most combat-ready Ukrainian forces assembled in the area from Kharkov to Pokrovsk and reach the Kherson-Zaporozhye-Dnepropetrovsk-Pavlograd-Kharkov line, with the expectation that a catastrophe on the front and the loss of new territories would make both the Kiev regime and its Western allies more constructive, leading to a peace agreement that would leave Ukraine without Novorossiya and thus severely undermine its demographic and industrial mobilization capabilities. In general, Kiev could lose up to 10 regions that were part of Ukraine in 1991 (Crimea, Sevastopol, the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, which have already become part of Russia, as well as the Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkov, Nikolaiv, and Odesa regions, which still need to be liberated).
Given that Dmitry Medvedev had been much more radical about the scope of future territorial changes throughout the summer (not excluding the possibility of Ukraine’s complete elimination), Moscow clearly wanted to demonstrate to its “partners” that there was an influential group within the Russian leadership advocating a more aggressive peace plan that would exclude Kyiv from the negotiation process and establish peace directly with those Western countries that were willing to accept it. Ukraine and those Western countries that were unwilling to take a constructive stance would be the ones to pay for the peace.
Judging by the way events unfolded since the meeting in Anchorage, and the careful nature of the Russian leadership’s statements regarding a peaceful resolution, Trump agreed to at least attempt to follow this path. However, it soon became apparent that the United States lacked European allies in its readiness for a compromise peace with Russia. Europe, in general, and its leading countries, in particular, supported Zelensky’s uncompromising stance. After some hesitation, and under serious pressure from American supporters of a hard line on Russia, including several members of his own team, Trump abandoned the idea of a separate peace with Russia and moved on to a “no peace, no war” project, in which the United States does not directly participate in the European crisis, but also does not seek a global compromise with Russia. Washington agreed to sell all types of weapons to its European partners and withdrew from restraining the provocative nature of their policies towards Russia. The principle was “Let Europe fight Russia if they want, and the United States will benefit.”
But it’s not so easy to escape from a war you started yourself, leaving your allies to fend for themselves. The Europeans, taking advantage of the Americans’ statement that they are willing to sell any type of conventional weapons in any quantity, have demanded that Ukraine receive at least several hundred long-range missiles. While the official request is for Tomahawk missiles, it is more likely that Ukraine will receive less powerful but equally long-range missiles of other types. However, the transfer of a certain number of Tomahawks, at least for the purpose of testing them against Russian air defense systems in real large-scale combat operations, is also not ruled out.
The transfer of long-range missiles to Ukraine will raise the question of a Russian response. Despite Moscow’s attempts to avoid another escalation, a response targeting the military infrastructure of countries that have provided missile weapons to the Kiev regime would quickly become inevitable. In this regard, Poland is the most vulnerable country, as it is home to the main hub for the supply of Western weapons to Ukraine, and it is actively involved in lobbying for Kiev’s interests and disrupting any negotiations for a compromise peace with Russia. Additionally, Poland hosts American troops, including the Aegis missile defense system, which could potentially be used for both missile defense and Tomahawk missile launches. In any case, the use of Kalibr, Iskander, or Kinzhal against a NATO military facility on NATO territory would have raised the question of NATO’s response. The situation threatens to spiral out of political control.
Judging by the latest actions of the Russian Armed Forces, Moscow has decided to accelerate the operation to defeat and destroy the most combat-ready units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces as much as possible and to give it more profound and decisive goals. This is a kind of response to the deployment of missiles before it takes place, in order to make this provocation meaningless.
Experience tells us that if the transfer of a particular type of weapon has become the subject of public discussion, it means that the Kiev regime will have access to that weapon in the near future. Initially, in a few instances, and then in a more significant number. Therefore, the sooner there is no one to transfer the weapon, the better.
In recent weeks, the Russian Armed Forces have been launching increasingly powerful strikes on Ukraine’s energy and railway infrastructure. As a result, all major Ukrainian cities, from the eastern border to the Dnieper River, have been plunged into darkness. Ukraine has also stated that Russia is attempting to logistically isolate the entire Left Bank region, including the Chernihiv and Sumy regions. This isolation is being carried out both before and during the offensive operation to prevent the enemy from maneuvering forces and resources and transferring reserves and supplies from the rear to the front, or at least to severely limit such capabilities.
Since the Russian Armed Forces are already conducting an offensive operation on the left bank of the Dnieper River with decisive goals, the sharp increase in missile strikes on Ukrainian rear areas should indicate Russia’s attempt to accelerate the pace of the operation without increasing its own losses, by leveraging its advantage in production and the number of missiles and UAVs it has accumulated compared to the collective West supplying Ukraine. Russia’s actions to isolate the combat zone and significantly reduce Ukraine’s ability to promptly repair equipment and produce UAVs in “garage” settings are effective in the short and medium term. Then, if the enemy is still alive, they gradually find ways to overcome the crisis, while their own strike forces are depleted, their reserves need to be replenished, and the intensity of their strikes decreases.
It could be assumed that Moscow is simply trying to speed up the operation to defeat the Kharkov-Donbass group of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but the expansion of the geography of attacks on Kiev, Odessa, Chernihiv and Sumy suggests that while maintaining the previous goals of the operation, the maximum program is also considered as a minimum program: in case of successful development of the offensive, expand its geography to the limits of February- March 2022, to reach the Dnieper River along its entire course, if conditions allow, to occupy several strategic bridgeheads (the right bank of the Kherson region, the districts of Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye. Kremenchug and Kiev) and in the face of a full — scale catastrophe of the Ukrainian front, either dictate ultimatum peace terms to the Ukrainian authorities, or continue the pursuit of the APU further (possibly to the western border, but at least to the Zhytomyr-Vinnytsia line, which provides Russia with security from almost all types of non-strategic weapons in service with NATO).
Today, only the complete exclusion of Ukraine from the game on the Western side gives a fairly high, albeit not 100% chance, of avoiding the development of a Russia/NATO missile crisis, which will immediately acquire a partial global character in addition to its European nature. The acceleration of the operation against Ukraine is possible only through the maximum intensification of attacks on the rear: the maximum use of Russia’s air and space superiority, which will serve not only as an effective means of combating the Armed Forces of Ukraine but also as a demonstration and warning to Europeans who wish to wage war against Russia.
The window of opportunity for Russia is not wide open, but it is ajar, and it is into this gap that Russian missiles will have to fly in order to make it a gateway to a victorious world.
A documentary of the missilemen of Iran. “…. the one who finishes a War, is the one claimant of expertise.”
https://x.com/AryJeay/status/1974164482088996971
@Fotros Resistance (Arya – آریا):
Exclusive footages of Iran’s underground missile complexes during the 12-day war.
An IRGC member recalls how they operated inside the deep underground missile tunnels during the 12-day war.
He explains the tunnels were not damaged and everything inside was operational, the only issue was the entrance that sometimes got hit which would delay launches until it’d get dig out.
The tunnels in the footage displays Haj Qassem & Kheybar Shekan missiles.
The IRGC operators says the morale among the IRGC was very high and they did everything to not delay launches.
One of the IRGC members says at one time, an Israeli Hermes drone had hit one of the launchers that caused him to get injured on the spot, but got up and continued working to launch the rest of the missiles.
One of them rejected Israeli ridiculous claims about having bombed Iranian missile capabilities “to dust” and says we’re not even above the ground to bomb us to dust.
During a Pentagon briefing to congressional staff, U.S. officials failed to provide any proof that the boat destroyed in last week’s drone strike in the Caribbean belonged to Venezuela or that its crew were members of the Tren de Aragua gang.
Senator Jack Reed, the senior Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, confirmed after the briefing that the Pentagon had offered “no positive identification” of the vessel, its crew, or any cartel links. Officials also admitted they could not determine the boat’s destination.
While Trump insisted it was headed toward the United States, Secretary of State Marco Rubio later conceded the drugs were likely bound for Trinidad or elsewhere in the Caribbean—further undermining Washington’s shifting narrative.
According to those familiar with the meeting, the boat even turned back after apparently spotting a U.S. surveillance aircraft overhead.
Pentagon officials further admitted they had no intelligence that the crew were armed or represented a danger to U.S. forces.
As Reed made clear, there is “no evidence—none—that this strike was conducted in self-defense.”
This admission underscores the reality: Washington launched a lethal strike on a civilian vessel in international waters without proof, justification, or legal authority. For Venezuela, it highlights once again how the U.S. uses the pretext of “narco-terrorism” to carry out unilateral military actions in the Caribbean, violating sovereignty and destabilizing the region.
From nowhere comes the news that Polish airspace is full of Russian drones. Airports close, fighter jets are in the air, rhetoric spreads through all major news, while NATO calls for consultations. Photos of ‘downed Russian drones in Poland’ and missile fragments appear. The NATO Secretary General said fighter jets from four countries were involved in intercepting drones over Poland. According to Tusk, “three or four” drones were shot down.
Belarus stated that it shot down some drones at night, which were diverted from their course by electronic warfare actions.
“During the nighttime mutual exchange of strikes with unmanned aerial vehicles between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, the duty forces and air defense means of the Republic of Belarus constantly tracked drones that lost their course as a result of the electronic warfare measures of the parties.
Some of the lost drones were destroyed by the air defense forces of our country over the territory of the republic.
Through existing channels of interaction, from 23:00 on September 9 to 4:00 on September 10, our duty forces and means exchanged information about the air and radar situation with the duty forces and means of Poland and the Republic of Lithuania. This notified them of the approach of unknown aerial vehicles to the territory of their countries.
This allowed the Polish side to promptly respond to the drone actions by scrambling their duty forces into the air.
To be fair, it should be noted that the Polish side also informed the Belarusian duty combat crews about the approach of unidentified aerial vehicles from the territory of Ukraine to the border of the Republic of Belarus,” the Belarusian Ministry of Defense said.
Fragments of an AIM-120C-7 AMRAAM air-to-air missile were discovered in Poland. The missile was fired either by Dutch F-35s or Polish F-16s during the interception of “stray drones.”
Elena Panina from Russtrat.ru reports:
In the case of the “Russian drones in Poland,” what matters is not what happened — but why.
On the night of September 10, Warsaw reported “repeated” violations of Polish airspace by Russian UAVs and that those which allegedly posed an immediate threat were shot down by Polish air defense forces with NATO allies’ support (fighters, including Dutch F-35s, were scrambled). Airports were closed, debris reportedly hit a residential building in Vyryky, but there were no casualties. The total number of drones is being determined — Polish media mention figures ranging from 8 to 20 drones.
Amid the many statements flowing from Poland and its surroundings, clear outlines of what is happening emerge. It is most likely an element of a higher-order system.
Recently, discussions have intensified in Western circles about the negotiation process between Russia and the USA, which is expected to become a major problem for Euro-globalists. For many in the EU, especially Poland and the Baltic political diaspora in Brussels, the very idea of a “US-Russia deal” is perceived as a threat: Washington might try to “shift” the Ukrainian front onto Europe to focus on China. Therefore, the pro-European Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and figures like the head of EU diplomacy Kaja Kallas have a direct interest in blocking any hint of Moscow-Washington negotiations with a loud incident — particularly in the NATO sphere. This would put Trump “on the spot”: he would have to either ignore the incident, casting doubt on the entire idea of NATO’s “collective security,” or spoil relations with Moscow. Notably, the Polish president Karol Nawrocki, who is not inclined toward Ukrainophilia, has not made any loud statements so far.
The drone incident fits perfectly as such a trigger. It is small in scale: no casualties, no direct strike on a NATO military base. Yet it is quite loud: airport closures, interception by allies, damage to someone’s home. This creates the picture of “Russia violating the sovereignty of a NATO member country,” which will be impossible to ignore in Washington and Brussels.
So far, Tusk has requested consultations through NATO channels under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Although the alliance, as Reuters reported a few hours ago, has already stated that it does not consider the incident an attack by Russia.
Why does this look like an information operation? Similar cases of drone crashes in Poland or Romania previously passed quietly and were interpreted as unintentional accidents. Now the reaction is disproportionately louder: emergency meetings, talk of an “act of aggression,” public pushing of the idea of a “drone wall.” In other words, a technical incident is being turned into a political case designed to complicate any progress toward effective US-Russia negotiations.
Even judging by footage of drones resembling “Gerber” decoys, published by Polish media, the fact that the Russian Armed Forces have no serious intention to attack Poland is obvious. Primarily because Moscow does not need this at all. And if it did — there would not be just 8 drones, but 800.
—
No requests from Poland for contacts have been received by the Kremlin; any information about possible appeals is not true, Dmitry Peskov stated.
The press secretary of the Russian president noted that commenting on the incident is not within the Kremlin’s competence, while also noting that the leadership of the EU and NATO accuses Russia of provocations daily.
La Pologne a abattu plus de 20 drones au-dessus de son territoire dans la nuit. Le Premier ministre Donald Tusk
L’article La Pologne abat une vingtaine de drones au-dessus de son territoire avec l’aide de l’OTAN est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
Les concepteurs de nos bateaux de combat sans pilote peuvent être félicités : pour la première fois dans l’histoire de
L’article Pour la première fois, la Russie parvient à couler un grand bâtiment ukrainien avec un drone naval est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
Les forces armées russes ont lancé de nouvelles frappes de missiles sur des cibles à Kiev et dans sa banlieue.
L’article L’armée russe lance des frappes de missiles d’ampleur sur des cibles à Kiev est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
Les États-Unis s’apprêtent à accélérer considérablement l’utilisation de l’impression 3D à des fins militaires, notamment dans le domaine des systèmes
L’article Le Pentagone veut généraliser la production de drones par impression 3D sur le modèle russe est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
Le groupe Kalachnikov va fournir à la zone de l’opération militaire spéciale le drone modernisé « Kvazimatchta », capable de
L’article Le groupe Kalachnikov va fournir un drone capable de voler pendant 20 jours aux troupes russes est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
We often report on how the Russian SMO is proceeding, but seldom on the continual drone attacks from Ukraine into Russia. Civilians get injured and killed in these drone swarm attacks. This is last night:
122 Ukrainian drones were shot down over Russia overnight
During the period from 23:30 Moscow time on July 16 to 7:00 Moscow time on July 17, 122 Ukrainian UAVs were shot down over Russian territory, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense on Thursday, July 17, 2025.
The most drones were intercepted and destroyed over the Bryansk and Kursk regions – 43 and 38, respectively.
10 UAVs were shot down over the Oryol region, six over the Smolensk and Voronezh regions, and five over the Belgorod region.
Over the Moscow and Kaluga regions, the air defense forces on duty destroyed three drones each, over Crimea – also three, over the Leningrad and Lipetsk regions – two each. Over the territory of the Tula region, one UAV was shot down.
All the drones were aircraft-type.
Earlier it was reported that on the evening of July 16 Belgorod was struck by a UAV. “A civilian was killed. From the injuries received, the man died on the spot”, – the regional head Vyacheslav Gladkov pointed out. According to him, six people were wounded. All the victims were taken to hospitals. According to medical estimates, all are in a medium-degree condition.
43 UAVs – over the territory of the Bryansk region,
38 UAVs – over the territory of the Kursk region,
10 UAVs – over the territory of the Oryol region,
6 UAVs – over the territory of the Smolensk region,
6 UAVs – over the territory of the Voronezh region,
5 UAVs – over the territory of the Belgorod region,
3 UAVs – over the territory of the Moscow region,
3 UAVs – over the territory of the Kaluga region,
3 UAVs – over the territory of the Republic of Crimea,
2 UAVs – over the territory of the Leningrad region,
2 UAVs – over the territory of the Lipetsk region,
1 UAV – over the territory of the Tula region.
—
Partially from Profile.ru and translated with Yandex
Le 8 juillet, les forces armées ukrainiennes ont attaqué une plage paisible de Koursk avec des drones. Trois personnes ont
L’article Des drones ukrainiens attaquent une plage municipale en région de Koursk et tuent trois personnes est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
After direct aggression of the messianic West on herself, Iran blocked US-controlled GPS and switched to the more advanced Chinese BeiDou. This is more than a technologic paradigm change..
Those whose calculus of a US/Iran war assumes overwhelming American air superiority will abruptly find the parameters of their equations altered.
By William Schryver at imetatronink.
How soon people have forgotten that, earlier this year, the US dispatched two carrier strike groups and a half-dozen B-2s (and other USAF assets) to disarm the Yemeni and open the selectively blockaded Red Sea.
They failed. Abysmally. For the second time!
First of all, in 2024, the USS Brave Sir Robin (CVN-69), USS Teddy Bear (CVN-71), and USS Fraidy Abe (CVN-72) gave it a try, only to eventually run away with their tail between their legs. The Brave Sir Robin left behind an F/A-18 at the bottom of the sea.
They were followed up by the USS Trembling Puppy (CVN-75) and the USS Timid Vinny (CVN-70). But they fared no better, with the Trembling Puppy losing two additional F/A-18 fighters over the course of its traumatic tour of the northern Red Sea.
And, not only did the Yemeni increase their score of MQ-9 Reaper drones to 23, they also targeted and credibly threatened both F-35s and B-2s, such that both platforms were summarily withdrawn from the fight for fear of one getting shot down.
Remember, Yemen is absolutely the bottom rung on the escalatory ladder of formidable adversaries.
Anyone who seriously believes the US Navy can operate in Iranian waters is just plain delusional.
Even if no ships got damaged or sunk, they’d still run out of munitions in a couple weeks or less — and they sure as hell won’t be able to reload in Bahrain.
As for an air campaign … well, I have yet to see any persuasive evidence that US/Israeli aircraft penetrated Iranian airspace to any appreciable extent in Act I of this war. Consequently, I am dubious that Iranian medium- and long-range air defenses were even used.
There is also zero credible evidence of top-shelf Iranian air defenses being destroyed.
From all indications, the Iranians were shooting down Israel’s big strike drones with short-range AD. And they shot down several.
The Israeli long-range air-launched ballistic missiles were apparently effective, but they simply don’t have very many of them, and as the war progressed into its second week, we saw fewer and fewer of them with each passing day.
In any case, when Act II of this war gets started (and it won’t be long), it will almost certainly entail penetration of Iranian airspace. And we will see not only the emergence of Iranian long-range AD, but I strongly suspect Russian and/or Chinese mobile air defense systems will suddenly appear on the battlefield.
Those whose calculus of a US/Iran war assumes overwhelming American air superiority will abruptly find the parameters of their equations altered.
The Russians and Chinese are not going to stand idly by and watch the US smash up their important southwest Asia ally in the rapidly emerging multipolar world.
And keep in mind: the US simply cannot logistically sustain a high-intensity air campaign for more than 2-3 weeks. And if even a dozen or so manned US aircraft are shot down, and a couple ships severely damaged … well, that will cause such overwhelming consternation in Washington that it might even result in a coup d’état, or something closely approximating one.
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“US bases in Gulf which were once a first line of defense for the US and Israel have now proven to be 1st line of defense for Iran”
Part 1 of 3. The Anglo-Zionists’ military superiority is shattered. Their shields are even weaker than that of Iran. They’re all Big Fat Targets under endless waves of precision missiles and drones.
The myth of genocidal invincibility has been shattered forever .. that death cult in West Asia can indeed be mortally wounded .. TACO announced a one-sided ceasefire and fled .. There will be blood – over and over again.
By Pepe Escobar at the Strategic Culture Foundation.
In the end, predictably, the Circus Ringmaster went TACO (“Trump Always Chickens Out”).
He was terrified by three crucial reality-based developments.
The chain of events leading to the ceasefire remains murky.
A key accelerating factor was Putin’s personal meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi at the Kremlin on Monday.
Speaking on behalf of Ayatollah Khamenei, Araghchi may have asked for a solid supply of weapons and most of all defense systems; but these will take time, especially considering that the strategic partnership recently approved by both the Duma and the Majlis in Tehran is not – officially – a military alliance.
Yet according to sources in Moscow who were informed about the meeting, Putin did position Russia at the center of a possible resolution, thus displacing Washington. Team Trump 2.0 was incensed. Trump boasted that both Iran and Israel had called him almost simultaneously to arrange a ceasefire. Nonsense: only Tel Aviv did. As Putin made it clear, once again, that Russia would back Iran, he indirectly offered Trump an off-ramp.
True to character, the Circus Ringmaster jumped on it, marketing his own, branded ceasefire, reality show-style. And this only two days after gloating that the Iranian nuclear program was “obliterated” (he insists on it even as U.S. intel admits the program may have been set back for only a matter of months).
A supreme taboo has been broken
Iran has learned a few important lessons the hardest way, paying a horrendous price. Tehran was way too transparent and reasonable dealing with a bunch of gangsters: from allowing IAEA nuclear monitoring that turned out to be a process of amassing precious intel for Israeli targeting; and believing in diplomacy and honoring agreements that were unceremoniously ditched.
There’s no diplomacy when it comes to dealing with the imperial Leviathan/Behemoth – especially as it contemplates, in horror, its footprint being reduced all across the Global South.
Domestically though, Iran is going to the next level. There are at least three factions in confrontation: Ayatollah Khamenei and his close circle plus the IRGC; the reformists, embodied by the meek Pezeshkian presidency; and what could be construed as secular nationalists, who want a strong Iran but not as a theo-democracy.
The IRGC now has all the power. Defending the homeland against the deadly Zionist axis, Empire included, crystalized a widespread sentiment of national unity and pride.
All sectors of the Iranian population – 90 million, someone tell pathetic Marco Rubio – rallied around the flag.
Conceptually, the ceasefire – nobody knows how long it will last – is adverse to Iran, because its increasing deterrence capacity is now lost. Israel will have its air defenses feverishly replenished while Iran, alone, will need months and even years to rebuild.
The imperial modus operandi remains the same. The Circus Ringmaster saw that a monster humiliation was at hand –something like Israel’s Vietnam: so he announced a one-sided ceasefire and fled.
Yet the configuration for the next battles has changed. If Washington decides to escalate again, or resorts to the certified practice of using terror proxies, Iran as the de facto leader of the Resistance will resolutely counter-attack. The myth of genocidal invincibility has been shattered forever. The whole Global South has seen it, and now takes it in serious consideration.
It remains open to serious discussion whether Tehran will finally opt to follow a DPRK model to counteract the – failed, so far – imposition of a Libya and/or Syria model. Uranium enrichment will continue. With an added film noir plot twist: nobody knows where the uranium is.
The Empire of Chaos, predictably, will never stop. Only when the whole Global South unites with an iron will and force it to stop. The conditions are not in place – yet.
As it stands, the real ceasefire would be between the U.S. and the Global South, led institutionally by Russia-China, BRICS and several other multipolar organizations. The chance of the U.S. ruling classes honoring such a long-lasting ceasefire, if it ever happens, are less than zero.
As for the Iran-Israel ceasefire, that’s not the end of the war. On the contrary; it’s the – dubious – end of just the first hot battle. The dogs and hyenas of war will be back, sooner or later. There will be blood – over and over again. Yet at least a supreme taboo has been broken: that death cult in West Asia can indeed be mortally wounded.
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Iran, the West, and the Illusion of Choice. The war launched by the United States and Israel inflicted not only physical damage, but ideological clarity; Tehran is turning to a posture of permanent resistance.
By Elijah J. Magnier on Twitter (X).
Iran appears unwavering in its resolve to retaliate in the face of the ongoing U.S.-Israeli war. Following American strikes on its nuclear infrastructure, Iran’s Army Chief, General Abdolrahim Mousavi, delivered a stark warning: “Every time the United States has committed a crime against Iran, it has faced a decisive retaliation—and this time will be no different. We will fight with all our means to defend our independence, our unity, and the integrity of our ruling system. We are not fighting for survival — we are fighting for victory.”
More than twenty-four hours after the U.S. assault, Israel was struck by a missile targeting Haifa — an attack that slipped past its air defense systems without triggering a single siren or interceptor. The breach exposed a serious vulnerability in Israel’s defensive shield and underscored the gravity of the unfolding conflict. It also sent a clear message:
Tehran is not backing down.
Far from deterred, Iran appears ready to escalate with precision and intent. The Haifa strike was not an isolated incident; it was followed by a series of additional missile attacks. The Iranian missiles are forbidding the Israelis from returning to a normal life until it is satisfied to say the last word in this war, signalling Iran’s willingness to shape the terms of any future ceasefire on its own terms.
Meanwhile, Israel’s calls for de-escalation appear driven less by diplomacy than by tactical self-interest. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, far from bowing to pressure, is wary of deeper and potentially uncontrollable damage within Israel’s borders. With the U.S. having already targeted Iran’s nuclear sites and Iran proving its capacity to strike back — inflicting significant harm on Israeli cities — Netanyahu now seeks to freeze the conflict while claiming strategic victory. His aim is to end the war on his terms, with another party brokering a ceasefire, allowing him to retain political capital while keeping Israel’s military posture intact for future contingencies.
President Donald Trump played a central role in shaping this dynamic. His decision to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities ensured a quiet night for Israelis—an action widely celebrated across Israel, and particularly by Netanyahu. At the Knesset, American flags flew beside Israeli ones in a show of unity, while digital billboards in Tel Aviv thanked Trump for defending Israel. These public displays reflected not just gratitude but the deep strategic synchronization between the two leaders — Netanyahu and Trump — waging a war defined by deception, calculated surprise, and tightly coordinated military operations.
Further underscoring its defiance, Tehran has declared its intention to continue enriching uranium — directly challenging U.S. and Israeli claims that the Iranian nuclear program has been dismantled. The move signals not only resilience but a calculated rejection of the narrative that Iran’s strategic capabilities have been neutralized.
Moreover, any Iranian retaliation at this stage threatens to shatter Israel’s carefully crafted narrative of having reestablished deterrence against Tehran. Netanyahu now seeks to conclude his war on favourable terms, having claimed that his actions have fundamentally reshaped the Middle East—weakening Iran, isolating its allies, and advancing normalization with moderate Arab states.
His broader ambition appears to be the imposition of a new regional order in which Israel serves as the undisputed security arbiter — a self-appointed policeman with the authority to strike pre-emptively at any actor perceived as a threat. Netanyahu believes he has inflicted serious damage on the so-called “Shia Crescent”— the axis of resistance stretching from Tehran through Yemen, Baghdad, and Beirut — which has grown more formidable over the past two decades. He now seems equally determined to prevent the emergence of a rival Sunni coalition, potentially led by Turkey, a country he has repeatedly criticized for its growing influence in Syria. In Netanyahu’s vision, no regional force — Shia or Sunni — should be allowed to patrol, shape, or challenge the strategic architecture of the Middle East. That role, he believes, belongs solely to Israel.
Meanwhile, the U.S. bombing of Iran’s peaceful nuclear facilities — combined with what Tehran sees as unlawful declarations of war by both Washington and Tel Aviv — has only deepened Iran’s determination to build a more formidable deterrent.
Iran is now expected to accelerate development of its missile capabilities and may reconsider its participation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), potentially restricting international inspections conducted under United Nations oversight.
Beyond bolstering its internal defense, Tehran may also double down on its support for regional allies such as Yemen’s Ansar Allah and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, viewing them as vital pillars of strategic depth in the face of a hostile alliance.
Yet, Iran now faces a critical and immediate challenge: the reconstruction of its damaged nuclear and military infrastructure. To address this, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei may tap into off-budget institutions like Setad or draw from sovereign reserves such as the National Development Fund of Iran — estimated to hold tens of billions of dollars — to support rapid recovery. Though the exact sums remain unclear, these financial mechanisms offer Tehran flexibility in responding to wartime damage and rebuilding key strategic assets.
At the same time, Tehran is expected to deepen military and technological cooperation with key partners such as China and North Korea, accelerating efforts to rebuild and modernize its defense capabilities.
Meanwhile, Iran’s trust in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been deeply shaken — if not entirely eroded — by the silence of its Director, Rafael Grossi, following the U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.
Under the IAEA’s mandate, any attack on safeguarded sites should be unequivocally condemned, regardless of the political context.
Yet no such condemnation was issued. For Tehran, this omission signals not neutrality, but complicity. The agency’s failure to defend the integrity of civilian nuclear infrastructure has led Iranian officials to increasingly view the IAEA not as an impartial international body, but as an extension of U.S. and Israeli intelligence interests. In this context, continued cooperation with an institution perceived as politically compromised appears untenable.
The war has also exposed the alarming effectiveness of multiple espionage networks operating within Iran —many believed to have directly supported U.S. and Israeli military operations. These spy rings, some reportedly embedded in critical infrastructure and government institutions, played a decisive role in enabling the precision and coordination of the attacks. In response, Iran’s security and intelligence services are expected to launch a sweeping and uncompromising crackdown to dismantle these networks and seal internal vulnerabilities.
However, this intensified focus on counterintelligence is likely to come at a domestic cost: tighter surveillance, increased repression, and a contraction of civil liberties. In this wartime atmosphere, the balance between national security and personal freedom is already shifting decisively toward the former.
Sanctions, once framed as a tool of last resort, have become a default mechanism of Western policy toward Iran— regardless of who holds power in Tehran. They are no longer reactive but structural. Iran is sanctioned not for what it does, but for what it represents: an independent, resource-rich nation capable of projecting power beyond its borders, outside the Western sphere of influence.
In this context, sanctions serve a dual purpose. First, they aim to economically weaken Iran, constraining its ability to invest in domestic growth or regional influence. Second, they are designed to sow internal discontent —fueling protests, shortages, and public dissatisfaction. The strategy is simple: if Iran cannot be coerced into compliance, it can be pressured until it collapses or capitulates.
This approach reflects a broader regional logic — one that seeks to enforce a strategic imbalance across the Middle East.
The Israeli Exception
Nowhere is this imbalance more visible than in the contrasting treatment of Israel and other regional powers. Israel maintains a sophisticated military, a known (though undeclared) nuclear arsenal, and a history of extraterritorial operations that would provoke global condemnation if undertaken by any other state. Yet it faces little to no accountability. Its dominance is not only accepted — it is protected.
When Iran develops defensive capabilities, asserts deterrence, or supports regional allies, these actions are labelled as aggression. When Israel carries out assassinations, sabotage, or airstrikes in neighboring countries, these acts are broadly justified as self-defense. This double standard is not born of legal nuance — it stems from strategic favoritism.
Seen from this perspective, the conflict is not about behavior, but about status. Iran is not punished for its actions, but for what it dares to become: a counterweight. And no counterweight to Israeli hegemony is tolerable under the current U.S.-backed regional order.
The core issue is the West’s refusal to accept strategic parity in the Middle East. For decades, the United States and its allies have worked to ensure that only one power — Israel — enjoys overwhelming superiority in military, intelligence, and technological domains. Any actor that seeks to challenge that monopoly, whether Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Syria under the Assads, or even Turkey when asserting independent policy, is treated as a threat.
Iran is the most resilient of these challengers. It has survived a revolution, a devastating war with Iraq, decades of sanctions, cyberattacks, and assassinations. Despite this, it remains a regional actor with influence extending from the Gulf to the Mediterranean. For the existing power structure, that persistence is unacceptable. Thus, parity is not just denied — it is criminalized and bombed.
The consequences for Iran are profound. Sovereignty can no longer be assumed; it must be actively defended. And that defense is no longer limited to military doctrine — it is now a principle that governs economics, foreign relations, technology policy, and even cultural identity. In Tehran’s view, the rules are selectively applied and strategically weaponized.
While the global narrative often casts Iran as a disruptor, Tehran sees itself operating within a system that punishes moderation and rewards submission. If peace can only be purchased at the cost of strategic paralysis, then for many Iranian leaders, peace itself becomes a trap.
Sovereignty as Resistance
The war launched by the United States and Israel has inflicted not only physical damage, but ideological clarity. It has stripped away the last illusions that diplomacy or moderation could earn Iran a place of respect within the Western-dominated order. The belief that strategic restraint would be rewarded has collapsed under airstrikes, sanctions, and the silence of institutions tasked with upholding international law.
The lesson for Iran is unambiguous: sovereignty is not granted — it must be asserted, relentlessly. Denied parity and recognition, Tehran is turning to a posture of permanent resistance. Its future will be shaped not by appeals to the West, but by the pursuit of autonomy, strategic alliances, and hardened deterrence.
What Israel and its allies call deterrence; Iran now sees as provocation. What the West labels aggression, Iran views as survival. And in this asymmetrical war of narratives, one truth remains: as long as sovereignty is punished and power is monopolized, peace will not prevail — only a shifting and dangerous balance of confrontation.
Judge Nap interviews Alastair Crooke : Why Israel is to Blame
IRGC Statement on the Eighth Wave of Operation True Promise 3
Public Relations of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC):
Victory comes only from God, the Almighty, the All-Wise.
Public Relations of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
A cargo plane from Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport flies southwest over eastern Turkmenistan, descending as it approaches Iranian airspace. 15.06.2025
This is posted for the names of the Iranian missiles. Some people would like to have the details but for my purpose, I post this for the names, so that we know what they are using and when, and perhaps why.
Each of these have a video attached, with technical detail, if you go to the tread reader here: https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1933413639052276060.html?utm_campaign=topunroll
Patarames says he is an Open source (-only) military technology analyst on Iran, Middle East, Russia, China, North Korea, Israel. I have no idea of what his stance is and have not listened to any of the videos.
From GlobalSouth.co, I will not give any guarantees. At least I learned the names of the various missiles and drones.
—
A thread on which weapons will likely use for what targets:
1: Fattah-2
Maybe the best tool to take out ’s U.S. AN/TPY-2 radar, a key asset for missile defense
But not known to be operational
2: Khorramshahr-4
Unlikely to be used but among the best systems to directly strike the THAAD AN/TPY-2 radar and battery components.
It would also be a suited tool against the Arrow missile defense layers.
Use unlikely as Fattah-1 is available.
3: Fattah-1
Operational and suited for taking out missile defenses and their radars
Probably the missile most likely to be used at the very start of the OTP-III strikes
4: Qassem-e-Basir
The precision-strike variant of the Haj-Qassem ballistic missile
Quite new but a tool to take out hardened targets like aircraft shelters, hitting vulnerable spots utilizing its image seeker
5: Kheybar-Shekan
Probably THE key missile for the phases after the missile defense radars are taken out.
Kheybar-Shekan-2 on its own has good capabilities to hit missile defenses
KS-1 is suitable for phases where some missile defenses remain active
6: Haj-Qassem
A new Qasi-Ballistic-missile but a low-cost one suited for strikes on demand throughout all of Israel.
Would be its first use but a very likely candidate
7: Emad & Etemad
Probably the main missile to be used in OTP-III
Precision is lower than the other Iranian missiles, due to its high impact speed.
But heavy warhead makes it suited for large targets, of which there are plenty
8: Paveh cruise-missile
The second layer is Iran’s low-cost high-quantity cruise missile.
Faster than
drones, but much easier to hit than ballistic missiles
9: Shahed-136/-131 and their decoys
Worlds most famous one-way-attack drone
Keeps the opposing airforces busy, which is a key defeat mechanism
It can also hit targets if it comes through or the opposing airpower is degraded via other means
10: Dezful
Iran’s low-cost, compact, ballistic missile which can reach northern Israel
Very likely to be used this time
(first time)
11: Rezvan
This missile could cause the most damage, since its the lowest-cost missile Iran has that can reach all of Israel.
Quantity is probably amongst the highest and its difficult to intercept
12: Ghadr
Largely replaced by Emad and upgraded to a similar standard (added MaRV).
It was once Iran’s main missile against Israel
Its heavy sub-munition warhead variants are very likely to be used against Israeli airbases
13: Qiam & Jahad
Again a high-quantity, low-cost missile, maybe the highest quantity of all Iranian ballistic missiles
A weapon of choice for hitting northern Israel
14: Sejil
A candidate for a missile to be used shortly after the first attack phase
It’s a launch on demand asset to hit targets that have just been located
15: Khorramshahr-2
Iran’s heavy warhead missile.
At later escalation stages, its up to 2000kg submunition warhead would be used against Israeli airbases
Its use, like the Khorramshahr-4, depends on escalation stage reached
16: Shahab-3
Iran’s first Israel-range missile.
Largely stored and non-active, but if things escalate badly, this rather inaccurate missile could be used to hit Tel-Aviv
17: Zolfaghar
Can reach Israel only if launched from Iraq
But that’s a real possibility at this point
18: Sayyad, Arash etc.
Iran’s various types of low-cost, one-way-attack drones.
Less capable than Shahed-136, but very useful if opposing defenses are sufficiently degraded
En réponse aux bombardements massifs de ses installations nucléaires, l’Iran a attaqué Israël. Plus de 100 drones ont été utilisés,
L’article L’Iran riposte aux bombardements israéliens avec des vagues de drones est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
Le constructeur automobile français Renault envisage de lancer la production de drones en Ukraine, a rapporté la chaîne de télévision
L’article Renault prévoit de fabriquer des drones en Ukraine est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
D’abord les faits, tels qu’ils sont connus, puis les opinions personnelles Le 1er juin 2025 cinq aéroports russes – Olenya,
L’article Le Pearl Harbor russe est-il proche ? est apparu en premier sur STRATPOL.
America’s military humiliation: the Houthis exposed its waning power.
By Malcom Kyeyune at UnHerd.
When, in reaction to the war in Gaza, the Houthis of Yemen started imposing their blockade on the Red Sea, it was seen as a sure sign of waning American power: a global hegemon was allowing its control over a vital sea route to be contested. In their rush to fathom why this might be happening, detractors of the then president claimed he was simply too weak, too much of an appeaser to use the full width of America’s military might to quash the problem.
In fact, in response, Biden authorised not one but two military campaigns. The first was Operation Prosperity Guardian, which aimed to combine US naval power with a coalition of willing states to protect shipping and break the blockade. That fast turned into an embarrassing debacle, as most of the coalition partners walked away and ships kept getting hit by Houthi missiles. And so, in January 2024, Operation Poseidon Archer was launched, which involved British as well as American aircraft attempting to bomb the Houthis into submission. Here again, the operation was unsuccessful, doing almost nothing to dent Houthi attacks or open up the Red Sea to shipping. But even then Biden was blamed; the mighty US military was being held back somehow. Thus, the natural conclusion was that once Trump was in office, the gloves would come off.
Biden’s critics were actually half right. Once Trump came in, the gloves did come off. Operation Poseidon Archer was followed by Operation Rough Rider, in March of this year, which attempted to show a new, much more muscular American military response against Houthi targets in Yemen — for all of six weeks. For six weeks, US warplanes pounded Yemen around the clock, with rare and expensive stealth bombers flying missions out of Diego Garcia in support of carrier-based aircraft. Yet once those six weeks were up, Trump proudly announced that Yemen had “surrendered” and that there was no more need for the US to keep up the bombing. A ceasefire had been brokered by Oman. This was trumpeted as a glorious victory for the US military, with the Houthis finally promising to not attack US ships anymore, and America graciously returning the gesture.
Of course, Trump didn’t mention the terms of the “surrender”. The Houthis only had to stop attacking American ships in exchange for America stopping the bombing; they were free to continue blockading the Red Sea or firing missiles at Israel. America, in other words, had given the Houthis carte blanche to carry on the behaviour that was the reason America had gone to war in the first place. Thus, to call this deal a surrender was entirely appropriate; it’s just that it wasn’t the Houthis hoisting the white flag.
It is very commonplace to blame reversals and even defeats in America’s various wars of choice as merely a matter of lack of will. If America really wanted to win, it would win, the story goes; the failure of the US is just one where it never commits the force necessary to finish the fight. But today, that excuse rings hollow. Trump’s Operation Rough Rider, unlike Biden’s operations, utilised many of America’s most limited, expensive, and advanced weapons to try to bring the Houthis to heel. And still it surrendered. The lessons here are thus quite bleak. America’s preferred and increasingly only viable method of warfare — aerial warfare — is no longer cost-effective nor practical. But the US has no alternative modes of warfare to fall back on, which means that its days as a military hegemon are probably coming to a close.
To understand just how big a mess the air war against the Houthis has turned out to be, it’s important to understand a very basic rule to US military inventories. For while, on paper, America has 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, an impressive figure that far outstrips any other country on the planet, that top line figure is barely relevant in practice.
For comparison, look to the United Kingdom. The UK has two large aircraft carriers, putting it near the top of the international leaderboard when it comes to the ability to project military force. But as anyone with any familiarity with the Royal Navy can tell you, that number does not tell the real story. The number of carriers the UK can actually deploy is far lower, a number which is fairly close to zero. For while the ships exist, the Royal Navy lacks the crew, the planes, the escorts, and the logistical capacity to actually put them to use for any length of time in a real war. The UK Navy has become something of a Potemkin village, where superficial on-paper strengths hide a catastrophic reality of deferred maintenance, insufficient budgets, and lack of personnel.
Though the situation for the US Navy isn’t quite as dire, in practice, the problem is the same: it cannot realistically put more than two to four carriers to sea at any given moment. The ability to surge capacity in times of crisis is limited, because the various reserve components of the US armed forces have catastrophically atrophied. If you discount the American carriers that are slated for the scrapyard, or those currently lacking a functional nuclear reactor, or those which are tied up in deep maintenance, the number of active, usable carriers is roughly a third of the on-paper number. Half of those carriers were being used against the Houthis.
But carriers are not the only example we ought to look at. For Operation Rough Rider, the US Air Force contributed some six B-2 Spirit stealth bombers, arguably the most advanced (and by far the most expensive) airframe in the US arsenal. At first blush, this seems like only a fraction of America’s power, because it has some 20 such bombers in its inventory. But a closer look at these planes suggest that those six used in Rough Rider very likely represent the entire working inventory of US stealth bombers. Because B-2s haven’t been built for decades, the only way to keep them operational is to cannibalise other B-2s for spare parts: as a result, a large number have been functionally scrapped and cannot ever hope to fly again. Only half of US bombers even qualify for so-called “mission capable” status on an average day, a status which doesn’t actually mean that the plane works; it simply means the plane isn’t completely broken and inoperable. Only two thirds or fewer of those mission capable planes can hope to qualify for what the US military instead classifies as “full mission capable” status. “Full mission capable” is your standard Pentagon-speak; it means the plane is in working order, has nothing broken that’s really important, and can realistically be used for what it was built for.
From carriers to stealth bombers, the pattern here is fairly clear, and it is further corroborated by testimonies from inside the Pentagon itself. America essentially pulled out all the stops to attack the Houthis, waging an extremely expensive and intensive air war against a militia controlling most of Yemen, the fourth-poorest nation in the world. The cost to operate a B-2 stealth bomber is extremely high on a per-hour basis; and their fragile stealth coating is not particularly fond of the warm, salty sea air at Diego Garcia. You don’t send in all of them unless you really mean business. America also committed roughly half of its active carriers, spent a fortune in land attack and air defence missiles, and it even cannibalised ammo stores and air defence systems from the Pacific theatre of operations for the sake of the operation.
But as the stories of the campaign start leaking to the press, it’s clear that none of this effort did anything good. The US couldn’t establish air supremacy, meaning it couldn’t risk flying its older, non-stealth planes for fear of losing them. This itself might seem like proof that America was once again just not trying very hard; for what kind of war is it when you’re not ready to accept losses? But the problem is, America can’t afford to replace planes that get lost and pilots that get killed. This is not a problem of cowardice, but of force generation: even if the US military suffers zero losses due to enemy fire in the years ahead, it is still slated to shrink precipitously. This shrinkage and loss of capacity is just due to America’s planes and ships wearing out, with not enough workers, dockyards, engineers, and dollars to replace them. As America burns through its massive military inheritance bequeathed by Ronald Reagan and the Eighties arms race, there is no plan to replace it. For the US military, avoiding casualties is not a matter of caution or cowardice; it is the result of a total inability to replenish the force.
The result of this American Achilles’ heel has been an extremely expensive reliance — when it has come to defending the Red Sea — on so-called “standoff” weaponry; cruise missiles, for example, that can be launched from far enough away that anti-air fire won’t be a threat. But even then, there were problems: according to leaked reports, even the vaunted F-35 stealth fighter had to dodge incoming anti-air missiles on at least one occasion. In Operation Rough Rider, the US deployed many of its most rare and bespoke weapons, such as the AGM-158 JASSM (Joint Air-To-Surface Standoff Missile) as well as heavy, specialised bunker-buster bombs. Again, by all accounts, this had little effect. Partly, this was because the US kept losing so many of its MQ-9 reaper drones, which come with a price tag north of 30 million dollars apiece, and which were supposed to provide the intel to ensure the bombing campaign found its targets.
When Biden first lost interest in defending the Red Sea against the Houthis, people were aghast. Not doing enough was akin to telling the entire world that the US was too weak to keep the Suez channel open. But Trump, after berating his predecessor, has also walked away, and de facto recognised the Houthi’s control of the channel. It would seem that the US doesn’t actually have many cards to play.
Trump could have sent another carrier to the region in support of his operation, bringing the total up to three. But this would hardly have made much difference to the air campaign because the problem with this offensive wasn’t lack of deck space or fighter sorties — US planes were too wary to go anywhere near Yemen’s air defence, and even stealth jets were reportedly not entirely safe. The problem was the lack of standoff munitions which can be deployed from a point of relative safety. But these are so expensive and so limited that there is no budget to replenish them when stores are depleted (a single JASSM with a 450 kilogram explosive warhead comes in at slightly under a million dollars). Wargames show the US running out of most or all such critical munitions in a matter of weeks or even days in a real conflict against a peer enemy such as China.
Even worse, much of the US military’s most advanced weapons systems are dependent on components and materials such as rare earths from China, which has already started imposing harsh export restrictions in order to slowly choke the life out of the US military industrial complex. In practice, the US does not have the economy to produce the weapons used for aerial warfare at any sort of scale, and this has only been hidden from full view because the military has coasted along on an aura of invincibility.
As the appetite for ground warfare has waned, the allure of quick, cheap and easy air campaigns has grown. But air warfare is no longer what it once was. Operation Rough Rider was supposed to be a decisive show of force against an under-equipped, internally divided third-world nation. Instead, it ended up looking like the last hurrah of a truly antiquated form of warfare, unable to cope with cheaper and better anti-air weapon systems.
All of these limitations make the current talk about a new bombing campaign against Iran utterly surreal. Iran is far bigger than Yemen, with a much more robust air defence network. Moreover, the distances involved are such that carrier-based aircraft, even when launched from the very shores of the Persian gulf, can’t actually reach places like Tehran and return on a single tank of fuel. Fighter-bombers will need aerial refuelling over the Iranian interior, and tanker planes are slow, easy to spot on radar, and pretty much defenceless. Even attempting to destroy the Iranian air defence network will take huge amounts of precision standoff weaponry, which the US cannot practically replace, even if it weren’t struggling with a massive fiscal crisis and soaring bond yields. The critical parts of Iran’s nuclear programme are kept under hundreds of feet of solid mountain; the US, using the heaviest and most advanced weapons in its entire arsenal, did not succeed against the much shallower Houthi bunkers and missile storage facilities in Yemen. All of the problems that forced America’s tacit surrender of the Suez canal would be writ large — and be far more lethal — in any campaign against Iran.
With exploding deficits, a growing internal political crisis, and a slowly collapsing military, America is a leopard that lacks the wherewithal to even attempt to change its spots. The generals know that the jig is up: the old model is broken, there is no new model coming, and nobody has the energy left to do much about it all. And so, this massive crisis of US military power is playing out in the vein of Ernest Hemingway’s comment about the course of his own bankruptcy: gradually, then suddenly.
Once upon a time, there was always a bigger plane, a more advanced high-tech future weapon, yet another trick up the Air Force’s sleeve that you could point to in order to silence the doubters. But those days are over. The gravity of what happened in Yemen will only assert itself once the political class is ready to deal with the new world we are now living in: one in which the US has no new military rabbits to pull out of its hat, and those that it does have simply aren’t enough to get anywhere close to victory.
Malcom Kyeyune is a freelance writer living in Uppsala, Sweden
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Here’s a better translation of the IRGC’s response as the translator did a poor job imo:
Our battle with the US and the… https://t.co/MJfjWNUu3n pic.twitter.com/yBtLuaMcDs
— Arya – آریا (@AryJeay) May 5, 2025
— Azadar Hussain (@Azadar04) May 4, 2025
@Fotros Resistance:
— Journalist Pepe Escobar asked the IRGC General responsible for the Missile exhibition why True Promise-3 did not happen as the US & Tel Aviv saw this move as weak. Why did it not happen and will it happen?
(My translation as the translator did a poor job)
| IRGC General: I personally do not have any official responsibility to answer this question, but for the sake of clarification, let me tell you this:
Our battle with the US and the Zionist regime did not just begin, and it will not end anytime soon. The tactics we choose for this prolonged confrontation are based on our own conditions, and no outside (foreign) interpretation will influence them.
We are the soldiers of our Leader. As he has said: “We will neither delay, nor rush.”
General Hajizadeh also stated that the operation will be carried out at the right time. Any other claims are just external noise.
As we’ve demonstrated up to now, we have never retreated — not from our rights, and not from our red lines. I’m not in a position to say if TP3 is ready or not, for that the responsibility lies with those in charge, namely the General Staff of the Armed Forces, who will make that call.
Whenever the time comes, they will notify us — and by “us,” I mean the Armed Forces & the Aerospace Division. |link|
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